And with regard to the "inferior offices," the patronage of which is exclusively in the President, Mr. Justice Story asserts that they "probably include ninety-nine out of every hundred of the lucrative offices of the Government."

It was argued, when the Constitution was under discussion, that the Executive would be materially weakened by being compelled to share with the Senate the power of appointment to the principal offices; but the contrary apprehension, that of the Executive becoming too powerful if possessed exclusively of the whole patronage of the Government, prevailed. And with regard to the inferior offices, it was urged that a President, acting under the eye of the public, would not venture to make his patronage subservient to party interests, but would distribute it with a view to the highest purposes of the public good. On this subject Mr. Justice Story observes: *—

"Perhaps the duties of the President, in the discharge of this most delicate and important duty of his office, were

never better summed up than in the following language of a distinguished commentator.* 'A proper selection and appointment of subordinate officers is one of the strongest marks of a powerful mind. It is a duty of the President to acquire, as far as possible, an intimate knowledge of the capacities and character of his fellow-citizens; to disregard the importunities of friends, the hints and menaces of enemies, the bias of party, and the hope of popularity. The latter is sometimes the refuge of feeble-minded men ; but its gleam is transient, if it is obtained by a dereliction. of honest duty and sound discretion. Popular favour is best secured by carefully ascertaining, and strictly pursuing the true interests of the people. The President himself is elected on the supposition that he is the most capable citizen to understand and promote those interests; and in every appointment he ought to consider himself as executing a public trust of the same nature. Neither should the fear of giving offence to the public, or pain to the individual, deter him from the immediate exercise of his power of removal, on proof of incapacity or infidelity in the subordinate officer. The public, uninformed of the necessity, may be surprised, and at first dissatisfied; but public approbation ultimately accompanies the fearless and upright discharge of duty.'"

The extent of the patronage vested in the President being as described in the former paragraph, the manner in which it is exercised, especially in reference to the removal

* Rawle on the Constitution, c. 14, p. 164.

of persons appointed by a preceding President, becomes a question of the most serious import.

The question whether the consent of the Senate was necessary to the removal of a person from office as well as to his appointment thereto, was warmly debated at the time of the framing of the Constitution. The writers of the Federalist adopted the view that no removal from office could be lawfully made without the concurrence of the Senate. "The maintenance of this doctrine with great earnestness by the Federalist," says Mr. Justice Story,

Had a most material tendency to quiet the just alarms of the overwhelming influence and arbitrary exercise of this prerogative of the Executive, which might prove fatal to the personal independence and freedom of opinion of public officers, as well as to the public liberties of the country. Indeed it is utterly impossible not to feel that if this unlimited power of removal does exist, it may be made, in the hands of a bold and designing man, of high ambition and feeble principles, an instrument of the worst oppression and most vindictive vengeance. Even in monarchies, while the councils of State are subject to perpetual fluctuations and changes, the ordinary officers of the Government

are permitted to remain in the silent possession of their offices, undisturbed by the policy or the passions of the favourites of the court. But in a republic, where freedom of opinion and action are guaranteed by the very first principles of the Government, if a successful party may first elevate their candidate to office, and then make him the instrument of their resentments or their mercenary bargains; if men may be made spies upon the actions of their neighbours to displace them from office; or if fawning sycophants upon the popular leader of the day may gain his patronage, to the exclusion of worthier and abler men-it is most manifest that elections will be corrupted at their very source, and those who seek office will have every motive to delude and deceive the people. It was not, therefore, without reason that, in the animated discussions already alluded to, it was urged that the power of removal was incident to the power of appointment; that it would be a most unjustifiable construction of the Constitution, and of its implied powers to hold otherwise; that such a prerogative in the Executive was in its own nature monarchical and arbitrary, and eminently dangerous to the best interests as well as the liberties of the country. It would convert all the officers of the country into the mere tools and creatures of the President. A dependence so servile on one individual would deter men of high and honourable minds from engaging in the public service. And if, contrary to expectation, such men should be brought into office, they would be reduced to the necessity of sacrificing every principle of independence to the will of the chief magistrate, or of exposing themselves to the disgrace of being removed from office, and that, too, at a time when it might

no longer be in their power to engage in other pursuits." "The language of the Federalist is, that the consent of the Senate would be necessary to displace as well as to appoint.* A change in the chief magistrate, therefore, could not occasion so violent or so general a revolution in the officers of the Government as might be expected if he were the sole disposer of offices. Where a man in any station had given satisfactory evidence of his fitness for it, a new President would be restrained from attempting a change in favour of a person more agreeable to him, by the apprehension that the discountenance of the Senate might frustrate the attempt, and bring some degree of discredit upon himself." "On the other

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hand, those who, after the adoption of the Constitution, held the doctrine (for before that period it never appears to have been avowed by any of its friends, although it was urged by its opponents as a reason for rejecting it), that the power of removal belonged to the President, argued that it resulted from the nature of the power, and was indispensable for a due execution of the laws, and a regular administration of the public affairs." • Besides, it was argued, that the danger that a President would remove good men from office was wholly imaginary. It was not by the splendour attached to the character of a particular President like Washington that such an opinion was to be maintained. It was founded on the structure of the office. The man in whose favour the majority of the people of the United States would unite to elect him to such an office, had every probability at least in favour of his principles. He must be presumed to possess integrity, independence, *Federalist, No. 77.