relieve members of both Houses from the imputations continually heaped upon them by the public press, that they wilfully prolong business for the sake of adding to the number of days for which they may claim their salaries. But the yearly amount proposed by that committee did not satisfy public opinion "out of doors." It was urged that the annual payments ought to be, for the President, 50,000 dollars a year (instead of 25,000 as at present); each cabinet minister 10,000 (instead of 6000); each senator, 6000; and each member of the House of Representatives, 5000. It was argued that, with so many means as now existed of making fortunes, by the application of ordinary talents and industry

in

any one of the various careers of life, it was not to be expected that men of the first qualifications would give themselves to the service of the republic for eight dollars per working day; that at the present rate of living, and considering the unavoidable expenses of a member of Congress at Washington and elsewhere, it was not probable that members in

general would be satisfied with that sum.

Hence it has arisen-and it is a matter too notorious in the United States to make any reluctance necessary in referring to it here— that accusations without stint or measure are launched against a considerable proportion of the members of both Houses of Congress, to the effect that, in order to make up such incomes as will enable them to live in the manner they think requisite, they accept money payments from persons interested in questions before the Legislature, to give their especial attention to such questions.

It is not necessary to impute corrupt motives to the members who thus allow themselves to become paid agents for the prosecution of claims, or the advancement of measures upon which they have also to decide in their deliberative capacity, in order to show how completely their conduct is a descent from the high position which the theory of their Constitution and the expectations of its framers claimed for it. That it is a departure from the first principles of a representative and deliberative body, is too obvious to need any

comment.

Neither, if corrupt motives are very freely imputed in the United States to such members (as is the well-known fact), do I desire to use that fact for the purpose of invidiously contrasting it with the general character of our own Legislature. Unhappily, the history of our railway legislation has left stigmas behind it which we should be glad to forget. And the circumstance that there always have been constituencies not very particular as to the moral qualities or the independence of the candidates of their choice, is sufficient to account for the degree of corruption that, in one form or another, is not unknown in the House of Commons. A marked distinction, however, between our system and that of the United States must not be forgotten, namely, that under their Constitution the frequency of elections, the very great diffusion of the franchise, and the payment of their members of both Houses, cause a class of men to be sent to the National Legislature, the majority of whom are not possessed of independent means sufficient to enable them to dispense with those

extraneous and unrecognised sources of emolument which are inconsistent with their position and character, should a low estimate of either happen to second the temptation; whereas, under ours, the vast preponderance among the members of the House of Commons of men of either hereditary or acquired wealth, or of competence honourably achieved and maintained, materially contributes to diffuse and preserve a high tone of feeling and of principle, which reduces the corrupt elements to exceptions; which is ever on the watch against their increase; and which despises and repels, though it may sometimes be obliged by political necessities to use them. And as regards the House of Lords, seldom indeed does even the voice of slander assail the honesty and independence of any one of its members. The extreme rarity —even during the moral contagion of the railway mania-of instances in which mem

any

bers of that House were known to have made a discreditable use of their position for their own private advantage, was a proof of the

general soundness of a body whose soul is honour.

I might, from the materials in my possession, bring forward many facts in illustration and in proof, if need were, of the habit among members of Congress of receiving money for the transaction of business before the House, and for their support in favour of certain measures. I will confine myself to one or two, which sufficiently describe the process; and I will add an Act of Congress lately passed upon the subject.

The following is an extract from a speech of Colonel Benton, an active member of the democratic party, and a personal friend of the present President, delivered just previously to the late presidential election. Colonel Benton, speaking of several measures which had been passed by Congress, of which he disapproved, said:

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The root of all this vicious legislation, and the opprobrium of our government, is a new power which has grown up at Washington, and which performs for legislation pretty much the same favour which caucuses and conventions perform for elections, that is, takes it out of the

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