Report on Roads and Canals. experience of the late war amply proves, in the present state of our internal improvements, the delay, the uncertainty, the anxiety, and exhausting effects of such calls. The facts are too recent to require details, and the impression too deep to be soon forgotten. As it is the part of wisdom to profit by experience, so it is of the utmost importance to prevent a recurrence of a similar state of things, by the application of a portion of our means to the construction of such roads and canals as are required with a view to military operations in time of war, the transportation of the munitions of war, and more complete defence of the United States." promptly and cheaply, at any point which may be menaced, the necessary force and means for defence. To resist ordinary hostilities, having for their object the destruction of our towns and the exhaustion of our means, the force ought to be drawn from the country lying between the coasts and the sources of the principal rivers which discharge through it into the ocean; but, to resist greater efforts, aiming at conquest, should it ever be attempted, the force and resources of the whole community must be brought into resistance. To concentrate, then, a sufficient force, on any point of this frontier which may be invaded, troops must be marched, and munitions of war transported, either along the line of the coast, or from the interior of the Atlantic States to the coast, or, should the invading force be of such magnitude as to require it, from the Western States; and the roads and canals necessary for the defence of this frontier are those which will render these operations prompt, certain, and economical. From the coast to the Alleghany mountains and the high land separating the streams which enter into the St. Lawrence from those of the Atlantic, in which the principal Atlantic rivers take their rise, the distance may be averaged at about 250 miles; and the whole extent, from the St. Marys to the St. Croix, is intersected, at short intervals, by large navigable rivers and the principal roads of this portion of our country, through which its great commercial operations are carried on. These, aided by the steamboats, now introduced on almost all of our great rivers, present great facilities to collect the militia from the interior, and to transport the necessary supplies and mu In all questions of military preparation, three of our frontiers require special attention; the Eastern or Atlantic frontier; the Northern, or the Canadian frontier; and the Southern, or the frontier of the Gulf of Mexico. On the West and Northwest we are secure, except against Indian hostilities; and the only military preparations required in that quarter, are such as are necessary to keep the Indian tribes in awe, and to protect the frontier from their ravages. All of our great military efforts, growing out of a war with an European Power, must, for the present, be directed towards our Eastern, Northern, or Southern frontiers; and the roads and canals which will enable the Government to concentrate its means for defence, promptly and cheaply, on the vulnerable points of either of those frontiers, are those which in a military point of view, require the aid of Government. I propose to consider each of those frontiers separately, beginning with the Atlantic, which, in many respects, is the weakest and most exposed. From the mouth of St. Croix to that of St. Marys, the two extremes of this frontier, is a dis-nitions of war. tance, along the line of the coast and principal bays, without following their sinuosities, of about two thousand one hundred miles. On this line, including its navigable rivers and bays, are situated our most populous cities, the great depots of the wealth and commerce of the country. That portion of it which extends to the south of the Chesapeake has, with the exceptions of the cities and their immediate neighborhood, a sparse population, with a low marshy country, extending back from 100 to 150 miles. To the north of the Chesapeake, inclusive, it affords, every where, deep and bold navigable bays and rivers, which readily admit vessels of any size. Against a line so long, so weak, so exposed, and presenting such strong motives for depredations, hostilities the most harassing and exhausting may be carried on by a naval Power; and, should the subjugation of the country ever be attempted, it is probable that against this frontier, facing Europe, the seat of the great Powers of the world, the principal efforts would be turned. Thus circumstanced, it is the duty of the Government to render it as secure as possible. For much of this security we ought to look to a navy, and a judicious and strong system of fortifications; but not to the neglect of such roads and canals as will enable the Government to concentrate, Much undoubtedly remains to be done to perfect the roads and improve the navigation of the rivers; but this, for the most part, may be safely left to the States and the commercial cities particularly interested, as the appropriate objects of their care and exertions. The attention of both have recently been much turned towards these objects, and a few years will probably add much to facilitate the intercourse between the coast and the interior of the Atlantic States. Very different is the case with the great and important line of communication, extending along the coast, through the Atlantic States. No object of the kind is more important; and there is none to which State or individual capacity is more inadequate. It must be perfected by the General Government, or not perfected at all, at least for many years. No one or two States have a sufficient interest. It is immediately beneficial to more than half of the States of the Union, and, without the aid of the General Government, would require their co-operation. It is, at all times, a most important object to the nation; and, in a war with a naval Power, is almost indispensable to our military, commercial, and financial operations. It may, in a single view, be considered the great artery of the country; and, when the coasting trade is suspended by war, the vast Report on Roads and Canals. It remains, in relation to the defence of the Atlantic frontier, to consider the means of communication between it and the Western States, which require the aid of the Government. Most of the observations made relative to the increased strength and capacity of the country to bear up under the pressure of war, from the coastwise communication, are applicable in a high degree at present, and are daily becoming more so, to those with the Western States; and should a war for conquest ever be waged against us, an event not probable, but not to be laid entirely out of view, the roads and canals necessary to complete the communication with that portion of our country would be of the utmost importance. intercourse between the North and South, which this may be easily effected, to the south of the annually requires five hundred thousand tons of Chesapeake, by land and steam batteries. That shipping, and which is necessary to the commerce, bay is itself one of the most important links in the agriculture, and manufactures of more than this line of communication; and its defence half of the Union, seeks this channel of commun- against a naval force ought, if practicable, to be ication. If it were thoroughly opened by land rendered complete. It was carefully surveyed, and water; if Louisiana were connected, by a the last Summer, by skilful officers, for this purdurable and well finished road, with Maine; and pose in part, and it is expected that their report Boston with Savannah, by a well established line will throw much light upon this important subof inland navigation, for which so many facilities ject, Long Island Sound, another part of the are presented, more than half of the pressure of line which is exposed, can be fully defended by war would be removed. A country so vast in a naval force only. its means, and abounding, in its various latitudes, with almost all the products of the globe, is a world of itself; and, with that facility of intercourse, to perfect which, the disposable means of the country is adequate, would flourish and prosper under the pressure of a war with any Power. But, dropping this more elevated view, and considering the subject only as it regards "military operations in time of war, and the transportation of the munitions of war," what could contribute so much as this communication to the effectual and cheap defence of our Atlantic frontier? Take the line of inland navigation along the coast, the whole of which, it is estimated, could be completed, for sea vessels; by digging one hundred miles, and at the expense of $3,000,000, the advantage which an enemy with a naval force now has, by rapidly moving along the coast, and harassing and exhausting the country, would be in a great measure lost to him. In fact, the capacity for rapid and prompt movements and concentration, would be, to the full, as much in our power. We would have, in most of the points of attack, a shorter line to move over, in order to concentrate our means; and, aided by steamboats, would have the capacity to pass it in a shorter time, and with greater certainty, than what an enemy, even with a naval superiority, would have, to attack us. Suppose the fleet of such an enemy should appear off the Capes of Delaware; before it could possibly approach and attack Philadelphia, information, by telegraphic communication, might be given to Baltimore and New York, and the forces stationed there thrown in for its relief. The same might take place if Baltimore or New York should be invaded; and, should an attack be made on any of our cities, the militia and regular forces, at a great distance along the coast, could, in a short time, be thrown in for its relief. By this speedy communication, the regular forces, with the militia of the cities and their neighborhood, would be sufficient to repel ordinary invasions, and would either prevent, or greatly diminish, the harassing calls upon the militia of the interior. If to these considerations we add the character of the southern position of the Atlantic frontier, so fatal to those whose constitutions are not inured to it, the value of this system of defence, by the regular troops and the militia accustomed to the climate, will be greatly enhanced. Should this line of inland navigation be constructed, to enjoy its benefits fully, it will be necessary to cover it against the naval operations of an enemy. It is thought that The interest of commerce, and the spirit of rivalry between the great Atlantic cities, will do much to perfect the means of intercourse with the West. The most important lines of communication appear to be from Albany to the Lakes; from Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, and Richmond, to the Ohio river; and from Charleston and Augusta, to the Tennessee; all of which are now commanding the attention, in a greater or less degree, of the sections of the country immediately interested. But in such great undertakings, so interesting in every point of view to the whole Union, and which may ultimately become necessary to its defence, the expense ought not to fall wholly on the portions of the country more immediately interested. As the Government has a deep stake in them, and as the system of defence will not be perfect without their completion, it ought at least to bear a proportional share of the expense of their construction. I proceed next to consider the roads and canals connected with the defence of our Northern frontier. That portion of it which extends to the east of Lake Champlain has not heretofore been the scene of extensive military operations; and I am not sufficiently acquainted with the nature of the country, to venture an opinion whether we may hereafter be called on to make considerable military efforts in that quarter. Without, then, designating any military improvements, as connected with this portion of our Northern frontier, I would suggest the propriety, should Congress approve of the plan for a military survey of the country to be hereafter proposed, to make a survey of it the duty of the engineers who may be designated for that purpose. For the defence of the other part of this line of frontier, the most important objects are, a canal or water communication between Albany and Report on Roads and Canals. the munitions of war, and the more complete defence of the United States, require. Lake George, and Lake Ontario, and between Pittsburg and Lake Erie. The two former have been commenced by the State of New York, and will, Many of the roads and canals which have been when completed, connected with the great inland suggested, are no doubt of the first importance to navigation along the coast, enable the Govern- the commerce, the manufactures, the agriculture, ment, at a moderate expense, and in a short time, and political prosperity of the country; but are to transport munitions of war, and to concentrate not, for that reason, less useful or necessary for its troops from any portion of the Atlantic States, military purposes. It is, in fact, one of the great fresh and unexhausted by the fatigue of marching advantages of our country, enjoying so many on the inland frontier of the State of New York. others, that, whether we regard its internal imThe road commenced, by order of the Executive, provements in relation to military, civil, or politfrom Plattsburg to Sackett's Harbor, is essentially ical purposes, very nearly the same system, in all connected with military operations on this por- its parts, is required. The road or canal can tion of the Northern frontier. A water commun- scarcely be designated, which is highly useful for ication from Pittsburg to Lake Erie, would greatly military operations, which is not equally required increase our power on the upper Lakes. The for the industry or political prosperity of the Alleghany river, by its main branch, is said to be community. If those roads or canals had been navigable within seven miles of Lake Erie, and pointed out, which are necessary for military by French creek, within sixteen miles. Pitts-purposes only, the list would have been small inburg is the great military depot of the country deed. I have, therefore, presented all, without to the west of the Alleghany, and, if it were con- regarding the fact that they might be employed nected by a canal with Lake Erie, would furnish for other uses, which, in the event of war, would military supplies with facility to the upper lakes, be necessary to give economy, certainty, and sucas well as to the country watered by the Missis- cess to our military operations; and which, if sippi. If to these communications we add a road they had been completed before the late war, from Detroit to Ohio, which has already been would, by their saving in that single contest, in commenced, and a canal from the Illinois river men, money, and reputation, have more than into Lake Michigan, which the growing popula- demnified the country for the expense of their contion of the State of Illinois renders very import-struction. I have not prepared an estimate of ant, all the facilities which would be essential "to carry on military operations in the time of war, and the transportation of the munitions of war" for the defence of the western portion of our Northern frontier, would be afforded. expenses, nor pointed out the particular routes for the roads or canals recommended, as I conceive that this can be ascertained with satisfaction only by able and skilful engineers, after a careful survey and examination. I would, therefore, respectfully suggest, as the basis of the system, and the first measure in the "plan for the application of such means as are in the power of Congress," that Congress should direct such a survey and estimate to be made, and the result to be laid before them as soon as practicable. The expense would be inconsiderable; for, as the army can furnish able military and topographical engineers, it would be principally confined to the employment of one or more skilful civil engineers, to be associated with them. By their combined skill, an efficient system of military roads and canals would be presented in detail, accompanied with such estimates of expenses as may be relied on. Thus full and satisfactory information would be had; and though some time might be lost in the commencement of the system, it would be more than compensated by its assured efficiency when completed. It only remains to consider the system of roads and canals connected with the defence of our Southern frontier, or that on the Gulf of Mexico. For the defence of this portion of our country, though at present weak of itself, nature has done much. The bay of Mobile, and the entrance into the Mississippi through all of its channels, are highly capable of defence. A military survey has been made, and the necessary fortifications have been commenced, and will be in a few years completed. But the real strength of this frontier is the Mississippi, which is no less the cause of its security than that of its commerce and wealth. Its rapid stream, aided by the force of steam, can, in the hour of danger, concentrate at once an irresistible force. Made strong by this noble river, little remains to be done by roads and canals, for the defence of our Southern frontier. The continuation of the road along the Atlantic coast, from Milledgeville to New Orleans, and the completion of the road which has already been commenced from Tennessee river to the same place, with the inland navigation through the canal of Carondelet, Lake Pontchartrain, and the islands along the coast of Mobile, covered against the operations of a naval force, every facility required for the transportation of munitions of war, and movement and concentration of troops, to protect this distant and import-But when the vast extent of our country is com ant frontier, would be afforded. Such are the roads and canals which military operations in time of war, the transportation of For the construction of the reads and canals, which Congress may choose to direct, the army, to a certain extent, may be brought in aid of the moneyed resources of the country. The propriety of employing the army on works of public utility cannot be doubted. Labor adds to its usefulness and health. A mere garrison life is equally hostile to its vigor and discipline. Both officers and men become the subjects of its deleterious effects. pared with the extent of our military establishments, and taking into consideration the necessity of employing the soldiers on fortifications, bar Report on Roads and Canals. latter patiently awaits the expiration of his term of service, while the former frequently seizes the first favorable opportunity for desertion. racks, and roads, connected with remote frontier posts, we ought not to be sanguine in the expectation of aid to be derived from the army in the construction of permanent military roads and canals, at a distance from the frontiers. When our military posts come to be extended up the Mississippi and Missouri, as far as is contemplated, the military frontier of the United States, not including sinuosities, and the coasts of navi-direction of the President. Where incorporate gable bays and lakes opening into our country, as was stated in a former report, will present a line of more than nine thousand miles, and, including them, of more than eleven thousand. Thinly scattered along so extensive a frontier, it will be impossible, I fear, without having some points exposed, to collect any considerable bodies in the interior of the country, to construct roads and canals. Should Congress think proper to commence a system of roads and canals for the "more complete defence of the United States," the disbursement of the sums appropriated for the purpose might be made by the Department of War, under companies are already formed, or the road or canal commenced under the superintendence of a State, it perhaps would be advisable to direct a subscription on the part of the United States, on such terms and conditions as might be thought proper. In other cases, and where the army cannot be made to execute it, the work ought to done by contract, under the superintendence and inspection of officers of the engineer corps, to be detailed for that purpose. It is thus the Government will be able, it is thought, to construct upon terms at least as favorable as corporate companies. The system of constructing all public works, which admit of it, by contract, would be attended with important advantages. It has recently been adopted in the construction of fortifications, and it is expected will be attended with beneficial results. The principal works at Mobile and New Orleans have been contracted for on terms considerably under the estimates of the engineers. Such a system, extended to military roads and canals, combined with a careful inspection and superintendence by skilful engineers, will enable the Government to complete them with economy, durability, and despatch. As connected with this subject, I would respect fully suggest the propriety of making an adequate provision for the soldiers, while regularly and continually employed in constructing works of public utility. The present allowance is fifteen cents a day, which is considered sufficient in occasional fatigue duty, such as is now done at most of the posts; but if systematic employ, on permanent works, should be made the regular duty of the soldiers who can be spared for that purpose, a compensation, taking into the estimate the obligation of the Government to provide medical attendance and pensions to the deceased and disabled soldiers, not much short of the wages of daily labor ought to be granted to them. Without such provision, which is dictated by justice, an increase of desertion and difficulty in obtain- In the view which has been taken I have ing recruits ought to be expected. Among the thought it improper, under the resolution of the leading inducements to enlist is the exemption House, to discuss the Constitutional question, or from labor; and, if the life of a soldier should be how far the system of internal improvements equally subject to it as that of other citizens in which has been presented may be carried into the same grade, he will prefer, if the wages are effect on the principle of our Government; and, much inferior, to labor for himself to laboring for therefore, the whole of the arguments which are the public. The pay of a soldier is sixty dollars used, and the measures proposed, must be conper annum; and if he were allowed, when em-sidered as depending on the decision of that quesployed permanently on fatigue, twenty-five cents a day, and suppose him to be employed two hundred days in the year, his compensation, including his pay, would be $110 per annum-a sum, it is thought, considerably short of the average wages of labor. If this sum should be allowed, the greater portion of it ought to be paid at the expiration of the term of enlistment. If fifteen cents a day were so reserved, and the soldier should be employed one thousand days in the five years for which he is enlisted, it would constitute a sum of one hundred and fifty dollars, to be paid at the expiration of his term, which ought, in the same manner as the bounty land, be made to depend on an honorable discharge. This would furnish an important hold on the fidelity of the soldier, and would be a powerful check to the great and growing crime of desertion. An honorable discharge is now worth but little to the soldier, and the consequence is, that desertions are more frequent with those enlisted since the war, than those who were then enlisted, and are entitled to the bounty in land on their honorable discharge. The tion. The only military roads which have been commenced are from Plattsburg to Sackett's Harbor, through the Chateaugay country; from the southern boundary of the State of Tennessee, and crossing the Tennessee river near the Muscle Shoals, to Madisonville, Louisiana; and from Detroit to Fort Meigs, at the foot of the Rapids of the Miami of the Lakes. Documents marked A, B, C, show the progress which have been made. These roads have been commenced, and thus far completed by the labor of the soldiers, who, while they are so employed, receive fifteen cents per day, with an extra allowance of a gill of whiskey. The labor of the troops is the only means within the reach of the Department of completing these roads; and, as the troops are so employed, only when they are not engaged in active service, it is impossible to state, with accuracy, when the roads will be completed. J. C. CALHOUN, Hon. HENRY CLAY, A. Report on Roads and Canals. HEADQUARTERS, BROWNSVILLE, December 6, 1818. Sir: Your letter, covering a copy of one of the 11th of August, calling for a report of the labor performed on the road leading from Sackett's Harbor, through the Chateaugay country, is be fore me. the road has been completed; and, from every It is considered that the most laborious part of An increase of men has been recently afforded information, it has been done in the best manner. which enables it to progress with much greater to the detachment south of Tennessee river, facility. Should I receive minute reports shortly, I shall And have the honor to be, &c., Adjutant General. My letter of the 29th of November will inform you what has been done, but I fear will not exhibit the progress of this work to the extent you have expected. It may, therefore, be proper to state, in this place, that when the President, in the Autumn of 1817, directed the road in question to be opened and improved, I did not under-communicate their contents without delay. stand that the second regiment were to be ordered from the duty they were then upon. This regiment, at the time referred to, were employed, enclosing with pickets the public ground at Sackett's Harbor, and that duty occupied them the remainder of the season. Expecting the troops at the Harbor would have been employed in completing the barracks at that place this year, they were not put upon the road, but allowed to be engaged in improving the public grounds for gardens; and, as these grounds were new, it required much labor to put them in good con dition. These causes, and the reasons assigned in my letters from this place and Plattsburg, produced the delay that has occurred in putting Colonel Brady's command upon the road, and, if your letter of the 11th of August had not been received upon my return to this place, I fear that this work would not yet have commenced. I pray you to believe, that I regret the delay, and I beg you to see good cause for it in the reasons I have endeavored to assign. It is due to the command of Colonel Brady and Colonel Atkinson to say, that they have discovered not only a becoming cheerfulness in obeying the orders received for perfecting the Plattsburg and Sackett's Harbor road, but much zeal in the performance of this duty, and, if these regiments are continued upon this important work the next season, more than double the length of way will be completed, that has been passed the last and the present year. With respect, I have the honor to be, &c., JAC. BROWN. Hon. J. C. CALHOUN, Secretary of War. B. HEADQ'RS, DIVISION OF THE SOUTH, ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, Hon. J. C. CALHOUN, C. HEADQUARTERS, Detroit, November 2, 1819. SIR: I have the honor to report that the military way, directed to be opened from this place to the Rapids of the Miami, has progressed as far as the Eight Mile Creek, that is, within eight miles of the Rapids, making in all a distance of seventy miles. The road is truly a magnificent one, being eighty feet wide, cleared of all the logs and underbush, every low place causewayed, and all the creeks and rivers requiring it bridged in a substantial manner. The number of causeways exceeds sixty, and the bridges are of considerable length. The one on which the troops are now employed is four hundred and fifty feet in length, constructed of strong oak framed work. It was found impossible to complete the road to the Rapids this season, on account of the time and labor required in throwing bridges over the larger streams: it was also deemed more essential to complete the bridges, than cut the road this season to the Rapids, as the road would be useless without the means of crossing the large streams. The officers and soldiers who have been employed in this service deserve much credit for the zeal and perseverance they have displayed on this occasion. The work they have performed has proved highly beneficial, both to the people of the country and of the Government. Besides greatly adding to the defence and strength of this frontier, the road has been the means of develop ing the richness of the public lands in this Territory, and greatly augmenting their value. As soon as Major Anderson, topographical enSIR: On the eve of setting out for the Chick-gineer, can complete the survey of the road, a asaw Territory, I deem it necessary to inform you more minute and particular description of the that no reports have been received as yet, of a work will be forwarded. particular character, in relation to the military road now opening from Columbia, Tennessee, to Madisonville; but I am enabled to inform you, officially, that fifty miles have been completed by I have the honor to be, &c. ALEX. MACOMB. Hon. J. C. CALHOUN, |