tive on land than the supremely glorious achievements of the Navy, which mark the epoch and render it the cynosure of every eye.

Some day a careful and dispassionate study of every detail should, and probably will, be made of all that relates to the soldier and his trade in this Spanish war by the men who were actually on the firing line and in the forefront of battle, whether belonging to some technical branch or to the line; and then it will be clearly known how the current of events and the methods of movement and care and supply appeared to those who most pointedly, and not unintelligently, felt the effects of either the excellence or remissness displayed. Then the record and the events may appear to be more nearly in juxtaposition and not separated by half the world, so the same soldierly spirit can actuate both. Indeed, this phase of feeling has already found expression in more than one book. In the meantime, and without any comparison with others who have played their part so admirably, it should be recognized how largely the burden of field work fell upon the regular company officers; who not only had the duties of then grade to perform, but were assigned by the score to every type of duty, both of the line and staff, and civil duties; while the simply superb organizations were subsequently swamped with untrained recruits, and indeed filled with them again and again, until it seemed miraculous, though the recruits were particularly admirable, that the characteristics of distinguished organizations could be so long retained despite such circumstances. How different this is from calling to the colors, as other civilized nations do, reserves trained for war in the very organizations they rejoin, all perfectly equipped at the outbreak of hostilities, is evident to every thinking mind. And it becomes us to consider that there are other qualities quite beneficial in war in addition to enthusiastic patriotism, intelligence, and admirable individual qualities; and it may be worth our while in view of the portents of destiny drawing close upon us to make a serious effort to keep our Army secure in constant possession of every quality that leads to reliability and victory. Extreme fluctuations in the training of the men from perfect excellence to perfect greenness may doubtless be adequately guarded against if desired.

Before this war regimental organizations were comparatively little recognized in military administration. This radical change from the habitual to the legal unit of supply upon the outbreak of hostilities is a noticeable feature deserving attentive consideration, and may be fundamental to our bureaucratic system and overburdened force. Even the companies may feel its effects. But the regiment is universally recognized as the unit of administration for war, and everything should be done to insure efficient and experienced regimental commanders and staff and confirm them in their legitimate duties and accustom the men to their methods and personal equation, especially in the first swift stages of war; though the calls for officers are so great elsewhere that the percentage must be quite small of regular regiments which went to the assault on the first day of the past fiscal year under their own colonels. This is one of the many fruits of maintaining a merely skeleton military organization without an organized and prescribed system of reserves and mobilization. To compare this situation with a similar grade in our sister service, what would be thought if nearly every ship at Manila or Santiago had gone into action without its captain? Certainly such a situation would be exceptional and not the rule in warfare by the Regular Navy on the sea. How ought a similar and essential contingency to be provided for or avoided on land?

If our Army practiced the art of mobilization annually every feature

and requirement would be thoroughly prescribed and organized and be as familiar a characteristic of military training with us as with foreign countries, and as perfectly and easily done as company drill. The only thing that prevented this fundamental preliminary practice in times of peace was lack of money. It depends wholly upon the appropriation bill. Within the decade all that could be done simply at the posts has been carefully and instructively carried out, so that military problems and minor tactics have become familiar as household words at the Western posts, and the junior officers were generally thorough masters of their art. And years ago General Miles had given out the problem for one post to assail the force at another throughout the department he then commanded, so that the instruction was not confined to a single post, but embraced two; and one year there were larger camps, commands, and maneuvers for actual practice and instruction at Chilocco under General Merritt, and at Camp Crook under General Brooke, where a brigade or more was assembled. How inadequate and infrequent this united experience was, and how earnest and persistent were the efforts to continue and extend it, and what were the obstacles that proved insurmountable, and how even the inadequate field equipment was reduced, are doubtless evident to all and well understood, at least in the Army. The National Guard also had its experiences, and had accomplished a most commendable work of instruction.

As usual in our wars we have experienced some of the effects of lack of preparation (though probably fewer ill effects than ever known before), and with customary intelligence and energy have remedied defects and overcome obstacles as they appeared, even in the very face of the enemy, if need be. And those who have had the burden to bear have borne it cheerfully and well. But ought we to allow this to remain our habitual system, with the discomforts and expense it involves?

How much had been done in advance to make model companies of regulars in all discipline, instruction, and care, by such captains as Fornance, who laid down his life at San Juan, or Dodd, who still pursues the even tenor of his way after doing his full duty in those scenes, may perhaps never be fully appreciated outside of the service; and the full effects of the admirable service schools have not yet been fully reaped. They can not be too promptly rehabilitated. The country is awakened to military needs, which are something more than liberal expenditures or calling out untrained troops in the hour of need; and the problem that presses for attention is something more than for the present. The problem of the future has also to be met, and should be met wisely and well.

As an indication how our arrangements met the actual exigency of war, it is noticeable that the general commanding at Santiago was and is stationed in San Francisco, and the general at Manila in New York. Whether the Navy had assigned their commands in relation to the contingency that actually developed is doubtless also historically interesting.

Our wars have been habitually fought by the volunVolunteers. teers, and the Spanish war was not an entire exception to this rule, though the per cent of regulars among the first to reach the front during this last struggle was perhaps as great or greater than in any of our previous wars. Some days before the call for volunteers was issued most of the regular regiments had already been ordered to points in the South, principally Chickamauga Park, Ga.; Tampa, Fla.; Mobile, Ala., and New Orleans, La., and as soon as the 200,000 volunteers called for

by the President's proclamations of April 23 and May 25, 1898, and the sixteen regiments of volunteer engineers, cavalry, and infantry were mustered into the service of the United States, they, too, were rapidly concentrated at the same points, and at Camp Alger, Va., and San Francisco, Cal., and together with the regulars formed into seven army corps. The First and Third corps were organized at Camp George H. Thomas (Chickamauga Park), Ga.; the Second at Camp Alger, Va.; the Fourth at Mobile, Ala.; the Fifth and Seventh at Tampa, Fla., and the Eighth at San Francisco, Cal. The Sixth was not organized.

The mobilization of so large a force, which by the close of May numbered nearly 170,000 men and received an increase of over 100,000 more during the next three months, was no unimportant task (even though under the well-practiced mobilizations of Europe they can turn out millions of men perfectly equipped in the same length of time without any undue sacrifice or discomfort), and its successful culmination under adverse conditions seems no less marvelous than our glorious achievements on land or water, which overshadowed all other events.

From legislative action to the final muster out every step was com paratively new to the participants and an experiment; and the arrival of regiments unarmed or half armed, or of regiments needing clothing and other supplies, was one feature, and the organization of expeditions by water to tropical islands in different oceans was another, illustrating the difficulties that seemed almost insurmountable: and much that was accomplished may have appeared to be done under telegraphic or hurry orders, meeting every exigency. American ingenuity and energy and perseverance triumphed then, and will again, whether we profit by the past or begin all over again in the next emergency. But no matter how large our resources, our duty in the premises is plain. The foremost powers of the European continent have every step thought out beforehand for every possible emergency, and we should do no less. Our experience has been varied, covering wars fought on land and on sea, at home and abroad, and doubtless some day the wisdom of the axiom "Si vis pacem para bellum" will dawn upon us. Let us therefore anticipate and be prepared in time.

The habit of concentrating inexperienced soldiers in large camps or requiring new legislation for every important step may entail serious delay or unnecessary suffering from camp diseases, which are more to be dreaded and guarded against than bullets. The past has now indicated what preparatory practical instruction is essential for war and also the absolute necessity of continuing beyond the day of signing the treaty of peace some organized force at the point of contact with the enemy to maintain order and clear up the débris of war. If it takes more than a fortnight to prepare the muster out papers, the trying time at the close of service should not be made more disorganizing by the uncertain and unsettled questions of soldierly duty about the date of discharge. How strongly this condition bore upon some of the organi zations sent upon the Texas expedition at the close of the civil war may be remembered still by some who were there.

To discipline and teach a man to take care of and be kind to himself requires far more effort than to learn the manual of arms or battalion drill, especially when the whole regiment is green. Without previous experience one can not be expected to learn in a minute how to overcome natural obstacles as merely a matter of instinct and habit, especially while mastering the heart and rudiments of a new trade, and living in such crowds and inconveniences as to seem almost an exaggerated state of nature, with such unfamiliar words as sanitation, castrametation, or

logistics, recurring and pressed upon the attention of each separate command until at last the sickness of many plucks out the heart of the mystery, and all find they are seasoned to a new business and instructed veterans in the soldiers' trade. If under the military law, general drill regulations, and the annual appropriation bill, this mobilization and practice was regularly provided for in times of peace, much misery and expense would be guarded against in the only practicable way. Now that the need is felt is perhaps the only time that the attention of Congress can be attracted to such questions; but, like the Arkansas traveler, it may be felt that war is no time for it and in peace there is no need of it.

When I visited Chickamauga Park, in May, 1898, among thirty-three volunteer regiments, representing eighteen States, from Maine to Mississippi and westward to Kansas, there were reported 40.6 per cent raw recruits, 34.4 per cent soldiers with less than one year's military training, and only 25 per cent with over one year's training. The military experience was mostly had in the National Guard, but there was also a sprinkling of men in these regiments who had served in the Regular Army or graduated from military colleges. So it seems about half were practically recruits, and perhaps but few of the other half had ever been in camp under conditions simulating war. But the splendid intelligence and physique made up for any deficiency, and the almost complete absence of foreign-born element was notable; over 91 per cent of the enlisted men being native born. And the officers, too, were an exceptionally fine body of men, cultured, and eager to learn their new duties. About 6 per cent of them had seen service during the civil war or in the Regular Army and about 8 per cent were graduates from military schools. No finer improvised army could well be gotten together in so short a time; but the endless details and paper work and worry from the date of the legislative authority of April 22, 1898, creating the Volunteer Army, to the final muster out, which was first ordered August 18, 1898, and had not yet been finally completed on September 30, 1899, may never be fully appreciated. Every step was new and every step met new conditions; and while the mustering-out process was going on twenty-five new volunteer regiments were being recruited under the act of March 2, 1899.

It seems almost an anomaly to muster out regiment after regiment of trained men and at the same time endeavor to create new regiments not wholly from the material thus discarded. From the 200,000 State and 16,000 United States volunteers enlisted for the Spanish war it seems enough men were not secured for the twenty-five new regiments recruited under the act of March 2, 1899, for service in the Philippines; but as only about 40 per cent of the men in these new regiments have served previously, the per cent of mustered-out volunteers reenlisting must fall below 8. This subject may deserve further study and consideration in future legislation affecting the military establishment.

We should endeavor to send only trained men to the front; and how to accomplish it with the best results is one of the problems before us. But when everything is considered, it is hard to see how our Army, whether regular or volunteer, could have done better. And in the enthusiastic desire to serve their country the splendid young, and not least the college men, who left their books and associations to face unknown dangers, should not be forgotten. The military instruction so wisely fostered by the Government served them and the country well. Over one-fifth of the 15,000 or more young men under military instruction at over 100 colleges throughout the United States aban

doned their pursuits and joined the Army, almost every one of them competent to perform the functions of an officer. So far as reported, 97 graduates of these colleges were commissioned in the Regular Army and over 700 received commissions in the volunteers during this warenough to officer seventeen regiments.

Under our peculiar military system it is our duty to disseminate military instruction and knowledge among the masses; but our first attention seems due the National Guard and these colleges which furnished about half the volunteers or their officers, and we should do for them the best we can-far better than we ever have done.

CHRONIC ABSENTEEISM.

The law of March 2, 1899, provides that for each Regular Army officer of a staff corps or department who may be retained in or appointed to a higher volunteer rank in said staff corps or department than that actually held by him in the regular establishment there may be appointed one officer of volunteers of the lowest grade provided for such staff corps or department, but no appointment shall be made which will increase the total number of officers, regular and volunteer, serving in any grade, above the number authorized. While this relieves the staff departments to a large extent, there are no provisions for replacing staff officers who have been promoted to general officers or assigned to other duties. In the Inspector-General's Department, where about 25 per cent of its officers are deflected to other duties and about 10 per cent have their health affected, the lack of inspectors is severely felt.

But the burden falls heaviest in war upon the regimental officers. As in the civil war, the Regular Army is seriously suffering from necessary absenteeism, inadequately provided for by law. Then we had an unlimited number of additional aids-de-camp, up to the rank of colonel, and a provost-marshal's and other corps authorized by law, which necessarily gave some relief. But even then absenteeism was sorely felt and regular companies were sometimes left without an officer, and this corps could not but feel it with such gallant and distinguished officers absent from inspection duties as general officers or otherwise, as Marcy, chief of staff in the Army of the Potomac, and Mansfield, mortally wounded at Antietam, and Buford at Gettysburg, and Baird and McCall leading divisions. General officers who can insure victories must, wherever found, be borne to the front where needed and given the men and quality of officers they need around them, let whatever else suffer that may. But it would be wise if provision was also made to adequately fill the gaps thus created as good soldiers step in to fill the gaps in war; and the system adopted for such an essential purpose should be definitely crystallized in our permanent military laws, so hereafter the first year of war will find every proper contingency as well provided for as any subsequent period.

Perhaps it is useless to dwell on this evident military necessity which has been, if not habitually disregarded, still in some respects apparently inadequately met in our military legislation or history, though everyone not only means well, but earnestly desires the Army to be wisely organized and liberally provided for. Whatever is expected of the Army, it will duly perform, however hampered. And something more than wealth and sympathy is needed to provide and care for it. The Biblical injunction to soldiers is to "be content," so it may be difficult to learn from the best what it is they need or why they suffer, as they