« PředchozíPokračovat »
437; Fair Haven & W. R. Co. v. New, U. S. 1, 51 L. ed. 933, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. Haven, 203 U. S. 379, 51 L. ed. 237, 27 585, 11 Ann. Cas. 398; Cummings v. Chi. Sup. Ct. Rep. 74; Noble State Bank v. cago, 188 U. S. 410, 47 L. ed. 525, 23 Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 55 L. ed. 112, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 472; Canada Atlantic L.R.A. (N.S.) 1062, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. Transit Co. v. Chicago, 126 C. C. A. 587, 186, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 487.
210 Fed. 7; Minnesota Rate Cases The idea is not uncommon that a (Simpson v. Shepard) 230 U. S. 352, 57 state's police power, because of its un- . ed. 1511, 48 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1151, 33 fortunate name, is limited to the pres- Sup. Ct. Rep. 729, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 18; ervation of the public health, safety, West Chicago Street R. Co. v. Illinois, and morals. Nothing could be further 201 U. S. 506, 50 L. ed. 845, 26 Sup. Ct. from the fact. It extends to all mat- Rep. 518; Missouri P. R. Co. v. Kansas, ters affecting the public convenience 216 U. S. 262, 54 L. ed. 472, 30 Sup. Ct. and general welfare, including commer- Rep. 330; Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotcial prosperity; and the definition of ton Duck Co. v. Alabama Interstate what is a public use in aid of which it Power Co. 240 U. S. 30, 60 L. ed. 507, may be exercised is precisely as com- 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 234. prehensive as the definition of a public The present case falls within that use for which the right to exercise the class of cases in which a public service right of eminent domain may be grant- corporation is required to do something ed.
in aid of the public interest which will Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. cost it money, with or without adequate S. 104, 55 L. ed. 112, 32 L.R.A.(N.S.) compensation therefor; the question of 1062, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 186, Ann. Cas. compensation, in this class of cases, be1912A, 487; Clark v. Nash, 198 U. s. ing of little more than nominal signifi361, 49 L. ed. 1085, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. cance, the expense of carrying such a 676, 4 Ann. Cas. 1171; Strickley v. burden in aid of the public interest beHighland Boy Gold Min. Co. 200 U. S. ing regarded as merely a part of its 527, 50 L. ed. 581, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 301, general cost of doing business, like 4 Ann. Cas. 1174; Offield v. New York, taxes, coal, or rails, or the liability for N. H. & H. R. Ćo. 203 U. S. 372, 51 | injuries to person or property, with or L. ed. 231, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 72; Bacon without negligence, and to be considv. Walker, 204 U. S. 311, 51 L. ed. 499, ered with these other items in determin27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 289; Chicago, B. & Q. ing whether the general schedules of R. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 561, 50 L. ed. rates which the corporation is allowed 596, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 341, 4 Ann. Cas. to charge produce the minimum fair re1175; Missouri P. R. Co. v. Omaha, 235 turn, whenever that question arises. In U. S. 121, 59 L. ed. 157, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. this class of cases it is universally held 82; Erie R. Co. v. Williams, 233 U. S. that whether there are any earnings at 700, 58 L. ed. 1161, 51 L.R.A.(N.S.) all from the particular investment so 1097, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 761; New York required is of little or no consequence. & N. E. R. Co. v. Bristol, 151 U. S. 556, At most the amount of the investment 38 L. ed. 269, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 437; is considered in comparison with the Wisconsin, M. & P. R. Co. v. Jacobson, size of the corporation and its total 179 U. S. 287, 45 L. ed. 194, 21 Sup. Ct. earnings. And, as we have already Rep. 115; Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. In shown, the investment required must be terstate Commerce Commission, 221 U. very great indeed in proportion to total S. 612, 55 L. ed. 878, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. assets before the courts will declare the 621; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Min. requirement, if within the limits of a neapolis, 232 U. S. 430, 58 L. ed. 671, state's police power, to be unconstitu34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 400; Close v. Glenwood tional on that account. Cemetery, 107 U. S. 466, 27 L. ed. 408, Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 267; Shields v. Ohio, 95 | 104, 55 L. ed. 112, 32 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1062, U, S. 319, 24 L. ed. 357; Atlantic Coast 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 186, Ann. Cas. 1912A, Line R. Co. v. Georgia, 234 U. S. 280, 487; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Illinois, 58 L. ed. 1312, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 829; 200 U. S. 561, 50 L. ed. 596, 26 Sup. Ct. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. ed. Rep. 341, 4 Ann. Cas. 1175; Missouri P. 77; Chesapeake & 0. R. Co. v. Public R. Co. v. Omaha, 235 U. S. 121, 59 L. ed. Service Commission, 242 U. S. 603, 61 157, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 82; Chicago, M. & L. ed. 520, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 234; Lake St. P. R. Co. v. Minneapolis, 232 U. S. Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Clough, 242 U. 430, 58 L. ed. 671, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 400; S. 375, 61 L. ed. 374, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. North 144; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Carolina Corp. Commission, 206 U. S. 1, North Carolina Corp. Commission, 206 51 L. ed. 933, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 585, 11 Ann. Cas. 398; Erie R. Co. v. Williams, was authorized as a lawful structure, 233 U. S. 700, 58 L. ed. 1161, 51 L.R.A. subject to the supervision of the Secre(N.S.) 1097, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 761; Wis- tary of War, and his approval of the consin, M. & P. R. Co. v. Jacobson, 179 plans. By the New York Act of 1857, U. S. 287, 45 L. ed. 194, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. "Said bridge may be constructed as well 115; West Chicago Street R. Co. v. Illi- for the passage of persons on foot and nois, 201 U. S. 506, 50 L. ed. 845, 26 in carriages and otherwise as for the Sup. Ct. Rep. 518; Atlantic Coast Line passage of railroad trains” ($ 15). And R. Co. v. Goldsboro, 232 U. S. 548, 58 "whenever said bridge shall be complete L. ed. 721, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 364. for the passage of ordinary teams and
The Federal government previously carriages” the company may erect toll having approved and authorized the gates, and charge tolls not exceeding roadway arm upon plaintiff in error's certain rates for foot passengers, carbridge, N. Y. Laws 1915, chap. 666, can- riages, etc. The original Canadian act not possibly contravene the foreign and had words similar to those just quoted interstate commerce clause of the Con- from  § 15, except that it said stitution.
"shall be constructed" instead of "may Cummings v. Chicago, 188 U. S. 410, be,”—a fact to which we shall advert 47 L. ed. 525, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 472; again. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Ohio, 165 Between 1870 and 1874 the bridge U. S. 365, 41 L. ed. 747, 17 Sup. Ct. was built as required by the charter, Rep. 357; Escanaba & L. M. Transp. Co. with one draw across Black Rock harbor v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 678, 27 L. ed. 442, and one across the main channel of the 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 185; West Chicago river. It crossed Squaw island on a Street R. Co. v. Illinois, 201 U. S. 506, trestle, afterwards filled in, but was 50 L. ed. 848, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 518; built as a railroad bridge exclusively, Canada Atlantic Transit Co. v. Chicago, without any provision for footpaths or 126 C. C. A, 587, 210 Fed. 7.
roadways. By the Act of Congress of
June 23, 1874, chap. 475, 18 Stat. at L.  Mr. Justice Holmes delivered 275, it was declared a lawful structure the opinion of the court:
and an established post route for the This is a suit brought by the state of mail of the United States. In the year New York to recover penalties from the 1899 a plan for rebuilding the bridge, Bridge Company for failure to place with wings for roadways and footpaths, upon its bridge a roadway for vehicles was approved by the Secretary of War, and a pathway for pedestrians between subject to changes at the expense of the Squaw island, in Niagara river, and the company if the Secretary should deem mainland of New York state, as required them advisable. The rebuilding took by chap. 666 of the Laws of 1915, of the place in 1899–1901, but omitted the state of New York. The defendant set wings, and this modification was assentup that the act was contrary to the Con- ed to by the Secretary of War. stitution of the United States in speci- The Niagara river is navigable at this fied respects, but the plaintiff got judg-point. In pursuance of plans for imment in the supreme court, which was provement adopted by the United States, affirmed by the court of appeals. 223 in 1906 it acquired from the state of N. Y. 137, 119 N. E. 351.
New York the land under Black Rock The Bridge Company originally was harbor, lying on the New York side of incorporated by a special charter from Squaw island, and the adjacent portions the state of New York. Laws 1857, of the Erie canal, both being within the chap. 753. As the bridge was to cross limits of the state and crossed by the the Niagara river from Buffalo to Can-bridge. Thereafter the improvements ada, a similar corporation was created were carried out. under the laws of Canada (20 Vict.
In 1907 the Secretary of War gave chap. 227), and subsequently the two notice to the company that the bridge corporations were consolidated, pursu-over Black Rock harbor and Erie canal ant to Laws of New York 1869, chap. obstructed navigation, and that changes 550, and a Canadian Act (32 and 33 Vict. were required. The company submitted chap. 65), subject to all the duties of plans again, showing in dotted lines each of the consolidated companies. By wings for roadways and footpaths, notthe Act of Congress of June 30, 1870, ing that they were not to be put in at chap. 176, 16 Stat. at L. 173, any bridge present, but that provision was made constructed across the Niagara river in in the design for their future construcpursuance of the New York Act of 1857, tion. The plans were approved, and the and any acts of the New York législa- bridge was built without the wings, the ture then in force, amending the same, completion being reported by his resi182
dent representative to the Secretary of It is argued that, the Canadian act War.
governing only the Canadian side, its By chap. 666 of the Laws of New York adoption by New York carried the oblifor 1915, the charter  of the com- gation no farther. But it appears to us pany was amended so as to require the that it would be quibbling with the construction of a roadway for vehicles rational understanding of the duty asand a pathway for pedestrians upon sumed to say that the company could the draw across Black Rock harbor, the have supposed that it had a contract or company being allowed to charge tolls property right to confine its building of not exceeding specified sums. The com- the footpath and carriageway to the pany failed to comply with the require- Canada side of the boundary line. ment, and the time limit had expired The New York legislature of course before this suit was brought to recover confined its command to the half of the penalties imposed by the act. It is bridge within its jurisdiction. It may found that the construction was neces- be presumed that, if that command is sary for the public interest and con- obeyed, either Canada or the company venience; that the cost of the changes is will see the propriety of carrying the insignificant in comparison with the way and path across to the other shore. assets and net earnings of the company, At all events, the power of New York to and that it does not appear that the in- insist upon its rights is not limited by vestment would not yield a reasonable speculation upon that point. As we return.
agree with the court of appeals that this The first objections to the new require- amendment to the charter was within the ment made by the state are that it im- power reserved to the state, the objecpairs the obligation of the contract in tion under the contract clause of the the original charter and takes the Constitution of course must fail, and, it company's property without due process would seem, that under the 14th Amendof law. The argument is based partly ment also. But, as to the latter, we may upon a reduction of the tolls from those add, as the court of appeals added, that mentioned in the charter of 1857, made there is nothing to show that the addiby the Act of 1915. Concerning this it tion to the structure will not yield a reais enough to say that the objection is sonable return, if that be essential, in premature. The clause relating to the view of the charter. Missouri P. R. Co. construction of the roadway and path- v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 262, 54 L. ed. 472, way is distinct from and independent of 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 330; Chesapeake & 0. that which fixes the maximum rates to R. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 242 be charged. The latter might be invalid U. S. 603, 61 L. ed. 520, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. and the former good. If the rates are 234. too low, they can be changed at any The only argument that impresses us, time. The only question now before us and the one that was most pressed, is is whether the additions shall be built that this is an international bridge, and As to that, it would be going very far that Congress has assumed such control in the way of limiting the reserved of it as to exclude any intermeddling by right to amend such charters, if it the state. It is said that  the should be held that the state had not bridge as constructed was and is depower to require what originally was voted wholly to international contemplated in permissive words as merce, and that when Congress authorpart of the scheme. But, however that ized it in that form in 1874, that might be, the New York act authorizing authority must be regarded as the charconsolidation subjected this consolidat- ter under which it was maintained. ed corporation to the duties of the Ca- Without repeating the considerations nadian as well as of the New York char- urged in support of this conclusion ter, and the Canadian act made the ar- we will state the reasons that prerangement for foot passengers and car- vail with us. The part of the structure riages a duty. The words that we have with which we are concerned is within quoted plainly impose one. The  the territorial jurisdiction of the state opinion in Atty. Gen. v. International of New York. There was no exercise of Bridge Co. 6° Ont. App. Rep. 537, the power of eminent domain by the 543, implies that they do so by speak- United States. The state was the source ing of the abandonment of a por- of every title to that land, and, apart tion of the work as probably an abuse from the special purposes to which it of the act of Parliament, and the same might be destined, of every right to use is clearly stated in Canada Southern R. it. Any structure upon it, considered Co. v. International Bridge Co. L. R. merely as a structure, is erected by the 8 App. Cas. 723, 729.
authority of New York. The nature and
qualifications of ownership are decided further condition of getting from Conby the state, and although certain super- gress consent to action upon the grant. vening uses consistent with those quali- No doubt, in the case of an interna‘fications cannot be interfered with by tional bridge the action of a state will be the state, still the foundation of a right scrutinized in order to avoid any possito use the land at all must be laid by ble ground for international complaint, state law. Not only the existence of the but the mere fact that the bridge was of company, but its right to build upon that nature would not, of itself, take New York land, came from New York, away the power of the state over its as was recognized by the form of the part of the structure if Congress were original Act of Congress of 1870, which silent, any more than the fact that it speaks of any bridge built “in pursu- was a passageway for interstate comance of” the New York statutes. It did merce, or crossed a navigable stream. not, as perhaps the New York Consoli- When Congress has acted, we see no readation Act did, refer to those statutes son for not leaving the situation as Consimply as documents, and incorporate gress has seemed to leave it, if, on the them,-it referred to them as the source most critical examination, we discover of the company's power.
no intent to withdraw state control, but, From an early date the state has been on the contrary, an assumption that the recognized as the source of authority, in control is to remain. We have adverted the absence of action by Congress. Will to the implications of the general Law son v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co. 2 of 1899, and have mentioned the statutes Pet. 245, 7 L. ed. 412; Escanaba & L. M. that deal specifically with  this Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 678, bridge. The Act of 1874, declaring 27 L. ed. 442, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 185. And the existing bridge lawful, was a conthis court has been slow to interpret firmation which it natural to such action as intended to exclude the seek, but was not a repeal of the ausource of rights from all power in the thority given to the company in 1870 premises. In a case of navigable waters to build subject to the approval of wholly within a state, over which a the Secretary of War. right of way had been conveyed to the structure has been rebuilt since 1874, United States, and which the United and the Secretary of War twice has States
spending considerable approved plans showing the carriage  sums to improve, it was held and footways. It is true that the that, whether or not Congress had company never has sought to execute power to authorize private persons that part of the plan, but, on the facts to build in such waters without the that we have stated, it appears to us a consent of the state, an act making strange contention that it has contract comprehensive regulations of work or property rights not to be required to within them did not manifest a pur- build the bridge, or that Congress by pose to exclude the previously exist- implication has forbidden the state to ing authority of the state over such demand that the plan recognized by work. Cummings v. Chicago, 188 U. S. everyone from the beginning should at 410, 413, 428, et seq., 47 L. ed. 525, 527, last be carried out. 530, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 472.
The conveyance of a part of the land But it is said that a different rule ap- under the bridge to the United States plies to an international stream, and for a public purpose not connected with that Congress has recognized the dis- the administration of the government did tinction by the Act of March 3, 1899, not affect the authority of New York chap. 425, § 9, 30 Stat. at L. 1151, Comp. over the residue within the state, and, Stat. § 9971, 9 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. taken in connection with the acts of the p. 81. It is true that that statute makes government before and after the grant, a distinction, but the distinction is that does not invalidate the Statute of 1915, bridges may be built across navigable even in part. See Cummings v. Chicago, waters wholly within the state, if ap- 188 U. S. 410, 413, 47 L. ed. 525, 527, 23 proved by the Chief of Engineers and Sup. Ct. Rep. 472; Ft. Leavenworth R. the Secretary of War, but, with regard Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525, 29 L. ed. 264, to waters not wholly within the state, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 995; Omaechevarria v. only after the consent of Congress has Idaho, 246 U. S. 313, 346, 62 L. ed. 763, been obtained. The act does not make 767, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 323. Congress the source of the right to build, Judgment affirmed. but assumes that the right comes from another source; that is, the state. It The CHIEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice merely subjects the right supposed to McKenna, and Mr. Justice McReynolds have been obtained from there to the dissent.
(135) GEORGE D. HORNING, Petitioner, especially upon his intention in the
premises. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
Swift v. Rounds, 19 R. I. 527, 33
L.R.A. 561, 61 Am. St. Rep. 791, 35 Atl. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 135-140.) 45.
The relation in law of defendant to Criminal law-intent-construction of
pledges taken by him as security for statute.
1. The intention of the accused to loans made by him is clearly defined keep within the law will not help him if and accurately described in a work of in fact he violated such law.
accepted authority. [For other cases, see Criminal Law, I. d, in
21 R. C. L. 651, 652, 663, 664. Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.) Pawnbrokers
What is meant by engaging in a busidoing business in District of Columbia.
ness is clearly settled; it does not de2. A pawnbroker who stores his pledges note a single act or transaction, but the in the city of Washington, and uses a aggregation of acts or transactions perWashington office as a collecting center, is taining to, and in fact constituting, doing a pawnbroking business within the such business; it is continuous in its District of Columbia, within the purview of character, and is synonymous with the Act of February 4, 1913, forbidding the employment or occupation; signifying doing of business as a pawnbroker and that which occupies the time, attention, charging more than 6 per cent interest with
and labor of a man for the purpose of out a license, although care is taken to receive all applications for loans, and to make gaining a livelihood or profit. all examinations of pledges, at an office
Hoagland v. Segur, 38 N. J. L. 237; established by him in Virginia, just outside Delaware & H. Canal Co. v. Mahlenthe District of Columbia.
brock, 63 N. J. L. 281, 45 L.R.A. 538, Appeal – reversible error directing 43 Atl. 978; Sterne v. State, 20 Ala. verdict criminal case.
46; Martin v. State, 59 Ala. 36, 3 Am. 3. A Federal judge did not commit re. Crim. Rep. 287. versible error, in a criminal case in which
It was palpable error in the police the undisputed facts, as testified to by both court in instructing the jury to assume, the witnesses for the government and the as it did, that the suspicion or prededefendant, show the latter's guilt, in telling the jury in effect to find the defendant termination of the court below, on the guilty, so long as the jury was allowed the mere specification of the acts, and in technical right to decide against the law the absence of evidence, was conclusive and the facts. If the defendant suffered of the matter, and forestalled and canany wrong, it was of such a purely formal celed the right and duty of the jury to character as not to afford, since the Act of determine for itself the question of deFebruary 26, 1919, a basis for reversing the fendant's good faith in the light of the judgment of the lower court. (For other cases, see Appeal and Error, VIII.
evidence. m, 6, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.)
Masters v. United States, 42 App.
D. C. 353, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 1243; (No. 77.)
Sparf v. United States, 156 U. S. 51,
39 L. ed. 343, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 273, 10 Argued November 8 and 9, 1920. Decided
Am. Crim. Rep. 168.
Mr. Robert L. Williams argued the N WRIT of Certiorari to the Court P. H. Marshall filed a brief for re
cause, and Messrs. F. H. Stephens and of Appeals of the District of Colum- spondent. bia to review a judgment which affirmed a conviction in the Police Court of the District of doing business as a pawn-the opinion of the court:
 Mr. Justice Holmes delivered broker without a license. Affirmed. See same case below, 48 App. D. C. certiorari granted to review a judgment
This case comes here upon a writ of 380. The facts are stated in the opinion.
of the court of appeals that affirmed a
conviction of the petitioner of doing Mr. Henry E. Davis argued the cause business as a pawnbroker and charging and filed a brief for petitioner: more than 6 per cent interest, without a
The question whether acts charged license, which is forbidden by the Act of apon a defendant constitute an inten- Congress of February 4, 1913, chap. 26, tional but unsuccessful endeavor to 37 Stat. at L. 657. 48 App. D. C. 380. avoid the operation of a law, or even to
The external facts are not disputed. evade it, turns not only upon the acts The defendant had been in business as a done by the defendant, but also and pawnbroker in Washington; but, antici