Game Theory

Přední strana obálky
MIT Press, 29. 8. 1991 - Počet stran: 604
This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point.

This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory—including strategic form games, Nash equilibria, subgame perfection, repeated games, and games of incomplete information—in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point. The analytic material is accompanied by many applications, examples, and exercises. The theory of noncooperative games studies the behavior of agents in any situation where each agent's optimal choice may depend on a forecast of the opponents' choices. "Noncooperative" refers to choices that are based on the participant's perceived selfinterest. Although game theory has been applied to many fields, Fudenberg and Tirole focus on the kinds of game theory that have been most useful in the study of economic problems. They also include some applications to political science. The fourteen chapters are grouped in parts that cover static games of complete information, dynamic games of complete information, static games of incomplete information, dynamic games of incomplete information, and advanced topics.

 

Obsah

ExtensiveForm Games
4
1
10
3
23
Exercises
36
References
42
1
67
3
74
2
108
2233
253
4
268
5
284
6
292
Perfect Bayesian
321
Appendix
343
Reputation Effects
367
Sequential Bargaining under Incomplete Information
397

5
117
Repeated Games
145
59
206
Bayesian Games and Bayesian Equilibrium
209
4
215
6
224
7
230
Exercises
237
7
243
Stability Forward
437
Exercises
473
Advanced Topics in StrategicForm Games
479
References
498
PayoffRelevant Strategies and Markov Equilibrium
501
Common Knowledge and Games
541
Index
573
Autorská práva

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O autorovi (1991)

Drew Fudenberg is Professor of Economics at MIT.

Jean Tirole, the 2014 Nobel Laureate in Economics, is Scientific Director of IDEI (Institut d'Economie Industrielle), Chairman of the Board of TSE (Toulouse School of Economics), and Annual Visiting Professor of Economics at MIT.

Bibliografické údaje