the good or ill fpeeches of others, and puts it in the power of every malicious tongue to throw him into a fit of melancholy, and destroy his natural rest and repofe of mind? Efpecially when we confider that the world is more apt to cenfure than applaud, and himfelf fuller of imperfections than virtues.

We may further obferve, that such a man will be more grieved for the lofs of fame, than he could have been pleafed with the enjoyment of it. For though the prefence of this imaginary good cannot make us happy, the absence of it may make us miferable: Because in the enjoyment of an object we only find that share of pleafure which it is capable of giving us, but in the lofs of it we do not proportion our grief to the real value it bears, but to the value our fancies and imaginations fet upon it.

So inconfiderable is the fatisfaction that fame brings along with it, and fo great the difquietudes, to which it makes us liable. The defire of it firs up very uneafy motions in the mind, and is rather inflamed than fatisfied by the prefence of the thing defired. The enjoyment of it brings but very little pleasure, though the lofs or want of it be very fenfible and afflicting; and even this little happiness is fo very precarious, that it wholly depends upon the will of others. We are not

only tortured by the reproaches which are offered us, but are difappointed by the filence of men when it is unexpected; and humbled even by their praises. C

No 257 Tuesday, December 25.

Ουχ ̓ εἴδει Διὸς

Ὀφδαλμός ἐγγὺς δ ̓ ἔςι καὶ παρὼν πόνω.

Incert. ex Stob.

No flumber feals the eye of Providence,
Prefent to ev'ry action we commence.

T

HATI might not lofe myself upon a fubject of fo great extent as that of fame, I have treated it in a particular order and method. I have first of all confidered the reafons why Providence may have implanted in our mind fuch a principle of action. have in the next place fhewn from many confiderations, first, that fame is a thing difficult to be obtained, and eafily loft; fecondly, that it brings the ambitious man very little happinefs, but fubjects him to much uneafinefs and diffatisfaction. I fhall in the last place fhew, that it hinders us from obtaining an end which we have abilities to acquire, and which is accompanied with fulness of fatisfaction. I need not tell my reader, that I mean by this end that happiness which is referved for us in another world, which every one has abilities to procure, and which will bring along with it fulness of joy and pleasures for evermore.

How the purfuit after fame may hinder us in the attainment of this great end, I fhall leave the reader to collect from the three following confiderations.

First, Becaufe the ftrong defire of fame breeds feveral vicious habits in the mind.

Secondly, Because many of thofe actions, which are apt to procure fame, are not in their nature conducive to this our ultimate happiness.

Thirdly, Because if we should allow the fame actions to be the proper inftruments, both of acquiring fame, and of procuring this happiness, they would neverthelefs fail in the attainment of this laft end, if they proceeded from a defire of the firit.

Thefe three propofitions are felf-evident to those who are verfed in fpeculations of morality. For which reason I fhall not enlarge upon them, but proceed to a point of the fame nature, which may open to us a more uncommon field of fpeculation.

From what has been already observed, I think we may have a natural conclufion, that it is the greatest folly to feek the praise or approbation of any Being, befides the Supreme, and that for thefe two reafons; becaufe no other Being can make a right judgment of us, and esteem as according to our merits; and because we can procure no confiderable benefit or advantage from the esteem and approbation of any other Being.

In the first place, no other Being can make a right judgment of us, and efteem us according to our merits. Created Beings fee nothing but our outfide, and can therefore only frame a judgment of us from our exterior actions and behaviour; but how unfit these are to give us a right notion of each other's perfections, may appear from feveral confiderations. There are many virtues, which in their own nature are incapable of any outward representation: Many filent perfections in the foul of a good man, which are great ornaments to human nature, but not able to discover themselves to the knowledge of others; they are tranfacted in private, without noise or show, and are only visible to the great fearcher of hearts. What actions can exprefs the intire purity of thought which refines and fanctifies a virtuous man? That fecret reft and contentedness of mind, which gives him a perfect enjoyment of his prefent condition? That inward pleasure and complacency which he feels in doing good? That delight and fatisfaction which he takes in the profperity and happiness of another? These and the like virtues are the hidden beauties of a foul, the fecret graces which cannot be discovered by a mortal eye, but make the foul lovely and precious in his fight, from whom no fecrets are concealed. Again, there are many virtues which want an opportunity of exerting and fhewing themfelves in actions. Every virtue requires time and place, a proper object and a fit conjuncture of circumftances, for the due exercise of it. A ftate of poverty obfcures all the virtues of liberality

and

and munificence. The patience and fortitude of a martyr or confeffor lie concealed in the flourishing times of chriftianity. Some virtues are only feen in affliction, and fome in profperity; fome in a private, and others in a public capacity. But the great Sovereign of the world beholds every perfection in its obfcurity, and not only fees what we do, but what we would do. He views our behaviour in every concurrence of affairs, and fees us engaged in all the poffibilities of action. He discovers the martyr and confeffor without the trial of Aames and tortures, and will hereafter intitle many to the reward of actions, which they had never the opportunity of performing. Another reafon why men cannot form a right judgment of us is, because the fame actions may be aimed at different ends, and arife from quite contrary principles. Actions are of fo mixta nature and fo full of circumstances, that as men pry into them more or lefs, or observe some parts more than others, they take different hints, and put contrary interpretations on them; fo that the fame actions may represent a man as hypocritical and defigning to one, which makes him appear a faint or hero to another. He therefore who looks upon the foul through its outward actions, often fees it through a deceitful medium, which is apt to discolour and pervert the object: So that on this account alfo, he is the only proper judge of our perfections, who does not guefs at the fincerity of our intentions from the goodnefs of our actions, but weighs the goodness of our actions by the fincerity of our inten

tions.

But further; it is impoffible for outward actions to represent the perfections of the foul, because they can never fhew the strength of those principles from whence they proceed. They are not adequate expreffions of our virtues, and can only fhew us what habits are in the foul, without discovering the degree and perfection of such habits. They are at best but weak resemblances of our intentions, faint and imperfect copies that may acquaint us with the general defign, but can never express the beauty and life of the original. But the great judge of all the earth knows every different ftate and degree of human improvement, from those

B 4

weak

weak ftirrings and tendencies of the will which have not yet formed themselves into regular purposes and defigns, to the laft intire finishing and confummation of a good habit. He beholds the firft imperfect rudiments. of a virtue in the foul, and keeps a watchful eye over it in all its progrefs, until it has received every grace it is capable of, and appears in its full beauty and perfection. Thus we fee that none but the Supreme Being can elteem us according to our proper merits, fince all others muit judge of us from our outward actions; which can never give them a juft eftimate of us, fince there are many perfections of a man which are not capable of appearing in actions; many which, allowing no natural incapacity of fhewing themselves, want an opportunity of doing it; or fhould they all meet with an opportunity of appearing by actions, yet thofe actions may be mifinterpreted, and applied to wrong principles; or though they plainly difcovered the principles from whence they proceeded, they could never thew the degree, ftrength and perfection of thofe principles.

And as the fupreme Being is the only proper judge of our perfections, fo is he the only fit rewarder of them. This is a confideration that comes home to our interest, as the other adapts itself to our ambition. And what could the most afpiring, or the most selfish man defire more, were he to form the notion of a Being to whom he would recommend himself, then fuch a knowledge as can difcover the leaft appearance of perfection in him, and fuch a goodness as will proportion a reward to it.

Let the ambitious man therefore turn all his defire of fame this way; and that he may propose to himself a fame worthy of his ambition, let him confider that if he employs his abilities to the best advantage, the time will come when the fupreme Gove nor of the world, the great Judge of mankind, who fees every degree of perfection in others, and poffeffes all poffible perfection in himself, fhall proclaim his worth before men and angels, and pronounce to him in the prefence of the whole creation that best and most fignificant of applaufes, Well done, thou good and faithful fervant, enter thou into thy Mafier's joy.