distribution of supplies and other administrative duties, Congress allowed itself to be defeated. From that time to the present moment, precisely what the committee predicted has substantially happened. Instead of acknowledging the general in chief, under the President, as the military head of the Army, the chiefs of staff corps have magnified the duties of the Secretary of War and have preferred to look to him, not only as the chief of administration, but as their sole and legitimate military superior. Under his protection, they have to a large degree withdrawn the operations of their departments, from the control and even inspection, of the general in chief and other military commanders. The Ordnance, for example, manufactures our guns and carriages; the Engineers build the fortifications on which the guns are mounted, and both are turned over to the Army to be tested in war, without an opportunity having been given for the general in chief, or the officers who may die in their defense, to make the slightest suggestion. This system, it should be borne in mind, is exclusively our own. The chiefs of staff corps continually issue orders to their subordinates, involving large expenditures of money, which orders may or may not be transmitted through the division or department commanders on whose staff their subordinates are serving. In this manner, after supplies,―pursuant to estimates approved by Congress,-have been procured by the War Department, the chiefs of staff corps in their distribution and use have, contrary to the practice in foreign armies, appropriated to themselves much of the authority of division and department commanders. More serious still, applying the same principle to duties wholly outside the domain of administration, successive Secretaries of War, in violation of a maxim vital to the existence of a free government, "that the purse and the sword should never be united," have assumed such control of the personnel of the Army and the movements of troops that two eminent generals in chief, finding their usefulness destroyed, have virtually been forced to request the removal of their headquar ters from the national capital. The country may continue to endure such a system, but in peace and war it will be found in the future, as in the past, to have an intimate relation with disasters and maladministration, such as have already compelled two Secretaries of War to retire from the Cabinet." BLACK HAWK WAR. This war began in March, 1832, and was brought to a close after two engagements. The first was fought by the Illinois volunteers on the 21st of July, on the banks of the Wisconsin River, with a loss to the Indians of 68 killed and wounded; the volunteers lost 1 killed and 8 wounded. The second and last engagement was fought on the 2d of August, on the banks of the Mississippi, where the Indians under Black Hawk were defeated and dispersed, with a loss of more than 150 killed and a Under the act of Congress organizing the General Staff of the Army, the Chief of Staff has supervision of the entire Army, under the direction of the President, or of the Secretary of War acting under direction of the President. Thus, for the first time in the history of the Army, unity of command and administration has been established by law.-EDITORS. wounded." The troops engaged consisted of 400 regulars and 900 Illinois volunteers, commanded by General Atkinson, colonel of the Sixth Infantry. Their loss was: regulars, 5 killed and 4 wounded; volunteers, 15 wounded." The Indians under Black Hawk were estimated at the beginning of the war at from 800 to 1,000. The number of troops employed was: regulars, 1,341; volunteers, 4,638; total, 5,979. In the conduct of this war the Government acted with more than usual vigor. With a view to prevent calling out militia and volunteers unnecessarily, it ordered, on the 16th of June, a concentration at the scene of action, under the command of General Scott, of all the available regular troops from the Lakes, the Atlantic, and the lower Mississippi. Of the six companies of artillery ordered from Fort Monroe, five reached Chicago, "a distance of 1,800 miles, in the short space of eighteen days, a rapidity which is believed to be unprecedented in military movements. The loss by cholera in that detachment alone, was equal to one out of every three men."d The ravages of this disease, more terrible than any armed foe, prevented both General Scott and the eastern troops from sharing in the glory of this short and decisive campaign. This war, however, brief as it was, afforded another proof of the expense of short enlistments. For the want of cavalry in the organization of 1821, the President, by the act of June 15, 1832, was authorized to raise for the defense of the frontier, a battalion of 600 mounted rangers to serve for one year. unless sooner discharged. Reverting to the principle of the militia, these rangers were required to arm and equip themselves and to provide their own horses, in consideration of which each of the enlisted men was to receive $1 per day. This injudicious provision was offset by the wise requirement, that the officers should be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The following November, in his annual report, the Secretary of War stated that the cost of a regiment of dragoons would be but $143,598 per annum, while the cost of the battalion of 600 rangers was $297,530, à difference of $153,932. On the 2d of December, the Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives, to whom the statement of the Secretary was referred, reported: The regiment of dragoons, which it is proposed by the Secretary of War to substitute for the battalion of rangers, will not cost so much for its maintenance as that of the rangers by $153,932 a year, as it will appear by his estimate accompanying his report. It must be evident, from the constitution of the corps of rangers and from the short period of their service, their efficiency will be but little superior to that of the ordinary militia. Every year there must be a loss of time in reorganizing and recruiting the corps and in the acquisition of the necessary experience and knowledge. Besides, it can not be expected that their equipments and horses will be equal to those furnished by the public. Regular dragoons, it is believed, are fully competent to discharge all the duties that can be required of mounted rangers. In celerity of movement they will, of course, a American State Papers, vol. 5, p. 30, report of Major-General Macomb, commanding the Army. b Same, p. 29. с Adjutant-General's Office. The Commissioner of Pensions gives the number at 5,031, report for the year 1874, p. 30. d General Macomb's report, American State Papers, vol. 5, p. 31. e American State Papers, vol. 5, p. 18. be equal, and as it is the duty of dragoons to serve on horse or foot, they may be trained to the use of the rifle and sword, as occasion may require. Besides these important objects, it is desirable to preserve in our military system the elements of cavalry tactics, and to keep pace with the improvements made in them by other nations. a 1 March 2, 1833, the second session of the same Congress that created the corps of rangers, retrieved its error, by establishing a regiment of dragoons, to consist of 1 colonel, 1 lieutenant-colonel, I major, 1 adjutant (lieutenant), 1 sergeant-major, 1 quartermaster-sergeant, 1 chief musician, and 10 companies. Each company was composed of 1 captain, 1 first lieutenant, 1 second lieutenant (exclusive of the adjutant), 4 sergeants, 4 corporals, 2 buglers, 1 farrier and blacksmith, and 60 privates; total company, 74; total regiment, 747. In connection with this expenditure of $153,000, it may be worth mentioning that the interest at 5 per cent of this sum, so quickly wasted by the faulty organization of a single battalion of mounted men, would support in perpetuity a post-graduate school for cavalry officers, and would thus insure to them the same professional advantages as are now extended to the officers of artillery by the Artillery School at Fort Monroe.' The Black Hawk War, in giving us a regiment of dragoons, thereby completing the three arms of service, advanced us a step further in military organization, but still left us with grave faults which remain. to be corrected. In the staff, all of the departments of supply, either by the laws of 1821, or by those passed afterwards, had secured a chief and several other permanent officers in the higher grades. The lower grades were filled by detail, without the saving clause, that the officers should be supernumeraries in their regiments. In the line, the striking error continued, of depriving the President, in peace and war, of all power to expand or contract the enlisted strength of the Army. a American State Papers, vol. 5, p. 126. This defect was remedied by the act of Congress organizing the Cavalry and Light Artillery School at Fort Riley, Kansas, approved January 29, 1887; published General Orders No. 9, Headquarters of the Army, dated February 9, 1887.-EDITORS. 34760°-16-11 CHAPTER XIV. FLORIDA WAR.a The organization of the Army, as reported by the General in Chief, on the 30th of November, 1835, was as follows: The number of enlisted men present for duty at that date, constituting the whole fighting strength of the Army, was 3,888. Of this number 1,543, under General Scott, were in the Eastern Department, embracing the Atlantic coast and nearly all the territory east of the Mississippi Valley. The remainder, commanded by General Gaines, was distributed in the Western Department, consisting of the seacoast from Key West to New Orleans, the Mississippi Valley, and the western country, as far as Fort Leavenworth and Fort Gibson. At this very time, then, although the population of the United States exceeded 15,000,000, less than 4,000 soldiers guarded its seacoast, its Canadian frontier, and all the outlying settlements in the vast territory, which swarmed with hostile Indians. In Florida, with an area of more than 52,000 square miles, were 9 companies of artillery and 2 of infantry, with 26 officers and 510 men; a total of 536.d Of these 11 companies, 6 under Brevet Brigadier-General D. L. Clinch, Fourth Infantry, were posted at Fort King and numbered, present for duty, 244 officers and men.d The remaining 5 companies were posted, 1 at St. Augustine, 3 at Fort Brooke, Tampa Bay, and 1 at Key West. The Administration, with this insignificant force at its disposal, was not ignorant of the certainty of a conflict, nor misinformed as to the character of the troops it ought to employ. a "This is a very valuable chapter and can not be curtailed without lessening its value.-J. A. Garfield." The above was indorsed on the manuscript in the handwriting of General Garfield.-EDITORS. American State Papers, vol. 5, p. 633. c American State Papers, vol. 5, pp. 634-639. d American State Papers, vol. 6, p. 57. Referring to the removal of the Seminole Indians west of the Mississippi, Governor Eaton, of Florida, on the 8th of March, 1835, wrote to General Cass, Secretary of War: The employing a military force will be an act of war, and the Indians will embody and fight in their defense. In this event, you will want such an imposing force as shall overawe resistance. The few companies you have ordered will not produce this result. They will serve but to begin the fight and to awaken angry feelings, so that, in the sequel, the militia will have to be called, which will end in the butchery of these miserable people. Send a strong, imposing regular force which can be commanded and prevented from doing more than actually is needful to be done, and then that force, judiciously acting and forbearing, may do much. But send only a handful of men and difficulties will come upon you. * * * On the whole, and to conclude a tiresome letter, I offer this advice: Avoid the exercise of force as long as possible, and let it be the only, the last sad alternative; and then let not by any means the militia be appealed to; they will breed mischief. To protect the defenseless citizens of North Florida from the impending danger, resort had once more to be made to raw troops. On December 9 the governor of Florida was requested, upon the requisition of General Clinch, to place under his command any portion of the militia of the Territory of Florida that he might find necessary for the suppression of Indian hostilities. December 22 General Call wrote to the President: Having heard of the distress and alarm on the frontier, occasioned by Indian depredations, I raised a detachment of 250 volunteer mounted riflemen for my brigade, and, under the orders of the acting governor, proceeded to this border, where I found about the same number of men under the command of Colonel Warren, of the East Florida militia. I have assumed command of the whole, making my force about 500 men. They were raised, however, for only four weeks, and many of them are badly armed and equipped. The services of these troops have been tendered to General Clinch and accepted for the prospect of protecting the frontier. I can, Sir, scarcely give you an adequate description of the frontier inhabitants. The whole country between the Suwanee and the St. Johns rivers, for the distance of 50 miles above the Indian boundary, is abandoned, the frontier inhabitants shut up in a few miserable stockade forts, and the Indians traversing the country at will, burning and destroying wherever they appear. c Such were the paltry dispositions for protection when, on the 28th of December, the Indians began the war by the massacre of Major Dade and his command. This unfortunate detachment, treacherously attacked while marching in fancied security from Fort Brooke to Fort King, was composed of portions of the Second and Third Artillery and of the Fourth Infantry, 110 officers and men in all, of whom only 3 escaped. The same day, the Indian agent, General Thompson, and Lieut. Constantine Smith, of the artillery, were waylaid and murdered about a mile from Fort King. Small as was the garrison at this post, it immediately took the offensive. On the 29th of December, General Clinch, with 6 companies of regular troops, amounting to about 200 men, proceeded from Fort King toward the Withlacoochee to attack the Seminoles, who were in force on the left bank of that river. In this expedition he was joined by Governor Call, with between 400 and 500 volunteers of Florida. On the 31st of December, General Clinch, with the regular troops under his command, crossed the Withlacoochee. He was here attacked by a large body of Indians, and, after a spirited engagement, the Indians were finally defeated and fled into the hummocks. In this affair, it will appear that the regular troops bore the brunt of the action. Out of the 200 regular troops who crossed the river with General Clinch, 57 were killed or wounded, including 4 officers. Of the 400 or 500 volunteers who had joined General Clinch, with a view of aiding in subduing the Indians, only 27 men and 3 officers took part in the action. Why so many remained out of the action is not explained. Had the same zeal and bravery been displayed by the a American State Papers, vol. 6, p. 493. |