Sound, the Emperor Paul laid an embargo on all British property in his dominions, which embargo was taken off on the convention between Great Britain and Denmark being known at St. Petersburgh.1 On the surrender of Malta to the British in September, 1800, the Emperor Paul claimed this island from our government, alleging his convention of 1798, in which, however, there was not a single clause, affording not only a reason, but even a pretext, for such a demand.2 It will be remembered that Paul had become Grand Master of the Knights of Malta, a fantastic attachment to that order being one of the many points which gave color to the suspicion of his insanity. Vexation at the refusal of the British to comply with his request, induced him to resort to the first means that offered of injuring this country, and in spite of the treaty between Great Britain and Russia, of which the twelfth article expressly forbade that, in case of rupture, the goods or persons of the subjects of either country should be detained or confiscated he laid an embargo on all British property in his dominions; and a British merchantman having managed to escape from Narva, he ordered that another British yessel should be burned.3 While in this state of incipient hostility, Russia concluded with Sweden, on the 4/16 December, 1800, a treaty renewing the confederacy for an Armed Neutrality. The principles declared to be established by this treaty, article III, were as follows: I. That any vessel may freely sail from port to port, and on the coasts of nations at war. II. That property belonging to the subjects of belligerent Powers shall be free on board the ships of neutrals, excepting goods that are contraband. III. That to determine what constitutes a blockaded port, this term shall only be allowed to ports where, from the arrangements of the Power which is attacking with vessels stationary and sufficiently close, there is an evident danger in entering; and that any vessel sailing towards a blockaded port shall not be regarded as contravening the present convention, unless, after having been warned of the state of the port by the commander of the blockading squadron, she shall attempt to enter, employing either force or fraud. IV. That neutral vessels may not be detained except on just grounds 1 De Martens, Recueil, vol. vii, pp. 150-154. 2See the treaty, which is a treaty of subsidy, ibid., vol. vi, p. 557. 3De Martens, Recueil, vol. vii, p. 155. and evident facts; that they shall be adjudged without delay, that the process shall always be uniform, prompt, and legal; and that in every instance, besides an indemnity to parties who have suffered loss without having committed wrong, there shall be afforded a complete satisfaction for the insult offered to the flag of Their Majesties. V. That the declaration of the officer commanding the ship or ships of the royal or imperial navy, accompanying a convoy of one or more merchant ships, that his convoy has not on board any goods that are contraband, shall suffice to prevent there being any visitation for search on board his ship or the ships of his convoy. By subsequent articles mutual assistance is promised in case of attack.1 Articles to the same effect were engaged by a treaty, of the same date, between Russia and Denmark, and, two days later, by a treaty between Russia and Prussia.3 An account of subsequent proceedings regarding this confederacy is given in the present treatise, in the chapter on the right of Search, to which the article on Convoy seemed to make the discussion most properly belong. It will be only necessary here to recapitulate that, the above-named States having joined themselves to a Power, after it had placed itself in a situation of equivocal amity with this country, an embargo was laid upon Danish and Swedish, as well as Russian property, in British ports. Subsequently the battle of Copenhagen took place, the Emperor Paul was assassinated, and the Emperor Alexander, immediately on his accession, made a treaty, which adjusted the dispute with Great Britain. In this treaty, dated 5/17 June, 1801, Great Britain acceded to the proposals of the Northern courts regarding convoy, and Russia agreed to the old principle, that neutral ships should not protect enemies' property. By article III, sec. 2, it was agreed that goods embarked in the ships of neutrals shall be free, excepting contraband of war and the property of enemies. To this treaty Denmark and Sweden afterwards acceded. Thus the principle that "free ships make free goods," had been attempted to be enforced by a confederacy which was broken by a single maritime Power, and the principle of the old rule was vindicated and reestablished. In the first Armed Neutrality, Great Britain, though she never acquiesced 1De Martens, Recueil, vol. vii, p. 172. 2Ibid. 181. 3Ibid. 188. 4 See the three treaties, De Martens, Recueil, vol, vii, pp. 260–281. in the pretensions of that confederacy, and formally protested against them, yet had too many foes at the same time to make an addition to them expedient. But, in the second Armed Neutrality, we were enabled to shew that we would not permit maritime rights to be invaded by confederates united to subvert the Law of Nations for their own selfish purposes; we forced an abandonment of principles which these confederates united to defend; and Nelson's glory at Copenhagen was of the purest character, arising from valor successfully exercised in the vindication of justice. A treaty embodying the five articles of the second Armed Neutrality, was made between Russia and Sweden on the 1/13 of March, 1801, that is, before the attack on Copenhagen, and ratified at St. Petersburgh on the 30 May/11 June, that is, after the signature of the above-named treaty between Russia and Great Britain. This merely shows how completely impossible it is to deduce anything like a system from the treaties of nations regarding the principle of "free ships free goods;" Russia, the leader in both the Armed Neutralities, making, in the instances before us, a treaty embodying one principle with Great Britain, while she ratified, in the very same week, a treaty with Sweden containing exactly the reverse principle. NYS: Le Droit International. New edition. Brussels, 1912. Ernest Nys. Contemporary Belgian publicist; born in 1851. Professor of international law at the University of Brussels; member of the Institute of International Law; member of the permanent court of arbitration. He is the author of many works on special branches of the subject of international law and is a frequent contributor to the periodicals. Among his numerous works, one of the most recent and systematic is Le Droit International, three volumes, 1904 et seq. The Anglo-American interpretation of international law by courts and juri-ts has been one of his special fields of study, and he is well known the French translator of Westlake and Lorimer Iolume 3, page 586.-We have recalled how, on March 17, 1693, math and Sweden signed a treaty, which is perhaps the first ex ample of a league to assert the rights of neutrality. In 1780 there were concluded between Russia, Denmark, and Sweden conventions likewise intended to uphold the rights of non-belligerents against the pretensions of belligerents, to which conventions a number of maritime States acceded. History calls this agreement of 1780 "the armed neutrality league." The Declaration of Independence of the English Colonies in America is dated July 4, 1776. On February 6, 1778, Louis XVI, King of France, who had already authorized his subjects to carry munitions of war to the Americans, formally recognized the United States as an independent nation and concluded with them a real treaty of alliance in the form of a treaty of amity and commerce. On March 15, 1778, the French Ambassador informed the Court of London of the signing of the treaty. This was the signal for war. The family pact signed at Paris on August 15, 1761, between the King of France and the King of Spain, binding both the reigning sovereigns and their descendants and heirs, was destined to draw Spain into the hostilities. Charles III vainly endeavored to play the part of mediator; on June 16, 1779, he was forced to make war on Great Britain. Spain and Great Britain put into operation the most rigorous measures with regard to neutrals on the sea. "Great Britain," says a writer, "who was the most directly interested in the argument, regarding the Americans as rebels, claimed the right to prohibit neutral Powers to have any commercial intercourse with her insurgent colonies. English Admiralty Judges-and the most formidable opponent of the rights of neutrals among them was Sir James Marriott-applied in the matter of blockade and contraband of war theories that were very elastic and fatal to neutral commerce. The privateers of Great Britain, feeling assured that they would very seldom, not to say never, be condemned to pay expenses, still less damages, became the scourge of neutral commerce."1 In the treaty which she had concluded with the United States on February 6, 1778, France had recognized the inviolability of a neutral flag, and if she had not in her regulations of July 26, 1778, abandoned the traditional principles of her marine legislation, she had tempered them with moderation. It has not yet been definitely ascertained whether the credit of having conceived the idea of solemnly declaring the rights of neutrals against unjust pretensions belongs to Catherine II, Empress of Russia, 1Ch. de Boeck, De la propriété privée ennemie sous pavillon ennemi, p. 57. to Charles Gravier de Vergennes, Secretary of State of Louis XVI of France, or to Andrew von Bernstorff, Minister of Charles VII of Denmark. Justice requires us to divide the honor, but it is proper to call attention to the part played by Vergennes. "The union of neutrais was his work," says a writer, "and he succeeded in formulating a masterly conception, which brought forth only beneficial results. The Secretary of State had conceived that measure even before the signing of the treaty of alliance with America. His object was to deprive the English of the mighty power which the sovereign possession of the sea assured to them. Holland, Sweden, Denmark, Russia were sc situated geographically that they could enjoy, like England, the advantages of the sea; but between all these countries and England there were strong ties, either close political ties or those that were almost as irresistible, created by the fear of displeasing the harsh and vindictive Power which the downfall of France had for twenty years made mistress of Europe. M. de Vergennes was too well aware of this situation to think of attacking it from the front. His economic sense and the ideas that it gives enlightened the politician in him. . . He perceived the new strength which the doctrine that the sea belonged to everybody and to no one, and that it was the right of neutrals to live under this law, would have in drawing these countries together." The author whom we have just quoted shows how the injury to her interests finally prevailed with Catherine II over the temptations with which Great Britain was luring her Court to bring her over to its side and how Count Panin, the Empress's Chancellor, seized this occasion to attach his sovereign to the doctrine of France. "Catherine II," he writes, "addressed to the belligerent Courts of Europe the declaration, for which Panin, the Prime Minister, has, not without reason, received the praise of history, but it is proper to mention the fact that M. de Vergennes and the Government of Louis XIV had laid down the doctrine and practically dictated its terms." Without attempting to write the history of the armed neutrality, let us recall certain facts in connection with it.3 Henri Doniol, Histoire de la participation de la France à l'établissement des Etats-Unis d'Amérique.--Correspondance diplomatique et documents (1888), vol. 3, p. 702. 2Ibid., vol. 4, p. 436. The Cambridge Modern History, vol. 9, 1906, chap. 2, The Armed Neutrality, by T. A. Walker and H. W. Wilson, |