3. The Japanese Government undertakes, before the cessation of British consular jurisdiction in Japan, to join the international conventions for the protection of industrial property and copyright.

4. It is understood between the two high contracting parties that, if Japan think it necessary at any time to levy an additional duty on the production or manufacture of refined sugar in Japan, an increased customs duty equivalent in amount may be levied on British refined sugar when imported into Japan, so long as such additional excise tax or inland duty continues to be raised.

Provided always that British refined sugar shall in this respect be entitled to the treatment accorded to refined sugar being the produce or manufacture of the most favoured nation.

5. The undersigned plenipotentiaries have agreed that this protocol shall be submitted to the two high contracting parties at the same time as the treaty of commerce and navigation signed this day, and that when the said treaty is ratified the agreements contained in the protocol shall also equally be considered as approved, without the necessity of a further formal ratification.

It is agreed that this protocol shall terminate at the same time the said treaty ceases to be binding.

In witness whereof, the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto the seal of their arms.

Done at London, in duplicate, this sixteenth day of the seventh month of the twenty-seventh year of Meiji.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE AMENDMENTS PROPOSED AND CONSIDERED SINCE THE ACTION OF THE SENATE ON THE FORMER CANAL TREATY WITH GREAT BRITAIN, AND WHICH HAVE RESULTED IN THE TREATY NOW SUBMITTED.1

[Prepared in the Department of State and sent by Mr. Hay to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.]

The Senate's amendments to the former treaty required (first) that there should be in plain and explicit terms an express abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty; (second) that the rules of neutrality adopted 1 Senate Document No. 746, 61st Congress, 3d Session.

should not deprive the United States of the right to defend itself and to maintain public order; and (third) that other powers should not in any manner be made parties to the treaty by being invited to adhere to it.

For a better understanding of the scheme of the new treaty, it may be well briefly to advert to the objections suggested by Great Britain to these several amendments.

AS TO THE ABROGATION OF THE CLAYTON-BULWER TREATY.

Lord Lansdowne's objections were as to the manner of doing this and as to the substance. It was insisted that in the negotiations which led to the making of the former treaty no attempt had been made to ascertain the views of the British Government on such complete abrogation, and that the Clayton-Bulwer treaty being, as it claimed, an international compact of unquestionable validity, could not be abrogated without the consent of both parties to the contract.

There was in this connection an apparent misconception on the part of His Majesty's Government in respect to the proper function of the Senate in advising the ratification of a treaty with amendments proposed by it. It seemed to be regarded as an attempt on the part of the Senate to accomplish by its own vote, as a final act, the abrogation of an existing treaty, without an opportunity for full consideration of the matter by the other party. It was overlooked that the Senate was simply exercising its undoubted constitutional function of proposing amendments to be communicated to the other party to the contract, to ascertain its views upon the question, and it was hoped by the President and the hope was expressed in submitting the treaty as amended by the Senate to the British Government - that the amendments would be found acceptable by it. Failing this, there was a full opportunity for His Majesty's Government, by counter propositions, to express its views on this and the other. amendments, and so by a continuous negotiation to arrive, if possible, at a mutually satisfactory solution of all questions involved. Nevertheless, in view of the great importance of the Senate's amendments, taken together, it was deemed more expedient by Lord Lansdowne to reject them, but to leave the door open for fresh negotiations, which might have a more happy issue; and he earnestly deprecated a final failure of the parties to agree, and emphatically expressed the desire of his government to meet the views of the United States on this most important matter.

The principal substantial objection to the Senate's amendment, completely superseding the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, was that if this were done, the provisions of Article I of that treaty, which had been left untouched by the original Hay-Pauncefote treaty, would be annulled, and thereby both powers would, except in the vicinity of the canal, acquire entire freedom of action in Central America, a change which Lord Lansdowne thought would certainly be of advantage to the United States, and might be of substantial importance.

AS TO THE RIGHT OF THE UNITED STATES, NOTWITHSTANDING THE NEUTRAL RULES ADOPTED BY THE TREATY, TO DEFEND ITSELF BY ITS OWN FORCES, AND TO SECURE THE MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC ORDER, COVERED BY WHAT WAS GENERALLY KNOWN AS THE DAVIS AMENDMENT.

His Majesty's Government criticized the vagueness of the language employed in the amendment, and the absence of all security as to the manner in which its ends might at some future time be interpreted; but thought that, however precisely it might be worded, it would be impossible to determine what might be the effect if one clause permitting defensive measures and another clause (which has now been omitted) prohibiting fortification of the canal were allowed to stand side by side in the same convention.

This amendment was strenuously objected to by Great Britain as involving a distinct departure from the principle of neutrality which had theretofore found acceptance by both governments, inasmuch as it would, as construed by Lord Lansdowne, permit the United States in time of peace as well as in time of war to resort to whatever warlike acts it pleased in and near the canal, which would be clearly inconsistent with its intended neutral character and would deprive the commerce and navies of the world of the free use of it.

It was insisted that by means of the amendment the obligation of Great Britain to respect the neutrality of the canal under all circumstances would remain in force, while that of the United States, on the other hand, would be essentially modified, and that this would result in a one-sided agreement, by which Great Britain would be debarred from any warlike act in or near the canal, while the United States could resort to any such acts, even in time of peace, which it might deem necessary to secure its own safety.

Moreover, it was insisted that by this amendment, in connection with the third amendment, which excluded other powers from becoming par

ties to the contract, Great Britain would be placed at a great disadvantage as compared with all other powers, inasmuch as she alone, with all her vast interests in the commerce of the world, would be bound under all circumstances to respect the neutrality of the canal, while the United States, even in time of peace, would have a treaty right to interfere with the canal on the plea of necessity for its own safety, and all other powers not being bound by the traety could at their pleasure disregard its provisions.

AS TO THE AMENDMENT STRIKING OUT THE ARTICLE IN THE TREATY AS SUBMITTED TO THE SENATE, WHICH PROVIDED FOR AN INVITATION TO THE OTHER POWERS TO COME IN AND ADHERE TO IT.

This was emphatically objected to because if acquiesced in by Great Britain she would be bound by what Lord Lansdowne described as the "stringent rules of neutral conduct" prescribed by the treaty, which would not be equally binding upon the other powers, and it was urged that the adhesion of other powers to the treaty as parties would furnish an additional security for the neutrality of the canal.

In the hope of reconciling the conflicting views thus presented between the former treaty as amended by the Senate and the objections thereto of the British Government, the treaty now submitted for the consideration of the Senate was drafted.

The substantial differences from the former treaty are as follows:

First. In the new draft of treaty the provision superseding the ClaytonBulwer treaty as a whole, instead of being parenthetically inserted, as by the former Senate amendment, was made the subject of an independent article and presented as the first article of the treaty. It was thus submitted to the consideration of the British Government in connection with the other substantial provisions of the treaty which declared the neutrality of the canal for the use of all nations on terms of entire equality.

Second. By a change in the first line of Article III, instead of the United States and Great Britain jointly adopting as the basis of the neutralization of the canal, the rules of neutrality prescribed for its use as was provided by the former treaty, the United States now alone adopts them.

This was regarded as a very radical and important change and one which would go far toward a reconciliation of the conflicting views of the two governments.

It relieves Great Britain of all responsibility and obligation to enforce the neutrality of the canal, which by the former treaty had been imposed upon or assumed by her jointly with the United States, and thus meets the main stress of the objection which seemed to underlie or be interwoven with her other objections to the former Senate amendments. The United States alone as the sole owner of the canal, as a purely American enterprise, adopts and prescribes the rules by which the use of the canal shall be regulated, and assumes the entire responsibility and burden of enforcing, without the assistance of Great Britain. or of any other nation, its absolute neutrality.

It was also believed that this change would be in harmony with the national wish that this great interoceanic waterway should not only be constructed and owned, but exclusively controlled and managed, by the United States.

Third. The next important change from the former treaty consists in the omission of the words " in time of war as in time of peace" from clause 1 of Article III.

No longer insisting upon the language of the Davis amendment which had in terms reserved to the United States express permission to disregard the rules of neutrality prescribed, when necessary to secure its own defense, which the Senate had apparently deemed necessary because of the provision in Rule I, that the canal should be free and open "in time of war as in time of peace" to the vessels of all nations — it was considered that the omission of the words "in time of war as in time of peace" would dispense with the necessity of the amendment referred to, and that war between the contracting parties, or between the United States and any other power, would have the ordinary effect of war upon treaties when not specially otherwise provided, and would remit both parties to their original and natural right of self-defense and give to the United States the clear right to close the canal against the other belligerent, and to protect it and defend itself by whatever means might be necessary.

Fourth. In conformity with the Senate's emphatic rejection of Article III of the former treaty, which provided that the high contracting parties would, immediately upon the exchange of ratifications, bring it to the notice of other powers and invite them to adhere to it, no such provision was inserted in the draft of the new treaty.

It was believed that the declaration that the canal should be free and open to all nations on terms of entire equality (now that Great Britain was relieved of all responsibility and obligation to enforce and defend its