The despatch from General Franklin containing this startling account, was dated Centreville, 8.15 p. m. The military council was not again summoned. Its members remained at their bureaus. The order taking away from the commander of the Army of the Potomac almost everything save his command was suppressed. The Secretary of War turned his attention to raising new levies. The next day the General in Chief telegraphed General McClellan:

I beg you to assist me in this crisis with your ability and experience. I am entirely tired out. a

Under the Roman Republic, where the people were accustomed to personal government, a similar crisis would have been met by the appointment of a dictator. But with a patriotic army, disciplined in spite of the impatience of the people, the situation was less desperate. It cannot, however, be denied that there was great dissatisfaction on the field. History relates that throughout the Revolution, the policy of Congress kept the Continental Army on the verge of mutiny, yet on the field of battle it never failed in its duty. Growling and fighting in those days were the only privileges of a disciplined soldier.

From the picket line overlooking the Chickahominy, the officers and men of the Army of the Potomac had often gazed upon the spires of Richmond, and confidently expected to soon occupy the Confederate capital.

They had emancipated themselves from the delusion that the art of war, or the principles of military organization, would make any exception in favor of our geography or free institutions. They did not believe that campaigns could be conducted without regard to lines of communication. Having withdrawn the last man from the defenses, they were clear in the conviction that if any army should attempt to defend Washington by hanging on the flanks of the enemy and placing its back against the mountains, it would invite its own destruction and insure the taking of the capital. Of the patriot host of 637,000 men who were on the rolls of the Army on the 31st of March, they saw with mortification that to meet the enemy in their front, on the 1st of September, there could be got together but 63,000 men.

To their minds history presented no parallel to such dispersion and waste of military strength; they did not hesitate to denounce its authors; they criticised the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War for breaking the bands of discipline by tempting officers to criticise their superiors; they denounced the military council; they denounced the withdrawal of the Army of the Potomac from the Peninsula as a crime plotted in the War Department; they denounced the Secretary of War for quitting the domain of administration to exercise the functions of a military commander; they denounced everybody connected with the gross mismanagement of the war, save the Patriot President, whose character they venerated as much as his office.

It cannot be said that at the Second Bull Run the Army of the Potomac did not fight. Regulars and volunteers, as well as nearly all of their commanding officers, received the highest praise in the official report of the commander of the Army of Virginia.

a McClellan's Report, p. 181.

Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. 2, p. 173, Supplement.

The charge was not cowardice but "unsoldierly and dangerous conduct of many brigade and some division commanders." It was not corps commanders alone who were censured. Admitting that there was discontent and freedom of speech on the part of some of the high officers, shall we count their exposure in battle for nothing? Shall we denounce them as unpatriotic? If so, what shall be said of Greene, Sullivan, and Knox, who in the dark days of 1777 threatened to resign because Congress proposed to overslaugh them by the appointment of a French officer, Du Coudray, as a major-general of artillery?

As a people who love our institutions, we should reflect that, as a rule, governments are overthrown only when enemies are thundering at the gates of their capitals. This being admitted, what shall be said of all the general officers who in 1776, without the definite authority of Congress, pressed upon Washington the immediate organization of more troops! What, too, shall be said of Washington and Greene, bosom friends, who, after frequent consultation, wrote to Congressthe former on the 20th of December, the latter on the 21st-urging that Washington be made a dictator."

According to the Father of his Country, subordination and discipline were the best pledge of devotion an army could give to its government, but in armies, as among the people, abuses can only be checked by discipline. Had the officers of the Army of the Potomac been reduced to the slavish subjection of Turkish pashas, they might have said anarchy is the best field for the ambition of a soldier, it matters little what becomes of the government. But their conduct was the reverse. They denounced the faults that had been committed, and by their indignation helped to save the Government and people from their further repetition.

The two army commanders, who, before the movement from the Peninsula, gave the Government opposite advice, at last coincided in opinion.

They both recommended that the two armies be drawn back to the defenses. In the attempt to execute an impossible plan both had been duped. General McClellan was led to believe that he would have the command of the combined armies, while General Pope was informed. that after their junction, the General in Chief would take command in person.

Later, according to the Proceedings and Report of the Board of Army Officers, in the case of General Porter:

It appears that General Pope was notified, on the 25th of August, that an active campaign was soon to be commenced, without waiting for a union of all the forces, and under some commander other than either of those before named. But this information appears to have been of a secret character, afterwards suppressed, and not made known to General McClellan and his subordinates until five days later, when the order appeared from the War Department, depriving McClellan of the command of all his troops then between the Potomac and the Rappahannock, although leaving him in nominal command of the Army of the Potomac.

When the armies were finally united, the question still remained open, Who should command? By an order from the Executive Mansion, General McClellan had been relieved as General in Chief. By a communication from the War Department, signed by an Assistant Adjutant

a Sparks's Writings of Washington, vol. 4.

Proceedings and Report of the Board of Army Officers, in the case of Fitz John Porter, vol. 2, p. 1803.

General, and said to be the order of the Secretary of War, he had practically been relieved from the command of the Army of the Potomac. This order had been ratified by the General in Chief as late as the 31st of August, who explained it by telegraphing General McClellan:

You will retain command of everything in the vicinity not temporarily belonging to Pope's army in the field.a

To reinstate the deposed commander, was to confess that the whole campaign was a failure; yet something had to be done. A double peril confronted the Government. Bragg, in the West, had begun his march toward the Ohio River, while Lee, with renewed confidence, was crossing into Maryland. For two or three days the President consulted his advisers, but with no satisfactory result. At last, assuming all the responsibility, he took the General in Chief with him, turned his back on the War Department, and, without disclosing his purpose, proceeded to the house of General McClellan, where, for the moment, he brought the long controversy to a close by saying:

General, you will take command of the forces in the field, a

a Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. 1, p. 451–453.

CHAPTER XXV.

REVIEW OF THE CAMPAIGN OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC FROM THE RESTORATION TO THE FINAL REMOVAL OF GENERAL MCCLELLAN FROM COMMAND.

The Departments of the Rappahannock and Shenandoah having been swept away by the course of events, the laconic order to General McClellan ought to have restored unity of command East of the Alleghenies, but the morbid fears still entertained as to the safety of the capital, again prevented a result which might otherwise have been decisive. On receiving this order, the commander of the Army of the Potomac did not seek to harrass or perplex the mind of the President. He might have represented that there could be no success in military operations while any civil officer other than the constitutional Commander in Chief was permitted to exercise military command. He proposed, however, no conditions, but like a faithful and subordinate soldier, at once crossed the Potomac to make dispositions against attack. The moment he appeared, the acclamations of the troops could be heard for miles, throughout the whole extent of the long columns.

No sound should have been more welcome at the capital. Confidence was restored. Retreating from a twice-fatal field, the defeated and dejected armies became, in an instant, ready for battle. In this crisis history repeated a valuable lesson. The fugitives from the First Bull Run spread such terror and dismay throughout the country, that for six months it was found impossible to again meet the enemy.

It was now reserved for the Army of the Potomac to prove that discipline could cover a multitude of blunders. Not a moment was lost in reorganizing. General McClellan was restored to command. on the 2d of September. The same day General Halleck ordered the two armies to fall back to the defenses. On the 3d, the heads of columns were directed across the Potomac, and on the 12th, the right wing reached Frederick. Thus far everything had gone well. But now the chronic fear in regard to the safety of the capital again began to trammel the action of the commander. On the 9th, he received a telegram from General Halleck:

Until we can get better advices about the numbers of the enemy at Dranesville, I think we must be very cautious about stripping, too much, the forts on the Virginia side. It may be the enemy's object to draw off the mass of our forces and then attempt to attack from the Virginia side of the Potomac. Think of this, a

On the 11th, General Halleck again telegraphed:

Why not order forward Keyes or Sigel? I think the main force of the enemy is in your front; more troops can be spared from here.

a McClellan's Report, p. 186.

b Ibid., p. 187.

The offer was quickly accepted and the request made for all the troops that could be spared, but none were sent forward.

The next day the President again telegraphed:

Governor Curtin telegraphs me "I have advices that Jackson is crossing the Potomac at Williamsport, and probably the whole rebel army will be drawn from Maryland." *** Receiving nothing from Harper's Ferry or Martinsburg to-day, and positive information from Wheeling that the line is cut, corroborated the idea that the enemy is recrossing the Potomac. Please do not let him get off without being hurt. a

By unexampled good fortune, General McClellan, on the 13th, received the full text of General Lee's order for the investment and capture of Harper's Ferry. The order directed Jackson, with three divisions, to move via Williamsport and Martinsburg, on Harper's Ferry; McLaws, with two divisions, to Maryland Heights; Walker, with one division, was to recross the Potomac below Harper's Ferry and occupy Loudoun Heights; Longstreet, with two divisions, all the reserve, supply, and baggage trains, was ordered to Boonsboro; Hill's division was to form the rear guard; the cavalry, after detaching a sufficient force to accompany each of the moving columns, was to bring up the stragglers in the rear.

Five divisions of the Confederate Army were thus separated from the remaining four by a broad river, while nothing but a thin curtain separated the artillery and trains from the whole Army of the Potomac. Never was a more brilliant opportunity presented to a commander. Another opportunity had presented itself for ending the Rebellion. Unfortunately the telegraph brought news of divided councils at the capital. The President a few days before had relinquished control, but he had not yet learned the importance of signifying his wishes through a General in Chief. While the President was telegraphing, "Please do not let him (the enemy) get off without being hurt," General Halleck was urging more caution. On the 13th, the day the order was found in the enemy's camp, he telegraphed McClellan:

Until you know more certainly the enemy's force south of the Potomac, you are wrong in thus uncovering the capital. I am of the opinion that the enemy will send a small column toward Pennsylvania to draw your forces in that direction, then suddenly move on Washington with the forces south of the Potomac and those he may cross over, a

Thus hampered by contradictory orders, McClellan moved forward, and on the 14th, to the great alarm of the enemy, captured the line of South Mountain, but not without a loss of more than 2,000 men.

To the despatch announcing this victory the President replied:

Your despatch of to-day received. God bless you and all with you. Destroy the rebel army if possible.

On the same day, the following telegram from General Halleck checked the energy and boldness which ought to have characterized his movements:

Scouts report a large force still on the Virginia side of the Potomac. If so, I fear you are exposing your left and rear.a

It may be said that, with the knowledge that had come into his possession, General McClellan should have imitated the example of Montecuculi, who refused to read the despatches from his government till

a McClellan's Report, p. 187.