of the state to bear the expense of supporting inspectors.

An act requiring counties of the state to collect a $5 poll tax on competent persons between the ages of twenty-one and fifty years residing in their limits, four fifths of the revenue to be remitted to the state treasury and one fifth to be kept by the county treasuries for their current expense funds, was upheld in Nipges v. Thornton (1922) 119 Wash. 464, 206 Pac. 17, over the contention that it was an imposition of a tax by the legislature upon the inhabitants of counties for county purposes (i. e., the one fifth to be kept), and therefore in contravention of Wash. Const. art. 11, § 12. The court thought it was the legislative intent that the fifth to be retained should reimburse the counties for the expense they would be put to in collecting the tax, and saw no objection to that course of action.

An act of the Washington legislature (Laws 1903, chap. 186, p. 393) providing in substance that, upon the signing of a petition by 15 per cent of the qualified voters of any city for an election for a vote upon amendments to the city charter, an election should be held, was attacked in Hindman v. Boyd (1906) 42 Wash. 17, 84 Pac. 609, as being a legislative compulsion upon cities to incur a debt for corporate purposes (the expense of the election) in violation of Wash. Const. art. 11, § 12, and as vesting in others than the corporate authorities the power to create a debt or impose a tax. The court very properly refused to take this view of the act, pointing out that the people of cities had under the Constitution the right to amend their city charters, that the matter was subject to general laws, and that the act in question merely provided a method by which the charters might be amended, such a method being necessary. In so holding, the court said: "We think the constitutional provision invoked by appellants must be held to relate to the imposition of taxes concerning ordinary corporate affairs incidental to the existence of the organized corporation. To hold that it relates also to the expense of

an amendment to the organic law of the city would place it within the power of the corporate authorities to perpetually prevent the people from exercising a fundamental power. The power resides with the people, its exercise may be in the manner provided by general laws, and the expense thereof is not necessarily at the will of the corporate authorities, as in the case of ordinary obligations incurred by the corporate government."

16. Financial aid to railroads.

The Tennessee cases dealing with the question whether municipal aid to railroad companies is a corporate purpose within the Tennessee Constitution are covered in III. c, infra.

See infra, III. b, 17, for the cases generally on the question whether it is a corporate purpose of taxation for a municipality to render financial aid to a private enterprise.

It will be recalled that in the last century, during the time that the railroad systems were being opened throughout the country, there was a general feeling prevalent that prosperity followed the railroads. Acting upon this hypothesis, a great many municipal corporations-cities, counties, school districts, etc.-attempted in one way or another to aid in the building of railroads to promote the general economic welfare of their inhabitants. So, the question was presented in a multitude of cases whether aid could be given, and under what restrictions. The following subdivision includes only those which expressly consider the question whether aiding in the building of a railroad. is a corporate purpose within the meaning of a constitutional provision limiting the power of the legislature in respect of municipal taxation for municipal purposes, or limiting the power of municipalities to tax for such purposes, and does not include the innumerable cases involving other questions of the constitutionality of attempted subscriptions to the stock of corporations or the validity of the subscription, etc.

As noted supra, III. a, one criterion of whether or not an object of taxation

is for a corporate or municipal purpose is whether it is designed to promote the general welfare of the inhabitants and property owners of the municipality. Under the view that any such object of taxation is a corporate purpose, it has been decided in not a few cases that it is a corporate purpose of municipal taxation for a municipality to subscribe stock in a railroad within or without the town, city, or county, where the promotion of the enterprise is well calculated to promote the economic and general welfare of the inhabitants and property

owners.

The proposition was established in Illinois by the following cases: Johnson v. Stark County (1860) 24 Ill. 75; Perkins v. Lewis (1860) 24 Ill. 208; Butler v. Dunham (1861) 27 Ill. 474; Keithsburg v. Frick (1864) 34 III. 405; Marshall v. Silliman (1871) 61 Ill. 218; Decker v. Hughes (1873) 68 Ill. 33; Quincy, M. & P. R. Co. v. Morris (1877) 84 Ill. 411; Hensley Twp. v. People (1877) 84 Ill. 544; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Aurora (1881) 99 III. 205.

To aid in the building of a railroad is a public purpose, said the Supreme Court of the United States in one case, and "being for the general welfare of the ordinary municipal corporations, such as counties, cities, and towns, through which the road is to pass, is a corporate purpose, within the meaning of a constitutional provision vesting in the legislature power to authorize municipal corporations to assess and collect taxes 'for corporate purposes.'" Folsom v. Township Ninety Six (1895) 159 U. S. 611, 40 L. ed. 278, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 174-citing a number of cases in support of the statement, some of which are in point and stated elsewhere in this subdivision.

The Florida court held in Cotten v. Leon County (1856) 6 Fla. 610, that the issuance of bonds in exchange for stock of a railroad proposed to be constructed into or through the county of Leon, authorized by an act of the legislature, constituted a "county purpose," and not in contravention of a provision of the Constitution, then in effect, similar to that of art. 9, § 5, of the

present Constitution. Dupont, J., said that no certain rule can be prescribed by which to determine whether a work of internal improvement shall be deemed to be embraced within the meaning of the phrase "county purpose," as used in the Constitution, and that neither the locality of the work within the county, nor the anticipated benefit to be derived by the county, is of itself a certain test; but that, if furnishing a general rule, the concurrence of the two would seem to be required.

One view that has found expression is that such public or municipal corporations as are created for the general purpose of developing the community and promoting its welfare may be required or authorized to levy taxes, or the legislature itself may impose taxes, for the purpose of building a railroad reasonably necessary to establish communications with other points. Such corporations have the power to establish, improve, and control public highways and streets, and the legislature may confer upon them the power to assess and collect taxes for purposes intimately connected with their organization and essentially conducive to their existence, and their advancement from a new and sparse settlement to a progressive civilization. They must keep pace with the onward and rapid progress around them, and secure the means of communication with the markets of the world. Without this they would perish, and the object of their formation would be thwarted. In this view alone have the courts been enabled to sustain laws which have allowed such municipal corporations to grant aid to railroads. With the progress of society, the growth of population, and the improvement in the arts and machinery, there has been a vast increase in our commodities. Thus, an absolute necessity has been created for the interchange of products and for a safe, cheap, and speedy transit. A state, and consequently counties, townships, and cities, which are its general parts, cannot exist without improved highways. As railroads are but improved highways, over which

the public at large have a right of passage, there is great plausibility, if not strict propriety, in assuming that the corporations mentioned may properly aid in their construction, and that taxes, thus applied, are for corporate purposes. See Trustees of Schools v. People (1872) 63 Ill. 299.

A county may be invested by the legislature with the power to subscribe to the stock of a railroad, without violating South Carolina Const. art. 9, § 8. State ex rel. Brown v. Chester & L. N. G. R. Co. (1880) 13 S. C. 290.

See supra, II. b, 4, the case of Floyd v. Perrin (S. C.) and the line of cases following it, as to whether subscriptions to stock in railroads by certain special taxing districts was a corporate purpose.

Parish and municipal aid to railroad enterprises by way of donations was provided for in a different article (242) of the Louisiana Constitution of 1879, from the provision (art. 202) by which the taxing power of such parishes and municipalities with reference to local affairs was stated. See art. 202, construed, in connection with an application of art. 242, in Vicksburg, S. & P. R. Co. v. Traylor (1901) 104 La. 284, 29 So. 141.

With respect to special taxes authorized by La. Const. art. 242, to be imposed upon the property within parishes by the authorities in aid of railroads thereof under legislative authority, and with the (required) sanction of a majority vote of the property taxpayers within the parishes, the court in Vicksburg, S. & P. R. Co. v. Traylor (La.) supra, said the taxes owed "their origin to a different source, through an entirely different process from that of the general taxes, voted for and levied by the police jury [the parish authorities] acting as a legislative body," and continued: "They not only differ from the general taxes in these respects, but the object to which the money levied by such taxation is to be applied is different. It is no part of the governmental duty of police juries to construct railroads, as it is to build a courthouse or a jail, or to contruct bridges. A courthouse,

a jail, or a bridge, when built, remains in kind and becomes the property of the parish. . . . While the amounts levied for that purpose [railroads] are in the nature of taxes, inasmuch as they are imposed, to some extent at least, under governmental authority, they are not taxes in the sense which that term bears with reference to strictly governmental taxes. They are contributions to the attainment of a certain purpose, but removed from being strictly donations by reason of their partially compulsory character. They are contributions made in invitum under constitutional authority based upon presumed benefits to be received." Fullilove v. Bossier Parish (1899) 51 La. Ann. 359, 25 So. 302, is a case to substantially the same effect.

Illinois cities were held to have the power to take subscriptions to the stock of railroads, to encourage their construction through or to them, that being held a corporate purpose of taxation. Cairo & St. L. R. Co. v. Sparta (1875) 77 Ill. 505.

It was held in Johnson v. Stark County (1860) 24 Ill. 75, that aiding in the construction of a railroad through a county by subscribing to stock in it was a legitimate county purpose within the meaning of Ill. Const. art. 9, § 5, and that a county of the state could, therefore, be authorized by the legislature to levy taxes to pay for the stock subscription. The reason of the decision is stated thus by the court: Common highways, turnpike roads, toll bridges, and improvements of that character, and for which taxes may be imposed, have been held to be for a county purpose, and have been so regarded in numerous cases where the power has never been questioned. Then, if a common highway, a turnpike road, or a toll bridge be a county purpose which authorizes municipal corporations to become shareholders to aid in their construction, no reason is perceived why a railroad is not such a county purpose. It has for its object the same purposes that are attained by the others.

It was said in Quincy, M. & P. R. Co. v. Morris (1877) 84 Ill. 417, that

the theory upon which the Illinois cases held that a municipal debt created for the construction of a railroad was for a corporate purpose was that "the trade and commerce of the municipality is increased, property is enhanced [in value], and the general prosperity and welfare of the entire municipality are promoted."

Under the view that any distinction between the appropriation of money by a municipality as a donation to and subscription to the stock in a railroad to be constructed through it was "more apparent than real," and "entirely shadowy," the supreme court of Illinois held a levy of taxes by a town to apply to such an appropriation was for a corporate purpose, within Ill. Const. 1848, art. 9, § 5. Chicago, D. & V. R. Co. v. Smith (1871) 62 III. 268, 14 Am. Rep. 99, where the court said that if the appropriation was for a public purpose for the benefit of the inhabitants of the municipality, then it was for a corporate purpose; that corporate purposes of taxation cannot be distinguished from public purposes thereof. (This criterion of a "corporate purpose" is discussed in subd. II. b, 1, supra.)

Such donations seem to have been made not infrequently.

See Harter Twp. v. Kernochan (1881) 103 U. S. 562, 26 L. ed. 411, where it is said that it must be conceded that such a donation is a corporate purpose, within Ill. Const. 1848, art. 9, § 5.

The fact that the railroad company in which a municipality subscribes to stock lies wholly within another state, does not render the subscription not for a corporate purpose, provided the railroad promotes the general welfare and prosperity of the municipality, develops its commerce, increases its trade, enhances the value of its property, and generally benefits the municipality as much as if located within the state, as where one terminus of a railroad extending through a fertile agricultural section of another state was across the Mississippi river from Quincy, Illinois. Quincy, M. & P. R. Co. v. Morris (Ill.) supra.

An attempt of the Illinois legisla

ture to validate by an act a void election by a township for stock in a railroad was overthrown in Marshall v. Silliman (1871) 61 Ill. 218, and Wiley v. Silliman (1871) 62 Ill. 170, under the theory that subscription to railroad stock was a corporate purpose. The same ruling was made in regard to a county subscription, in Gaddis v. Richland County (1879) 92 III. 119.

With regard to subscriptions by municipalities to the stock in railroads, the supreme court of Illinois, in Trustees of Schools v. People (Ill.) supra, held that, while generally it is a legitimate corporate purpose of municipalities to make such subscriptions, the trustees of schools in counties "not under township organization" were not the corporate authorities of a corporation in which the power to tax could be vested under Ill. Const. 1848, art. 9, § 5, since they were not named in the Constitution among the municipalities which might be vested with power to assess and collect taxes, and had never been authorized by any public law to assess taxes for any purpose; the term "townships," as used in the section, was said by the court evidently to refer to townships. formed under township organization, and "school districts," as used in the section, was likewise held not to refer to trustees of schools. The court further held that had the trustees of schools been capable of an investiture of the power to tax for some local purpose, it would, nevertheless, not have been a corporate purpose for them to subscribe to the stock in railroads, their sole purpose being the education of the people within the districts, and in this connection the court said: "Neither school districts nor trustees of schools have any special interest in the object to be accomplished [by building railroads], and, in granting aid of the character under consideration, the principle must ever be regarded that the particular interest to be benefited, or those of a similar kind, must be under the control of the authorities which impose the tax." The decision was that school trustees were not "corporate authorities" who could be vested with authority to levy

taxes under the constitutional provision involved, but it was held that, even if they. had been such authorities they could tax only for school purposes, and that the appropriation of money derived from taxation by a school district, for the construction of a railroad, was not for a corporate purpose.

An examination of the duties, and the scope and extent of the powers, of trustees of schools in townships "not under township organization," and the purposes for which the township officers were given corporate existence, was held to show, in People ex rel. Cairo & St. L. R. Co. v. Dupuyt (1874) 71 III. 651, that they were created quasi corporations for the purpose and with the sole and only power of acting in matters pertaining to the public schools within their limits, and that all other business was foreign to the object for which they were created bodies corporate. So, aiding in the building of railroads appeared to the court to be so utterly foreign to the object and purpose for which the trustees of schools were created corporations, that it was unable to perceive upon what principle they could embark in an enterprise of that character; and, while admitting that the development of the resources of the townships by the construction of railroads was a laudable purpose, the court held it no legitimate corporate purpose of the particular corporations, and a subscription to stock by one such corporation was held unenforceable. The court identified Trustees of Schools v. People (1872) 63 Ill. 300, as a case in point on all fours, and saw no reason for departing from the decision there made.

On a careful review of the decisions above cited and the reasons which led to them, the court saw no grounds, in People ex rel. Cairo & St. L. R. Co. v. Trustees of Schools (1875) 78 Ill. 136, for overruling or modifying them.

In Illinois a township not under township organization, that is, school township,-even though acting. under a statute, has no power to become, through the trustees of schools, a stockholder in a railroad company,

with power to issue bonds, and levy and collect taxes on the property in the township to pay the bonds. Weightman v. Clark (1881) 103 U. S. 256, 26 L. ed. 392; People ex rel. Cairo & St. L. R. Co. v. Dupuyt (1874) 71 Ill. 651, following Trustees of Schools. v. People (1872) 63 III. 299. The townships held not to have the power were created solely for school purposes, and the building of railroads was "so utterly foreign to the objects and purposes for which the trustees of schools were created a corporation" that the court in the Dupuyt Case said it was unable to perceive upon what principle they could embark in an enterprise of that character, since, under the construction theretofore placed by the court upon Ill. Const. 1848, art. 9, § 5, taxation could not be imposed by a corporation except for "local or corporate purposes." The court, having observed that the issuing of the bonds, and the necessary taxation that must have followed to raise money to liquidate interest and principal, were not germane to the objects for which the trustees of schools were incorporated, and had no legitimate connection with the objects for which they were created, said, in extension of its argument, that if the people of the school township could authorize, by a vote, the trustees of schools to incur a heavy railroad debt, which was to be paid by taxation, upon the same principle they could invest them with power to subscribe to stock in a manufacturing enterprise to be established in the township, issue bonds, and levy and collect taxes to pay them, and that while the maufacturing enterprise, as well as the railroad, might add to the wealth and general prosperity of the inhabitants of the township, the inhibitory section of the Constitution, above referred to, prohibited the levy and collection of taxes for either purpose.

Under the reasons given for holding that aiding railroads financially is a corporate purpose, it seems that, in the usual case at least, the railroad benefited must pass through the county or touch at the town aiding it. See infra, III. c, Louisville & N. R. Co. v.