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camera channels are by special design and construction incapable of being used in the United States and are not commercially interchangeable. United States v. Ford Motor Company, 46 Cust. Ct. 735, A.R.D. 124 (1961). In addition to sales in the home market or to a third country, cost of production figures may be used to establish a price which fairly reflects the merchandise under consideration. United States v. Acme Steel Company, 51 CCPA 81, C.A.D. 841 (1964). The record is barren of any evidence of cost of production.

Sales to other importers in the United States may be utilized as in the case of J. L. Wood v. United States, 68 Cust. Ct. 259, R.D. 11766 (1972) (application for review pending). The customs official followed this procedure in this case since the appraisement was made on the basis of sales to the other United States purchaser, CBS.

Appellant's contention is that the modification of the focus handle, connectors and particularly the yoke made the CBS article "similar" to the one imported by Ampex. This is based upon the contention that the yoke supplied to Ampex would not function in a highly magnetic field area as is found in New York. If we were to hold that the CBS camera was "similar" and not "such", there is insufficient evidence to establish that the Ampex camera price fairly reflects the market value. Though the testimony does allude to certain after-sales services and spare parts provided to CBS and not to Ampex, evidence is lacking to establish such costs. In the absence of such evidence or proof of cost of production, there is a failure of proof in establishing the contended value. Even if we were to assume that the 11.11 percent differential was due to these after-service costs, and it is not since we are aware of the modification of the focus handle, connectors and yoke, such evidence without a further breakdown is insufficient to overcome the presumption of correctness attaching to the appraised value. Ellis Silver Co., Inc. v. United States, 67 Cust. Ct. 564, A.R.D. 293 (1971), aff'd, 60 CCPA 143, C.A.D. 1100 (1973).

Additionally appellant contends CBS is not an industrial user and is within the meaning of section 402(f) (1) (B), supra, and section 402 (f) (3), supra. The opinion of Senior Judge Wilson considered this matter and made the following comment:

***The business of producing network programs for broadcasting on a network affiliate is a known, recognized, albeit occasionally controversial practice which constitutes a major economic factor in the billion dollar television industry. I am unable to perceive any significant difference, in assaying "industrial use" under the valuation statute, between the use of articles such as the steel strapping involved in United States v. Acme Steel Company, supra, and the articles at bar.

Furthermore, assiduous research into the legislative history of the Customs Simplification Act of 1956 fails to disclose any intent to give the term "industrial use" the narrow meaning ascribed to it by plaintiff. In the absence of such a showing, the appraising officer's presumptively correct finding that CBS purchased the cameras for "industrial use" has not been overcome.

For all of the reasons heretofore stated, we find the 11.11 percent addition here in question was properly included in the export value as appraised.

We adopt and incorporate by reference the facts found and the conclusions of the trial judge. The decision and judgment of the trial judge is hereby affirmed and judgment will be entered accordingly.

DECISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

CUSTOMS COURT

Rules

(C.R.D. 73-1)

SHANNON LUMINOUS MATERIAL COMPANY v. UNITED STATES

Opinion Re: Motion for Rehearing of Prior Order of
This Court Relating to Contested Venue for Trial

Court Nos. R70/5047, R70/5048, R70/5049,
R70/5052, R70/5053 and R70/5054

(Dated January 5, 1973)

Glad & Tuttle (Edward N. Glad of counsel) for the plaintiff.

Harlington Wood, Jr., Assistant Attorney General (Herbert P. Larsen, trial attorney), for the defendant.

BOE, Chief Judge: Pursuant to rule 12.1 of this court, plaintiff has filed a motion for rehearing of the prior order entered by this court in the above-entitled action on the 20th day of October, 1972 (see opinion relating thereto, C.R.D. 72-21). In so doing, plaintiff seeks to have the order of this court amended to include a statement "*** that a controlling question of law is involved as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from an order may materially advance the ultimate determination of the litigation ***." Rule 13.2(a).

The motion of the plaintiff is deemed groundless and untenable and, accordingly, does not merit extended comment. The issue decided in the prior order of this court relating to the question of contested venue does not constitute a "controlling question of law" which might serve to justify an interlocutory appeal as contemplated by rule 13.2. Nor can this court concur in the reasoning of the plaintiff supporting its contention “* *that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate determination of the litigation ***." If the final decision of the trial judge in the above-entitled action should prove to be of such a nature that the plaintiff might wish to perfect an appeal therefrom, the question presently sought by the plaintiff to be the subject of an interlocutory appeal might well

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be included in a final appeal at the later date without incurring the inevitable delay resulting from an interlocutory appeal as to the single issue.

For the first time the plaintiff submits in the supporting affidavits to its present motion specific reasons, as required by rule 9.1 (d), for requesting trial at the port of entry, Los Angeles, California. This court in its prior opinion under date of October 20, 1972 stated:

"The plaintiff in its objection to defendant's request for a trial at the port of New York, on the contrary, has submitted no information or reasons in support of its request for a trial at Los Angeles, California, except to assert a 'constitutional right' to a trial at that port of entry. No information is contained in plaintiff's response with respect to the number or character of witnesses which it may require, the availability of the same or the character of the evidence which it hoped or expected to obtain from them.

"It has long been the practice of this court to provide an accessible forum to a party litigant who finds it burdensome and impractical to try his action at a place other than the port of importation. This court, however, would be guilty of an abuse of discretion were it to accede to the request of the plaintiff as to the venue of this action in the absence of any information or reasons having been stated in conformity with the rules of this court. (rule 9.1)."

Had the plaintiff provided the information required by rule 9.1 (d) in its original objection to defendant's notice of trial, this court would have been in possession of facts which would have enabled it to place the venue of this cause of action at a location or locations which would be the least burdensome to each of the respective parties.

It is hoped that all party litigants ultimately will achieve the realization and appreciation that rules of court are adopted not only to provide a uniform and orderly manner of judicial practice and procedure, but also to provide the court with information from which it may make its determinations and orders. Only through such an understanding can the delays, resulting in part from an apparent disregard or unwillingness to follow the requirements of the rules of court, be avoided. Accordingly, the motion of the plaintiff for a rehearing of the order made and entered by this court on October 20, 1972, is denied.

In view, however, of the information which the plaintiff has now provided with respect to the availability of witnesses in Los Angeles, California, who are essential and necessary to the presentation of plaintiff's cause of action, this court will enter a supplemental order fixing a date and time for the presentation of plaintiff's testimony at Los Angeles, California, and reserving unto the defendant at the completion of plaintiff's testimony the right to move for a transfer of this

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