the subject, are completely within their interna We do not propose, in our plan, to e The League of Peace will furnish more definite formulation of the 1 law. The arbitral court will ampl application of its general prin They will create a body of judg value. Then the existence of the Le ring congresses of the Leag legislative capacity, may wide in a way that a court may n This is our plan. It is no ment. In its practical app seen may arise, but we beli upon which a successful a Te ment, help Tom a policy. more But we complihe many : 1 League ers will be -League will rong against ROPOSALS 1 : the constitu te to Enforce stand them, are in our platform. Kween the signatory ect to the limitations cural for hearing and y issues as to its i vermanent court by Assemblage of the League gue. It contemplates the opporthe League, having a cause of commember of the League, to sue such ad bring it into court by proper proit's pleading will, of course, state its e defendant may wish to question the court on the ground, for instance, that tated by the complainant does not involve that it can not be decided on principles on this preliminary question, must decide ction. If it finds the question not to be cust dismiss the complaint; but it may properly stigation to the Commission of Conciliation. at it is justiciable, it must require the defendant Iswer. have to discuss is whether the President and the constituting the treaty-making power for this .ent, may consent, for and on behalf of the United to the settlement of any justiciable issue arising bethe United States and any other member of the League is permanent court; and whether it may leave to that the power to decide whether the issue raised is a jusble one. It was argued against a similar provision in è general arbitration treaties with England and France that ich a stipulation constituted a delegation by the President nd Senate of the authority reposed in them over the foreign relations of our Government and therefore that it was ultravires. Both upon reason and authority this objection is untenable. The United States is a nation, and, from a foreign standpoint, a sovereign nation, without limitation. of its sovereignty It may, therefore, through its treaty has served us so well, because we are a strong nation. We must bear our share of the responsibilities of the moment, and we must help along the world, and incidentally help along ourselves, for I believe, even if you view it from a selfish standpoint, in the long run it will be a better policy. It is objected that we only propose to include the more powerful nations. We'll gladly include them all. But we don't propose to have the constitution of our court complicated by a demand for equal representation of the many smaller nations. We believe that when we have a League initiated by the larger powers, the smaller powers will be glad to come in and enjoy the protection that the League will afford against the unjust aggression of the strong against the weak. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PROPOSALS 1 To me has been assigned the discussion of the constitutional objections to the proposals of the League to Enforce Peace. These objections, so far as I understand them, are directed against the first and third planks in our platform. The first plank reads as follows: "First: All justiciable questions arising between the signatory powers, not settled by negotiation, shall, subject to the limitations of treaties, be submitted to a judicial tribunal for hearing and judgment, both upon the merits and upon any issues as to its jurisdiction of the question." This looks to an organization of a permanent court by 1 Address delivered at the First Annual Assemblage of the League to Enforce Peace, Washington, D. C., May 26, 1916. the signatories to the League. It contemplates the opportunity of any member of the League, having a cause of complaint against any other member of the League, to sue such member in this court and bring it into court by proper process. The complainant's pleading will, of course, state its cause of action. The defendant may wish to question the jurisdiction of the court on the ground, for instance, that the cause of action stated by the complainant does not involve a justiciable issue; that it can not be decided on principles of law or equity. The court, upon this preliminary question, must decide upon its jurisdiction. If it finds the question not to be justiciable, it must dismiss the complaint; but it may properly refer its investigation to the Commission of Conciliation. If it finds that it is justiciable, it must require the defendant nation to answer. What I have to discuss is whether the President and the Senate, constituting the treaty-making power for this Government, may consent, for and on behalf of the United States, to the settlement of any justiciable issue arising between the United States and any other member of the League by this permanent court; and whether it may leave to that court the power to decide whether the issue raised is a justiciable one. It was argued against a similar provision in the general arbitration treaties with England and France that such a stipulation constituted a delegation by the President and Senate of the authority reposed in them over the foreign relations of our Government and therefore that it was ultravires. Both upon reason and authority this objection is untenable. The United States is a nation, and, from a foreign standpoint, a sovereign nation, without limitation of its sovereignty It may, therefore, through its treaty making power, consent to any agreement with other powers relating to subject matter that is usually considered and made the subject of treaties. The well-known language of Mr. Justice Field, in the case of Geofrey v. Riggs, 133 U. S. 258, leaves no doubt upon this point. It is as follows: "That the treaty power of the United States extends to all proper subjects of negotiations between our Government and the Governments of other nations, is clear. . . . The treaty power, as expressed in the Constitution, is in terms unlimited, except by those restraints which are found in that instrument against the action of the Government, or of its Departments, and those arising from the nature of the Government itself, and of that of the States. It would not be contended that it extends so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids, or a change in the character of the Government, or in that of one of the States, or a cession of any portion of the territory of the latter without its consent. But with these exceptions, it is not perceived that there is any limit to the questions which can be adjusted touching any matter which is properly the subject of negotiation with a foreign country." Issues that can be settled on principles of law and equity are proper subjects for decision by a judicial tribunal. Such issues have been settled by Boards of Arbitration, agreed to by independent sovereigns since there were governments. The first provision agreed to by the United States for an arbitration of this kind was in the Jay Treaty in 1794; and since that time there have been eighty-four international arbitrations to which an American nation was a party. In forty, or nearly one-half of these, the other party was an European Power, while the arbitrations between American nations were forty-four. To about two-thirds of all of these the United States was a party, the number of arbitrations between other American powers being fourteen. Of this |