U. S. 380; Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137, 138; Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U. S. 251. In Compagnie Francaise &c. v. Board of Health, supra, the court had before it the quarantine law of Louisiana which, among other things, provided the State Board of Health might "in its discretion, prohibit the introduction into any infected portions of the State, persons acclimated, or unacclimated or said to be immune, when in its judgment the introduction of such persons would add to or increase the prevalence of the disease." The Supreme Court of the State, interpreting the statute, held that it empowered the Board to exclude healthy persons from a locality infested with a contagious or infectious disease, whether they came from without or within the State. It was objected that this provision was too broad and that the former decisions of the court were based upon the right of the States to exclude diseased persons and things which were not legitimate subjects of commerce. The court sustained the law, saying, with respect to this argument: "But it must be at once observed that this erroneously states the doctrine as concluded by the decisions of this court previously referred to, since the proposition ignores the fact that those cases expressly and unequivocally hold that the health and quarantine laws of the several States are not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, although they affect foreign and domestic commerce, as in many cases they necessarily must do in order to be efficacious, because until Congress has acted under the authority conferred upon it by the Constitution, such state health and quarantine laws producing such effect on legitimate interstate commerce are not in conflict with the Constitution. True is it that, in some of the cases relied on in the argument, it was held that a state law absolutely prohibiting the introduction, under all circumstances, of objects actually affected with disease, was valid because such objects were not legitimate commerce. But this implies no limitation on the power to

/regulate by health laws the subjects of legitimate commerce. In other words, the power exists until Congress has acted, to incidentally regulate by health and quarantine laws, even although interstate and foreign commerce is affected, and the power to absolutely prohibit additionally obtains where the thing prohibited is not commerce, and hence not embraced in either interstate or foreign commerce." (Id., p. 391.)

State inspection laws and statutes designed to safeguard the inhabitants of a State from fraud and imposition are valid when reasonable in their requirements and not in conflict with Federal rules, although they may affect interstate commerce in their relation to articles prepared for export or by including incidentally those brought into the State and held for sale in the original imported packages. Gibbons v. Ogden, supra, p. 203; Turner v. Maryland, 107 U. S. 38; Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U. S. 461; Patapsco Guana Co. v. North Carolina, 171 U. S. 345, 357, 358; Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501. And for the protection of its game and the preservation of a valuable food supply, the State may penalize the possession of game during the closed season whether obtained within the State or brought from abroad. Silz v. Hesterberg, 211 U. S. 31.

Interstate carriers, in the absence of Federal statute providing a different rule, are answerable according to the law of the State for nonfeasance or misfeasance within its limits. Chicago, Milwaukee &c. Ry. Co. v. Solan, 169 U. S. 133, 137; Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Hughes, 191 U. S. 477, 491; Martin v. Pittsburg & Lake Erie R. R. Co., 203 U. S. 284, 294; Southern Pacific Co. v. Schuyler, 227 U. S. 601, 613. Until the enactment by Congress of the act of April 22, 1908, c. 149, 35 Stat. 65, the laws of the States determined the liability of interstate carriers by railroad for injuries received by their employés while engaged in interstate commerce, and this was because Congress, although empowered to regulate the subject,

had not acted thereon. In some States the so-called fellow-servant rule obtained; in others, it had been abrogated; and it remained for Congress, in this respect and in other matters specified in the statute, to establish a uniform rule. Mondou v. N: Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co., supra; Michigan Central R. R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U. S. 59, 66, 67. So, where Congress has not intervened, state statutes providing damages for wrongful death may be enforced not only against land carriers but also against the owners of vessels engaged in interstate commerce where the wrong occurs within the jurisdiction of the State. Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99, 103. See American Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 16 Wall. 522; The Hamilton, 207 U. S. 398. And, until Congress legislated on the matter, liability for loss of property, on interstate as well as intrastate shipments, was subject to state regulation. Some States allowed an exemption by contract from all or a part of the common law liability; others allowed no exemption. These differences in the applicable laws created inequalities with respect to interstate transportation, but each State exercised the power inherent in its territorial jurisdiction, and the remedy for the resulting diversity lay with Congress, which was free to substitute its own regulations; and this was done in the recent amendment of § 20 of the Act to Regulate Commerce. Act of June 29, 1906, c. 3591, 34 Stat. 584; Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491, 500. It is within the competency of a State to create and enforce liens upon vessels for supplies furnished under contracts not maritime in their nature, and it is no valid objection that the state law may obstruct the prosecution of a voyage of an interstate character. The Winnebago, 205 U. S. 354. It may also create liens for damages to property on land occasioned by negligence of vessels. Johnson v. Chicago &c. Elevator Co., 119 U. S. 388; Martin v. West, 222 U. S. 191. Cars employed in interstate commerce may be

seized by attachment under state law, in order to compel the payment of debts. Davis v. C., C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 217 U. S. 157. And the legislation of the States, safeguarding life and property and promoting comfort and convenience within its jurisdiction, may extend incidentally to the operations of the carrier in the conduct of interstate business, provided it does not subject that business to unreasonable demands and is not opposed to Federal legislation. Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465; Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U. S. 299; N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co. v. New York, 165 U. S. 628; Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285; Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Larabee Mills, 211 U. S. 612; Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 262. It has also been held that the State has the power to forbid the consolidation of state railroad corporations with competing lines although both may be interstate carriers and the prohibition may have a far-reaching effect upon interstate commerce. Pearsall v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 161 U. S. 646, 677; Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 161 U. S. 677, 701, 702. See Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197, 317, 348, 382.

Again, it is manifest that when the legislation of the State is limited to internal commerce to such degree that it does not include even incidentally the subjects of interstate commerce, it is not rendered invalid because it may affect the latter commerce indirectly. In the intimacy of commercial relations, much that is done in the superintendence of local matters may have an indirect bearing upon interstate commerce. The development of local resources and the extension of local facilities may have a very important effect upon communities less favored and to an appreciable degree alter the course of trade. The freedom of local trade may stimulate interstate commerce, while restrictive measures within the police power of the State enacted exclusively with re

spect to internal business, as distinguished from interstate traffic, may in their reflex or indirect influence diminish the latter and reduce the volume of articles transported into or out of the State. It was an objection of this sort that was urged and overruled in Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1, to the law of Iowa prohibiting the manufacture and sale of liquor within the State, save for limited purposes. See also Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U. S. 519, 534; Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U. S. 343; Capital City Dairy Co. v. Ohio, 183 U. S. 238, 245; Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Kansas, supra. When, however, the State in dealing with its internal commerce undertakes to regulate instrumentalities which are also used in interstate commerce, its action is necessarily subject to the exercise by Congress of its authority to control such instrumentalities so far as may be necessary for the purpose of enabling it to discharge its constitutional function. Southern Railway Co. v. United States, supra; Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, supra. Within the state power, then, in the words of Chief Justice Marshall is, "that immense mass of legislation, which embraces everything within the territory of a State, not surrendered to a general government: all which can be most advantageously exercised by the States themselves. Inspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every description, as well as laws for regulating the internal commerce of a State, and those which respect turnpike roads, ferries, &c., are component parts of this mass. No direct general power over these objects is granted to Congress: and, consequently, they remain subject to state legislation. If the legislative power of the Union can reach them, it must be for national purposes; it must be where the power is expressly given for a special purpose, or is clearly incidental to some power which is expressly given." Gibbons v. Ogden, supra, pp. 203, 304.

And, wherever as to such matters, under these estab