Institutional Incentives And Sustainable Development: Infrastructure Policies In PerspectiveAvalon Publishing, 21. 3. 1993 - Počet stran: 288 Integrating recent research in the fields of public administration, public finance, institutional economics, and policy analysis, this book shows how institutional arrangements and the incentives they generate can help or hinder development efforts. The authors present a method for systematically comparing alternative institutional arrangements for the development of rural infrastructure. Their analysis reveals the special strengths and weaknesses of polycentric as compared to centralized or decentralized institutional arrangements. Descriptions of a variety of infrastructure projects—including roads, bridges, and irrigation systems—in geographical settings as diverse as Africa, Asia, and Latin America are used to illustrate key concepts.Perfect for courses on policy analysis, development administration, and economic development and for use by professional practitioners, Institutional Incentives contributes appreciably and practically to the understanding of sustainable development, infrastructure maintenance, institutional analysis, and the central importance of institutional arrangements. |
Obsah
The Role of Infrastructure | 1 |
rruption 65 | 12 |
en Provision and Production 74 | 18 |
Autorská práva | |
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