EXTRACTS FROM WORKS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 87

acceded to it, never recognized its principles except when convenient, and it did not even reflect the practice of Russia itself. For in a despatch dated 26th May, 1780, Lord Malmesbury says of Admiral Greig, an eminent officer in the Russian service, "As soon as he read the declaration and saw the grounds on which the instructions were to be made, he collected the various sentences which had been pronounced last war in the Archipelago by the Russian tribunal instituted for that purpose, and at which he frequently presided, on neutral ships. After proving in the clearest manner that they confiscated and condemned Turkish property wherever they found it, and the only prizes they made were such property on board neutral ships, he gave in the whole to Count Czernicheff, signifying that as a faithful and affectionate servant of the Empress he thought himself obliged to set before her eyes, that if she carried her present measures into execution she would act in direct contradiction to herself." 1

In the next place the declaration, "free ships, free goods," was not the statement of a principle, but the expression of an interest-an interest as shifting as any of those movable necessities which have always regulated political combinations, never recognized in war by those very belligerents who have declaimed about it in peace. The effort to elevate it into an international law has been only a struggle to legalize one sort of selfishness at the expense of another; and such a rule can take its place only in a system which, in the emphatic language of Sir Wm. Scott, "if it is consistent, has for its real purpose an entire abolition of capture in war-that is, in other words, to change the nature of hostility as it has ever existed among mankind, and to introduce a state of things not yet seen in the world--that of a military war and a commercial peace." 2

The Congress of the United States, however, fancied that they saw in the sentiment of this purely selfish coalition, indication of such a general liberality of political judgment as would respond to the spirit of their resistance. Although discouraged by the more sober wisdom and better information of the French court, they expressed in strong resolutions their approbation of the code of the neutrality, forwarded these resolutions through Mr. Adams to the various courts who had entered into the league, and finally, on December 19, 1780, despatched Mr. Francis Dana as minister to St. Petersburgh. In their instruc

1Malmesbury's Diaries, etc., vol. i, p. 264.

2Judgment of the High Court of Admiralty upon the Swedish convoy, in the case of the ship Maria, Paulsen, master.

tions they say to him, "You will readily perceive that it must be a leading and capital point if these United States shall be formally admitted as a party to the convention of the neutral maritime Powers for maintaining the freedom of commerce. This regulation, in which the Empress is deeply interested, and from which she has derived so much glory, will open the way for your favorable reception, which we have greater reason to expect, as she has publicly invited the belligerent Powers to accede thereto." 1

One would have supposed that the maintenance of their own freedom was quite enough for the attention of Congress; and it was, to say the least, a broad interpretation of Catharine's invitation to suppose themselves included under the term belligerents. But it must be said for the statesmen of that day, that they never forgot what they intended to be; and the uniform language of their diplomacy was bold even to what their circumstances might have stigmatized as presumption. But the anxiety with which they sought to introduce themselves into the affairs of Europe was ample evidence that they did not intend their independence to be isolation. They had resolved to be one of the nations of the earth-one to whom the politics of the world were to be matter of practical interest, and they considered their commerce as the means of direct connexion. It will be now generally admitted that any participation by the United States in this coalition would have been a useless complication of their affairs, serving no national purpose and contributing to no general good. The opportunity, however, was never offered; for Mr. Dana's efforts, however able, were very useless. His presence in St. Petersburgh resulted only in affording Lord Malmesbury the small triumph of preventing his public reception by Russia. even after the acknowledged independence of the United States, and enabling him to close his career of disappointment at that court by trusting that he had "suspended the appearance of the American agent here in public, till such time as it may take place without having any disagreeable or extraordinary effect." 2

Secret Journal of Congress, vol. ii, p. 358.

2Malmesbury's Diaries, etc., vol. i, p. 506. Despatch to Lord Grantham, March 11. 1783.

Volume II, page 267.-One result of the armed neutrality of 1780 was to lay the foundation of a common concert amongst the continental Powers on the subject of contraband of war, although such concert could only take effect amongst the Powers which were parties to the treaties and declarations; for it was not attempted on occasion of either of the armed neutralities of 1780 or 1800 to set aside the treaty-engagements as to contraband of war, which existed between the Powers, which were parties to either Armed Neutrality, respectively and Great Britain; on the contrary, there were express stipulations that in the matter of contraband, each State should adhere to its existing engagements with other States. It is consistent therefore with the custom of contracting which prevails amongst the European Powers, that the same nation should have different conventions on the subject of contraband of war with different nations. "Hence it arises, that the catalogue of contraband has varied very much," as observed by Lord Stowell, "and sometimes in such a manner as to make it very difficult to assign the reason of the variations, owing to particular circumstances, the history of which has not accompanied the history of the decisions."2

'The Declarations of Prussia on the subject of contraband of war will be found in Martens, vol. iii, p. 247; and that of Austria in Martens, vol. iii, p. 258. The Jonge Margaretha, 1 Ch. Robinson, p. 192.

WALKER: The Science of International Law. London, 1893.

Thomas Alfred Walker. English publicist and clergyman; born in 1862; fellow and lecturer of Peterhouse College, Cambridge; senior Whewell scholar in international law, 1884; examiner in constitutional history, roman law and jurisprudence in University of London; member of the International Law Association and of several other societies interested in international and social problems. Among his publications are: The Science of International Law, 1893; A Manual of Public International Law, 1895; A History of the Law of Nations, volume 1, 1899.

Page 303.-The armed neutrality of 1780 was an outcome of the intrigues of Count Panin working in the interests of France and Prussia upon the vanity of the Empress Catharine, who was herself well-inclined to British views. Already in 1778 Sweden and Denmark had approached the Empress with formal proposals for the formation of a combined fleet for the protection of the neutral trade of the north against all attack. It was not until early in 1780 that, chafing under the indignities to which she deemed herself to have been subjected by the submission of her neutral commerce to the belligerent right of search, she caused to be presented to the three belligerent Courts of London, Versailles and Madrid a Declaration, wherein she set out certain principles which, without departing from the strict and rigorous neutrality which she had hithereto inviolably observed, she expressed herself determined alike to adopt and effectively defend.3 She took this step, she said, with the more confidence "qu'Elle trouve consignés ces principes dans le droit primitif des peuples, que toute nation est fondée à réclamer, et que les Puissances belligérantes ne sauroient les invalider sans violer les loix de la neutralité, et sans désavouer les maximes qu'elles ont adoptées, nommément dans dif ferens traités et engagemens publics."

1Diaries and Correspondence of the Earl of Malmesbury, vol. i, pp. 219 et seq. Sir J. Harris to Viscount Stormont, April 24/May 5, 1780; Ibid. i. 299. Same to Same, 15/26 May, 1780, Ibid. i. 307. Sir James Harris to Hugh Elliott, 7/18 Feb., 1782, Ibid. i, pp. 485 et seq.

2Mr. Harris to the Earl of Suffolk, 11/22 Dec., 1778, Ibid. i, pp. 219–220. Lord Hillsborough was unfortunate enough to excite the wrath of Catharine by a jesting remark that "Her Imperial Majesty's commercial navy was already the best guarded in Europe, as she had a man-of-war to each merchantman." Diaries and Correspondence of the Earl of Malmesbury, vol. i, p. 219.

3 Declaration of Her Majesty the Empress of all the Russias to the Courts of London, Versailles and Madrid, Martens, Recueil, vol. ii, p. 74.

The principles proclaimed in this imposing fashion in the name of neutrality and universal justice are set forth in five articles.

1. Que les vaisseaux neutres puissent naviguer librement de port en port et sur les côtes des nations en guerre.

2. Que les effets appartenans aux sujets des dites Puissances en guerre, soyent libres sur les vaisseaux neutres à l'exception des marchandises de contrebande.

3. Que l'Impératrice se tient quant à la fixation de celles-ci à ce qui est énoncé dans l'Art. X et XI de son traité de commerce avec la Grande-Bretagne, en étendant ces obligations à toutes les Puissances en guerre.

4. Que pour déterminer ce qui caractérise un port bloqué, on n'accord cette dénomination qu'à celui, où il y a par la disposition de la Puissance, qui l'attaque avec des vaisseaux arrêtés et suffisamment. proches, un danger évident d'entrer.

5. Que ces principes servent de règle dans les procédures et les jugemens sur la légalité des prises.1

These articles became the basis of the First Armed Neutrality.? The reception accorded to the Imperial Declaration by the various Powers of Europe, and its ultimate fate forms a sufficient comment upon its character.

Great Britain, struggling desperately with a host of foes, with the combined force of her revolted Colonies and of her ancient enemies France and Spain, could little afford to forfeit the goodwill of the

1Martens, Recueil, vol. ii, p. 75. Diaries and Correspondence of the Earl of Malmesbury, vol. i, p. 291.

"The precise extent of the term contraband being in the various acts of accession set out in detail, and the fifth article of the Imperial program being further explained, the principles of the first armed neutrality were four; viz.

(1) "Que les vaisseaux neutres puissent naviguer librement de port en port et sur les côtes des nations en guerre."

(2) "Que les effets appartenans aux sujets des dites Puissances en guerre, soient libres sur les vaisseaux neutres à l'exception des marchandises de contrebande."

(3) "Que pour déterminer ce qui caractérise un port bloqué, on n'accorde cette dénomination qu'à celui, où il y a par la disposition de la Puissance, qui l'attaque avec des vaisseaux arrêtés et suffisamment proches, un danger évident d'entrer."

(4) "Que les vaisseaux neutres ne peuvent être arrêtés que sur justes causes et faits évidens; qu'ils soient jugés sans retard; que la procédure soit toujours uniforme, prompte et légale, et que chaque fois, outre les dédommagemens, qu'on accorde à ceux qui ont fait des pertes sans avoir été en faute, il soit rendu une satisfaction complette pour l'insulte fait au pavillon."

See the Convention between Russia and Denmark, July 9, 1780; Martens. Recueil, vol. ii, pp. 103–107.