in the affairs of Hungary. We tested him for egotism, ambition, and nerve; we decided that he had enough of the first to fire the second in him, and of the two to give him a passable amount of the third. Thereupon we drew him a picture of what it would mean if he should take the situation in hand, organize a revolution, and throw the Bolsheviki out of Hungary. We pointed out to him that the nations outside would do it in self-defense if some strong man within did not anticipate them; we urged on him the opportunity that was offered him to

a state where the labor and socialist elements, heartily sick of monarchical government, had demanded and would continue to demand a voice in the affairs of state, and that Kun had only taken advantage of this advanced position on the part of the majority. In short we offered him the enticing plum of glory, fame, honor, and power and a logical scheme for plucking it. ENTER THE HEROES

AGOSTON AND HAUBRICHT STEAL IN

hero who struck the bloody hand of soviet Communism from the throat of an exhausted nation! I told him that Bela Kun was certainly doomed; showed him that Hungary was not Bolshevist in fact (to which he agreed) but

was whether the Supreme Council would stand behind him; his second whether he could have assistance in gathering together the men he would need to move with him. On the first point I could only say that Paris would undoubtedly recognize and support any govern

ment, representative of all classes, on which the whole people of Hungary could agree; on the second that he undoubtedly knew of men who wielded really powerful influences in Hungary and who would undoubtedly fall in with any plan for the unhorsing of Bela Kun, were it sufficiently well-conceived and organized to have reasonable chances of success. He instantly named Agoston and Haubricht, two of the most powerful of the labor representatives in the Kun Government. We agreed. They were sent for and came secretly to Vienna. We undertook to obtain the most favorable possible pronouncement from Paris; he declared that he would do the rest! The first step was taken.

From the beginning I had taken into my confidence Sir Thomas Cunningham, the British military commissioner, and Prince Borghesi, the Italian diplomatic representative, in central Europe. Sir Thomas played up like a sportsman and a gentleman. He was a splendid, forceful man, keen of vision, and with initiative and driving power. Prince Borghesi was also a dependable team-mate-a solid, clear-thinking, straight-forward gentleman, more like an English squire than an Italian diplomat. I outlined my plan to them. They brought to it their experience and training as diplomats and statesmen; they approved it, checked it up, rounded it out. We agreed at once that the next step must be the framing of a pronouncement of principles on which the Allied governments could stand in giving their moral support to the anti-Kun movement, although it was quite clear in the beginning that this must be stated in terms so general that it would not specifically imply the support of Boehm or his conspiracy.

The declaration almost immediately suggested to Paris, through Mr. Hoover, contained the following points:

1. Assumption of dictatorship in which complete powers of government were to be vested. Names to be discussed: Haubricht, Agoston, Garami, and Boehm.

2. Dismissal of the communistic Kun Government, with a repudiation of Bolshevism and a complete cessation of Bolshevistic propaganda.

3. Dictatorship to bridge over period until formation of a government representative of all classes.

4. Immediate cessation of all terrorist acts, confiscations, and seizures.

5. Raising of blockade and immediate steps to be

taken by Entente to supply Hungary with food and coal and to assist in opening up the Danube.

6. Immediate calling of an Entente advisory body. 7. No political prosecutions.

8. Ultimate determination respecting socialization of permanent government.

THE CONSPIRACY IS HATCHED HOOVER WINS OVER THE SUPREME COUNCIL

T MUST be kept clearly in mind that, aside from Boehm, who was a mere tool, the real conspiracy we had set afoot was one dominated by the labor-democratic interests in Hungary. Agoston, Gerami, and Haubricht were leaders of the advanced labor movement thought of the state. Behind them were the forces of labor, liberal and democratic in complexion, who were as bitter against the ruthless tyranny of Bolshevism in Hungary at that time as the higher type of American labor leaders are here to-day. Without this strong and active body of men, and without the leadership of the three named, Boehm, or any other military or monarchistic conspirator, would have been as helpless as a school-boy. The plot hinged on the labor element: it was for this reason that later developments turned me into a berserk madman, foaming at the mouth.

Meanwhile there remained for us the task of bringing our conspirators and Paris together on these matters of principle; Haubricht and Agoston-the brains of the trio with whom we were dealing-agreed to them instantly and enthusiastically; I wired the eight points to Hoover the moment they were drawn up and now Cunningham and Borghesi communicated them to their respective governments. We had chosen, because of the difficulty we had always found in getting prompt and decisive coöperation from the French, to make our arrangements first and to communicate them to M. Allize, the French commissioner, afterward; and when we showed him the eight points and told him of the plan we found that we had been wise in our determination, since his instant attitude was one of coldness and skepticism-an attitude, I may say, that was echoed by his government throughout the whole incident. At any rate Allize telegraphed his own version of our plan to Paris; now our success depended upon results there.

There is no doubt that Mr. Hoover was the principal agency responsible for the prompt return we received. The proposed programme

set the Supreme Council by the ears. Who was Boehm? Had he the prestige necessary to carry the country with him in such a bold and impudent enterprise? What was the motive behind his willingness, and that of the men to be associated with him, to risk execution at the hands of Bela Kun in order to try this doubtful experiment in revolution? And the French, always adroit in scenting trickery, advanced the hypothesis that Boehm was merely a dummy being used by Bela Kun to gain recognition for Hungary under the guise of this plot. The debate waxed hot; the fate of our project hung in the balance. But Hoover, driving steadily toward the important point, insisted that a general declaration on the lines of the eight planks presented could do no harm and might result in the overthrow of the Hungarian Reds. He won. The Supreme The Supreme Council, emphatic in the statement that this programme for Hungary was a general rather. than a specific one, signed and issued it. Boehm and his associates, already in touch with influential friends and supporters in Hungary, and now assured the moral support of the Allies if they kept faith, began to crystalize their plans.

My work in the hatching of this plot, which seems to me now to have had in it some of the elements of a typical comic opera, was done. But my zeal, born of my single purpose to feed and aid those unfortunate millions of the newly formed states, had put me into a tight position, from which it was only an extraordinary chance that extricated me. And this, like the subordinate plot of a novel, heightened the drama of the climax that came a few days later.

It will be observed in the programme of eight points given above that the Allies, on their part, proposed to send food and supplies into Hungary if the laborites succeeded in ousting Bela Kun. On its face this looked a simple matter. But furnishing food and supplies meant that, not Paris, but myself and associates in Vienna had to make good on this promise. And in the meantime the work for which our Mission was created was almost finished and by irrevocable stipulation we were to wind up our activities, close our offices, discharge our staffs, and leave central Europe on August 1st. It was now July 28th. Hoover had wired me that our funds were used up and that no more were forthcoming. There was food in Trieste belonging to private packers, as well as supplies of wheat and maize in the Banat that were

available, but I had no money with which to purchase these commodities and there was no source from which I could obtain any. Save

one.

TW

THE PLOT THICKENS

THE BOLSHEVIKI HAND OVER GOLD 'WO or three times the assistant Bolsheassis vist food administrator of Hungary, a shrewd and clever man, had come to me secretly in Vienna, representing Bela Kun, and begged me to sell him supplies. I had refused him absolutely for there was a blockade on Red Hungary. I had told him from the first that we would have no dealings of any nature with Bolshevism and that he was wasting time asking me. Through this source I thought I saw the possibility of effecting a coup that would help terminate our Mission in central Europe with complete success.

The food minister had no more knowledge than had Bela Kun that a mine was being laid under Bolshevism. I knew he had none. Within forty-eight hours of the time that the finale was to be attempted in Budapest I sent for him and told him that it was possible that I might reconsider my former decision as to selling him food for the Hungarian people.

He almost cried with joy. But I checked him.

"There is one difficulty in the way,” I said. "I cannot send you a grain of wheat nor an ounce of fat until it is paid for in cold cash. Have you any real money, not local wall paper-real money."

He almost shouted.

"How much do you want!" he cried.

"First ante will be a million dollars," I replied. "What kind of money have you and where is it?"

"You can have your choice," he said. "The Bolsheviki have taken charge of the banks in Hungary, and I have millions of cronin, francs, marks, pounds-I have even American dollars. I alone know where it is."

"Bring it in to-morrow morning," I said, "and I will take a look at it."

I might have clapped him on the back and told him, with tears in my eyes, that he was a real good Bolshevik, but anything might happen in twenty-four hours so I restrained my feelings.

"If you say anything to your government about this trade," I added as he was leaving, "there won't be any."