to govern. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. 22. Reduced rates may be granted by a carrier for the transportation of the personal effects of Army officers changing stations under orders, in view of the provision of the Interstate Commerce Act of February 4, 1887, § 22, permitting reduced rates to the United States, and of a conference ruling of the Interstate Commerce Commision, making such section applicable to property transported for the United States. Western P. R. Co. v. United States, 255 U. S. 349, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 332, 65:671 | 23. The practice of railway carriers entering a certain city to absorb switching charges within the switching limits, where the line-haul carrier competes with the switching line, and to refuse to absorb such charges when the switching line does not compete with the line-haul carrier, may be forbidden by the Interstate Commerce Commission as being unjustly discriminatory and unlawful, under the Act of February 4, 1887, § 2, which prohibits any carrier from charging or receiving from any person a greater compensation than it receives from another person for doing for him a like and contemporaneous service under substantially similar circumstances and conditions. Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. United States, 254 U. S. 57, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 24, Discrimination. See also supra, 23. 65:129 con 24. A commission merchant, the signee of an interstate shipment, is, as a matter of law, liable to the carrier for the difference between the freight charges erroneously claimed by the carrier and paid by the consignee upon receipt of the goods, and the larger amount due under the applicable published tariffs, although the standard "straight" bills of lading, under which the goods were shipped, did not come into the consignee's possession, and it had no knowledge of their issuance or terms, and although the consignee accepted the shipment upon the understanding that the charges were as reported, and did not agree to pay more. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. v. York & W. Co. 256 U. S. 406, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 509, CASES CERTIFIED. 65:1016 The court of appeals of the District of Columbia is without power to certify questions to the Federal Supreme Court in a case in which the judgment or decree of such court of appeals would be reviewable by the Federal Supreme Court on writ of error or appeal. Heald v. District of Columbia, 254 U. S. 20, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 42, CERTIFIED QUESTIONS. CERTIORARI. 65: 106 Final decree for purpose of appeal or Right to writ of certiorari as bar to writ of mandamus, see Mandamus, 3. 1. A decision of the court of appeals of the District of Columbia on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents, which affirms the latter's decision to refuse an application for the registration of a trademark, and directs the clerk to certify the decision of the court to the Commissioner, as required by law, is not final for the purpose of certiorari from the Federal Supreme Court. American Steel Foundries v. Whitehead, 256 U. S. 40, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 407, 65: 818 2. An inadvertent allowance of a writ of certiorari to the court of appeals of the District of Columbia does not establish the jurisdiction of the Federal Supreme Court. Baldwin Co. v. R. S. Howard Co. 256 U. S. 35, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 405, To state courts. 65: 816 Error or certiorari, see Appeal and Error, 20-22. 3. Certiorari, not writ of error, is the only mode of reviewing in the Federal Supreme Court the judgment of a state court granting a writ of prohibition over the objection that such prohibition would take property without due process of law, contrary to the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Bullock v. Florida ex rel. Railroad Commission, 254 U. S. 513, 41 Sup. 65: 380 Ct. Rep. 193, 4. The ruling of the highest court of a state in a revisory proceeding, that the state is not bound by a decree of foreclosure of a railroad mortgage in a suit to which the state voluntarily makes itself a party, is upon a local question with which the Bullock v. Florida ex rel. Railroad ComFederal Supreme Court has no concern. mission, 254 U. S. 513, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 193, 65: 380 Court of a decision of a state court grant5. A review by the Federal Supreme ing a writ of prohibition over the objection without due process of law, contrary to U. that such prohibition would take property S. Const., 14th Amend., cannot be defeated because the state court's decision was stated in terms of jurisdiction, where it is unquestioned that the lower court had jurisdiction, and it is not suggested that any statute forbids the decree that was made. Bullock v. Florida ex rel. Railroad Com mission, 254 U. S. 513, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 193, To circuit courts of appeals. 65: 380 6. Certiorari, not appeal, is the proper mode of reviewing in the Federal Supreme Court a judgment of the circuit court of appeals upon an application for leave to file in the district court a petition in the nature of a bill of review in a patent suit, since such proceeding was ancillary to the original jurisdiction invoked, and was still, in its essence and nature, a suit involving the validity of a patent, which is expressly made final in the circuit court of appeals. National Brake & Electric Co. v. Christensen, 254 U. S. 425, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 154. 65: 341 7. The Federal Supreme Court, upon reversing on certiorari the judgment of a circuit court of appeals on a petition which that court should have regarded as an application for leave to file in the district court a petition in the nature of a bill of review, invoking a consideration of the effect of a decree in another district as res judicata, will not pass upon the merits of the petition, but will remand the cause to the circuit court of appeals for a determination of the effect of such decree. National Brake & Electric Co. v. Christensen, 254 U. S. 425, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 154. CHARTER. Of vessel, see Shipping. CHINESE. Immigration of, see Aliens. CHOICE. 65: 341 Of remedies, see Election of Remedies. CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS. Appellate jurisdiction of, see Appeal CITIZENS. Abridging privileges and immunities of, see Constitutional Law, III. Jurisdiction based on citizenship, see Courts, 11-14. See also Aliens. CLAIMS. 3. One who purchased in 1865 cotton which had previously been sold to the Confederate States under a sale treated by the seller as rescinded before delivery, and who, after a seizure of the cotton by the Federal Treasury agents, agreed with her vendor that the sale should be rescinded because of his prior transactions in connection with the cotton, was not the owner at the time of the seizure, within the meaning of the Judicial Code, § 162, which conferred jurisdiction on the court of claims to hear and determine the claims of those whose property was taken subsequent to June 1, 1865, under the Abandoned and Captured Property Act of March 3, 1863, where the property so taken was sold and the net proceeds placed in the Treasury of the United States, and directed the Secretary of the Treasury to return the net proceeds to the owners thereof on the judgment of said court. Mangan v. United States, 254 U. S. 494, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 157, 65: 370 4. Only the owner of the property at the time of the seizure is within the protection of the provision of the Judicial Code, § 162, which conferred jurisdiction on the court of claims to hear and determine the claims of those whose property was taken subsequent to June 1, 1865, under the Abandoned and Captured Property Act of March 3, 1863, where the property so taken was sold and the net proceeds placed in the Treasury of the United States, and directed the Secretary of the Treasury to return the net proceeds to the owners thereof on the judgment of said court. Mangan v. United States, 254 U. S. 494, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 157, 65: 370 Jurisdictional amount, see Appeal and Error, 3, 4. Error in refusal of court of claims to make additional findings, see Ap-sissippi Choctaws of certain persons for peal and Error, 67, 68. Remanding cause to court of claims for additional findings, see Appeal and Error, 73, 74. 1906, § 9, and May 29, 1908, § 27, authoriz5. The jurisdictional Acts of April 26, ing the court of claims to hear, consider, and adjudicate the claims against the Mis Rules for appeals from court of claims, see Rules of Courts. Jurisdiction; claims cognizable. Contracts of United States generally, see United States, 6-17. 1. The United States has not consented to be sued in the court of claims for the torts of its officers or agents. Journal & Tribune Co. v. United States, 254 U. S. 581, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 202, 65: 415 2. A claim against the United States which rests upon payments for maintenance and medical care of alien immigrants, alleged to have been made by a steamship company under duress because of wrongful and tortious acts of Federal officials, without authority of law, in coercing the claimant to pay the sums demanded, is not justiciable in the court of claims under the Judicial Code, § 145, being a claim sounding in tort, within the exception made by that section. United States v. Nederlandsch-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart Maatschappij, 254 U. S. 148, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 72. 65: 193 the matter of the claims of the Mississippi services rendered and expenses incurred in Choctaws to citizenship in the Choctaw the principle of quantum meruit in such Nation, and to render judgment thereon on amounts as may appear equitable or justly due therefor, which judgment, if any, shall be paid from any funds now or hereafter due such Choctaws by the United States, and declaring that the lands allotted to the Mississippi Choctaws are subject to a lien to the extent of any judgment so rendered, contemplate, not an action in personam to establish a personal liability against individual Indians or a group of Indians, but a suit of an equitable nature against that class of Mississippi Choctaws who, through successful assertion of the right of citizenship in the Choctaw Nation, acquired allotments of lands in what formerly was the tribal domain, and a participation in funds held in trust by the United States; a suit having the object of imposing an equitable charge upon their funds and lands for a reasonable and proportionate contribution towards the value of services rendered and expenses incurred by the claimants in securing for said class of Indians a beneficial participation in the trust estate. Winton v. Amos, 255 U. S. CLASS SUIT. 373, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 342. services 65: 684 before Con 6. Professional gress and its committees, individual representatives and Senators, the Dawes Commission, etc., intended to establish the right of the Mississippi Choctaws to participation in the material benefits of citizenship in the Choctaw Nation, and to secure such legislation by Congress as might be needed for the practical attainment of the object sought, though rendered under particular contracts of employment by many individnal Mississippi Choctaws, but with the object, incidentally, of benefiting the Missis. sippi Choctaws as a class, will, whether such contracts be valid or not, support the suit authorized by the Acts of April 26, 1906, § 9, and May 29, 1908, § 27, to be brought in the court of claims to impose an equitable charge for reimbursement and compensation on the basis of quantum meruit upon the interest of those beneficiaries who received the benefit, provided that the services rendered were substantially instrumental in producing a result beneficial to the class of cestuis que trustent upon whose interests the charge is to be imposed. Winton v. Amos, 255 U. S. 373, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 65: 684 342, Abandonment and waiver. 7. The right of a land-grant railroad to recover from the United States the difference between its commercial or general tariff rates and the land-grant rates charged and accepted by it for the transportation for the government of the personal effects of Army officers is lost by the carrier's long acquiescence in the govern ment's explicit assertion that the land-grant rates were the proper ones for such service. Western P. R. Co. v. United States, 255 U. S. 349, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 332, 65: 671 8. The right of a land-grant railroad to recover from the United States the difference between its commercial or general tariff rates and the land-grant rates charged and accepted by it for the transportation for the government of the personal effects of Army officers is lost by the carrier's long acquiescence in the government's explicit assertion that the land-grant rates were the proper ones for such service. Oregon-Washington R. & Nav. Co. v. United States, 255 U. S. 339, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 329, 65: 667 Assignment. 9. The prohibition of U. S. Rev. Stat. § 3477, against the transfer or assignment of claims against the United States, does not preclude a recovery by a railway company against the United States for charges for transportation services originally payable to another railway company to whose rights the former company has succeeded through merger or consolidation sanctioned by state laws. Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. United States, 256 U. S. 655, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 611, CLASSIFICATION. 65: 1149 By statute, see Constitutional Law, III. Conclusiveness of judgment in, Judgment, 13. Parties in, see Parties, 2. see Injunctive relief under, see Injunction, 6-10. COAL LANDS. See Mines. COLLATERAL ATTACK. see Frivolous Federal question respecting preference of ports, see Appeal and Error, 47. As to powers of Interstate Commerce Commission, see Interstate Com 1. Transportation of a passenger and baggage under an interstate ticket would be none the less interstate commerce because the transportation in question was Galveston, only one stage of the journey, lying between two points in the same state. II. & S. A. R. Co. v. Woodbury, 254 U. S. 357, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 114, Conflicting state and Federal legisla tion. 65: 301 2. The requirement of the Federal Employers' Liability Act of April 22, 1908, as to the effect as a defense of the assumption of risk by an employee, prevails over any state law. Pryor v. Williams, 254 U. S. 43, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 36, 65: 120 3. There is no such conflict between the Harrison Anti-narcotic Drug Act of December 17, 1914, and Minn. Laws 1915, chap. 260, regulating traffic in habit-forming narcotic drugs, as invalidates the state statute, although the prohibitory measures of the Federal statute do not apply to the disposition and dispensation of drugs by physicians registered under the act, in the regular course of professional practice, provided records are kept for official inspection, while, under the state law, physicians can only furnish prescriptions to addicts, and may not dispense the drugs to such persons at pleasure from stocks of their own. 65: 819 nesota ex rel. Whipple v. Martinson, 256 U. S. 41, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 425, Control of navigable waters and navigation. Min Test of navigability, see Waters, 1, 2. 4. So far as the Ordinance of July 13, 254, 255, 256 Ü. S. the addition of a roadway for vehicles and a pathway for pedestrians on that part of the bridge within the jurisdiction of the state. International Bridge Co. v. New York, 254 U. S. 126, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 56, 65: 176 1787, for the government of the Northwest, bridge company's charter, from requiring, Territory, established public rights of high way in navigable waters capable of bearing commerce from state to state, it did not regulate internal affairs alone, and was no more capable of repeal by one of the states than any other regulation of interstate commerce enacted by Congress. Economy Light & P. Co. v. United States, 256 U. S 113, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 409, 65: 847 5. A river having actual navigable capacity in its natural state, and capable of carrying commerce among the states, is within the power of Congress to preserve for purposes of future transportation, even though it be not at present used for such commerce, and be incapable of such use according to present methods, either by reason of changed conditions or because of artificial obstructions. Economy Light & P. Co. v. United States, 256 U. S. 113, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 409, 65: 847 6. The prohibition in the Act of March 3, 1899, § 9, against the construction of a dam in a navigable river of the United States without the approval of the War Department, applies to a river having actual navigable capacity in its natural state, and capable of carrying commerce among the states, even though it be not at present used for such commerce, and be incapable of such use according to present methods, either by reason of changed conditions or because of artificial obstructions. Economy Light & P. Co. v. United States, 256 U. S. 113, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 409, 65: 847 7. The Des Plaines river below the city of Joliet, and just above where the Des Plaines joins the Kankakee to form the Illinois river, is a navigable river of the United States, within the meaning of the prohibition in the Act of March 3, 1899, § 9, against the construction of a dam in a navigable river of the United States without the approval of the War Department. Economy Light & P. Co. v. United States, 256 U. S. 113, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 409, 65: 847 8. The requirement of the Act of March 3, 1899, § 9, that the War Department approve the location and plans for any dam in a navigable river of the United States, is not in substance satisfied by the refusal of the Secretary of War to act because, as he was assured that the river was not navigable, he had no jurisdiction. This cannot be regarded as an equivalent to an approval, either in form or effect, or even as an official inquiry into the navigability of the river. Economy Light & P. Co. v. United States, 256 U. S. 113, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 409, 65: 847 10. The conveyance to the United States for a public purpose not connected with the administration of the government of a part of the land under a bridge constructed over the Niagara river, under legislative authority from the state of New York, did not affect the authority of the state to require, in the exercise of its reserved right to amend the bridge company's charter, the addition of a roadway for vehicles and a pathway for pedestrians on that part of the bridge within the jurisdiction of the state. International Bridge Co. v. New York, 254 U. S. 126, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 56, 65: 176 Regulating carriers and transportation. Due process of law in imposing special burden on interstate telegraph company, see Constitutional Law, 34. Imposing special burden on interstate railroad companies, see Constitutional Law, 36. 11. A railway company cannot, consistently with the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution, be required to detour its two through interstate day passenger trains via a city of some 4,000 inhabitants, instead of running such trains over a cut-off forming a part of the main line, where such city is otherwise served by fourteen local daily passenger trains, seven each way, and where to make the detour will require the railway company to maintain 16 more miles of track at the high standard essential for the through trains, and to move the latter 10 miles farther, with consequent delay and inconvenience all along the line. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 254 U. S. 535, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 192. Licenses and taxes. See also supra, 3. 65: 389 Invalidity of excise tax in part, see 12. A tax on a foreign corporation is not obnoxious to the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution merely because it is imposed upon property used in interstate commerce, even if it takes the form of a tax for the privilege of exercising the corporate franchise within the state. Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S. 113, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 45, 65: 165 13. While a state may not, in the guise 9. Congress, by authorizing, as it did of taxation, constitutionally compel a corin the Act of June 30, 1870, the building of poration to pay for the privilege of ena bridge over the Niagara river, under leg-gaging in interstate commerce, yet this islative authority from the state of New York, subject to the approval of the Secretary of War, and by recognizing as a lawful structure, as it did in the Act of June 23, 1874, the bridge as constructed for railroad purposes only, did not assume such control of the bridge as to prevent the state, in the exercise of its reserved right to amend the immunity does not prevent the state from imposing an ordinary property tax upon property having a situs within its territory, and employed in interstate commerce, including the franchise of the corporation, if not derived from the United States, although that franchise is the business of interstate commerce. St. Louis & E. St. L. Electric R. Co. v. Missouri ex rel. Hager-, because its intrastate business in that city, which the company asserts it is compelled man, 256 U. S. 314, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 488, 65: 946 by statute to continue to carry on at the 14. A state franchise tax upon a do- rates therein prescribed, may be insufficient mestic railway company does not contra- to pay the tax, where any deficit may be vene the commerce clause of the Federal obviated by application for an increase of Constitution merely because the value of intrastate rates, and where, in addition, the the franchise taxed is derived partly from telegraph company, when it entered the the fact that the corporation does interstate city, the ordinance levying the tax being business. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co. v. then in existence, did not declare against Middlekamp, 256 U. S. 226, 41 Sup. Ct. its legality or complain of its detrimental 65: 905 operation, but subjected itself to further Rep. 489, 15. State taxation of a foreign manufac- regulation, licensing, and taxing, and paid turing and trading corporation, measured the tax (by mistake and inadvertence, it Postal Teleg.by the net profits earned within the state, asserts) for several years. does not offend against the commerce clause Cable Co. v. Fremont, 255 U. S. 124, 41 Sup. of the Federal Constitution, whether deemed Ct. Rep. 279, a property tax or a franchise tax, even though these profits may have been derived in part, or indeed mainly, from interstate commerce, where payment of the tax is not made a condition precedent to the right of the corporation to carry on business, including interstate business, but its enforcement is left to the ordinary means of collecting taxes. Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S. 113, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 45, 65: 165 16. A state tax upon the intangible property within the state of a domestic. corporation operating a street railway over an interstate bridge cannot be said to have been levied exclusively upon its franchise to do an interstate business, and hence to be a direct tax and burden on the right to engage in interstate commerce, where such corporation had acquired by private contract an exclusive right to operate over such bridge, and had also derived from private contract other rights which made its line of track a part of two street railway systems, and gave it a profitable operating arrangement with them. St. Louis & E. St. L. Electric R. Co. v. Missouri ex rel. Hagerman, 256 U. S. 314, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 488, 65: 946 17. The imposition of a state license tax upon local agents to whom automobiles are consigned for sale by their nonresident manufacturers, which discriminates in favor of the product of resident manufacturers, is an unconstitutional attempt by the state to regulate interstate commerce, it being in effect a tax upon the importation Bethle of the automobiles into the state. hem Motors Corp. v. Flynt, 256 U. S. 421, 65:1029 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 571, 18. A state may impose an excise tax upon the use of gasolene by a dealer at his distributing stations in the operation of his automobile, tank wagons, and trucks employed in the business of distributing his wares for sale, although the gasolene is the Bowman v. Conproduct of other states. timental Oil Co. 256 U. S. 642, 41 Sup. Ct. 65: 1139 Rep. 606, 19. A municipal license tax of $60 a year upon the privilege of doing an intrastate telegraph business in a city having more than five thousand and less than twenty-five thousand inhabitants cannot be said to be in effect a burden upon the telegraph company's interstate business merely COMMON CARRIERS. COMPLAINT. 65: 545 In criminal prosecution, see Indictment and Information. CONCLUSIVENESS. Of judgment, see Judgment, 5-14. CONCURRENT FINDINGS. CONCURRENT REMEDIES, CONDEMNATION. Of property, see Eminent Domain. CONDITION. Condition precedent to recovery back of illegal tax, see Internal Revenue, 27. CONDUCT. Estoppel by, see Estoppel. Of intoxicating liquors, see Intoxicat- CONFLICT OF LAWS. As to conflict of authority between courts, see Courts, 22. CONGRESS. Validity of legislation by, generally, see Commerce; Constitutional Law; Counterfeiting; Criminal Law; Elections; Indians; Internal CONNECTING CARRIERS. For sale of entire property of corpora- |