As my position may warrant, even if it does not call for some explanation of the causes, as far as they can be seen, which led to the results herein stated, I trust it may not be out of place if I refer in a few words to the immediate antecedents of the battle. When I submitted to the General-in-Chief, in compliance with his verbal instructions, the plan of operations and estimate of force required, the time I was to proceed to carry it into effect was fixed for tho 8th of July, Monday. Every facility possible was given me by the General-in-Chief, and the heads of the administrative departments, in making the necessary preparations. But the regiments, owing, I was told, to a want of transportation, came over slowly. Many of them did not come across till eight or nine days after the time fixed upon, and went forward without my even seeing them, and without having been together before in a brigade. The sending reinforcements to General Patterson, by drawing off the wagons, was a further and unavoidable cause of delay. Notwithstanding the Herculean efforts of the QuartermasterGeneral, and his favoring me in every way, the wagons for ammunition, subsistence, &c., and the horses for the trains and the artillery, did not arrive for more than a week after the time appointed to move. I was not even prepared as late as the 15th ultimo, and the desire I should move became great, and it was wished I should not, if possible, delay longer than Tuesday, the 16th ultimo. When I did set out, on the 16th, I was still deficient in wagons for subsistence. But I went forward, trusting to their being procured in time to follow me. The trains thus hurriedly gathered together, with horses, wagons, drivers, and wagon man agers, all new and unused to each other, moved with difficulty and disorder, and was the cause of a day's delay in getting the provisions forward, making it necessary to make on Sunday the attack we should have made on Saturday. I could not, with every exertion, get forward with the troops earlier than we did. I wished to go to Centreville the second day, which would have taken us there on the 17th, and enabled us, so far as they were concerned, to go into action on the 19th, instead of the 21st; but when I went forward from Fairfax Court House, beyond Germantown, to urge them forward, I was told it was impossible for the men to march further. They had only come from Vienna, about six miles, and it was not more than six and a half miles farther to Centreville-in all a march of twelve and a half miles; but the men were foot weary; not so much, I was told, by the distance marched, as by the time they had been on foot, caused by the obstructions in the road, and the slow pace we had to move to avoid ambuscades. The men were, moreover, unaccustomed to marching, their bodies not in condition for that kind of work, and not used to carying even the load of light marching order. of all arms, the fifth division (Miles's and Er ardson's brigade) on the left, at Blak Ford to Centreville, and Schenck's brig Tyler's division on the left of the roa the stone bridge, not participating in the a action. The numbers opposed to us have le variously estimated. I may safely say, a avoid even the appearance of exact that the enemy brought up all he could, were not kept engaged elsewhere. He notice of our coming on the 17th, and halt that time until the 21st to bring up whe he had. It is known that in estimatag force to go against Manassas, I engaged B have to do with the enemy's forces under ston, then kept in check in the valley by General Patterson, or those kept engag Major-General Butler, and I know everyt was made by the General-in-Chief that should be done, and that even if Johnston j Beauregard, it would not be because he be followed by General Patterson, but causes not necessary for me to refer th knew them all. This was not done, and enemy was free to assemble from every tion in numbers only limited by the amo his railroad rolling-stock and his supply of visions. To the forces, therefore, we dret from Fairfax Court House, Fairfax Station by mantown, and Centreville, and those Beauregard at Manassas, must be added the under Johnston from Winchester, and brought up by Davis from Richmond, to places at the South, to which is to be added levy en masse ordered by the Richmond thorities, which was ordered to assemble Manassas. What all this amounted to, I ca say-certainly much more than we attes them with. I could not, as I have said, more early on faster, nor could I delay. A large and best part of my forces were three months unteers, whose term of service was about expire, but who were sent forward as have long enough to serve for the purpose of the pedition. On the eve of the battle the For Pennsylvania regiment of volunteers, and battery of volunteer artillery of the New Yor Eighth militia, whose term of service expire insisted on their discharge. I wrote to the re ment, expressing a request for them to rem a short time, and the Hon. Secretary of W who was at the time on the ground, tried to induce the battery to remain at least five days But in vain. They insisted on their discharg that night. It was granted, and the morning, when the army moved forward in battle, these troops moved to the rear to the sound of the enemy's cannon. in the In the next few days, day by day, I should have lost ten thousand of the best armed drilled, officered, and disciplined troops army. In other words, every day which added to the strength of the enemy made us weaker. In conclusion, I desire to say, in reference to We crossed Bull Run with about 18,000 men the events of the 21st ultimo, that the general or the battle to which I referred was, and bridge approaches, on which both Ayers ght modifications, literally conformed and Carlisle at different times tried the effect the corps were brought over Bull Run of their guns without success; and a careful anner proposed, and put into action as examination of the banks of Bull Run satisfying rranged, and that up to late in the me that they were impracticable for the purn every movement ordered was carry-pose of artillery, these batteries had to remain successfully to the object we had pro- comparatively useless until such time as IIunter's efore starting-that of getting to the column might clear the approach by a moveleading from Manassas to the valley of ment on the opposite bank. During this period and going on it far enough to break of waiting the thirty-pounder was occasionally destroy the communication and inter- used with considerable effect against bodies of etween the forces under Beauregard | infantry and cavalry, which could be seen from e under Johnston. And could we have time to time moving in the direction of Hunter's day or a few hours sooner, there is column, and out of the range of ordinary guns. ing to show how we could have con- Using a high tree as an observatory, we could uccessful even against the odds with constantly see the operations of Hunter's and e contended. Heintzelman's column from the time they crossed Bull Run, and through one of my staff, Lieut. O'Rourke, of the engineers, I was promptly notified as to any change in the progress of their columns up to the time when it appeared that the heads of both were arrested, and the enemy seemed to be moving heavy reinforcements to support their troops. At this time I ordered Colonel Sherman, with his brigade, to cross Bull Run, and to support the two columns already in action. Colonel Sherman, as appears by his reports, crossed the run without opposition, and after encountering a party of the enemy flying before Hunter's forces, found General McDowell, and received his orders to join in the pursuit. The subsequent operations of this brigade and its able commander having been under your own eye and directions, I shall not follow its movements any further, but refer you to Colonel Sherman's report, which you will find herewith. the honor to be, very respectfully, FIRST DIVISION. GENERAL TYLER'S REPORT. AL: In obedience to order No. 22, treville, July 20, Sherman's, Schenck's, es's brigades, of this division-Richardcade having been left in front of Blackrd-moved at half-past two A. M., on inst., to threaten the passage of the n turnpike bridge, on Bull Run. I In front of the bridge with Schenck's man's brigades, and Ayres's and Carteries, about six A. M., Keyes's brigade en halted by your order to watch the ing up from Manassas, and about two So soon as it was discovered that Hunter's n the run. After examining the posi- division had been arrested, I ordered up Keyes's posting Sherman's and Schenck's bri- brigade, which arrived just as the left of Sherartillery, I fired the first gun at half-man's was crossing the run, and having satisfied M., as agreed upon, to show that we myself that the enemy had not the force nor osition. As my orders were to threat- the purpose to cross Bull Run, I ordered Keyes's sage of the bridge, I caused Schenck's brigade to follow Sherman, accompanying the be formed into line, its left resting move in person, as I saw it must necessarily ection of the bridge, and the battery place me on the left of our line, and in the best enemy had established to sweep the possible position, when we should have driven 1 its approach, so as to threaten both. the enemy off, to join Schenck's brigade and sbrigade was posted to the right of the two batteries left on the opposite side. I enton turnpike, so as to be in position ordered Colonel Keyes to incline the head of Schenck, or to move across Bull Run his column a little to the right of the line of ection of Hunter's column. march taken by Sherman's brigade, to avoid the fire of a battery which the enemy had opened. This movement sheltered the men to a considerable degree, and resulted in closing on the rear of Sherman's brigade; and, on reaching the high ground, I ordered Colonel Keyes to form into line on the left of Sherman's brigade, which was done with great steadiness and regularity. After waiting a few moments the line was ordered to advance, and came into conflict on its right with the enemy's cavalry and infantry, which, after some severe struggles, it drove back, until the further march of the brigade was arrested by a severe fire of artillery and infantry, sheltered by some buildings rty pounder gun attached to the Carery was posted on the Warrenton with Ayres's battery considerably in Carlisle's battery was posted on the erman's brigade. In this position we he appearance of Hunter's and Heintcolumns as ordered, until such time proach to the bridge should be carried, ridge rebuilt by Capt. Alexander, of ers, who had on the spot the necesture for that purpose. ter getting into position we discovered enemy had a heavy battery, with insupport, commanding both the road fresh, to have it cover the retreat. I did ar find it in the position in which I had left it, a supposed it had moved forward and joined the retreating column. I did not see Gen Schenck again until near Cub Run, where e appeared active in rallying his own or sce other regiments. General Schenck reports t's the two Ohio Regiments left Bull Run after th cavalry charge, and arrived at Centreville i good order. In closing this report, it gives me pleasure to express my admiration of the na ner in which Colonel Keyes handled his brigad completely covering it by every possible ac dent of the ground, while changing his positi and leading it bravely and skilfully to the tack at the right moment, to which the br responded in every instance in a manner hig creditable to itself and satisfactory to its c manding officers. At no time during the flict was this brigade disorganized, and it wa the last off the field, and in good order. standing on the heights above the road leading | General Schenck's brigade, intending, as it ve to Bull Run. The charge was here ordered, and the Second Maine and Third Connecticut regiments, which were opposed to this part of the enemy's line, pressed forward to the top of the hill until they reached the buildings which were held by the enemy, drove them out, and for a moment had them in possession. At this point, finding the brigade under the fire of a strong force behind breast works, the order was given to march by the left flank across an open field until the whole line was sheltered by the right bank of Bull Run, along which the march was conducted, with a view to turn the battery which the enemy had placed on the hill below the point at which the Warrenton turnpike crosses Bull Run. The march was conducted for a considerable distance below the stone bridge, causing the enemy to retire, and giving Captain Alexander an opportunity to pass the bridge, cut out the abatis which had been placed there, and prepared the way for Schenck's brigade and the two batteries to pass over. Before the contemplated movement could be made on the enemy's battery it was removed and placed in a position to threaten our line; but before the correct range could be obtained, Colonel Keyes carried his brigade, by a flank movement, around the base of the hill, and was on the point of ascending it in time to get at the battery, when I discovered that our troops were on the retreat, and that, unless a rapid movement to the rear was made, we should be cut off, and through my aid, Lieutenant Upton, Colonel Keyes was ordered to file to the right and join the retreating column. The order was executed without the least confusion, and the brigade joined the retreating column in good order. When this junction was made I left Keyes's brigade and rode forward to ascertain the condition of Schenck's brigade and the artillery left this side of Bull Run, and on arriving there found Ayers's battery and Lieutenant Haines's 30-pounder waiting orders. I immediately ordered Lieutenant Haines to limber up and move forward as soon as possible. This was promptly done, and the piece moved on towards Centreville. I then went into the wood where the ammunition wagon of this piece had been placed, out of the reach of the fire, and found that the driver had deserted and taken away part of the horses, which made it impossible to move it. I then returned to Ayers's battery, which I found limbered up, and ordered it to move forward and cover the retreat, which was promptly done by its gallant officers, and when the cavalry charge was made, shortly afterward, they repulsed it promptly and effectually. I then collected a guard, mainly from the Second Maine regiment, and put it under the command of Colonel Jameson, with orders to sustain Captain Ayers during the retreat, which was done gallantly and successfully, until the battery reached Centreville. Before ordering Colonel Jameson to cover Ayers's battery, I passed to the rear to find Colonel Keyes says:-"The gallantry which the Second Maine and Third Connectire regiments charged up the hill upon the enemys artillery and infantry, was never, in my opia surpassed, and the conduct of Colonels Ja son and Chatfield in this instance and throug out the day merits the highest commendation Colonel Terry rendered great assistance by gallantry and excellent conduct. Lienters Hascall, Acting Assistant Adjutant-Gener Lieutenants Walter and Ely, rendered ga and effective assistance." It gives me pleas to be able to confirm the above from perse observation, and to express my personal satis faction with the conduct of this brigade. F further particulars as to gallant conduct individuals, I beg leave to refer you to the ports of commanders of brigades, here attached. Colonel Sherman speaks highly of Colonel McCoon, of Wisconsin, and Lieutenars Piper and McQuester-all on his personal sta From my own personal staff I received, in every instance, prompt and gallant assistance, and my thanks are due to Captains Baird and Merrill, Lieutenants Houston, Abbott, Upto O'Rourke, and Audenreid, for gallant conduct and the prompt and valuable assistance they rendered me. Lieutenants Abbott and Upton were both wounded, and each had a horse killed under him, as also had Lieutenant O'Rourke. I enclose herewith a table of casualties showing our losses at Bull Run. I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant, DANIEL TYLER Brigadier-General Commanding Division. Brig.-Gen. McDowell, Commanding Depart ment North-eastern Virginia. CASUALTIES. First Brigade. Killed. Wounded. Missing. Slightly W Col. E. D. Keyes.....19 Gen. Schenck.......21 50 118 21 16 208 253 19 |