Quartermaster-General's Department, substituting in its place 4 brig. ade quartermasters, who, like the brigade inspectors, were, from motives of economy, to be selected from the line. These defects were partially remedied by the construction that the law did not apply to the Crdnance, Purchasing, and Pay departments, as also to judge-advocates and chaplains. The evils were still further diminished by the authority of the President, who ordered the provisional retention of 1 adjutant and inspector-general, 2 adjutants-general, 1 quartermaster-general, and 2 deputy quartermasters-general. These temporary measures were superseded by the general reorganization of the staff, by the act of April 24, 1816, which made the General Staff consist of 1 Adjutant and Inspector-General; 1 AdjutantGeneral; 1 Inspector-General; 3 topographical engineers; 1 Quartermaster-General; 1 Deputy Quartermaster-General to a division; 1 assistant of each to every brigade (to "supersede the brigade quartermasters and inspector now existing"); 1 Commissary-General of Purchases; 1 Deputy Commissary to each division; 6 Assistant Commissaries of Issues, and as many military storekeepers as the service might require, their pay and emoluments to be regulated by the Secretary of War, not to exceed that of a captain of infantry; 1 PaymasterGeneral; 1 paymaster to each battalion of the corps of artillery who, as well as the regimental paymasters, in addition to paying their respective regiments or corps, were required to act as district pay masters. Ordnance Department as already existing by act of February 8, 1815, viz: 1 colonel, 1 lieutenant-colonel, 2 majors, 10 captains, 10 first lieutenants, 10 second lieutenants, 10 third lieutenants, 3 judgeadvocates to each division, 1 chaplain to each division, 4 hospital surgeons and 8 hospital surgeon's mates to each division, post surgeons not to exceed 12 to each division, 1 Apothecary-General, and 2 assistant apothecaries. No rank was prescribed for any of the officers of the Commissary Department. The Commissary-General received $3,000 per annum; the deputies, $2,000; the Assistant Commissaries of Issues, $1,300. The regimental and battalion paymasters received the pay and emoluments of majors of infantry and were selected either from the subalterns of the line or from civil life. The law did not stop merely with the appointment of citizens as paymasters. It went far beyond, and, failing entirely to recognize the value of special and professional training in any of the staff departments, prescribed in the tenth section that "hereafter the staff of the Army may be taken from the line of the Army or from citizens." a With all of its imperfections, however, the law of 1816 marked an important advance in our military system. In connection with the law of 1815 it gave us, as Washington had recommended more than thirty years before, our first permanent peace establishment, in which both the line and staff were represented. The size, too, of the Army-fixed at 10,000, or in the ratio of little more than 1,000 men to each 1,000,000 of population-was fairly proportioned to the wants of the country. Nearly all of its higher grades were filled by officers who had acquired practical training in the war, a Callan's Military Laws of the United States, p. 276. while through the wisdom of Congress, in increasing the Corps of Cadets in 1812, the lower grades were in future to be filled by young men who had been carefully "trained and taught all the duties of a private, noncommissioned officer, and officer." From this moment, wherever the Regular Army has met the enemy, the conduct of the officers and men has merited and received the applause of their countrymen. It has rendered the country vastly more important service than by merely sustaining the national honor in battle. It has preserved, and still preserves, to us the military art; has formed the standard of discipline for the vast number of brave volunteers of our late wars, and, while averting disaster and bloodshed, has furnished us with military commanders to lead armies of citizen soldiers, whose exploits are now famous in the history of the world. TRANSMISSION OF THE PRESIDENT'S ORDERS TO THE ARMY. The undefined relation of the Secretary of War, to the Army, and the consequent irregularity in issuing and transmitting orders, were the cause of much unnecessary confusion, not only during the War of 1812, but also after its close. These irregularities, however, were not prominently brought out until General Jackson took action, in 1817. The trouble began in 1814, when an order was issued from the War Department, signed by a Deputy Inspector-General, which, without being transmitted through the division commander, directed Colonel Sparks, Major Laurence, and some officers of the Second Infantry to proceed on recruiting service. Upon receipt of the order, Colonel Sparks was in command at Mobile and Major Laurence at Fort Boyer, at the entrance of the bay, both of which points were in danger of immediate occupation by the British. Both officers declined to obey the order, while soon after Major Laurence was called upon to defend his post from a combined land and naval attack, in which he repulsed the enemy with great gallantry. The manifest peril to the country occasioned by the irregular transmission of an order, whereby, at a critical moment, two important posts might have been deprived of their commanders, drew from General Jackson an energetic remonstrance; nevertheless no answer was returned, neither was the abuse corrected. Another case occurred in 1817 which, while it did not jeopardize the national cause, nor the lives of our soldiers, brought the authority of the commanding general into direct conflict with the War Department. A Major Long, who for military reasons had been specially detailed by General Jackson to make a topographical survey of part of the Mississippi River, was relieved and ordered to New York, where the report of his survey was made public and conveyed to the division commander through the newspapers. In this change of station, the commander had not been consulted, nor was he informed of the order detaching his subordinate. Exasperated by this discovery, he wrote to the President on the very day of his inauguration, strongly setting forth the serious consequences involved in such irregularities; but this letter, like his former remonstrance, elicited no reply. After waiting for nine or ten days longer than the time required for communications 34760°-16-10 to go to Washington and return, he resolved to settle the difficulty in his own way, and therefore issued the following order: ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, HEADQUARTERS DIVISION OF THE SOUTH, Nashville, April 22, 1817. The commanding general considers it due to the principles of subordination, which ought and must exist in our Army, to prohibit the obedience of any order emanating from the Department of War to officers of this division who have been reported and been assigned to duty, unless coming through him as the proper organ of communication. The object of this order is to prevent the recurrence of a circumstance which removed an important officer from the division without the knowledge of the commanding general, and, indeed, when he supposed that officer engaged in his official duties and anticipated hourly the receipt of his official reports on a subject of great importance to his command; also to prevent the topographical reports from being made public through the medium of the newspapers, as was done in the case alluded to, thereby enabling the enemy to obtain the benefit of our topograhical researches as soon as the general commanding, who is responsible for the division. Superior officers having commands assigned them are held responsible to the Government for the character and conduct of that command, and it might as well be justified in an officer senior in command to give orders to a guard on duty without passing that order through the officer of that guard, as that the Department of War should countermand the arrangements of commanding generals, without giving their orders through the proper channel. To acquiesce in such a course would be a tame surrender of military rights and etiquette and at once subvert the established principles of subordination and good order. Obedience to the lawful commands of superior officers is constitutionally and morally required, but there is a chain of communication that binds the military compact which, if broken, opens the door to disobedience and disrespect, and gives loose to the turbulent spirits who are ever ready to excite to mutiny. All physicians able to perform duty, who are absent on furlough, will forthwith repair to their respective posts. Commanding officers of regiments and corps are ordered to report specially, all officers absent from duty on the 30th of June next, and their cause of absence. The Army is too small to tolerate idlers, and they will be dismissed the service.a By order of Major-General Jackson: ROBERT BUTLER, This order excited universal comment, but still the President, upon whom devolved by law the responsibility of prescribing the manner in which the business of the War Department should be conducted, came to no decision. Two months later a final issue was presented. General Ripley, at New Orleans, received an order direct from the War Department, which, in obedience to the order of his division commander, he declined to obey. The responsibility for his action was immediately assumed by General Jackson, who, in a letter to the President, dated August 12, 1817, commended the "proper disobedience" of his subordinate. He then in justification continued: In the view I took of this subject on the 4th of March, I had flattered myself you would coincide, and had hoped to receive your answer before a recurrence of a similar infringement of military rule rendered it necessary for me to call your attention thereto. None are infallible in their opinions, but it is nevertheless necessary that all should act agreeably to their convictions of right. My convictions in favor of the course I have pursued are strong, and should it become necessary, I will willingly meet a fair investigation before a military tribunal. The good of the service and the dignity of the commission I hold alone actuate me. My wishes for retirement have already been made known to you; but, under existing circumstances, my duty to the officers of my division forbids it until this subject is fairly understood. a Parton's Life of Andrew Jackson, vol. 2, p. 373. The receipt of this letter was followed in October by the appointment of Mr. Calhoun as Secretary of War, who promptly decided that on ordinary occasions, orders from that Department would issue only to the commanding generals of the divisions, and in cases where the service required a different course, the General in Chief would be notified of the order with as little delay as possible, a In putting an end, for the time, to this abuse so pernicious to good order and military discipline, the new Secretary of War laid aside every personal consideration and, as clearly appears from the following private letter to General Jackson, was influenced by no other motive than "regard to the public interest:" * * * I am aware the subject is delicate and important, but I trust that in practice no inconvenience under their present form will be experienced. The general rule is that all orders in the first instance will issue to commanders of division; and this rule to be deviated from only when the public interest may require it. The correctness of the rule itself can not be doubted. Order, discipline, and responsibility all concur in establishing it. But that there are exceptions to the rule is to my mind not less clear. The very principles on which it is established point out the exception. Why maintain order, discipline, and responsibility, but to give to the movements of the Army promptitude and success? When, then, they can only be had by deviating from the established rule, the exception becomes the rule. That such cases must occur, a mere reference to the great extent of the divisions furnishes incontestible proof. I will not press the subject further, for I perceive, by looking over the correspondence with the President, the orders accord substantially with your view in relation to this subject. You insist on the rule that orders ought to issue to the commanders of divisions, as they are responsible. This rule is the basis of the orders which have been adopted. You admit that necessity may cause exceptions to it, and it is the only cause of exception recognized by the orders; for, I presume, when we speake of necessity in this case, we only mean a due regard to the public interests.a * * * SEMINOLE WAR. The management of this war, which began in 1817, strictly conformed to the mixed policy pursued during the Revolution and the War of 1812. For want of enough regular troops, the military commanders assumed the responsibility of organizing a force of volunteers and Indians, whom they caused to be formally mustered into the service of the United States. These measures, as well as the military operations of the war, became the subject of Congressional investigation and were reported and commented upon by a committee of the Senate, as follows: From this time [alluding to the massacre of a detachment of about 40 men and 7 women under Lieutenant Scott of the Seventh Infantry] the war became more serious, the Indians in considerable numbers were embodied and an open attack made on Fort Scott. General Gaines with about 600 regular soldiers was confined to the garrison. In this state of things, information having been communicated to the War Department, General Jackson was ordered to take the field. He was advised of the regular and militia force, amounting to 1,800 men, provided for that service, and the estimated force, by General Gaines of the enemy, said to be 2,800 strong, and directed, if he should consider the force provided insufficient to beat the enemy, to call on the governors of the adjoining States for such portions of the militia as he might think requisite. On the receipt of this order, General Jackson, instead of observing the orders of the Department of War, by calling on the governor of Tennessee, then in Nashville, near the place of his residence, chose to appeal, to use his own expression, to the patriotism of the West Tennesseeans who had served under him in the last war. a Parton's Life of Andrew Jackson, vol. 2, p. 374. One thousand mounted gun men, and two companies of what were called life guards, with the utmost alacrity, volunteered their services from the States of Tennessee and Kentucky, and repaired to his standard. Officers were appointed to command this corps by the general himself, or by other persons acting under his authority. Thus organized they were mustered into the service of the United States. About the time General Jackson was organizing this detachment of volunteers in the State of Tennessee, or perhaps previously thereto, General Gaines was likewise employed in raising forces among the Creek Indians. There was this difference in the two cases: General Jackson raised his army in disregard of positive orders; General Gaines, without orders, took upon himself the authority of raising an army of at least 1,600 Creek Indians, appointing their officers, with a brigadier-general at their head, and likewise mustering this force into the service of the United States. While your committee feel a pleasure in applauding the zeal and promptness that have marked the military conduct of these general officers on many former occasions, they would feel themselves wanting in their duty to the Senate and the nation if they did not express their decided disapprobation of the conduct of the commanding generals in the steps they took to raise and organize the force employed on this occasion. There was no law in existence that authorized even the President of the United States to raise or accept of the services of volunteers. The law passed for that purpose had expired in the year 1815. ** * It is with regret that the committee are compelled to declare that they conceive General Jackson to have disregarded the positive orders of the Department of War, the Constitution, and laws. That he has taken upon himself not only the exercise of those powers delegated to Congress as the sole legislative authority of the nation, and to the President and Senate, as it relates to the appointments, but of the power which had been expressly reserved to the States in the appointment of the officers of the militia-a power the more valuable to the States because, as they had surrendered to the General Government the revenue and physical force of the nation, they could only look to the officers of the militia as a security against the possible abuse of the delegated power. The committee find the melancholy fact before them, that military officers, even at this early stage of this Republic, have, without the shadow of authority, raised an army of at least 2,500 men and mustered them into the service of the United States. Two hundred and thirty officers have been appointed and their rank established from an Indian brigadier-general down to the lowest subaltern of a company. To whom were those officers accountable for their conduct? Not to the President of the United States, for it will be found that it was not considered necessary, even to furnish him with a list of their names; and not until the pay rolls were made out and payment demanded, were the persons known to the Department of War. And in this place it is proper to observe that General Jackson seemed to consider those officers of his own creation, competent to discharge all the functions of officers appointed by the authority of the General or State governments; for we find five of them detailed afterwards to sit on a general court-martial on a trial of life and death. Might not, on the same principles, General Jackson have tried, condemned, and executed any officer of the Georgia militia by the sentence of a court-martial composed of officers created by him and holding their assumed authority by the tenure of his will? The committee will next take notice of the operations of the army in the Floridas. * * * It appears that General Jackson advanced into Florida with a force of 1,800 men, composed of regulars, volunteers, and the Georgia militia, and afterwards, on the 1st day of April, was joined by General McIntosh and his brigade of 1,500 Indians, who had been previously organized by General Gaines, opposed to whom, it appears from the report of Captain Young, topographical engineer, and other evidence, the whole forces of the fugitive Seminole Indians and runaway negroes, had they all been embodied, could not have exceeded 900 or 1,000 men, and at no time did half that number present themselves to oppose his march. Of course little or no resistance was made. The Mikasuky towns were first taken and destroyed. The army marched upon St. Marks, a feeble Spanish garrison, which was surrendered "without firing a gun" and then occupied as an American post. * * * This being done and St. Marks garrisoned by American troops, the army pursued their march eastward to Suwanee River, on which they found a large Indian village, which was consumed, and the Indians and negroes were dispersed, after which the army returned to St. Marks. * * * Having made these arrangements, the army marched to Fort Gadsden, on the Appalachicola River. "From Fort Gadsden," the report continues, "and after a march of about twenty days, having met his artillery, General Jackson, with about |