This appeal resulted in our decision of June 2, 1919, affirming the decree, with two modifications, one of which related to an occupation tax that was under attack in the same suit, but is not now material; the other was to cause the dismissal of the suit as to the rate ordinance to be without prejudice to the commencement of a new action thereafter to restrain enforcement of the ordinance if it could be shown to be confiscatory in its effect under the new conditions. and should pay to the clerk of the dis-, in conformity with the direction of trict court or his successor in office, for the mandate of the appellate court. the benefit of all whom it might concern, This may be conceded. But here and, in particular, for the benefit of all our mandate expressly commanded consumers entitled to refunds, all over- "that such execution and proceedings charges collected since the granting of be had in said cause as, according the original injunction, together with to right and justice, and the laws of interest thereon, when the several par- the United States, ought to be had, the ties lawfully entitled and the amount of said appeal notwithstanding." Of refund due to each should have been as- course, whatever proceedings were taken certained in the action in such manner thereafter in the same cause would be as the court should direct, the determi- further proceedings; and the absence of nation to be binding upon all parties to the particular word "further" from the the bond, then the obligation should be mandate is of no consequence. Emphatvoid; otherwise to remain in force. ically the command called for proceedings in the nature of execution according to right and justice, and the laws of the United States. The necessary meaning is that the court below should proceed to carry our decision into full effect according to right and justice; and, manifestly, this could not be done without proceeding to enforce the supersedeas bond according to its terms. The bond recognized that the city and its officials, who were the nominal parties defendant, were, in a broad sense, the representatives of the consumers, the parties actually concerned. It recognized that they were required to pay a rate for gas higher than the city [517] ordinance had determined to be just and reasonable; that these excess charges were be ing exacted pending the suit, in order that the company might be secure in the event that it should prevail, and, per contra, that they ought to be refunded with interest in the event that it should fail. It recognized that the consumers were so many in number, and the difficulty of sustaining their individual, claims through separate suits would be so great, that to remit them to such suits would be a virtual denial of justice. And it recognized that to ascertain what should be due to them, to see to its collection from the company in case of its failure to make good its attack upon the ordinance, and to cause distribution to be made among the several claimants, was essential to the doing of complete equity, and therefore a natural incident to the jurisdiction of the court in the main cause. To retain jurisdiction for the purpose of requiring that restitution be made according to the terms of the bond was and is a necessary part of the duty of the district court under the mandate. Thus it appears that, during the entire course of this protracted litigation (except for a period when the company put the prescribed rate into effect as a test), the operation of the ordinance was suspended at the instance of the company, upon terms obliging it and its surety to refund all overcharges should it fail to make good its attack upon the established rate, and binding it to abide by the determination of the court in the same cause as to the amounts due, and pay the entire amount thus ascertained, with interest, to the clerk of the court, for the benefit of the consumers. According to the company's [516] own statement, its books showing the accounts between it and its customers during the period from 1906 to 1920 contain more than 25,000 accounts, which are involved and complicated by other charges, so that an examination of them would involve much time and expense. The principal contention upon which the petition for mandamus is rested is that, under our mandate following the decision of June 2, 1919, and the more recent one on dismissal of the subsequent appeal, no jurisdiction was conferred upon the district court to take any action except to affirm its decree of September 23, 1915, dismissing the bill of complaint, after modifying the decree in the two particulars specified. It is said that, after an appeal, the court below has jurisdiction to proceed only The case is within the principle of Arkadelphia Mill. Co. v. St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. 249 U. S. 134, 143-147, 63 L. ed. 517, 523-525, P.U.R.1919C, 710, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 237. The contention that the jurisdiction fails because the consumers were not parties to the record nor in privity with the parties, and the company prayed no relief against them, is transparently unsound. The ordinance was intended to limit the gas rate for the benefit of the consumers; suit was brought against the municipality and its officers as the public representatives of the interests of the consumers; the restraining order and temporary injunction were intended for the very purpose of enabling the company to exact, pending the suit, rates in excess of those limited by the ordinance; the equitable duty to refund excess charges if the suit should fail was a duty owing to the consumers; and the form of the supersedeas [518] bond recognized all this, and was particularly designed for their protection. Nor is there substance in the contention that the jurisdiction does not extend to overcharges subsequent to September 23, 1915. The thought suggested is, that the adjudication of the validity: of the ordinance did not extend beyond thereafter at any time before the final determination of the suit. The specific obligation thus assumed requires it to refund all overcharges collected in excess of the ordinance rate, so long as it had the benefit of the injunction pending the appeal; and the jurisdiction of the district court to see [519] that the excess charges are refunded has corresponding extent. We have said enough to demonstrate the existence of the jurisdiction of the district court and its scope. Other points are raised, but they relate not to the question of jurisdiction, but to the mode in which the jurisdiction ought to be exercised. If they have substance,as to which we make no intimation,they will be subject to review in the appropriate method, after the conclusion of the proceeding. Rule discharged. ANCHOR OIL COMPANY, Appt., V. the date of the final decree; that there- W. H. GRAY, F. D. McDonnell, Charles Egan, et al. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 519–523.) approval by Secrerelation Indians leases after changed conditions, increased costs, and other circumstances referred to by us in 250 U. S. 268, 63 L. ed. 977, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 454, may have rendered the limited rate noncompensatory, and the ordinance therefore confiscatory; and that at least the company, before 1. The authority of the Secretary of being called upon to make restitution, the Interior to approve and thereby confirm ought to have a hearing upon this ques- Creek allottees upon their allotments, deoil and gas mining leases made by full-blood tion as to the period subsequent to rived from the Act of May 27, 1908. § 2, September 23, 1915. The contention did not cease at the death of the allottee overlooks the effect of the ordinance, by reason of the provision of § 9 of that which is presumptively valid, and has act, that "the death of any allottee of the continuing force unless and until set Five Civilized Tribes shall operate to reaside by judicial decree as the result of move all restrictions upon the alienation of an investigation, in which the burden of said allottee's land: Provided, that no conproof is upon the company; that the de-Indian heir in such land shall be valid unveyance of any interest of any full-blood cree of September 23, 1915, is conclusive less approved by the court having jurisdieevidence that the company has made tion of the settlement of the estate of said such an attempt, and has failed, and deceased allottee." Such approval might be that the ordinance rate not only is law-given at any time, either before or after ful and binding, but will so continue un- the death of the allottee, so far as the less and until the company, under the rights of her heirs and those claiming un"without prejudice" clause, shall begin a der them with notice were concerned, and new suit and maintain its contention took effect as of the execution of the lease the approval, when given, related back and that the rate, through changed condi-by the parties named therein. Indians tions, has become noncompensatory. [For other cases, see Indians, VIII. in Digest See Missouri v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. Sup. Ct. 1908.] 241 U. S. 533, 539, 60 L. ed. 1148, 1154, leases-constructive notice. 2. The lodging of an oil and gas min36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 715. The contention also overlooks the fact that the bond it-ing lease made by a full-blood Creek allottee upon her allotment in the office of the United States Indian agent, Union Agency, self was given subsequent to the decree appealed from, in terms for the benefit not only of gas consumers who there- Note. As to rights and status of Intofore had purchased gas from the com- dians-see note to Worcester v. Georgia, pany, but of those who should purchase | 8 L. ed. U. S. 484. state. leases admission of Moffett v. Conley, 63 Okla. 3, 163 Pac. 118; 13 Cyc. 259; 1 Devlin, Real Estate, 3d ed. §§ 177, 178; Harris v. Gale, 188 Fed. 712; MaHarry v. Eatman, 29 Okla. 46, 116 Pac. 935; McCosar v. Chapman, 59 Okla. 78, 157 Pac. 1059; Nicholas v. Cornelius, 52 Okla. 163, 152 Pac. 831; Sampson v. Stapleton, 55 Okla. 547, 155 Pac. 213. If the appellant can be said to be an innocent purchaser for value, without notice of the existence of the alleged departmental lease, even though it be held to be valid as between the parties, it is a nullity as against the appellant. Pickering v. Lomax, 145 U. S. 310, 36 L. ed. 716, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 860; Moffett v. Conley, 63 Okla. 3, 163 Pac. 118. The lease in the case at bar must have been filed in the office of the county clerk of Tulsa county, Oklahoma, in accordance with the registration laws of the state of Oklahoma, in order to constitute constructive notice. Shulthis v. McDougal, 170 Fed. 529. 3. Neither the admission of the state of Oklahoma into the Union, nor the provisions of the Enabling Act of June 16, 1906, repealed or superseded the provision of the Act of March 1, 1907, that the filing theretofore or thereafter of any lease in the office of the United States Indian agent, Union Agency, Muskogee, Indian Territory, should be deemed constructive notice, since the Enabling Act contains in § 1 a proviso that "nothing contained in the said Constitution shall be construed to limit or impair the rights of person or property pertaining to the Indians or to limit or affect the authority of the government of the United States to make any law or regulation respecting such Indians, their lands, property, or other rights by treaties, agree ment, law, or otherwise, which it would have been competent to make if this act had never been passed," and while § 21 of that act and the state Constitution contain provisions to the effect that laws in force in the territory of Oklahoma at the time of the admission of the state, not repugnant to its Constitution, and not locally inappliforce throughout the state, there is nothing ing it did not occur until ten days after to show an intent to repeal or supersede her death. It is a valid instrument. the provision in question, or to establish the local recordation statutes in its place cable, shall be extended to and remain in so far as related to Indian leases. [For other cases, see Indians, VIII. in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] Mr. Preston C. West argued the cause, and, with Mr. A. A. Davidson, filed a brief for appellees: The lease made by Jennie Samuels, the original allottee, during her lifetime, and pending for approval in the Department of the Interior at the time of her death, was rightfully approved by the Secretary, though the act of approv Lomax v. Pickering, 173 U. S. 26, 43 L. ed. 601, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 416; Lykins v. McGrath, 184 U. S. 169, 46 L. ed. 485, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 450; Scioto Oil Co. v. O'Hern, Okla. -, 169 Pac. 483; Almeda Oil Co. v. Kelley, 35 Okla. 525, 130 Pac. 931; Harris v. Bell, 254 U. S. Argued and submitted January 27, 1921. 103, ante, 159, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 49. [No. 188.] Decided June 1, 1921. APPEAL from the United States Cir- case below, 168 C. C. A. The approving agency of the lease in question was not the Secretary of the Interior, but the proper county court. The Act of Congress approved March 1, 1907, which provides, inter alia, that the filing heretofore or hereafter of any lease in the office of the United States Indian agent, Union Agency, Muskogee, shall be deemed constructive notice, was not repealed nor abrogated either by the act of Congress providing for the admission of the state of Oklahoma into the Union, or by the Constitution of the state of Oklahoma, or by both together; and was in full force and effect at all of the times during which the transactions concerning the lands involved in this case took place. Anicker v. Gunsburg, 246 U. S. 110, 62 L. ed. 603, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 228, 141 C. C. A. 174, 226 Fed. 176; Scioto Oil Co. v. O'Hern, Okla. 169 Pac. 483. Congress possesses now and has at all, ground that it arose under the Constitutimes possessed a paramount power over tion and laws of the United States; a the subject, both by reason of its guardi- motion to dismiss the suit was granted anship over the Indians and the express by that court, the decree of dismissal provisions of the Federal and state Con- was affirmed by the circuit court of apstitutions. peals for the eighth circuit (168 C. C. A. 361, 257 Fed. 277), and an appeal brings the case here. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U. S. 553, 47 L. ed. 299, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 216; Choctaw Nation v. United States, 119 U. S. 1, 30 L. ed. 306, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 75; Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U. S. 445, 43 L. ed. 1041, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 722; | United States v. Allen, 103 C. C. A. 1, 179 Fed. 13; Marchie Tiger v. Western Invest. Co. 221 U. S. 286, 55 L. ed. 738, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 578; Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, 240 U. S. 522, 60 L. ed. 779, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 453. There is no higher attribute of sovereignty than the taxing power, and yet, even as to that, the state has no control whatsoever over those things which fall exclusively within the sphere of Federal control, and that derive their existence and authority from the national government, and not from the state. From appellant's amended petition it appears that the 80 acres were allotted to Jennie Samuels, a full-blood Creek Indian, as her distributive share of the lands of the tribe, and patented to her in the year 1903. December 5, 1914, pursuant to the Act of Congress of May 27, 1908, chap. 199, § 2 (35 Stat. at L. 312, 3 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 883), and the rules and regulations [521] of the Secretary of the Interior, she made an oil and gas mining lease to McDonnell and Egan, covering the lands in controversy, and this was filed in the office of the United States Indian agent (now designated as Superintendent of the Five Civilized Tribes), Union Agency, at Muskogee, on January 5, 1915. was forwarded by the agent to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs with a favorable recommendation October 14, 1915; submitted by the Commissioner to the Secretary of the Interior for ap It M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 429, 4 L. ed. 579, 607; Choctaw, O. & G. R. Co. v. Harrison, 235 U. S. 292, 59 L. ed. 234, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 27; Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Okla-proval, and by him approved October homa, supra. The state court has, by repeated decisions, recognized the inapplicability of state statutes to the matter of these allotted and restricted lands, as to which Congress still retained its paramount control. 21, 1915. It was first filed for record in the county clerk's office of Tulsa county on August 10, 1916. Appellees are the owners of this lease, and are in possession of the lands. Jennie Samuels died intestate October 11, 1915 (ten days before the SecreWilson v. Morton, 29 Okla. 745, 119 tary's approval of the above lease), leavPac. 213; Chapman v. Siler, 30 Okla. ing as her heirs a daughter, Feney 714, 120 Pac. 608; Walker v. Brown, 43 Rogers, and a granddaughter, Lina Okla. 144, 141 Pac. 681; Re Allen, 44 White, both full-blood Creek Indians, Okla. 392, 144 Pac. 1055; Carson v. and to them the lands descended, subFrench, 45 Okla. 819, 147 Pac. 319; Ash-ject to the lease. In the following Deton v. Noble, 46 Okla. 297, 148 Pac. 1043. Messrs. George S. Ramsey, Malcom E. Rosser, Villard Martin, James A. Veasey, John M. Chick, G. Earl Shaffer, James C. Denton, and Edgar A. De Meules filed a brief as amici curiæ. Mr. Justice Pitney delivered the opinion of the court: This is a suit in equity, instituted by appellant against appellees, in a state court of Oklahoma, involving the ownership of a leasehold estate for oil and gas mining purposes in a Creek Indian allotment containing 80 acres, situate in Tulsa county, Oklahoma. Upon petition of appellees it was removed to the United States district court upon the cember they made oil and gas leases to Appellees, having entered into possession, commenced drilling, and discovered and produced petroleum and natural gas in paying quantities. This suit was commenced in January, 1917, appellant praying that their lease be canceled and they enjoined from inter fering with appellant in the possession of the premises, and required to account. Like the courts below, we find it unnecessary to consider the inherent validity or invalidity of appellant's [522] title, because we conclude that that of appellees is good and has priority over it. The authority of the Secretary of the Interior to approve and thereby confirm oil and gas mining leases made by full-blood Creek allottees upon their allotments-derived from § 2 of the Act of May 27, 1908-did not cease at the death of the allottee by reason of the provision of $9 of the same act (35 Stat. at L. 315): "That the death of any allottee of the Five Civilized Tribes shall operate to remove all restrictions upon the alienation of said allottee's land: Provided, that no conveyance of any interest of any full-blood Indian heir in such land shall be valid unless approved by the court having jurisdiction of the settlement of the estate of said deceased allottee." The validity of the lease made by Jennie Samuels having been conditioned upon the approval of the Secretary, such approval might be given at any time, either before or after her death, so far as the rights of her heirs and those claiming under them with notice were concerned, and the approval, when given, related back and took effect as of the execution of the lease by the parties named therein (Pickering v. Lomax, 145 U. S. 310, 314, 316, 36 L. ed. 716, 718, 719, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 860; Lomax v. Pickering, 173 U. S. 26, 27, 32, 43 L. ed. 601-603, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 416; Lykins v. McGrath, 184 U. S. 169, 171, 172, 46 L. ed. 485-487, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 450). state, which became effective November 16, 1907. As the circuit court of appeals pointed out (168 C. C. A. 361, 257 Fed. 282), § 1 of the Enabling Act (June 16, 1906, chap. 3335, 34 Stat. at L. 267) contained a proviso "that nothing contained in the said Constitution shall be construed to limit or impair the rights of person or property pertaining to the Indians or to limit or affect the authority of the government of the United States to make any law or regulation respecting such Indians, their lands, property, or other rights by treaties, agreement, law, or otherwise, which it would have been competent to make if this act had never been passed." While § 21 of the same act (34 Stat. at L. 277), and § 2 of the Schedule to the Constitution of Oklahoma (Rev. Laws Oklahoma, 1910, p. cxcix.), contained provisions to the effect that laws in force in the territory of Oklahoma at the time of the admission of the state, not repugnant to its Constitution, and not locally inapplicable, should be extended to and remain in force throughout the state, there was nothing to show an intent to repeal or supersede the provision of the Act of Congress of March 1, 1907, above quoted, or to establish the local recordation statutes in its place so far as related to Indian leases, such as we have here. See Ex parte Webb, 225 U. S. 663, 682, 683, 56 L. ed. 1248, 1256, 1257, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 769. The satisfactory reasoning of the courts below, which we have followed in outline, has the support of a well-considered decision by the supreme court of Oklahoma in Scioto Oil Co. v. O'Hern, Okla., 169 Pac. 483. The lease received the approval which gave it complete validity, some time before the first of the leases made by the heirs to Williams. And Williams was charged with notice of the prior grant, because, under the provision of the Act of March 1, 1907 (chap. 2285, 34 Stat. at L. 1015, 1026), "the filing heretofore or hereafter of any lease in the office of the United States Indian agent, Union Agency, Muskogee, Indian Territory, shall be deemed constructive notice," the [524] UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, lodging of the prior lease with that officer in January, 1915, for transmission to Appellant lays some stress upon particular provisions in the Jennie Samuels lease, but we find nothing in them to affect the result. They are sufficiently dealt with in the opinion of the circuit court of appeals (168 C. C. A. 361, 257 | Fed. 280, 281). Decree affirmed. Plff. in Err., V. the Secretary of the Interior, consti- A. Z. HUTTO, J. R. White, Ray See, and tuted notice to all parties thereafter claiming under her or her heirs. We agree that this provision was neither repealed nor superseded by the admission [523] of the state of Oklahoma into the Union, or by the provisions of the Enabling Act, or the Constitution of the J. R. Ricks. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 524–529.) Indians U. trading with interest of government employee. 1. The purpose of the prohibition of S. Rev. Stat. § 2078, against personal |