Collected Papers, Svazek 1MIT Press, 2000 - Počet stran: 786 Robert Aumann's career in game theory has spanned over research - from his doctoral dissertation in 1956 to papers as recent as January 1995. Threaded through all of Aumann's work (symbolized in his thesis on knots) is the study of relationships between different ideas, between different phenomena, and between ideas and phenomena. When you look closely at one scientific idea, writes Aumann, you find it hitched to all others. It is these hitches that I have tried to study. |
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What Is Game Theory Trying to Accomplish? | 3 |
Peleg B 1965 Utility Functions of Money for Clear Games NRLQ 12 5763 | 12 |
A Definition of Subjective Probability | 25 |
Von NeumannMorgenstern Solutions to Cooperative Games without Side | 38 |
Payments with B Peleg 39 The Core of a Cooperative Game without Side Payments | 39 |
Introduction to Some Thoughts on the Theory of Cooperative Games | 40 |
A Survey of Cooperative Games without Side Payments | 41 |
Bargaining Set Kernel Nucleolus 42 The Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games with M Maschler | 42 |
Foreword to A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games | 153 |
Asphericity of Alternating Knots | 163 |
The Coefficients in an Allocation Problem | 193 |
Assigning Quantitative Values to Qualitative Factors in | 209 |
Subjective Programming | 231 |
Battigalli P P Veronesi 1996 A Note on Stochastic Independence without SavageNull | 235 |
14a Utility Theory without the Completeness Axiom | 257 |
A Correction | 275 |
A Method of Computing the Kernel of nPerson Games with B Peleg | 43 |
P Rabinowitz 44 Cooperative Games with Coalition Structures with J Dreze | 44 |
GameTheoretic Analysis of a Bankruptcy Problem from the Talmud with | 45 |
Core and Equilibria of Markets 46 Markets with a Continuum of Traders | 46 |
Game Theory | 47 |
Disadvantageous Monopolies | 48 |
A Note on Gales Example with B Peleg | 49 |
On the Rate of Convergence of the Core | 50 |
Economic and Political Applications of the Shapley Value 51 Values of Markets with a Continuum of Traders | 51 |
Power and Taxes with M Kurz | 52 |
Power and Taxes in a MultiCommodity Economy with M Kurz | 53 |
An Example with R J Gardner | 54 |
and R W Rosenthal 55 Power and Public Goods with M Kurz and A Neyman | 55 |
Voting for Public Goods with M Kurz and A Neyman | 56 |
Values of Markets with Satiation or Fixed Prices with J Dreze | 57 |
Economic Applications of the Shapley Value | 58 |
An Application of the Shapley Value with R Myerson | 59 |
A Comment on Scafuri | 63 |
A Review of Rapoports Fights Games | 107 |
CORE as a Macrocosm of GameTheoretic Research 19671987 | 119 |
Report of the Committee on Election Procedures for Fellows | 145 |
Ben Porath E I Gilboa 1994 Linear Measures the Gini Index and the Income Equal | 277 |
Linearity of Unrestrictedly Transferable Utilities | 291 |
19 | 311 |
Buhler W H Gehring 1978 ShortTerm Financial Planning with Uncertain Receipts | 313 |
2220 | 321 |
W 1979 A Perspective on Subjective Probability for Prediction and Decision | 325 |
Chateauneuf A 1991 On the Use of Capacities in Modeling Uncertainty Aversion | 343 |
23 | 411 |
24 | 430 |
Damato A 1978 Limits of Legal Realism Yale Law J 87 468513 | 468 |
25 | 469 |
26 | 491 |
28 | 501 |
29 | 523 |
30 | 533 |
553 | 691 |
1994 Kahns Theory of Liquidity Preference and Monetary Policy Cambridge | 704 |
Fishburn P C 1994 Utility and Subjective Probability in Handb Game Th 2 1397 | 708 |
| 723 | |
34 | 745 |
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action allocation alternating knot applications aspheric assumption Aumann axioms behavior Chapter choice common knowledge continuum cooperative games core correlated equilibrium decision defined definition denote discussion distribution double vote Econ Econometrica Economic Theory equilibrium point example finite Fishburn follows game G game theory game-theoretic games of perfect given Harsanyi Hence idea IJGT incomplete information individually rational International Journal intuitive Journal of Economic Journal of Game kind LEMMA linear market games Maschler Math Mathematical Economics maximal measurable Mertens minimax mixed strategies Morgenstern n-tuple Nash equilibrium Neumann non-cooperative notion obtain optimal outcome payoff function perfect information play players positive preference order Prisoner's Dilemma problem proof pure strategies random Repeated Games result Selten sense Shapley value Shubik situation solution concept space stable set strong equilibrium subjective probabilities supergame theorem Theory of Games tion traders two-person unique voting game yields zero-sum