For the distinctions between robbery, larceny, extortion, embezzlement, and those cases of taking of personal property which amount only to trespass, see notes upon the subjects of larceny and extortion. S281. To constitute robbery the force or fear must be employed either to obtain or retain possession of the property or to prevent or overcome resistance to the taking. If employed merely as a means of escape it does not constitute robbery. This provision conforms to the existing law, as established by the Revised Statutes. It has been held, indeed, that violence employed to get possession of the property does not constitute robbery; to have this effect the force must be employed to prevent or overpower resistance. State v. Johu., 5 Jones N. C. Law Rep., 163; Rex v. Gnosil, 1 Carr. & P., 304; Rex v. Baker, Leach., 290; R. v. Homer, Leach, 291, n. The Commissioners believe, however, it will be found the safer rule to punish the taking as robbery where it is accomplished by force, against an actual dissent of the owner's will. This will exclude secret stealing from the person; such as picking the pocket, and other cases in which, though an indefinitely small force is used in removing the property, it is done without the owner's knowledge. $282. When force is employed in either of the ways specified in the last section, the degree of force employed is immaterial. In an English case, it appeared that the prisoner struck the prosecutor's hand so as to cause money in it to fall to the ground, and then picked up the money himself, using threatening violence to prevent the prosecutor from doing so. Held, robbery if the taking by the prisoner was committed while the owner of the money still remained present. Rex v. Francis, 2 Strange, 1015. In a case in Rhode Island it appeared that the prisoner put one of his hands through the arm of the prosecutor, and with the other seized the latter's watch; saying, “I will have your watch;" and, breaking the watch guard, fled with the watch. Held, robbery, on the ground, the taking was by force. The expressed determination made the case one of open violence, as distinguished from a secret taking or mere snatching by surprise. State v. McCune, 5 R. I., 60. How force or fear must be emp loyed. Degree of terial. force imma $283. The fear which constitutes robbery may be What fear either: may be an element in robbery. Value of property taken 1mmaterial. Taking of property robbery. 1. The fear of an unlawful injury, immediate or future, to the person or property of the person robbed, or of any relative, of his, or member of his family; or, 2. The fear of an immediate and unlawful injury to the person or property of any one in the company of the person robbed, at the time of the robbery. Founded upon the provisions of 2 Rev. Stat., 677, S$ 55, 56; but extended to embrace the case of a theft accomplished by means of a threat of immediate violence towards a companion of the person deprived of property, who is not, however, a relative or member of his family; and, also, the case of theft accomplished by means of a threat of a future injury to the property of a relative of the person robbed, or of a member of his family. S284. When property is taken under the circumstances required to constitute robbery, the fact that the property was of trifling value does not qualify the offense. In Rex v. Bingley, 5 Carr. & P., 602, the property taken was a slip of paper containing a memorandum of a debt due to the person robbed. It was held that the offense was robbery notwithstanding the small value of the paper. That the prosecutor showed, by carrying the memorandum in his pocket, that he considered it of some value. $285. The taking of property from the person of Pecretly not another is not robbery, when it clearly appears that the taking was fully completed without his knowledge. Two degrees of robbery. Punishment of S 286. Robbery when accomplished by the use of force or of putting the person robbed in fear of some immediate injury to his person, is robbery in the first degree. When accomplished in any other manner it is robbery in the second degree. Corresponds with the distinction established by 2 Rev. Stat., 677 and 678, §§ 55, 56. S 287. Every person guilty of robbery in the first degree is punishable by imprisonment in a state first degree. prison not less than ten years. robbery in 2 Rev. Stat., 678, § 57. ment of S288. Every person guilty of robbery in the second Punish degree is punishable by imprisonment in a state prison robbery in not exceeding ten years. 2 Rev. Stat., 678, § 57. second degrec. ment of committed by two or robbery, more per S289. Whenever two or more persons conjointly Punishcommit a robbery, or where the whole number of persons conjointly committing a robbery, and persons present and aiding such robbery amount to two or more, each and either of such persons is punishable by imprisonment for life. Intended as a stringent provision against "garroting" and other forms of robbery by gangs. The language of the section is framed upon that of section 391 of the Indian Penal Code. sons. CHAPTER VII. ASSAULTS WITH INTENT TO COMMIT FELONY OTHER THAN ASSAULTS WITH INTENT TO KILL. SECTION 290. Shooting and assaults with deadly weapons. 291. Other assaults. 292. Administering stupefying drugs. S 290. Every person who shoots or attempts to shoot at another with any kind of fire-arms, air-gun, or other means whatever, or commits any assault and battery upon another by means of any deadly weapon or by such other means or force as was likely to produce death, with intent to commit any felony other than an assault with intent to kill, or in resisting the execution of any legal process, is punishable by imprisonment in a state prison not exceeding ten years. Embraces so much of 2 Rev. Stat., 665, § 36, as is not already covered by the provisions of sections 278, supra, relative to attempts to kill. Shooting saults with weapons. and as deadly saults. S291. Every person who is guilty of an assault Other aswith intent to commit any felony, except an assault with intent to kill, the punishment for which assault is not prescribed by the preceding section, is punish Administering stupefying drugs. able by imprisonment in a state prison not exceeding five years, or in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, or by both such fine and imprisonment. Embraces so much of 2 Rev. Stat., 666, § 39, as is not embraced by the provisions of section 279, supra, relative to attempts to kill. $292. Every person guilty of administering to another any chloroform, ether, laudanum or other intoxicating, narcotic or anesthetic agent, with intent thereby to enable or assist himself or any other person to commit any felony, is guilty of felony. See Consol. Stui. of Canada, 955, § 13. CHAPTER VIII. Duel defined. Punishment for fighting a duel. Incapacity to hold office. DUELS AND CHALLENGES. SECTION 293. Duel defined. 294. Punishment for fighting a duel. 295. Incapacity to hold office. 296. Punishment of seconds, aids, and surgeons. 297. Punishment for challenges. 298. Challenge defined. 299. Attempts to induce a challenge. 300. Posting for not fighting. 301. Leaving the state with intent to evade laws against duel ing. 302. Where such person may be indicted and tried. 303. Witness's privilege. $293. A duel is any combat, with deadly weapons, fought between two persons by previous agreement or upon a previous quarrel. S 294. Every person guilty of fighting any duel, although no death or wound ensues, is punishable by imprisonment in a state prison not exceeding ten years. Founded on 2 Rev. Stat., 686, § 1. $ 295. Every person convicted of fighting a duel is thereafter incapable of holding or being elected or appointed to any office, place or post of trust or emolument, civil or military, under this state. 2 Rev. Stat., 686, § 4. ment of seconds, aids, and surgeons. S296. Every person who is present at the time Punishwhen any duel is fought, either as second, aid or surgeon, or who advises or gives any countenance to any duel, is punishable by imprisonment in a state prison not exceeding seven years. 2 Rev. Stat., 686, § 2. ment for S 297. Every person who challenges another to Punishfight a duel; every person who accepts any such challenges. challenge; and every person who knowingly forwards, carries or delivers any such challenge, is punishable by imprisonment in a state prison not exceeding seven years. Founded on 2 Rev. Stat., 686, § 2. defined. S 298. Any words, spoken or written, or any signs, Challenge uttered or made to any person, expressing or implying or intended to express or imply a desire, request, invitation or demand, to fight a duel, or to meet for the purpose of fighting a duel, are deemed a challenge. See State v. Perkins, 6 Blackf., 20; Commonwealth § 299. Every person guilty of sending, uttering or making to another any words or signs whatever, with intent to provoke or induce such person to give or receive any challenge to fight a duel, is guilty of a misdemeanor. So held in King v. Philips, 6 East., 464; upon the ground that as sending a challenge is a misdemeanor (as to which see Rex v. Rice, 3 East., 581,) any act done with intent to cause one to be sent is a misdemeanor. Attempts to challenge. induce a not fighting. $300. Every person who posts or publishes another Posting for for not fighting a duel, or for not sending or accepting a challenge to fight a duel, or who uses any reproachful or contemptuous language, verbal, written or printed, to or concerning another, for not sending or |