Essays on Ethics, Social Behaviour, and Scientific ExplanationSpringer Science & Business Media, 6. 12. 2012 - Počet stran: 278 When John Harsanyi came to Stanford University as a candidate for the Ph.D., I asked him why he was bothering, since it was most un likely that he had anything to learn from us. He was already a known scho lar; in addition to some papers in economics, the first two papers in this vol ume had already been published and had dazzled me by their originality and their combination of philosophical insight and technical competence. However, I am very glad I did not discourage him; whether he learned any thing worthwhile I don't know, but we all learned much from him on the foundations of the theory of games and specifically on the outcome of bar gaining. The central focus of Harsanyi's work has continued to be in the theory of games, but especially on the foundations and conceptual problems. The theory of games, properly understood, is a very broad approach to social interaction based on individually rational behavior, and it connects closely with fundamental methodological and substantive issues in social science and in ethics. An indication of the range of Harsanyi's interest in game the ory can be found in the first paper of Part B -though in fact his owncontri butions are much broader-and in the second paper the applications to the methodology of social science. The remaining papers in that section show more specifically the richness of game theory in specific applications. |
Obsah
Comparisons of Utility | 6 |
Ethics in Terms of Hypothetical Imperatives | 24 |
Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? | 37 |
Do Welfare | 64 |
PART BRATIONALCHOICE AND GAME THEORETICAL | 86 |
RationalChoice Models of Political Behavior | 118 |
Game Theory and the Analysis of International Conflicts | 145 |
Measurement of Social Power Opportunity Costs and | 162 |
Measurement of Social Power in nPerson Reciprocal | 185 |
A Bargaining Model for Social Status in Informal Groups | 204 |
Explanation and Comparative Dynamics in Social | 226 |
Poppers Improbability Criterion for the Choice | 243 |
INDEX | 255 |
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Essays on Ethics, Social Behaviour, and Scientific Explanation J.C. Harsanyi Náhled není k dispozici. - 1980 |
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A's power A₁ actually agreements alternative amount analysis argued assign assumption attitudes axioms B₁ B₂ bargaining model basic Bayesian cardinal utility causal choice choose cial coalition Comparative Dynamics concept conflict cooperative games costs course deference defined disutility empirical facts ence equilibrium point ethical example expected utility explain game theory game-theoretical given Harsanyi high social status hypothesis hypothetical imperatives important incentives income individual utilities interests interpersonal utility comparisons Jeffreys's mathematical maximin principle means measure moral rules motivational n-person non-cooperative game objective p₁ particular payoff payoff matrix people's performing action player political Popper position possible power situations preferences priori probability probability metric problem rational behavior Rawls rewards social group social institutions social power social system social values social welfare function society solution solution concept specific strategy strength of A's theoretical tion two-person u₁ u₂ utilitarian utility functions utility level value judgments welfare economics