laws and regulations of society," or to minors, who, by the law of England, attain their majority at the age of twenty-one; by the law of France, at one time, at the age of thirty; by the law of Naples, at eighteen; and by the law of Holland at twenty-five ?* "Who shall say that one man is not as well qualified as a voter at eighteen, as another at twenty-five, or a third at forty, and far better than most men at eighty?”† It is almost superfluous to advert to the assumption on which the ultra-democratic theory rests, "that all men are born free and equal;" its unsoundness has been long since fully exposed by the discussions to which it gave rise at the time of the French Revolution. Men are born into society, and find, from the moment that they become responsible agents, that their natural liberty, even in the freest States, has been placed under certain limitations, long before they were born, by that society, and for the good of its members * Blackstone's Commentaries, §§ 463, 464. as a whole. And if their natural liberty has been in one case justly restrained by laws expressing the mature and enlightened opinion of the governing body of society-as by all those laws which prevent a man from using his natural liberty to the injury of his neighbour-why should it not be restrained with equal justice in another as that no man should participate in the governing power, until the mature and enlightened opinion of the governing body of society is satisfied that he is capable of using that power with intelligence, and for the benefit of society? Again, with respect to the ultrademocratic notions of equality, it has been abundantly shown that it is perfectly untrue in fact, that all men are born equal, either in natural gifts and abilities, or in the eye of society, even the most savage. To equality before the law-that first sentiment of natural justice every individual is entitled, of whatever age or sex, or of whatever condition-mental, physical, or social. This just feeling and principle of equality before the law, has, by a confusion of ideas, been extended to convey the meaning of a natural and social equality, neither of which ever existed among men. In the same manner, the idea that there is such a thing as an abstract right to vote, is traceable to the habit of using the word "right" in a too general sense. The imperfection of language leads to the use of the same word to express a natural right as to express a civil right. The latter is a mere creation of the law for the time beinga civil ordinance, which may or may not be just or equitable, expedient or otherwise; which, as regards the franchise, may involve the questions of whether the age at which a minor shall attain his majority shall be twentyone, eighteen, or twenty-five, and whether it is for the general good that this or that qualification should be required of a man before the power of voting is conceded to him; and when these questions are determined by the law of the State, the individual is invested with a right in accordance with that law. The former -a natural right—is one which the universal sense of mankind in a state of civil society deems such as the right to justice, to protection against injury, and which may be claimed inhabitant of a free country, whether male or female, sane or insane, minor or of full age, or even a criminal. by any Mr. Justice Story proceeds to say:— "The truth seems to be, that the right of voting, like many other rights, is one which, whether it has a fixed foundation in natural law or not, has always been treated in the practice of nations, as a strictly civil right, derived from and regulated by each society according to its own circumstances and interests." *** "If every well-organised society has the right to consult for the common good of the whole, and if, upon the principles of natural law, this right is conceded by the very union of society, it seems difficult to assign any limit to this right, which is compatible with the due attainment of the end proposed. If, therefore, any society shall deem the common good and interests of the whole society best promoted, under the particular circumstances in which it is placed, by a restriction of the right of suffrage, it is not easy to state any solid ground of objection to its exercise of such an authority."* He then goes on to show that every State in the Union has acted upon this principle; * § 580. that "in the adoption of no State constitution has the assent been asked of any but the qualified voters;" and who shall be the qualified voters has been, and is continually being settled and altered by themselves, "no two States having fixed the qualifications of voters upon the same uniform basis." "From this,' he adds, “will be seen how little, even in the most free of republican governments, any abstract right of suffrage, or any original indefeasible privilege, has been recognised in practice."* If, therefore, there be any person in this country, of any pretensions to fair reasoning or competent information, who is still prepared to maintain that the franchise is anything more than a trust, placed by the legislative authority of the State, for the time being, in the hands of those who, in the judgment of that authority, will not abuse it, but will use it for the promotion of the common good, he must have recourse to the example of some country whose practice has gone beyond that |