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similar cases, as well that of amendment pro-
vided within itself, as, in case of abuse, the
justly dreaded but unavoidable ultima ratio
gentium.-TO EDWARD EVERETT.
vii, 437.
FORD ED., x, 385. (M.. 1826.)

That all powers not delegated to the United States, by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States or to the people." [XIIth Amendment.] To take a single step beyond the boundaries thus specifically drawn around the 1689. CONSTITUTION (The Federal), powers of Congress, is to take possession of Jefferson and.-One passage in the paper à boundless field of power, no longer susceptible of any definition.-NATIONAL BANK you enclosed me must be corrected. It is OPINION. vii, 556. FORD ED., v, 285. (1791.) the following: "And all say it was yourself more than any other individual that planned CONSTITUTION (The Federal), Gen- and established the Constitution." I was in eral Welfare clause of.-See GENERAL WEL-Europe when the Constitution was planned, FARE CLAUSE.

1682 CONSTITUTION (The Federal), Infractions of.-If on [one] infraction [of the Constitution] we build a second, on that second a third, &c.. any one of the powers in the Constitution may be made to comprehend every power of government.-To ALBERT GALLATIN. iv, 450. FORD ED., viii. 175. (1802.)

1683. CONSTITUTION (The Federal), Intention of.-We ought always to presume that the real intention [of the Constitution] which is alone consistent with the Constitution.-To ALBERT GALLATIN. iv, 449. FORD ED., viii, 174. ((1802.)

CONSTITUTION (The Federal), Internal Improvements and.—See INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS.

1684. CONSTITUTION (The Federal), Interpretation of.-Where a phrase is susceptible of two meanings, we ought certainly to adopt that which will bring upon us the fewest inconveniences.-OPINION ON APPORTIONMENT BILL. vii, 599. FORD ED., V, 498. (1792.)

1685.

The Constitution * * * was meant to be republican, and we believe it to be republican according to every candid interpretation. Yet we have seen it so interpreted and administered, as to be truly what the French have called, a monarchie masquée-To ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON. iv, 338. FORD ED., vii, 464. (W., Dec. 1800.) 1686. The Constitution on which our Union rests, shall be administered by me according to the safe and honest meaning contemplated by the plain understanding of the people of the United States. at the time of its adoption.-a meaning to be found in the explanations of those who advocated, not those who opposed it, and who opposed it merely lest the construction should be applied which they denounced as possible.REPLY TO ADDRESS. iv, 387. (W., March 1801.)

1687. The Constitution is a compact of many independent powers, every single one of which claims an equal right to understand it, and to requre its observance.TO EDWARD LIVINGSTON. vii, 404. 1825.)

(M.,

1688. The Constitution of the United States is a compact of independent nations, subject to the rules acknowledged in

and never saw it till after it was established.
On receiving it, I wrote strongly to Mr. Mad-
ison, urging the want of provision for the free-
by jury, habeas corpus, and substitution of
dom of religion, freedom of the press, trial
militia for a standing army, and an express
reservation to the State of all rights not
specifically granted to the Union. He ac-
cordingly moved in the first session of
Congress for these amendments, which were
agreed to and ratified by the States as they
now stand. This is all the hand I had in
what related to the Constitution.-TO DR.
JOSEPH PRIESTLEY.
iv, 441. FORD ED., viii,
159. (W., 1802.)

1690. CONSTITUTION (The Federal), Jurisdiction of.—It may be impracticable to lay down any general formula of words which shall decide at once and with precision_in there are two canons which will guide us every case, this limit of jurisdiction. But safely in most of the cases. Ist. The capital and leading object of the Constitution was to leave with the States all authorities which respected their own citizens only, and to transfer to the United States those which respected citizens of foreign or other States; to make us several as to ourselves, but one as to all others. In the latter case, then, constructions should lean to the general jurisdiction, if the words will bear it, and in favor of the States in the former, if possible to be so construed. And, indeed, between citizens and citizens of the same State and under their own laws, I know but a single case in which a jurisdiction is given to the General Government. That is where anything but gold or silver is made a lawful tender, or the obliThe separate legislatures had so often abused gation of contracts is any otherwise impaired. that power that the citizens themselves chose to trust it to the general rather than to their own special authorities. 2d. On every question of construction, carry ourselves back to the time when the Constitution was adopted, recollect the spirit manifested in the debates, and instead of trying what meaning may be squeezed out of the text, or invented against it. conform to the probable one in which it was passed.-TO WILLIAM JOHNSON. vii, 296. FORD ED., x, 230. (M., 1823.)

1691. CONSTITUTION (The Federal), Model for France.-Ours [Constitution] has been professedly their model, in which such changes are made as a difference of circumstances rendered necessary, and some others neither necessary nor advantageous, but into

which men will ever run, when versed in theory and new in the practice of the government, when acquainted with man only as they see him in their books, and not in the world. To JAMES MADISON. iii, 98. FORD ED., V, 109. (P., Aug. 1789.)

1692. CONSTITUTION (The Federal), Monarchizing.-I am opposed to the monarchizing its features by the forms of its administration, with a view to conciliate a first transition to a President and Senate for life, and from that to an hereditary tenure of these offices, and thus to worm out the elective principle.-To ELBRIDGE GERRY. iv, 268. FORD ED., vii, 327. (Pa., 1799.)

1693. CONSTITUTION (The Federal), Necessity for.-Our new Constitution has succeeded beyond what I apprehended it Iwould have done. I did not at first believe that eleven States out of thirteen would have consented to a plan consolidating themselves as much into one. A change in their dispositions, which had taken place since I left them, had rendered this consolidation necessary, that is to say, had called for a federal government which could walk upon its own legs, without leaning for support on the State Legislatures. A sense of necessity, and a submission to it, is to me a new and consolatory proof that whenever the people are well-informed, they can be trusted with their own government; that whenever things get so far wrong as to attract their notice, they may be relied on to set them to rights. To DR. PRICE. ii, 553 (P., 1789.) See 1648.

1694. CONSTITUTION (The Federal), Preservation of.-The preservation of the Federal Constitution is all we need contend for.-TO ARCHIBALD STUART. iii, 314. FORD ED., V, 409. (Pa., 1791.)

1695. The preservation of the General Government in its whole constitutional vigor, as the sheet anchor of our peace at home and safety abroad, I deem [one of] the essential principles of our government, and consequently [one of] those which ought to shape its administration.-FIRST INAUGURAL ADDRESS. viii, 4. FORD ED., viii, 4. (1801.)

1696. I do, with sincere zeal, wish an inviolable preservation of our present Federal Constitution according to the true sense in which it was adopted by the States; that in which it was advocated by its friends, and not that which its enemies apprehended,

who therefore became its enemies.-To ELBRIDGE GERRY. iv, 268. FORD ED., vii, 327. (Pa., 1799.)

1697. May you and your cotemporaries meet them [attacks on the Constitution] with the same determination and effect, as your father and his did the Alien and Sedition laws, and preserve inviolate a constitution, which, cherished in all its chastity and purity, will prove in the end a blessing to all the nations of the earth.-To MR. NICHOLAS. vii, 230. (M., 1821.)

1698.

* * *

To preserve the republican forms and principles of our Constitution, and cleave to the salutary distribution of powers which that has established, are the two sheet anchors of our Union. If driven from either we shall be in danger of foundering.-TO WILLIAM JOHNSON. vii, 298. FORD ED., X, 232. (M., 1823.)

1699. CONSTITUTION (The Federal), Principles of.—The principle of the Constitution is that of a separation of Legislative, Executive and Judiciary functions, except in cases specified. If this principle be not expressed in direct terms, it is clearly the spirit of the Constitution, and it ought to be so free government.-To JAMES MADISON. iv, commented and acted on by every friend of 161. FORD ED., vii, 108. (M., Jan. 1797.)

1700. The leading principle of our Constitution is the independence of the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary of one another.-To GEORGE HAY. v, 103. FORD ED., ix, 60. (W., 1807.)

vii,

1701. The adored principles of our Constitution.-To JEDEDIAH MORSE. 235. FORD ED., X, 205. (M., 1822.)

1702. CONSTITUTION (The Federal), Republican opposition to.-Our first federal constitution, or Confederation, as it was called, was framed in the first moments of our separation from England, in the highest point of our jealousies of independence as to her, and as to each other. It formed, therefore, too weak a bond to produce a union of action as to foreign nations. This appeared at once on the establishment of peace, when the pressure of a common enemy which had hooped us together during the war, was taken away. Congress was found to be quite unable to point the action of the several States to a common object. A general desire, therefore, took place of amending the federal constitution. This was opposed by some of those who wished for monarchy, to wit, the refugees, now returned; the old tories, and the timid whigs who prefer tranquillity to freedom, hoping monarchy might be the remedy if a state of complete anarchy could be brought on. A convention, however, being decided on, some of the monocrats got elected, with a hope of introducing an English constitution, when they found that for adhering to republicanism, and for giving the great body of the delegates were strongly due strength to their government under that form, they then directed their efforts to the assimilation of all the parts of the new government to the English constitution as nearly as was attainable. In this they were not altogether without success; insomuch that the monarchical features of the new Constitution produced a violent opposition to it from the most zealous republicans in the several States. For this reason, and because they also thought it carried the principle of a consolidation of the States farther than was requisite for the purpose of producing a union of action as to foreign powers, it is still

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