we saw the account alluded to, but we do re- | bers of Congress, sitting in grand council, and member that in his first essay with the ariny yet commanders of regiments in the field—if it of Egypt he was invited by the Turks to walk does not likewise silence in some way the news up to a deliberately constructed range of bat- | paper school, who cause impatience, and conteries and be slaughtered; but that-in a cow- sequent insubordination in the camp, as well as ardly sort of manner, perhaps―he chose to go untimely precipitancy at head-quarters, it wil around the spot where they were planted with prolong a struggle awful to contemplate in the so much care, and the result was, that he slew far future. Some steps, it is true, have been some thousands of the Turks, and broke their taken toward reforms in high places, in view power completely for all time. Valor is a very of the lesson of the other day; but there must good thing, doubtless, but we greatly prefer the be a clean sweep of the blundering and incom"Rich Mountain" sort-the McClellan and petent civilians, in the new levies especially, if Rosecranz school of tacticians-to that which the country at large is to expect success in the is in vogue lower down on the Potomac, es- reconstruction of the Government. pecially where the purpose of those on the line -Baltimore American, July of the advance is to disorganize and conquernot slay-with the remembrance that those who are opposed to them are people of the same country.

That a more overwhelming disaster has not been the consequence of all this management— this helter-skelter rush to "Richmond "-is rather remarkable than otherwise. Nearly two hundred miles to advance through hostile territory is an exceedingly long distance, comparatively, as those have found, doubtless, who have penetrated about one-eiglith as far, to retrace their footsteps under these untoward results. And suppose-here comes a lesson from history again-suppose, we say, that Beauregard and his advisers had adopted the tactics of the Parthians toward the Roman consul, Crassussuppose they had coaxed along toward Richmond the brave but inadequate force lately defeated, and then turned upon and suddenly and completely destroyed them, what then would have been the condition of the questions at issue to-day? They might have done it. "Onward to Richmond!" has been the senseless battle-cry which has stunned the ears of the nation for weeks past, and the authorities at Washington may consider themselves fortunate that the case for them is no worse.

WASHINGTON, July 26, 1861.-The public mind, painfully but reasonably excited, is entitled to be informed of what so deeply and vi tally concerns the general welfare. When the rebellion broke out into open war upon Fort Sumter, the people rose with a unanimity uLEIampled in the world's history, offering themselves and their possessions to the Government, asking only in return that a war thus wantonly and wickedly provoked, should be vigorously prosecuted.

Passing over an interval of three months, we come to the disastrous battle of Manassas, Who is responsible for this great national disaster? Officials cannot answer-individuals may speak-their answers passing for what they are worth, according to the estimate which the public put upon the judgment and means of information.

Lieutenant-General Scott, in the discharge of his duty as commander-in-chief of the army, conceived and perfected a plan or programme, by means of which he confidently, as the results of a summer and fall campaign, anticipated the overthrow of the Confederate army, and thus virtually to end the rebellion.

This plan, primarily, contemplated camps of instruction, where raw levies might, during the months of June, July, and August, be subject to discipline and inured to service, sending the regiments as they became fit for duty, into the field, making room, as they departed, for green organizations.

It is not our special business either to censure or defend those attempting, with varied success, to preserve those free institutions, that unequalled fabric of free government so nearly suffered to go to ruin mainly by default of the head of the late Administration. We cannot defend the palpable blunders of our present rulers, but when we behold them reeling under the heavy burdens cast upon them by the faults of others, we would be as charitable as possible toward their shortcomings. Not their partisans, we yet hope they may, with as little suffering to the nation as possible, restore the country to its wonted condition of prosperity; but to do this, that terrible evil-political brawling-must not be recognized as a qualification for military position, or for the places of military counsellors. If there is one rock which more than any other endangers the safety of the Government in this frightful crisis it is this. But this plan did not accord with the popular And if the Government does not remorselessly, idea. Prominent individuals, whose counsels and at once, throw overboard the whole phalanx and clamors precipitated the outbreak, demandof these insane brawlers-some of them mem-ed precipitate action. These demands were

With this disposable force (after the safety of the Capital was assured) Gen. Scott commenced operations at Fortress Monroe, near Harper's Ferry, and in Western Virginia, the latter point being most favorable, profiting, as no other section did, by the coöperation and sympathies of loyal inhabitants. With Washington for his base of operations, the western wings of his army were to feel and fight their way southward; until at the appointed time, having reached their designated positions, all his columns were to move sinultaneously, Richmond falling as Mexico fell, before an irresistible

army.

and more clamorous. Exciting appeals pular feeling were soon followed by open sions and denunciations of Gen. Scott. finally, with a presumption and insolence ard of, a leading journal, assuming comof the army, issued and reiterated the -,"On to Richmond."

It is not true, however, as has been averred, that General Scott was constrained to hazard this battle by the President. Between the President and, with one exception, the Cabinet and General Scott, there have been a mutual regard and confidence.

I will not now stop to consider details or criticize acts. The major blunder includes all the minor ones. There should have been no general engagement until we were in the field with an army strong enough to overwhelm and crush out rebellion. There are other points at which we could be advantageously and successfully occupied.

ile widely spread newspapers were thus ening the Administration by assaults upon ommanding-General, his embarrassments aggravated by the persistent hostility and -day aspersions of the Postmaster General, e brother, a prominent member of Con- assailed him from the stump. anwhile Congress assembled. Senators But even if it were excusable to assault an representatives, with more zeal than army equal in numbers to our own, in its ledge, caught up and reiterated the cry, chosen position behind its intrenchments, the to Richmond." The impatient Congress-purpose should have been abandoned when the were leading and influential. They wait- army of Manassas was reinforced by that from on the President to complain of the in- Winchester. Then, surely, the conflict was too ty of the army, and upon General Scott, unequal. With all the conditions and circumg him "On to Richmond." Army bills, stances so changed, General McDowell should red with deliberation by Senator Wilson, have taken the responsibility of disobeying ccordance with the views of the Govern- his orders. The reason would have justified ) were emasculated by the House Military him in the judgment of the Government and nittee, of which Mr. Blair is Chairman. people. President and his Cabinet had reason to apnd-if not the censures of Congress-the e of measures essential to the prosecution e war, unless the Tribune order of "On chmond" was obeyed.

But the order of "On to Richmond" was obeyed, and where does it leave us? Where we were three months ago, with a harder conflict on our hands, and a dismal, if not doubtful future. The "On to Richmond dictators have added another year to the war, an hundred millions of dollars to its cost, and opened graves for fifteen or twenty thousand more soldiers.

d now the sensation journals began to dise the strength and courage of the rebel | "The rebels will not fight!" "The ds will run!" &c., &c., appeared in flampitals over flash paragraphs. The whole And what have we gained? Alas, too little ar mind was swayed by these frenzied ap- for such a fearful expenditure of time, treasure, A movement upon Manassas was uni- blood, and reputation. We have learned, what ly and blindly demanded. Passions and few doubted, that our army is all that is expectsities, kindred to those which once del-ed of it; that our men fought with the courage France in blood, were being excited. of veterans; that we may always, and under all yranny of the press, the denunciations of circumstances, rely on them. We have learned, inet minister, and the impetuosity of a what was also too well known, that the army members of Congress excited the masses, was in many instances indifferently officered. red" Gen. Scott "from his proprieties." We have learned, too, the importance and necesnce in his life his purposes were thwarted sity of discipline. Effective troops, however once "his mind became the mind of other excellent the material, cannot be found in workshops, the cornfields, or the cities. They must have military training, without which every "On to Richmond" movement will prove a failure.

result has shown that it was a fatal ess. And yet who knows what would been the effect of an adherence to his The New York Tribune was educating ns to distrust the wisdom of the Adminon and the fidelity of the commanding als. Every day emboldened its audacity ry rail and wire disseminated its treason every hour augmented the popular disnt. Congress, though its session opened ciously, began to falter. The Blairs, one Cabinet and the other in Congress, were izing the "On to Richmond" faction. To resisted these demands would have overn the Administration, and might have deed the Government. "Madness ruled the ' and a battle at Manassas, right or wrong, ne, not a military but a political "necessity." VOL. II.-Doc. 32

Though we have encountered a great and disastrous check-though we are pained and humiliated-we possess the means and the energy to retrieve all, if these means henceforth are wisely employed. I may in a future letter indicate how, in my judgment, these means should be employed. -Albany Evening Journal.

SOUTHERN PRESS ON THE BATTLE. It would be a very difficult task to review the various accounts current in this city and along the railroad to Manassas, of the great battle which was fought on the 21st inst., in the vicinity of Manassas Junction and Centreville,

support of McClellan from the West and of terson from the North. It was a fatal deture from the anaconda policy which he had viously been pursuing. The consequence is backbone of the serpent is broken. The ance of McClellan's column in Western Vira is rendered inconsequential, and if it adce far into the mountains its destruction nevitable; while Butler at Fort Monroe is strained to moderate his exorbitant military bition to the humble office of performing rison duty.

were but striplings; on the 21st thousands of
them were heroes; and another battle will find
thousands of them hardy and invincible veter-
ans. Nor need we fear that our Generals will
fail us. Davis, Beauregard, Johnston-it can-
not be said of them, to-morrow or the next
day, that their spirit has abated and their vision
dulled-that they have

-hearts worn out with many wars,
And eyes grown dim with gazing on the pilot stars.
-New Orleans Delta, July 28.

THE MORAL OF MANASSAS.

'pinions differ here materially as to what or should be the war policy of the Confede Government after the Manassas victory. y think that the victory should be instantly wed up by a dash upon Washington and a into Maryland. They say that we have orne from the aggressive long enough to Certainly there can be no difference of opin vince the most stupid and most deluded of ion as to its having proved a God-send to the Northern people that we did not aim at cause of Southern independence and true conquest; that we had no wish to destroy the stitutional liberty. It has greatly strengthened ional Capital, or to overturn the Govern- the confidence of our people in the ability of t which they were supporting, but that our their government to maintain itself, even at the desire was to be let alone and to live un-point of the bayonet, against the marauding a government of our own choice. It is legions of Hessian soldiery who have been pre› now, they think, to set about conquering cipitated by the enemy upon our sacred soil. ace by carrying the war into the enemy's It has impaired the energies of the "old try, since it is evident we cannot secure wreck" of the Federal Government, and has e by scrupulously remaining within our so far annihilated the confidence of its subThere are others, however, who argue jects in the final success of its boasted scheme it is best to prove at once our forbearance of subjugation, as to work the most serious our invincibility, by pausing after every vic- detriment to the national credit-which, acand giving the enemy an opportunity to cording to the recent acknowledgment of a it by the "sober second thought." These congressman, has already failed. It has given are for letting Washington alone, and ad- a prestige to the young republic of the South, ing no further than the Potomac, from the just emerging, like Venus, in all the perfection of that an attack upon the National Capital of her beauty, from the foaming sea of political an invasion of territory beyond the limits convulsion, which will put to naught the vaunthe Confederate States would cause the same ing assertion of Northern superiority, and perersal outburst and uprising in the North as haps decide the question of foreign recognition citnessed on the capture of Sumter. Such which now trembles in the hesitating balance s are plausible, but they are totally without held by the hands of European powers. In adical value. dition to these there may be even other, though less important results flowing from it.

There is a danger we fear that the Southern mind, intoxicated with its exultations over the recent great victory of our arms at Manassas, may over-estimate the present advantage as well as the ultimate consequences of that brilliant achievement.

e North has explicitly, in word and act, enged to a fight to the death, and forced us e deadly issue. It has shown no repentunder frequent failures to overpower us ttle; and much less has it exhibited magnity under the encouragement of partial ess. We must disable it from harm, or put power to do so beyond question, before it be ready either to tender or accept the branch. The enemy's people, in my opincill be far from satisfied with their trial ength on the 21st. They will impute the t to any thing but intrinsic superiority ur army. They call Scott a dotard, well an incapable, Patterson a coward, listributing the responsibility for the defeat g the three, confidently predict a different under the generalship of McClellan. Be Let them bring their highest military s, their choicest soldierly prowess against d we need have no misgivings of the final . Yesterday thousands of our soldiers

But to suppose that our independence is an accomplished fact, without other like desperate struggles, is palpable absurdity, the entertainment of which will prove a delusion and a snare. It is true that the forces of the enemy, outnumbering our own more than two to one, were utterly routed, and driven into a retreat styled by themselves both disgraceful and cowardly. But the defeat is not such as to turn the reckless politicians, who manage this movement, from the attempted execution of their direful purpose. Their pride has been sorely wounded, and their passion of revenge stimalated to the performance of new deeds of infamy. At any sacrifice of life or of the people's money, they will rally their routed forces and attempt with still greater desperation to retrieve their lost fortunes. Relying upon the brute force of mere numbers, the enemy are evidently determined to risk other engagements, perhaps of greater magnitude, if for

-Memphis Appeal, Raja

Doc. 1111.

nothing else than the gratification of their | MUST FIGHT! I REPEAT IT, SIPS, WIC malignity, or the palliation of their disgrace FIGHT!" now so manifest to the eyes of foreign powers. The vast preparations that are now being made, and the great caution taken in the efficient organization of the army for the future, with the unceremonious dismissal of incompetents, are but a few of the indications to foreshadow their increased, yet fruitless determination.

THE DARK DAY.

BY EDWARD EVERETT.

THERE probably never was a military aster, of which the importance was nice i duly maguified, than that of the 21st of J in front of Manassas. After a severe ardy tracted encounter between the two a which, it is admitted, was about to termine in a drawn battle, if not even in favor of hi United States, the Confederates were la reinforced, a panic arose on the part of the teamsters and civilians following in the tran our forces, the alarm gradually spread to troops, a retreat commenced, and ended b general rout. The losses of the eremy in L mean time were equal to our own; he was D able to pursue our flying regiments, and reoccupied, unmolested, the positions fiz which (from political reasons, and against Le judgment of the Commander-in-chief) t

It may be that the half million of men voted Mr. Lincoln by his obsequious parliament may not all be obtained, and certain it is that the five hundred millions of money will come in very tardily, and at great sacrifiees on the part of the Government, if at all. But it is quite as evident that men and money will be secured for the prosecution of this atrocious war, even though the one be obtained by drafting, and the other by direct taxation and forced loans. | We may expect, and must be prepared to encounter, an army of at least four hundred thousand men, who will be gathered at various points upon the borders of our Confederacy, seeking to force an entrance with the bayonet in less than ninety days. Our preparations for the vast campaign, unequalled by any of mod-premature advance was made. A month is ern times, and scarcely overshadowed by Bonaparte's into Russia, must be commensurate with its magnitude and the importance of confronting it with successful resistance.

The population of the eleven States, comprising the Confederate Government, according to the census of 1860, is just 5,581,649. A levy of ten per cent. of this amount, which has always been regarded as not only practicable but extremely light for military purposes, would give us an army of five hundred and fifty-eight thousand men. Leaving out the disaffected portions of the country, where recruiting might prove somewhat difficult, we may safely calculate on raising 400,000 men with the greatest facility, for it is estimated that we have more than 200,000 armed and equipped in the field. The Confederate Government should at once exercise its energies in this work. While we can readily whip the enemy in an open field and fair fight, where they do not outnumber us in a proportion greater than three to two, we must not place ourselves in such a condition as to render the result the least doubtful. To make assurance doubly sure, it is our bounden duty to meet the invaders man for man, and by the adoption of a vigorous and aggressive policy make this war a brief one. An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth, is the maxim that should guide us through this revolution.

But, to resume: The point which we most desire to impress upon the minds of the people is the necessity of being prepared yet for the worst. No delusive hope need be entertained for a solitary moment that a peace has been conquered by the result at Manassas. It is only the entering wedge to such a consummation. We may still with propriety advise with Patrick Henry, when he eloquently exclaimed, "WE

since elapsed; the army of the United Strs has passed through the terrible ordeal of the return of the three months men, which be simultaneously with the disaster of the 21st d July, and in spite of the disheartening effect a that disaster and the confidence it was so wi calculated to inspire on the part of the Confl erates, our military position is stronger per than it was before the inauspicious event,

Had this occurred in a campaign in Europe where it is not the custom to cloud the outskirts of an advancing army with a host of curious non-combatants, even if the military retreat had taken place at all, (which withet the civilians' panic might not have happened. the account given of the day would probably have been that which Mr. Russell, while ignerant of the disaster behind, gave to the affrighted fugitives whom he encountered toward its close: "Oh, it's a drawn battle. The troops are reoccupying the position from which they started in the morning." Unhappily the best night's mails were loaded with accounts, not of course intentionally exaggerated, but written under the influence of the same panic which had indefinitely aggravated, if it did not cause, the disaster. From the necessity of the case, the civilians being in the rear of the forces en gaged, the disorderly retreat, and finally the panic rout of the forces was all of which they could have been the eye-witnesses, and in their accounts, accordingly, these disastrous events occupy the chief place, to the exclusion of the military operations of the day. These opera tions extended over a space of several miles, and the commanding officers themselves were unable for some days to make a full and accurate report of them.

During my residence in London, I had ser