theretofore recognized as the foundation of the common-law rule has been abrogated, so far at least as to make either spouse liable for larceny from the other. Common-law rules have usually been founded upon sound reason and considerations of public policy, and out of this fact has grown the safe maxim that statutes derogating from the common law should be strictly construed. Keeping this maxim in mind, we have found nothing in the statutes of Ohio, and nothing has been pointed out to us, which would justify a conclusion that the General Assembly expressly or impliedly abrogated the commonlaw rule that neither husband nor wife can be prosecuted for larceny of the goods of the other; and much less an intention to do so. Indeed, we doubt that any member of that body had in contemplation such a result when he voted for the statutes which protect the individual rights of married people. The legislature was contemplating the expressed purpose of the statute, and that only. They were not at that time considering crimes and criminal procedure; and surely they cannot be presumed to have intended a thing which they did not clearly express and which is fraught with such far-reaching and radical consequences to the law of the domestic relations, for the abrogation of the doctrine of the legal unity of husband and wife, when pushed to its logical conclusion, would not only create crimes where there were none before, but would also authorize a husband or wife to maintain civil actions for tort against the other, such as actions for personal injuries, assault, false imprisonment, or slander (15 Am. & Eng. Encyc. Law [2d ed.] 857), thus multiplying a hundredfold the unhappy differences which have to be settled in the divorce courts. We cannot assume that the legislature intended this without very clear evidence of such an intention in the language of the statutes."

RIGHT TO MAKE ORIGINAL PROBATE OF WILL IN STATE OTHER THAN THAT IN WHICH TESTATOR DIED. - In In re Chadwick's Will, (N. J.) 82 Atl. Rep. 918, it was held that original probate of a will might be made in a state other than that in which the testator died if he left property there to be administered. The court said: "It is conceded that Chancellor McGill, sitting as ordinary, in Gordon's Case, 50 N. J. Eq. 397, 26 Atl. Rep. 268, held that the will of a testator domiciled in another State at the time of his death may be proved in this State, although it has not been probated at the place of domicile, if the testator left property here to be administered. He cites the following cases as establishing this doctrine: Stevens v. Gaylor, 11 Mass. 256, 263; Varnar a Bevil, 17 Ala. 286; Hyman v. Gaskins, 27 N. C. 267; Jaques v. Horton, 76 Ala. 238; Woods v. Matthews, 73 Mo. 477, 482. Counsel for the appellant contends that the decision of this question in Gordon's case is dictum. To this I assent. Chancellor McGill concedes it when he says, at page 400 of 50 N. J. Eq., at page 269 of 26 Atl. Rep.: Question as to the domicile of Mr. Gordon, although urged on both sides at the argument, does not appear to me to be necessarily in issue at this time.' The second branch of the case presented the question upon which it was decided, namely, that of forgery. Gordon's will was decided to have been supposititious and was denied probate, which rendered the decision of the question of domicile unnecessary. The contention made on behalf of the appellant that the above cases cited by Chancellor McGill, as authority for the dictum that the will of a nonresident decedent may be probated here if there be property here to administer, is that they do not sustain the position taken by the learned chancellor and are not authority for his dictum. I incline to agree to this proposition. Nevertheless I am not prepared to go the length of overruling that late chancellor's opinion, for this dictum was not obiter, but 'judicial'; that is, it was not the expression of an opinion upon a collateral question, but one directly involved, argued by counsel, and deliberately passed

upon by the court, and was not a mere argument or illustration originating with the chancellor himself. 'Judicial dictum, like obiter dictum,' is not binding as a decision; nevertheless the former is entitled to much greater weight than the latter, and should not be lightly disregarded. Therefore, on the authority of Chancellor McGill's judicial dictum in Gordon's case, now twenty years old (and, I believe, universally regarded as the law since its enunciation), I do not feel at liberty to hold that original probate of the will of a testator domiciled elsewhere may only be had at his place of residence, even though I incline to the opinion that that is or rather was, the better law."

POWER OF TRIAL JUDGE TO RECALL JURY WHICH HAD RETIRED FOR PURPOSE OF TAKING FURTHER EVIDENCE. -In People v. Ferrone, (N. Y.) 98 N. E. Rep. 8, which was a criminal action for abduction, it appeared that at the trial important evidence on the essential fact of the complainant's age was given by her mother, who was evidently ignorant and confused. After the jury had been charged and had retired, they returned, and on the request of one of their number the mother was recalled to the stand for further examination on this subject. This examination was largely conducted by members of the jury, although the court and the prosecuting attorney did ask some questions. The counsel for the defendant was not denied the right of subsequent cross-examination, he expressly disclaiming any desire therefor, nor did he request the privilege of commenting on the additional evidence before the jury retired again. There was a verdict and judgment against the defendant who appealed on the ground that the trial court committed error in permitting the jury after it had retired to return and hear further evidence. It was held, however, that there was no error. The court said: "We think that no reversible error was committed. The wide discretion of a trial judge in regulating the order in which evidence shall be produced, in permitting the examination of witnesses out of the natural order, in allowing the recall of witnesses, and in relieving a party from his error and default in not calling a witness at the proper time, is so well established that no authorities need be cited. Proceeding along these lines, it has already been determined in this State that in a criminal trial, after the case has been finally submitted to the jury, and before their retirement, the trial may be reopened for the purpose of permitting evidence to be introduced on an essential point which had been overlooked People . Reilly, 49 App. Div. 218, 63 N. Y. S. 18, affirmed without opinion 164 N. Y. 600, 59 N. E. Rep. 1128. This being the established law, I am unable to find any authority or principle which would justify us in holding that because the action had proceeded a little further, and the jury had passed out of the room or even entered upon the consideration of the case, the discretionary power of the court would cease, and that it would be unable to recall the jury for the purpose of taking further evidence. It seems to me that in order thus to hold we should have to draw an arbitrary rather than a logical distinction. It is obvious that such a practice is not to be encouraged or lightly pursued, but I think it cannot be held as matter of law that the court on proper facts may not exercise its discretion and permit additional evidence to be taken even after the jury had retired. . . The precise question here involved was considered by the court in Commonwealth v. Ricketson, 5 Metc. (Mass.) 412, and the court, in overruling an objection similar to that now urged by the appellant, said: 'An objection was taken to the course of the judge at the trial in admitting testimony after the jury had been out. We think it was a matter depending wholly upon the discretion of the court. The order of receiving evidence is adopted for convenience, and may be varied according to particular circumstances.' Accordingly, I think the objection should be disregarded, and the judgment affirmed."

RIGHT OF WIFE TO MAINTAIN ACTION AGAINST PERSON SELLING MORPHINE TO HUSBAND FOR Loss of CONSORTIUM. — In Flandermeyer v. Cooper, (Ohio) 98 N. E. Rep. 102, it was held that one who with knowledge that a husband by the constant and continued use of morphine had become so weakened in body and mind that he was unable to resist his cravings for the drug, and who after the repeated protests of the wife continued to sell morphine to the husband until by the use thereof his mind became so impaired and destroyed that it was necessary to confine him in an insane asylum, was liable to the wife for damages for her loss of consortium. The court said: "There can be no reasonable contention but that the wife suffers the same injury from the loss of consortium as the husband suffers from that cause. His right is not greater than hers. Each is entitled to the society and affection of the other. The rights of both spring from the marriage contract and in the very nature of things must be mutual, and while this was always true of the marriage relation, yet there was a time in the history of our jurisprudence when the legal status of the wife was such that she could not, at common law, maintain an action of this character. Now her legal status is the same as that of her husband. She has the same right to the control of her separate property, the same right to sue in her own name, and, in a word, is in the full enjoyment of every right that her husband enjoys, so that she comes clearly within the principles of the common law that allow a right of action by the husband for damages for the loss of the consortium of his wife. Either we must hold that the common law is fixed, unchangeable, and immutable, that it possesses no such flexibility as will permit its ready adaptability to changing conditions of human affairs, or that when every reason and every theory for denying the wife the same rights as the husband has entirely disappeared from our jurisprudence, that she is now equally entitled with her husband to every remedy that the common law affords, and we have no hesitation in adopting the latter view. It is insisted, however, that neither husband nor wife would have a right of action under the facts and circumstances of this case, and our attention is called to the fact than an enabling statute was necessary in order to permit a wife to recover damages to means of support by reason of intoxication caused by sales of liquor to the husband. This, however, is not a similar case. This is not an action for damages for loss of support, or loss of the earning capacity of the husband, but is wholly an action for damages for loss of consortium. Consortium is defined to be the conjugal fellowship of husband and wife, and the right of each to the company, co-operation, and aid of the other in every conjugal relation.' Bigaouette v. Paulet, 134 Mass. 123, 45 Am. Rep. 307. This right is invaded whenever a third person, through machination, enticement, seduction, or other wrongful, intentional, and malicious interference with the marriage relation, deprives the husband or wife of the consortium of the other. The remedy for an invasion of these rights is not in the nature of the action for damages to means of support provided by the statutes relating to the sale of intoxicating liquors. No enabling statute was necessary to authorize a husband to maintain an action for the loss of consortium."

RIGHT OF JURY IN PERSONAL INJURY CASES TO ADD INTEREST BECAUSE OF DELAY OF DEFENDANT. -In Cochran v. Boston, (Mass.) 97 N. E. Rep. 1100, which was an action for personal injuries received by the plaintiff while a traveler from a defect in a highway, it was held that the plaintiff was not entitled to an instruction to the effect that in ascertaining damages tho jury had a right to add to the fair compensation interest by reason of delay. The court said: "The plaintiff relies on Frazer v. Bigelow Carpet Co., 141 Mass. 126, 4 N. E. Rep. 620, where it was held that in an action for injury to property 'the

jury, in their discretion, and as incident to determining the amount of the real loss, may consider the delay caused by the defendant.' This case has been followed in other cases of tortious injury to property. The rule in substance adopted in these cases is that while interest is not allowed as matter of right, the time for which the plaintiff has been kept out of the use of his property or the damage occasioned it by the wrong of the defendant may be considered and an amount not exceeding the legal rate of interest may be included therefor in the verdict if necessary in order to give adequate compensation. This principle is applicable to cases where there has been a definite injury to specific property. The reason is that stated by Chief Justice Shaw in Parks v. Boston, 15 Pick. 198 in laying down the rule for the computation of interest where property is taken by eminent domain. The injury occurs and is finished in its results on a particular day, and can then best be ascertained, and exact justice would be done by a contemporaneous determination of the loss. An action for personal injuries is essentially different in its nature. The damages are not complete and ended on the day of the accident, but continue for a greater or less period thereafter. The extent and magnitude of the injury are not infrequently unappreciated and incapable of reasonable ascertainment on the day it is received. Its degree of permanence is often deceptive at the first, and commonly the determination of conditions requisite for recovery is materially assisted by the perspective of time. The most helpful aids in learning the nature and degree of actual injury may be events occurring after the event complained of. There is no fixed standard by which the compensation to be awarded can be measured. Its general rules have been stated many times. The sum of money fixed upon must be such as fairly compensates the injured person for the loss of time, the physical pain and the mental suffering, both that undergone in the past and likely to occur in the future, and also money reasonably expended and to be expended in assúaging pain and in restoration to health. Elements that are past and also those which are to come must be considered. Most of them are not capable of mathematical computation. They can be settled only by the sound judgment and conscience of the tribunal by which they are assessed, and they are peculiarly within its province. The damages are to be determined, moreover, as of the day of the trial. It is apparent that interest or consideration akin to interest have no place in an inquiry of this sort. Interest is compensation for the use of money which is due. But the money which the wrongdoer is required by law to pay for the future suffering, expense or loss of time of one whom he has injured is not due until judgment is made up. It is not a debt and does not become a definite obligation until a verdict or finding has been finally entered. It is composed of divers elements, together making up a gross sum, many of which may not have sprung into being on the day when the tort was committed, although directly traceable to it as a cause. If interest were properly chargeable on that which has already accrued, discount should be allowed upon that which relates to the future. Such a method of computing damages would be wholly impracticable. The amount of damages recoverable in action of this sort, as well as those under certain branches of the Employers' Liability Act and under penal statutes for causing death, is limited to definite amounts. Plainly no interest can be allowed in instances of maximum injury. It has been the practice in this commonwealth not to extend the rule of Frazer v. Bigelow Carpet Co., supra, to cases of this sort. Although the custom has been firmly established and continuous not to allow enhancement of damages by reason of delay, and personal injury actions have been very numerous for many years, the question has never been presented before for consideration. The grounds against such an extension of allowance of interest appear conclusive."

At the annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools in August, 1910, a resolution was passed that a committee of five be appointed to arrange for the translation and publication of a series of Continental masterworks on jurisprudence and philosophy of law. The committee spent a year in collecting the material; advice was sought from a score of masters in the leading universities of France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and elsewhere, and the result of these labors is a series of volumes called the Modern Legal Philosophy Series, of which Professor Miraglia's book is one. In 1873 Professor Miraglia published a book entitled "The Fundamental Principles of the Various Systems of Legal Philosophy and Hegel's EthicoJuridical Doctrines." The work received a second edition in 1893; and the third, enlarged edition, in 1903, bearing the simple title "Philosophy of Law," is the work here translated by Mr. Lisle. The book was intended by the author as a complete course in the Philosophy of Law for the use of undergraduate students of law. The scope of the work is well stated by Professor Kocourek in his introduction, as follows: "Since Philosophy of Law must rest upon foundations sufficient to support universal knowledge and universal reality, Professor Miraglia commences with a discussion of the basic proposition 3 of the leading general philosophies, treating the subject from a critical and comparative standpoint. With this necessary orientation accomplished, he passes to the notion of law, and treats in detail the various institutions which appear in society as phenomena of the law." The translator has performed his labors well, and the publisher has put the matter in attractive form for the reader. Finally the student of law owes a debt of gratitude to the Committee of the Association of American Law Schools, of which such well-known legal scholars as Professor Wigmore and Professor Pound are members, for the results already accomplished in behalf of legal scholarship.

Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology. By John J. Reese, M. D. Eighth edition. Revised by D. J. McCarthy, A. B., M. D. Pp. 660+ ix. Philadelphia, P. Blakiston's Son & Co. 1911.

Dr. Reese's well-known textbook on Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology has now reached its eighth edition. In the Preface to the first edition it was said to be intended as a textbook to meet the wants of students of legal medicine, and to have been written by one who had taught the subject for over twenty years. This eighth edition is also intended as a textbook for students, and the principal purpose of the book, as in former revisions, has been kept prominently in mind. As Dr. McCarthy, the present editor, says: "It is essentially a textbook for the student and a reference manual for the attorney and general expert." Alterations in the text have been made and new matter added throughout the book. Extensive revisions have been made in the chapter on Insanity; a concise chapter on Commitment of the Insane has been inserted; a resumé of the subject of anaphylaxis has been added to the chapters on Toxicology, and some new material has been added to the toxicology of formaldehyde poisoning and chronic poisoning of bismuth. The revision has received thoughtful treatment by the editor, who it might be well to state is professor

of Medical Jurisprudence in the University of Pennsylvania. In its present form the work embodies the latest ideas relative to the science of Medical Jurisprudence and should and most likely will supplant earlier editions.

Lawyers, Doctors, and Preachers. A Satirical Survey of the Three Learned Professions. By George H. Bruce, A. M., LL. B. Pp. 107. The Irvington Publishing Company, New York. 1912.

This little book contains amusing anecdotes and sayings concerning the three so-called "learned professions." The material appears to have been collected from various sources, and some of the anecdotes have the flavor of age, but as they have lived this long they must have merit, and the author perhaps deserves our thanks for having made them readily accessible.

News of the Profession.

THE UTAH STATE BAR ASSOCIATION will hold its annual meeting at the Hermitage, Ogden canyon, in June.

THE TENNESSEE BAR ASSOCIATION will hold its thirty-first annual meeting in Knoxville, Tenn., on June 25 and 26.

NEW PENNSYLVANIA JUDGE. William C. French, of Philadelphia, has been appointed judge of the Camden District Court to succeed Samuel P. Jones.

FEDERAL JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT. Edward E. Cushman, former federal judge in Alaska, has been appointed federal judge for the Southwest Washington district.

MCKINLEY PORTRAIT GIVEN TO COUNTY. An oil painting of the late President McKinley has been presented to Stark county, Ohio, by the County Bar Association.

THE GEORGIA BAR ASSOCIATION met in annual convention at Tybee, Ga., on May 30, May 31, and June 1. An account of the meeting will be found in Law NOTES for July.

WOMAN LAWYER CALLED TO CANADIAN BAR. Miss Mabel P. French, the first woman lawyer in British Columbia, was called to the bar at the last session of the Benchers of the Law Society.

COUNTY JUDGES' ASSOCIATION. - At the annual meeting of the Nebraska County Judges' Association, held in April, Judge Campbell, of Polk county, was elected president, and Judge Kelso, of Franklin county, was elected secretary and treasurer.

THE LOUISIANA BAR ASSOCIATION. The annual meeting of the Louisiana Bar Association, which was to have been held at Shreveport, La., on April 19 and 20, was indefinitely postponed on account of the floods along the Mississippi river.

PHILADELPHIA ATTORNEY WINS PRIZE. - The American Philosophical Society has awarded to Charles H. Burr, of Philadelphia, the H. W. Phillips prize of $2,000 for the best essay on the treaty-making power of the United States.

He

United States at Boston. Mr. Mathews is a Harvard man. was formerly shortstop on the Harvard baseball team and a good football player.

CANADIAN JUDGE SWORN IN. - Mr. Haughton Lennox, K. C., who represented South Simcoe in the House of Commons for twelve years, was sworn in as judge of the Supreme Court and justice of the High Court of Justice of Ontario, by Chancellor Sir John Boyd, on May 3.

INVITED TO SPEAK BEFORE BAR ASSOCIATION. Thomas W. Thomas, former deputy county attorney of Warren county, Kentucky, and a leading member of the bar of Bowling Green, Ky., has accepted an invitation to deliver an address before the American Bar Association which will meet in Milwaukee in August.

OHIO JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS. Governor Harmon has appointed Joseph W. O'Hara, of Cincinnati, to succeed James L. Price, deceased, on the bench of the Supreme Court of Ohio, and Robert C. Pugh, of Mt. Auburn, to succeed Prescott Smith, deceased, on the Superior Court bench of Cincinnati.

APPOINTED DIRECTOR OF PEOPLE'S INSTITUTE. - Frederick C Howe, a lawyer, of Cleveland, 0, and once a member of the faculty of the Cleveland Law School, has been appointed managing director of the People's Institute of New York. Mr. Howe practiced law in Cleveland for fifteen years and before that was engaged in newspaper work in New York.

TWENTY YEARS' SERVICE ON COMMISSION. Judge Judson C. Clements, a member of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and a noted Georgian, has just celebrated his 20th year on the commission. He was appointed from Georgia by President Harrison in 1892, and was successively reappointed by Presidents Cleveland, McKinley, and Roosevelt.

NAMED AS SPROIAL SESSIONS JUDGE. Cornelius F. Collins, an assistant corporation counsel of New York city, has been appointed by Mayor Gaynor to the bench of the Court of Special Sessions of New York to succeed Justice Willard H. Olmsted, whose term expired on May 1. The term is ten years and the salary is $9,000 a year.

RESOLUTION BY NEVADA BAR ASSOCIATION. The Nevada Bar Association has adopted the following resolution: "Resolved, That the members of the Nevada Bar Association do absolutely refuse to vouch for any attorney from another State, seeking admission to the bar of the State of Nevada, unless the applicant's character and qualifications are known to the member who vouches for him; and further

Resolved, That no such applicant shall be vouched for unless his character and qualifications are such as to fairly entitle him to admission to the bar of the State of Nevada."

CONSOLIDATION OF LAW MAGAZINES. Controlling interest in The Lawyer and Banker, a monthly magazine founded and edited by Attorney Charles E. George, and published in San Francisco, has been sold by him to the following well-known lawyers: Fred O. Farnsworth, secretary American Bankers'

The ques

Association, New York; Charles F. Mathewson, representing the National City Bank, New York; Senator Elihu B. Root, New York; John D. Lawson, St. Louis, and William Forgan, Chicago. The new management will consolidate the American Law Review, of St. Louis; the Southern Bench and Bar Review, of Atlanta, Ga., and the Law Journal, of New York, in two monthly publications - The Lawyer and Banker in San Francisco and the Bench and Bar Review in New York. CONFERENCE ON WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION Law. tion of workmen's compensation was discussed at some length on May 4 at a joint conference in the home of the New York Bar Association, in New York city, between the legal compensation committee of the National Civic Federation and the cooperating workmen's compensation committees of the American Bar Association and Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Representatives of these bodies were present from several States. P. Tecumseh Sherman, former New York State Labor Commissioner, is chairman of the legal compensation committee of the Civic Federation; Hollis R. Bailley, of Massachusetts, is chairman of the committee of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and Charles Henry Butler, of Washington, D. C., is chairman of the committee of the American Bar Association. RECOMMEND CHANGE IN TEXAS JUDICIAL SYSTEM. -A special committee of the Texas Bar Association met at Austin on May 2 and formulated a report making recommendations with reference to changing the judicial system of Texas. The recommendations are made to the Bar Association, and it in turn will probably offer them to the legislature for favorable action. The Bar Association meets in Galveston in July. The committee is composed of the following members: Chief Justice T. J. Brown of the Supreme Court, Associate Judge A. J. Harper of the Court of Criminal Appeals, Associate Justice B. H. Rice of the third Court of Civil Appeals, District Judge Robert G. Street of Galveston, Judge John C. Townes, dean of the University Law School; ex-Associate Justice F. A. Williams, H. C. Carter, of San Antonio; C. G. Kreuger, of Bellville, and W. W. Searcy, of Brenham.

NEW JERSEY BAR ASSOCIATION OFFICERS NOMINATED. - The committee on nominations of the New Jersey State Bar Association, of which Judge Howard Carrow, of Camden, is chairman, and Justices Kalisch and Voorhees are members, met recently in Trenton and agreed upon the following nominations for the action of the annual session in Atlantic City in June: President, Halsey M. Barrett, of Newark; first vice-president, former Judge John W. Westcott, of Camden; second vice-president, George Bourgeois, of Atlantic City; secretary, William J. Kraft, Camden; treasurer, former Judge Lewis Starr, Woodbury.

NEW FEDERAL STATUTE SUGGESTED. The American Bar Association has urged Congress to pass a statute which contains the following provision: "No judgment shall be set aside, or reversed, or new trial granted, by any court of the United States in any case, civil or criminal, on the ground of misdirection of the jury or the improper admission or rejection of evidence, or for error as to any matter of pleading or procedure, unless, in the opinion of the court to which application is made, after an examination of the entire cause, it shall appear that the error complained of has injuriously affected the substantial rights of the parties." It should be noted that California adopted an amendment to its constitution substantially in harmony with the above last October and that such is also the law, with some modifications, in the States of Wisconsin, Kansas, Oregon, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Ohio, and Kentucky.

AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. The sixth annual convention of the American Society of International Law

was held in Washington, D. C., on April 25–27. The society was organized at Lake Mohonk, N. Y., January 12, 1906, and its object is "to foster the study of international law and promote the establishment of international relations on the basis of law and justice." The recent session of the society was devoted to the consideration of the program, organization, and procedure for the third Hague conference. Notable members of the society are President Taft, Elihu Root, Chief Justice White, Justice William E. Day, Hon. P. C. Knox, Andrew Carnegie, Hon. Joseph H. Choate, Hon. John W. Foster, Hon. George Gray, Senator John W. Griggs, Hon. William W. Morrow, Hon. Richard Olney, Hon. Horace Porter, Hon. Oscar S. Straus, Senator Shelby M Cullom, Hon. Jacob M. Dickinson.

BAR COMMITTEE TO PROBE RECALL AGITATION. — In pursuance of a resolution adopted at a special meeting of the New York State Bar Association, held in Albany, N. Y, on April 13, President William Nottingham of the association has appointed a committee "to investigate the causes leading to the present feeling of discontent with our judicial system and with the manner in which justice is administered, and if any evils be found to exist," to make recommendations "for their abatement and for the correction of any weakness found to exist in our judicial system, in lieu of the recall of judges and of their decisions." Alton B. Parker, former chief judge of the Court of Appeals, is chairman of the committee. The other members are as follows: William B. Hornblower, Austen G. Fox, William D. Guthrie, Morgan J. O'Brien, of New York; D. Cady Herrick, Lewis E. Carr, Frederick E. Wadhams, of Albany; Adelbert Moot, Ansley Wilcox, of Buffalo; A. T. Clearwater, of Kingston; Ceylon H. Lewis, of Syracuse; Richard E. White, of Rochester; Theodore R. Tuthill, of Binghamton, and Henry Purcell, of Watertown.

ILLINOIS STATE BAB ASSOCIATION, The Illinois State Bar Association held its annual convention in Chicago on April 20 and 27. In many respects the meeting was the most notable in the history of the association. The President's address was delivered by Horace Kent Tenney, of Chicago. Short addresses on various phases of the subject of "Procedural Reform" were delivered by the following delegates coming at the invitation of the Illinois Bar Association as representatives of the Bar Associations of their respective States: Benjamin P. Crum, Alabama; Henry M. Armistead, Arkansas; Horace G. Lunt, Colorado; Clarence R. Wilson, District of Columbia; William A. Blount, Florida; Sanders McDaniel, Georgia; Charles G. Saunders, Iowa; Edmund F. Trabue, Kentucky; Victor M. Gore, Michigan; Charles W. Farnham, Minnesota; John G. Schaich, Missouri; Alfred G. Ellick, Nebraska; Edward Q. Keasbey, New Jersey; Hayden Clement, North Carolina; John Knauf, North Dakota; Allen Andrews, Ohio; R. A. Kleinschmidt, Oklahoma; A. W. Biggs, Tennessee; W. B. Gano, Texas; P. L. Williams, Utah; Warren R. Austin, Vermont; George Bryan, Virginia; H. H. Field, Washington; George E. Price, West Virginia; B. R. Goggins, Wisconsin. A discussion of the "Recall of Judges" and the "Recall of Judicial Decisions" was participated in by R. M. Wanamaker, judge of the Court of Common Pleas, Akron, O.; James H. Wilkerson, Albert Martin Kales, and Charles H. Hamill, of the Chicago bar, and others. At the banquet in the evening of April 27 the speakers were Orrin N. Carter, chief justice of the Supreme Court of Illinois; Stephen S. Gregory, president of the American Bar Association; Albert W. Biggs, of the Tennessee bar, and Michael J. Daugherty, of the Illinois bar. The following officers were elected for the ensuing year: President, Harry L. Higbee, Pittsfield; vice-presidents, Robert McMurdy, Chicago; William B. Wright, Effingham; Edwin M. Ashcraft, Chicago; secretary-treasurer, John F. Voigt, Mattoon.

English Notes.

A CASE OF MISTAKEN IDENTITY. - The Court of Criminal Appeal has already justified its creation by investigating the case of an elderly man named Thompson, who was accused of false pretenses. Thompson was "identified" by twenty-one witnesses, and sentenced to three years in prison. The Court of Criminal Appeal found that he had been the victim of mistaken identity, his likeness to the real culprit being striking. It is a pity that this useful court was not created long ago.

WHAT IS A " WRECK"?- Mr. Justice Bargrave Deane had a somewhat difficult question to answer as to whether the Olympic after the collision with H. M. S. Hawke was a (6 wreck," so that the engagement of her seamen was thereby terminated. The words in section 158 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, are wreck or loss," so it would seem to be clear that the word "wreck" does not mean loss, and that the test to be applied is, as the learned judge pointed out, whether the vessel was sufficiently injured and damaged that she ceased to be a ship of a serviceable character to her owners. Naturally every case must be one of degree, and if, as the section shows, the word "wreck" does not only mean loss, the facts as to the Olympic certainly tend to support the finding that she was a wreck within the section.

SURVIVORSHIP IN COMMON DISASTER-The dreadful tragedy of the loss of the Titanic, which has cast a gloom over the civilized world and absorbed thought to the exclusion of all other topics, may perhaps, having regard to the fact that husbands and wives, parents and children, and indeed whole families, have perished together, give occasion to doubts and difficulties in reference to the settlement of questions regarding survivorship. Where a husband and wife had been carried off the deck of a vessel by the same wave it was held that there was no inference in law as to survivorship from the different sex, age, and state of health of the husband and wife; that the question was from beginning to end one of fact, and the difference in strength, age, and in other respects was a mere matter of evidence for those who had to discharge the functions of a jury. (Wing v. Angrave, 8 H. L. Cas. 183; see Roscoe's Nisi Prius, 18th ed., p. 42; see also Dart's Vendors and Purchasers, 7th ed., p. 380, where all the cases on the subject are collected.) "DAMAGE TO PROPERTY BY SUFFRAGIST.- An ingenious point was taken on behalf of an appellant before the Court of Criminal Appeal lately in a case arising out of the recent disturbances in connection with the suffragist movement. An appellant was convicted at quarter sessions of malicious injury to property of a value exceeding £5. The evidence showed that she had broken a window of a post office, which was admittedly of the value of more than £5, but that, if the amount realizable as salvage were taken into account, the actual loss suffered after replacing the window would be less than that sum. It was therefore argued that the appellant had not committed damages exceeding £5. It will be remembered that under the Malicious Damage Act, 1861, § 51, it is a misdemeanor "unlawfully and maliciously to commit any damage, injury, or spoil to or upon any ... property, the damage, injury, or spoil being to an amount exceeding five pounds." The court held that the test that should be applied, in an indictment under that section, was the actual value of the window or property in question, and the cost of repairing the damage, or replacing the property, irrespective of what amount might be obtained as salvage.

AN INEFFECTUAL PLEA.-A curious situation was revealed in a case which came before the Court of Criminal Appeal last month. Upon an indictment charging an appellant with feloniously having in his possession without lawful excuse a