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non, Cas. (Tenn.) 508, and Colbert v. Bond (1903) 110 Tenn. 376, 75 S. W. 1061, wherein, the Washington court. said, the judges were regarded as state officers alone.

It was held in Campbell County v. Newport (1917) 174 Ky. 712, L.R.A. 1917D, 791, 193 S. W. 1, that while, under Ky. Const. § 181a, the legislature may authorize the fiscal court of a county to raise by a special tax imposed upon the property in the county, or to appropriate out of its general funds raised by county taxation, a sum sufficient to defray the expenses of a county juvenile court (described as "a county institution, the county having full control and supervision of all matters connected with it"), and may authorize the establishment of a juvenile court by city authorities, and give the city the right to raise by a special tax imposed upon the property in the city, or appropriate out of its general funds raised by the taxation, such a sum as may be necessary to defray the expenses of the court, if it was under the control of the city authorities, the legislature could not authorize a county to establish and maintain such a court and require cities within its borders to pay, out of funds raised by such cities for city purposes, one half of the expenses incurred by the county in the conduct of the court. The court said that such an investiture of power in the county would be the equivalent of authorizing the county authorities to tax city property for county purposes; and since. if the county paid the expense out of its general fund (as the statute authorized it to do in the event that the special tax was not levied), the city property-paying taxes into that fund-would already have been taxed therefor; and if the city property was taxed to pay one half of the amount spent out of the general fund of the county, it would be taxed twice for the same purpose. In this connection the court said: "The legislature, as we have said, has authority to provide for the establishment of juvenile courts in the county and the creation of probation officers to perform the duties incident to these courts, as well as to

place in the hands of the county authorities the right to control the court, appoint the officers, fix their salaries, and levy a tax upon the property in the county to defray the expenses of the court and its officials. When this is done the property in the city must, of course, bear its equal share of the expense and burden, in connection with property in other parts of the county. The legislature might, also, if it saw proper to so do, provide, as we have said, for juvenile courts and probation officers to be appointed by city authorities, and paid by special tax levied on the property in the city. But the legislature cannot, as we think, empower the fiscal court with authority to subject the property in the city to a special and extra tax for the purpose of defraying the expenses of a juvenile court that is purely a county institution, after the property in the city has once paid its fair share of the tax necessary to the conduct of this court.”

14. Support of or aid to military forces.

As to whether the erection of a monument to the soldiers and sailors of the late war is a corporate purpose, see Hill v. Roberts (1919) 142 Tenn. 215, 217 S. W. 826, set out infra, III. c.

As to the constitutionality of statutes requiring counties to support state Militia under constitutional provisions not within the scope of the annotation, see State ex rel. Long v. Brinkman (1893) 3 Ohio C. D. 710; Wilder v. Daniels (1895) 53 Ohio St. 658, 44 N. E. 1150; Bryant v. Palmer (1897) 152 N. Y. 412, 46 N. E. 851. See also State ex rel. Sutherland v. Nye (1895) 23 Nev. 99, 42 Pac. 866.

One view is that, where the state troops aid a county in enforcing the law and order within its borders, financial aid to them is a county purpose. Rushton v. State (1918) 75 Fla. 424, 78 So. 345.

The Florida supreme court held in State ex rel. Milton v. Dickenson (1902) 44 Fla. 623, 60 L.R.A. 539, 33 So. 514, 1 Ann. Cas. 122, that the state Militia, being an arm of the state government, was in no sense such a county institution or establishment that any particular county could, ex

clusively, be required to impose taxes for any part of its maintenance, and that a statute requiring each county in which there a state troop was organized to provide an armory or armories therefor was unconstitu

tional and void.

But the case was later distinguished by the court, and its holding so limited as to render nugatory its practical effect. A special local law authorizing a county, upon stated conditions, to issue bonds and levy taxes to pay the principal and interest thereof, for the purpose of erecting and equipping an armory to be used, in whole or in part, for the state Militia, in the county, "upon such terms and conditions and with such limitation or reservation of the use of said armory, . . . as may by said board of county commissioners be determined to be for the best interests of said county," was held in Jordan v. Duval County (1914) 68 Fla. 48, 66 So. 298, not beyond all reasonable doubt to violate Fla. Const. art. 9, § 5, limiting taxation by counties to the field of county purposes.

In Kentucky the state Militia is essentially and exclusively a state institution, with no county receiving any special benefits so as to make taxation for the support or encouragement thereof a "county purpose," within Ky. Const. articles 181 and 181a. Com. ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Sparks (1923) 201 Ky. 5, 255 S. W. 859. In this case the court said that the Militia serves all the counties of the state alike, and the local community does not receive even the remote and incidental special benefit of an increase in its population because of the organization of a military company (the members already being localized to the place), nor on any other account.

The Washington court said, in State ex rel. Pierce County v. Clausen (1917) 95 Wash. 214, 163 Pac. 744, that it held, in Terry v. King County (1906) 43 Wash. 61, 86 Pac. 210, 9 Ann. Cas. 1170, an act "authorizing the counties of King, Pierce, and Spokane to create an indebtedness for the purpose of acquiring sites for and the construction of state armories to fall within the constitutional inhibi

tion of a special act creating corporate powers. The opinion is not based upon the holding that the construction of state armories is a corporate purpose because the subject of the act is a state armory, but seems to rest upon the theory that the act confers new powers and privileges not theretofore conferred and not extended to any other county in the state, and hence the act was special. The only contention presented by appellant in that case was that, inasmuch as these three counties were already empowered to issue and sell bonds, which power was asserted to be a corporate power, no new power was conferred in providing for the issuance of armory bonds. No comment was made by either counsel or court as to any distinction between governmental and corporate powers, and the case seems to have progressed upon a mutual concession that the power dealt with was à corporate power. As we now view it, we would not now hold that building an armory was exercising corporate powers for purely county purposes. It seems to us that the building of an armory falls within those higher and sovereign powers which the state exercises for the protection and welfare of all its citizens, and that among the governmental powers exercised by a sovereign state there are none higher than those which it exercises for the public safety and general welfare of the state. These views were neither urged upon nor considered by the court in the Terry Case, and we cannot, for this reason, regard that case as in any wise controlling upon questions calling for the expression of an opinion as to the extent to which the state may go in exercising its sovereign governmental powers for the benefit of all its citizens, and imposing the burdens of that power upon any of its political subdivisions in the discharge of the duty that the political subdivision owes to the state, to contribute to its public safety and general welfare." The right of the state to compel a county to issue $2,000,000 of bonds to buy a site for an army mobilization camp to be given to the Federal government was upheld under Wash.

Const. art. 11, § 12, that being a state purpose of taxation, and not a local corporate purpose. This holding was made after a valuable examination of the authorities on the point, which the court said sustained the proposition that "the legislature may impose upon a county the full burden of an indebtedness for a purpose which, though of a general nature and for the benefit of the whole people, combines with those others that are essentially a special benefit to the county." In conclusion the court said of the act assailed: "While the mobilization and training of the Federal soldiery to aid in the suppression of insurrection or the repelling of invasion is in a sense a duty of the Federal government, it is likewise a state duty to which the state may be called upon to contribute its aid. The mobilization and training of a state Militia may be a state purpose, but it is likewise a public purpose to which every political subdivision of the state may be called upon to contribute to the full extent of its power and ability. So that, whether we regard the duty of the state to aid the Federal government as a state purpose, or the duty of mobilizing and training state Militia and other like military organizations as a state purpose, the state, acting through its legislature, is fully empowered to distribute this burden to its political subdivisions as the legislative body may determine. Upon the feature of local benefit, there would seem to be no question. We have no doubt that the people of Pierce county are as patriotic as the people of any county in the state, and would tax themselves to any extent to aid either the Federal government or the state in matters of military necessity; but we also know that the people of Pierce county, in subjecting themselves to the burden. of this tax, considered the local benefit to them in having this station located within Pierce county,-a benefit which they deemed equal to the burden entailed,-and because of this they are willing to assume the entire burden. We have, then, an expression from the legislature, from the county commissioners, and from the people

themselves, that the purposes enumerated in chapter 3 are not only state purposes of the highest sovereign character, carrying the right to exercise the taxing power for its accomplishment, but that they embrace and carry with them local benefits of such a nature that, irrespective of any question of duty, the people have willingly assumed the burden as one that carries its own recompense."

Under a broad construction of Ill. Const. 1848, art. 9, § 5, a tax to pay bounties to persons who should thereafter enlist or be drafted into the Federal Army in the Civil War, which the towns in certain Illinois counties were authorized by an act to levy if the qualified voters approved the law, -the object being to secure volunteers, was held a tax for a corporate purpose, in Taylor V. Thompson (1866) 42 III. 9.

A tax by a county for a similar purpose was held not distinguishable in Henderson v. Lagow (1866) 42 III. 360, and the Thompson Case (Ill.) supra, was followed.

While it has been said by the Illinois court that it "went far enough" in holding the purpose involved in Taylor v. Thompson (Ill.) supra, the holding has been followed. Briscoe v. Allison (1867) 43 Ill. 291; Misner v. Bullard See also Johnson

(1867) 43 Ill. 470. v. Campbell (1868) 49 Ill. 316, as showing that municipalities frequently exercised the taxing power for this purpose.

The case of Livingston County v. Weider (1872) 64 Ill. 427, supra, was discussed in People ex rel. Cairo & St. L. R. Co. v. Dupuyt (1874) 71 Ill. 651, where it was said that the court in the earlier case was of opinion that a tax levied for the purpose of saving a community from the evils inseparable from a draft might be fairly considered a tax for the common good of the municipality, and therefore a legitmate corporate purpose, but that in that case a vote of the people authorizing the tax was first to be taken, and the people did vote the tax. This was said to have been an important fact in determining the case, and it was further, said, with emphasis, that the

court went far enough in upholding the tax there considered.

15. Miscellaneous functions pertaining to the general government.

It seems indisputable that where the legislature is by the state Constitution inhibited from imposing taxes upon counties, or the inhabitants or property thereof, for county purposes, it may lawfully impose upon the several counties of the state the duty of providing for and paying the necessary expenses in connection with the enforcement of the state penal laws, and for state elections. See supra, III. b, 13. See also 14 Columbia L. Rev. 407.

The assessment and collection of taxes for the payment of the expenses incurred by election commissioners in the conduct of elections (which Chicago was required by an act to pay-office rent, clerk hire, stationery, ballot boxes, etc.) was declared in Wetherell v. Devine (1886) 116 III. 631, 6 N. E. 24, to be for a purpose germane to the object for which municipal corporations are created, and also tending to promote the general welfare and prosperity of the municipality, and therefore a corporate purpose of taxation and within the taxing power of the city, not being affected by the fact that some of the elections occurring in the city were for other than city officers. But it was held not an imposition of taxes by the legislature for such purpose as prohibited by §§ 9 and 10 of Const. art. 9, since the people of the city adopted the law by a vote, and thereby "consented to be taxed for the purpose." In so holding the court said:

"Municipal corporations are bodies politic and corporate, established by law, to share in the civil government of the country, but chiefly to regulate and administer the local or internal affairs of the city, town or district, which is incorporated.' 1 Dill. Mun. Corp. § 9b. A municipal corporation cannot share in the civil government of the country, nor regulate and administer its internal affairs, except through its officers. Its chief officers are elected by the people. The cities in this state, which have adopted the general act for the

incorporation of cities and villages, are under charters which provide for the election of aldermen, mayors, city clerks, city attorneys, and city treasurers. The conduct of elections is, therefore, a purpose which is germane to the object for which municipal corporations are created. Elections certainly have a legitimate connection with that object, and a manifest relation thereto. For the government of municipal corporations cannot be carried on, except through the action of official agents, the chief of whom become such solely through the medium of elections. Nor can it be denied that the proper conduct of elections tends to 'promote the general prosperity and welfare of the municipality.' It does not affect the corporate character of the purpose that some of the elections occurring in the city may be for other than city officers. The city is a part of the county and a part of the state, and its welfare depends, in no small degree, upon the character of the officers who conduct the county and state governments."

Advertent to all the provisions of the Kentucky Constitution relating to the preservation of the right of local self-government, the court of appeals of Kentucky held that the matter of equalizing tax assessments, whether between individuals, classes, or counties, is not purely or at all a local matter, but is one in which the state and every citizen thereof are directly and vitally interested, and that, therefore, no question of local self-government was involved in the action of the state tax commission in equalizing a taxpayer's assessment with the assessment of all other citizens of the state for state revenue purposes. Johnson v. Fordson Coal Co. (1926) 213 Ky. 445, 281 S. W. 472.

The expense of registering voters being but a part of the expense of holding elections in counties and cities, it was held not such a local purpose as the legislature of Missouri is inhibited by Mo. Const. art. 10, § 10, from imposing taxes. State ex rel. Faxon v. Owsley (1894) 122 Mo. 68, 26 S. W. 659. The expense of holding all elections, not only for local but for

state and national officers, and for other state purposes, has always been one of the purposes the expense of which the legislature has required counties and other municipalities to bear; it was so from the beginning of the state government and at the time the constitutional provision was adopted. Ibid. The tax for the expense of registering voters was regarded by the court as a local tax, as distinguished from a state tax, since, as the court said, "it is levied and collected by the local authorities only upon the property within the particular municipality, and can be uniform only within the territorial limits of the municipality by whose authorities it is levied and collected." But the court said that counties and other municipalities had always been required by the legislature to impose some local taxes, mentioning, in addition to the purpose involved in the case, maintaining public schools, constructing and keeping in repair public roads and bridges, supporting the poor and insane within their limits, providing courthouses in which the courts of the state may be held, and the expense of holding them, and the administration of the general laws of the state.

The constitutional power of the legislature of Missouri to require a tax to be levied by city authorities to pay the expenses of elections was reaffirmed in State ex rel. Lynn v. Board of Education (1897) 141 Mo. 49, 41 S. W. 924, in which case the court said that the rule extends to all elections, national, state, and municipal. The election costs involved in the case were those required by a legislative act to be paid by the city of St. Louis for school directors of the city.

The compulsory duty imposed upon municipalities of paying for the auditing of the books of corporate officers by state auditors out of the general expense fund of the taxing districts (being a part of an act of the legislature to provide for the creation of a bureau for the purpose of requiring the ministerial duties imposed on public officers by state laws and local orders, ordinances, etc., to be performed in a uniform and systematic manner,

and providing for an examination of the public officers under state authority to determine whether the state laws and local orders, etc., have been carried out as required by law) was held in State ex rel. Clausen v. Burr (1911) 65 Wash. 524, 118 Pac. 639, not in contravention of Wash. Const. art. 11, § 12, which prohibits legislature from imposing taxes upon counties, cities, etc., for county, city or other municipal purposes, the demand of the state for the money being held not to be for county, city, town, or other municipal purposes, in the sense in which the language is used in the Constitution; that is, for the ordinary purposes for which taxes are levied by municipalities.

The court, in the Burr Case, in support of its conclusion, quoted an authority to the effect that no local community has any inherent right to decide for itself whether it will, or will not, bear its share of the state burdens, and that the state obviously could not afford to confer the right on local communities, and continued to say that the distinguishing idea is that, in matters which do not concern the inhabitants of the municipality alone, the municipalities act as agencies for the state and can be compelled to carry out the scheme of the state looking towards good government. Two members of the court dissented, thinking that, since the examiners were state officers, they should be paid out of state funds.

A provision saddling upon a county the duty of paying the salary of a fruit-tree inspector and his deputies, under an act requiring counties to employ such inspector, was held in State ex rel. Wright v. Standford (1901) 24 Utah, 148, 66 Pac. 1061, to be unconstitutional and void as being an attempt on the part of the legislature to invest in others than the corporate authorities of the county the power to involve the county in debt. The inspection of fruit trees within. counties was treated as being a county purpose of taxation within Utah Const. art. 13, § 5, for which the legislature could not compel the counties

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