(Md.

of buildings, or any use of them, which "would create hazards from fire or disease, or would menace the public security, health, or morals." Charter of Baltimore, art. 1, § 18; Tighe v. Osborne, 148 Md., 43 A.L.R. 819, 131 Atl. 801; Osborne v. Grauel, 136 Md. 88, 110 Atl. 199; Brown v. Stubbs, 128 Md. 129, 97 Atl. 227; Rossberg v. State, 111 Md. 394, 134 Am. St. Rep. 626, 74 Atl. 581.

The real question in the case, then, is, not whether the city of Baltimore had the power to pass an ordinance protecting the public security, health, or morals, but whether it had the right to delegate to the zoning commissioner the power to determine, in the

manner prescribed by Ordinance No. 522, whether buildings or the proposed use of them would menace the public security, health, or morals. If this was a question of first impression, there might be a considerable difficulty in determining it, but the past decisions of this court, as well as the prevailing trend of authority elsewhere, seem to us to have settled the matter. An examination of the opinion in Tighe v. Osborne, 148 Md., 43 L.R.A. 819, 131 Atl. 801, supra, shows that the chief difficulty with the ordinance in that case was caused by the phrase "public welfare," and all that was there decided was that the city could not delegate to any one the power to decide what was detrimental to the "public welfare." In the present case there is no such delegation. Here the authority of the zoning commissioner is limited to prohibiting structures or uses of them which would menace the public security, health, or morals. These things, as we have seen, are proper objects of the police power, and many of the matters which can legitimately be said to affect any of them, as well as many matters which cannot be properly said to affect them, have been passed upon in previous decisions of this court. These decisions are binding on the zoning commissioner, and, in addition, the ordinance

133 Atl. 465.)

itself provides in § 3 that in passing on permits the commissioner shall give consideration to:

"(a) The character and use of buildings and structures adjoining or in the vicinity of the property mentioned in the application.

"(b) The number of persons residing, studying, working in or otherwise occupying buildings adjoining or in the vicinity of the property mentioned in the application.

"(c) The location, kind and size of surface and subsurface structures in the vicinity of the property mentioned in the application, such as water mains, sewers and other utilities.

"(d) Traffic conditions, in so far as they or any of them relate to hazards from fire or disease, or to the public security, health, or morals."

It is thus apparent that the ordinance does not vest an unlimited discretion in the zoning commissioner. He cannot refuse a permit, unless the building or its proposed use would menace the public security, health, or morals. He is required to secure information about, and give consideration to, all the matters just enumerated in reaching a decision; and, finally, he is bound by numerous decisions of this court as to what does, and what does not, bear a substantial relation to the public security, health, or morals. Among these decisions are Cochran v. Preston, 108 Md. 220, 23 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1163, 129 Am. St. Rep. 432, 70 Atl. 113, 15 Ann. Cas. 1048, holding that a limitation on the height of buildings was valid; Byrne v. Maryland Realty Co. 129 Md. 210, L.R.A.1917A, 1216, 98 Atl. 547, holding that an act prohibiting the erection of dwelling houses in a certain part of Baltimore city, unless of brick, semidetached, and at least 10 feet apart, or, if of frame, 20 feet apart, is invalid; Brown v. Stubbs, 128 Md. 129, 97 Atl. 227, holding that an ordinance requiring the assent of the mayor and city council of Baltimore to the licensing of buildings for moving picture shows was val

id; State v. Hyman, 98 Md. 596, 64 L.R.A. 637, 57 Atl. 6, 1 Ann. Cas. 742, holding that an act requiring, inter alia, a permit to manufacture coats, etc., in a tenement, and authorizing an inspector to revoke the permit at any time the health of the community required it, was valid; Goldman v. Crowther, 147 Md. 293, 38 A.L.R. 1455, 128 Atl. 55, holding that certain provisions in the ordinance in that case attempting to regulate the use of property were void; Bostock v. Sams, 95 Md. 400, 59 L.R.A. 282, 93 Am. St. Rep. 394, 52 Atl. 665, holding that a municipal ordinance providing that no building could be erected without securing a permit from the appeal tax court, and that "no such permit shall be granted, unless in the judgment of the said judges of the appeal tax court, or a majority of them, the size, general character, and appearance of the building or buildings to be erected will conform to the general character of the buildings previously erected in the same locality, and will not in any way tend to depreciate the value of surrounding improved or unimproved property," was void; and Stubbs v. Scott, 127 Md. 86, 95 Atl. 1060, in which it was held that the building inspector of Baltimore city could not, under the ordinances then existing, lawfully refuse to issue a building permit for a building to be erected in a residential neighborhood simply because the proposed structure was to be used for store purposes. The foregoing considerations make it abundantly evident that the ordinance before us contains many limitations on the powers of the zoning commissioner, and, while he could disregard these limitations, it is not to be presumed

Municipal corporationsvalidity of ordinancepossibility that officer will disregard limitations.

that he will do so, nor is such a possibility a proper ground for declaring the ordinance invalid. State V. Hyman, supra. And should these limitations be disregarded, the party injured thereby has a right of

appeal to the board of zoning appeals, and thence to the Baltimore city court, under § 2 of the ordi

nance.

In

And, finally, there is ample authority to sustain even broader delegations of power to administrative boards or subordinate officials. It was strongly intimated throughout the majority opinion in Tighe v. Osborne, supra, that the delegation of power contained in the ordinance involved in that case would have been valid had the phrase "public welfare" been omitted from the ordinance. Not only has that phrase been eliminated from the ordinance we are now considering, but, in addition, the provision in the first ordinance authorizing the commissioner to refuse a permit if the building or its use would, "in his judgment, in any way menace the public, security," etc., has been changed, and in the present ordinance the commissioner is authorized to refuse a permit only when the building or its use "would menace the public security," etc. State v. Hyman, supra, the delegation by the Legislature to an inspector of the power to determine when the manufacture of clothing in a tenement was detrimental to the health of the community was upheld as valid. In Smith v. Standard Oil Co. 148 Md., 130 Atl. 181, we held valid two ordinances of Baltimore city requiring any one who desired to erect a livery stable, junk shop, garage, gasoline service station, etc., to first secure a permit from the mayor; and in the very recent case of Baltimore v. Bloecher & Schaff, 149 Md., 132 Atl. 160, we sustained an ordinance of the mayor and city council of Baltimore which authorizes the health commissioner or his inspectors to condemn meat which was found to be intrinsically unsound, unhealthful, unwholesome, or otherwise unfit for human food, and which further authorized the condemnation of meat products prepared under conditions so unclean or unsanitary as to induce a reasonable belief that they

had thereby been rendered unsound, unclean, unwholesome, and unfit for human food. This ordinance did not provide any more definite formula than that contained in the phrase "unfit for human food" by which the wholesomeness of meat could be determined, but, on the contrary, it directed the health commissioner to have inspections made by experts in sanitation so that he could acquire the necessary information about the places in which meat was prepared or offered for sale, and it amounted, in effect, to delegating to the health commissioner the power to condemn and prohibit the sale of meat or meat products which would injure the public health. The inspectors are specifically directed to consider whether the meats contain dyes, chemicals, preservatives, or other injurious ingredients, just as in the ordinance now before us the zoning commission is required to consider the matters set out in § 3, but general authority to condemn meats found to be "unfit for human food" (that is, "detrimental to the public health") is given in the meat ordinance just as authority is given in Ordinance No. 552 to prohibit the erection of buildings or uses of them which would menace the public security, health, or morals.

In Osborne v. Grauel, 136 Md. 88, 110 Atl. 199, the court declined to compel by mandamus the issuing by the building inspector of a permit for a garage; it appearing that the permit had been disapproved by the mayor under the authority of an ordinance of Baltimore city requiring him to investigate all applications for garages and to approve them before a permit could be granted. The validity of this delegation of power to the mayor seems to have been conceded in the case; the chief point raised being as to the validity of the reasons assigned by him in disapproving the permit. In Creaghan v. Baltimore, 132 Md. 442, 104 Atl. 180, this court sustained as valid an ordinance authorizing the commissioner of health of

Baltimore city to prohibit the sale of milk within the city if the producers of the milk did not store, keep, and distribute it in accordance with such regulations as the commissioner might adopt to insure its being safe for human consumption, and also authorizing him to prohibit its sale, if in his "opinion" it was kept, stored, or distributed under such conditions as to render it unsuitable for human food.

In Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 236 U. S. 230, 59 L. ed. 552, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 387, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 296, the Supreme Court upheld as valid a statute which delegated to the board of moving picture censors the power to prohibit the exhibition of moving picture films which were not, "in the judgment and discretion of the board of censors of a moral, educational, or amusing or harmless character."

In United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506, 55 L. ed. 563, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 480, an act of Congress giving the Secretary of Agriculture the power to provide rules governing forest reservations, and making the violation of such rules a criminal offense, was held valid.

In Wilson v. Eureka City, 173 U. S. 32, 43 L. ed. 603, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 317, an ordinance requiring the written permission of the mayor of a town before any person was allowed to move a building along the streets was upheld.

In Blue v. Beach, 155 Ind. 121, 50 L.R.A. 64, 80 Am. St. Rep. 195, 56 N. E. 89, it was held that under a general statutory authority to prevent the spread of contagious and infectious diseases, a rule of the state board of health upon the subject of vaccination was not legislative. And to the same general effect see Boehm v. Baltimore, 61 Md. 259; Downs v. Swann, 111 Md. 53, 23 L.R.A. (N.S.) 739, 134 Am. St. Rep. 586, 73 Atl. 653; State ex rel. Ebert v. Loden, 117 Md. 384, 40 L.R.A. (N.S.) 193, 83 Atl. 564, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 1300; Scholle v. State, 90 Md. 729, 50 L.R.A. 411, 46 Atl.

-delegation of

powervalidity.

The foregoing authorities seem to us to establish conclusively the validity of the delegation of power contained in Ordinance No. 522. It may be that the language used in some of the earlier decisions of this and other American courts is at variance with this conclusion, but certainly the more modern decisions amply and specifically sustain it. The change, if there has been any, is due to the constantly increasing complexity of modern society, and the consequent multiplicity of matters which require the state's attention. The field has become so vast, and the things to be considered so enlarged in number, and so interrelated with one another, that it has been found practically impossible to provide in laws and ordinances specific rules and standards by which every conceivable situation can be measured and determined. The result has been that we have turned more and more to the plan of providing in our laws and ordinances general rules and standards, and leaving to administrative boards and agencies the task of acquiring information,

working out the details, and applying these rules and standards to specific cases. This is not considered a delegation of legislative authority, though it probably does represent an expansion of administrative power. trative power. We think the ordinance now under consideration is one of this class, and that the rules and standards which it provides for the regulation of the zoning commissioner furnish a sufficient limitation upon the discretion it vests in him.

Such ordinances represent no change in principle. They merely indicate that the courts, faced by at least an apparent necessity, have relaxed to some extent the particularity with which they formerly required the laws and ordinances to set out the rules and standards by which the delegated power was to be limited, and whatever may be said of the wisdom of this relaxation no doubt can now be entertained as to its sanction by the great weight of authority in this country. See cases cited supra.

The cases of Baltimore v. Radecke, 49 Md. 230, 33 Am. Rep. 239, and Hagerstown v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 107 Md. 178, 126 Am. St. Rep. 382, 68 Atl. 490, have been so often explained and distinguished in prior decisions from cases like the present one that we do not think it would serve any useful purpose to again discuss them, and so we will not do so. And because of a similar frequency of discussion and citation we have also refrained from commenting on the cases of Easton v. Covey, 74 Md. 262, 22 Atl. 266, and Farmers & P. Co. v. Salisbury, 136 Md. 617, 111 Atl. 112.

This brings us to a consideration of that part of Ordinance No. 522 which provides for an appeal from the zoning commissioner to the board of zoning appeals, and from that body to the Baltimore city court. The ordinance provides that on this last-mentioned appeal "the court shall decide whether the order, decision, or determination complained of is arbitrary, unreason

able, unwarranted, or unlawful," and the court is also given authority to remand the case for the taking of additional testimony. Section 28 of article 4 of the Maryland Constitution gives the Baltimore city court exclusive jurisdiction of appeals arising under the ordinances of the mayor and city council of Baltimore, and, so far as we are advised, no one has ever seriously questioned the right of the city, under this constitutional provision, to provide in its ordinances for appeals to the Baltimore city court, and such provisions have been made in numerous instances. See ordinances of mayor and city council of Baltimore.

In State ex rel. Baltimore v. Rutherford, 145 Md. 363, 369, 125 Atl. 725, the provisions for an appeal from the board of zoning appeals to the Baltimore city court in Ordinance No. 922 of Baltimore city (subsequently held void on other grounds in Goldman v. Crowther, 147 Md. 293, 38 A.L.R. 1455, 128 Atl. 55), were apparently conceded to be valid, and were so treated by the court. In the case last mentioned the court again intimated; though it expressly refrained from deciding, that these same provisions were valid. And in Baltimore v. Bloecher & Schaff, 149 Md., 132 Atl. 160, we expressly held that the provisions for an appeal from the health commissioner to the Baltimore city court contained in Ordinance No. 431 of the mayor and city council of Baltimore (commonly called the "Meat" Ordinance) were valid; the court saying: "The Balti more city court having been designated by the Constitution as the tribunal to hear all appeals arising under the ordinances of the mayor and city council of Baltimore, it was within the power of that municipality, in order to secure uniformity in the administration of the law, to provide for an appeal from the determination by administrative or executive agencies of questions of law to that court, and we do not understand that in doing that it en

case

appeal.

these provisions the board of zoning appeals must furnish the court with "all papers, documents, and memoranda" relating to the case appealed. The court is authorized to determine whether the action appealed from was "arbitrary, unreasonable, unwarranted, or unlawful. It is given "power to remand the for the taking of additional testimony, and to pass any order which it may deem proper in the premises," and, finally, it is authorized "to reverse, affirm, or modify the order, decision, or determination complained of." These provisions are more ample than the appeal provisions contained in the ordinance approved in Baltimore v. Bloecher & Schaff, supra, and apparently confer a wider jurisdiction than do those provisions. In fact, they seem practically to amount to authorizing a trial de novo on appeal, as did the ordinance considered in State ex rel. Baltimore v. Rutherford, supra, and, in our opinion, there is nothing in them which could in any way be held to render Ordinance No. 522 invalid.

Nor does the failure of the ordi