with foreign nations, or among the several States or with the Indian tribes. In pronouncing the statute invalid in its entirety the court said:

(p. 96) "When, therefore, Congress undertakes to enact a law, which can only be valid as a regulation of commerce, it is reasonable to expect to find on the face of the law, or from its essential nature, that it is a regulation of commerce with foreign nations, or among the several States, or with the Indian tribes. If not so limited, it is in excess of the power of Congress.

(p. 98) "It has been suggested that if Congress has power to regulate trade-marks used in commerce with foreign nations and among the several States, these statutes shall be held valid in that class of cases, if no further. To this there are two objections: Secondly, while it may be true that when one part of a statute is valid and constitutional, and another part is unconstitutional and void, the court may enforce the valid part where they are distinctly separable so that each can stand alone, it is not within the judicial province to give to the words used by Congress a narrower meaning than they are manifestly intended to bear in order that crimes may be punished which are not described in language that brings them within the constitutional power of that body.

(p. 99) "If we should, in the case before us, undertake to make by judicial construction a law which Congress did not make, it is quite probable we should do what, if the matter were now before that body, it would be unwilling to do; namely, make a trade-mark law which is only partial in its operation, and which would complicate the rights which parties would hold, in some instances under the act of Congress, and in others under state law."

The two cases from which we have quoted have been often followed and applied. United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629, 641; Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U. S. 678, 685;

James v. Bowman, 190 U. S. 127, 140; United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253, 262; Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. McKendree, 203 U. S. 514, 529-530; Karem v. United States, 121 Fed. Rep. 250, 259.

Counsel for the plaintiff cites El Paso & Northeastern Railway Co. v. Gutierrez, 215 U. S. 87, as an authority for holding the sections in question valid as applied to American vessels upon the high seas and to the District of Columbia and the Territories, notwithstanding their invalidity as applied to the States. The matter involved in that case was whether the provision in the Employers' Liability Act of 1906, 34 Stat. 232, c. 3073, relating to the District of Columbia and the Territories could be sustained, considering that the provision relating to interstate commerce had been adjudged invalid in Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463. That act was quite unlike the sections now before us in two important particulars: 1. It was not a penal or criminal statute, to be strictly construed, but was a civil and purely remedial one, to be construed liberally. 2. Its applicability to the District of Columbia and the Territories did not depend upon the same words which made it applicable to interstate commerce. On the contrary, it dealt expressly, first, with common carriers "in the District of Columbia, or in any Territory of the United States," and, second, with common carriers "between the several States." The latter provision had been adjudged invalid because too broad in some of its features, and the Gutierrez Case involved the other provision. In that case the court, considering the terms of the statute, held that the provision relating to interstate commerce was "entirely separable from" the one relating to the District of Columbia and the Territories, and that Congress manifestly had proceeded "with the intention to regulate the matter in the District and the Territories, irrespective of the interstate commerce feature of the act." With the

invalid and separable provision eliminated, there still remained a complete and operative statute in terms applying to the District of Columbia and the Territories. The differences between that act and the sections now before us are so pronounced and so obvious that the Gutierrez Case is not an authority for the plaintiff. On the contrary, it is in entire harmony with the other cases before cited, as is shown throughout the opinion and by the following excerpt (p. 97):

"It remains to inquire whether it is plain that Congress would have enacted the legislation had the act been limited to the regulation of the liability to employés engaged in commerce within the District of Columbia and the Territories. If we are satisfied that it would not, or that the matter is in such doubt that we are unable to say what Congress would have done omitting the unconstitutional feature, then the statute must fall. Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. McKendree, 203 U. S. 514; Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U. S. supra."

Here it is not possible to separate that which is constitutional from that which is not. Both are dependent upon the same general words, "within the jurisdiction of the United States," which alone indicate where the sections are to be operative. Those words, as the context and the preamble show, were purposely used. They express the legislative will and cannot be limited in the manner suggested without altering the purpose with which the two sections were enacted. They must therefore be adjudged altogether invalid. James v. Bowman and United States v. Ju Toy, supra; Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270, 305.

Judgment affirmed.

230 U. S.

Syllabus.

OCHOA v. HERNANDEZ Y MORALES.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR PORTO RICO.

No. 92. Submitted December 17, 1912.-Decided June 16, 1913.

Under § 35 of the Foraker Act, appeals from the District Court of the United States for Porto Rico are subject to the provisions applicable to appeals from the Supreme Courts of the Territories under the act of April 7, 1874, under which the jurisdiction of this court is confined, in a case where there are no errors assigned upon questions of evidence, to determining whether the findings of the court below support the judgment. Rosaly v. Graham, 227 U. S. 584. Even if the commanding officer in territory occupied by military forces of the United States has all the legislative power as to such territory possessed by Congress, he is still subject, as Congress is, to the provisions of the Fifth Amendment and cannot by military orders deprive persons of their property without due process of law. To shorten the period for acquisition of title by prescription and give the order a retroactive effect so that the period has elapsed at the time the order is made without giving those who have interests in the property an opportunity to be heard and saving no existing rights, amounts to taking property without due process of law. The provision in the judicial order of General Henry published April 7, 1899, during the military occupation of Porto Rico by the United States, reducing the period for prescriptive title to real estate in that island from the periods previously established by law down to six years with retroactive effect and without any opportunity for third parties to be heard, amounted to a deprivation of property of the actual owners without due process of law and was beyond the power of the Military Governor; nor was this provision ratified by any subsequent action of Congress.

The status of Porto Rico during the military occupancy and before the exchange of ratifications of the treaty of peace, was the same as that of the Philippine Islands during the same period.

From the exchange of ratifications until Congress acted by the passage of the Foraker Act the provisional government established in Porto Rico continued as before the peace.

During the entire period General Orders No. 101 relating to Cuba and

Argument for Appellants.

230 U. S.

reiterated mutatis mutandi as to Porto Rico by General Miles continued in force as the recognized declaration of principles by which the Military Government was limited, and under this the Governor was without authority to make any order that would deprive any person of his property without due process of law.

While the exact definition of the term "due process of law" may be uncertain, it is certain that it inhibits the taking of one man's property and giving it to another, contrary to settled usages and modes of procedure, and without notice or an opportunity to be heard. Statutes of limitation may be modified by shortening the time which is still running but only so that a reasonable time still remains for commencement of an action before the bar takes effect.

Wherever registry laws are in force, the rule is that a purchaser takes subject to any defects and infirmities that may be ascertained by reference to the chain of title as spread on the record, and this includes invalidity of an order on which title is based.

Under the registry law of Porto Rico rights of third parties were preserved and a mortgagee or grantee acquired no better right before the expiration of the period of prescription than the grantor, but took subject to the rights of infants who owned property the title to which had been fraudulently registered in the name of the grantor. Where the limitations on a person exercising authority are notorious and are simply in accord with national and international law, there is no hardship in applying the rule that rights cannot be acquired under orders made by such person which are wholly beyond his authority.

5 Porto Rico Fed. Rep. 463, affirmed.

THE facts, which involve the title to real estate in Porto Rico and the constitutionality of certain military orders during the military occupation of that Island, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. T. D. Mott, Jr., for appellants:

The Judicial Order of April 4, 1899, is not unconstitutional nor is it repugnant to Art. V of, or the Fourteenth Amendment to, the Constitution of the United States.

Paragraph 3 of the Judicial Order is not a statute of limitations properly so called. It cut off no right of action on the part of anyone. In the present case it permitted appellants' grantor to convert his possessory into a dominio