SAW a good deal of both the Bolshevist and the anti-Bolshevist armies, but the more I saw of them the less important I came to feel that they were, and I write of them in detail merely to present the proof that Russia cannot be saved by arms alone.

I first came into intimate contact with the Bolshevist army immediately after its capture of Odessa, when I arrived on a destroyer sent to take away any Americans there.

The Commander-in-Chief of the army which had taken Odessa was the famous General Uborevitch, who has been active from the Arctic to the Black Sea and more recently throughout the Ukraine. He arrived at headquarters shortly after I did, and entered with much swagger though he greeted me in a rather hail-fellow-well-met style. I was rather surprised at his appearance of extreme youth, for he seemed not more than twenty-three or twenty-four. He was not prepossessing to look at his small, beady, closely set eyes, cruel lips, alert manner, exceeding vanity, braggadocio air and manner, at once flippant and bumptious, were far from attractive. But he was sharp as a whip and quick to seize an advantage; his inordinate conceit appeared his weak point. Perhaps his most definite characteristics were that of utter unscrupulousness and the attitude that he would stop at nothing.

On stating that I wanted to get into communication with the American citizens who were still in Odessa and take them out to the ship if they wished to leave, the General replied that a matter of this kind could be determined only by the Moscow authorities, and it would be referred to them immediately. He then began an account of his own exploits and stated that he had come from Moscow, from the heart of Russia, to clear the borders of Russia of the bandits of Denikin's volunteer army who were aided and abetted by England and protected "a little bit also" by America.

He added that he had decided, however, that for the moment I was his guest and would be so treated, and unless instructions to the contrary were received from Moscow, he would not hold me as a hostage although there was ample ground for doing so, since there were many enemies of the Bolsheviki-spies, etc., who had committed outrages against the Red forces-who were at that moment under the shelter of the guns of the Allied squadron in the harbor.

Referring to the various foreign men-of-war that had rushed to Odessa to look out for their own nationals during the evacuation, he asked me very pointedly why the Allied squadron, as he called it, had fired on the Red forces. I answered that I could answer only for my own ship that we had not fired a single shot and had no intention of firing, and, for that matter not a single shot had been fired by any of the ships, save those of the Bolsheviki, since we had been in port. He smiled rather broadly, and then began on a most bitter tirade against the English. But his information seemed extraordinarily inaccurate, and his reasoning as unsound; he was simply blind to anything good in the English, and altogether unfair. His comments about the French, though less bitter, were equally far-fetched. This seemed odd in so shrewd a man, but the reason was obvious, he knew nothing about conditions anywhere beyond the Russian borders, and he used his imagination and that of his friends, to supply the deficiency.

Upon our conversation becoming general, the commissar, who had been listening all along, joined in and asked what America thought and what I thought about Bolshevism and the recent Bolshevist victories. I answered that I had not been in America since the war and so did not know American opinion in detail, but that I thought that, in general, American opinion was not impressed with the chance of success of any government based on the will of so minute

a minority as that of the present Bolshevist régime. Concerning the recent Red victories I stated quite frankly that it was my own impression that the Bolshevist advance was rather an example of the weakness of the Denikin forces than a sign of strength of the Bolsheviki. No one made any comment on this reply and I became very definitely of the opinion that at heart they agreed. Uborevitch stated that in a country such as Russia only an active minority could accomplish results-a majority was always too unwieldy. He went on with a rather boastful account of the Red army, stating that it now numbered more than four millions, and that when the organization now under way was completed the Bolsheviki would fear no one-not England, nor America, nor the whole world. By this time the General had gotten into a pretty good humor and to my great surprise suddenly waved his hand and said there was no harm in my seeing the Americans in Odessa in advance of instructions from Moscow, since I was to remain there in any case until he had orders concerning my disposition. On looking up these so-called Americans I found that only one of them could speak English, and that was of doubtful quality. Nor did they wish to leave Odessa, though I learned that a Mr. Rubin, an American who had been in Odessa for some time under the Denikin régime, had gone over to the Bolsheviki immediately upon their entry into the town and was said to have entered their service. This same Mr. Rubin has recently gotten out of Russia, but he appears to be disillusioned about Bolshevism.

THE

DINING WITH THE BOLSHEVIKI

HE General then pressed me to stay for supper and would not take a refusal; he added, significantly, that in no case could he release me until he had instructions from Moscow. So I accepted with thanks and joined a long table where generals, colonels, orderlies, and soldiers, all sat down indiscriminately. I noticed that all of the officers I saw were Russian, but the large group of civilian officials were almost entirely Jews.

By the time supper was over the General, who had talked long and loudly and told many fine stories about himself, was in splendid humor, so when I thanked him for the entertainment, I asked if he would allow me to return the following morning to take off to my ship the Americans who were still in town, since it

was necessary to go back to the ship the same evening. And in a burst of enthusiasm the General agreed to my departure and added that the following morning, when I returned, he would let me know Moscow's decision about allowing Americans to depart. So I left at once; nor did I feel it necessary to reply that, inasmuch as these so-called Americans had no interests in leaving Odessa, I had none in taking them! But I was very glad to leave, and needless to say, I did not return!

UPON

BOLSHEVIST DECEIT

PON arrival at Sebastopol some days later, I was not a little surprised when the Commander-in-Chief of General Denikin's Black Sea fleet asked me the details of our battle with the Bolsheviki at Odessa. I smiled rather tolerantly at what I thought was a feeble attempt at some sort of witticism, but I soon became vastly more interested when he showed me the Bolshevist wireless communiqué of two days before, which the Sebastopol wireless station had intercepted. This contained a long statement to the effect that one Captain Keller (apparently myself!) of the American naval forces that had attacked Odessa the previous day, had that morning ventured into the town of Odessa where he had been apprehended by the Red forces. The communiqué further stated that upon his express assurance that the American vessels in the harbor would not fire on the town Captain Keller had not been detained as a hostage but had been allowed to depart. However, despite his solemn promise not to fire, no sooner had Captain Keller regained his ship, than he opened up a murderous fire on the centre of the town, and in the ensuing bombardment many innocent women and children were killed through the destruction of buildings as well as through shell-fire. This was further decried as simply one more example of the dastardly acts of the Allies, which was all a non-capitalistic government could ever expect from any capitalistic government; but nevertheless it was stated that protest would be made to the League of Nations.

A day or so later I was still further surprised by a message from Admiral Knapp, the commander of the United States naval forces in Europe, requesting information concerning a wireless telegraph message from the Bolshevist Government to President Wilson protesting in general against the bombardment of Odessa

by our forces, and in particular against my own wicked behavior, etc. etc. Of course the facts in the case are that we fired not a single shot of any kind, nor, for that matter, did any of the other Allied vessels fire a single shot during the entire time that we were in the harbor. The Bolsheviki knew this well enough -there was no possibility of their making a mistake about this, for the bombardment of a town from sea is not a thing likely to be confused either with a pleasant afternoon or a rain squall. So the whole fabrication would appear rather senseless. It is of interest, however, in that it so perfectly illustrates certain Bolshevist methods. The explanation is that such despatches were never intended to convince the recipients—that would manifestly be impossible-they were intended purely and simply for home consumption. For instance, the Bolsheviki knew well enough that we knew that we had not bombarded Odessa, nor did they think that they could persuade President Wilson that we had done so. many thousands of Russians who would not know the truth would see the despatch to President Wilson and would swallow whole the tale of the brutality and treachery of the Allies, which the Red authorities considered such useful propaganda. The railways, telegraphs, telephones, the mail, and the press are all controlled by the Bolsheviki. This situation, taken in conjunction with what amounts to nonintercourse with the outside world, enables the Bolsheviki to keep the large mass of Russians thinking upon a totally erroneous set of facts.

SOME INTERESTING LOOT

HE of lies preven

THE

dissemination and the

tion of the truth reaching Russia greatly help the Red régime to keep its armies together. Perhaps the most interesting batch of propaganda that I saw was the loot which I got in Melitopol with the help of half a dozen Cossacks lent me by the White general who had just captured the town. While the general was celebrating his success by a feast on eggs which for long had been too rare for a general in the White army, I collected literally a wagon load of Bolshevist pamphlets, papers, etc., from the propaganda bureau which the Reds had abandoned hurriedly. A counterattack by the Reds forced me to abandon my cargo temporarily, but I later brought my booty out with me. On our return to the White lines we were received with much enthusiasın,

that the Russian Revolution was a similar political phenomenon. If that theory is correct, and there are many facts to substantiate it, we may consider it normal for ten or fifteen years to elapse between the time of the first sudden political explosion and the end of the revolutionary era. The French Revolution began in 1789. The men who inaugurated it were followed by others far more extreme and these extremists-a small minority-ruled with a terror and tyranny by which they tried to force their theories upon the public, as they said, for its good. They lasted for a few years and, as their theories failed, a less radical and more able group followed, to be followed again by a dictator. Probably the history of the Russian Revolution will not exactly parallel the French, but it is much alike in the early stages. It was begun by fairly conservative radicals. They were followed by the Bolsheviki-a small minority-who rule by terror in an effort to practise impossible theories. The Bolshevist theories are demonstrating their impracticability. The Communists are rapidly abandoning communism. The next step in the evolution is about ready.

But to go back to the Bolshevist armies. The majority of the Red soldiers are conscripted peasants. They are usually sent to fight far from their homes, and cajoled by the promise that their families will be cared

for in their absence if they are faithful, and threatened with the punishment of their families if they are not. Coming into service under these conditions they are kept in ignorance of world conditions and constantly influenced by Bolshevist teaching. Each regiment has besides its officers a political instructor. A cavalry detachment of Wrangel's army that I was with captured one of these instructors.

He had been serving with the Red army for some two years. As far as book education went, this political instructor had precious little of it, but he had native intelligence that went far to supply the want. He explained that every Bolshevist regiment had a similar political instructor, usually a Communist, and that great stress was laid on the manner in which he carried out his instructions. The first duty of these instructors was to keep the army indoctrinated with the Bolshevist idea, and then to spread such further propaganda as was sent out by Red headquarters. These instructors began with recruits, and, as a first principle, instructed each and every one of them in what they were fighting for and in the wrongs that the poor had suffered at the hands of the rich during the generations of the old régime.

Great pains were taken to point out the fundamental reason for these wrongs and then show that the suffering caused by the present Bolshevist régime was not inherent in the Bolshevist system but was due to the difficulty of righting in a few months the accumulated wrongs of ages of a bad system-a system impossible of good. The Red soldiers were also told that while they were fighting at the front their families and property would be cared for; that their fields would be plowed and sowed for them, grain gathered, and all else necessary would be done by the labor battalions. Moreover, the grain gathered from these fields would belong to their families, who were further to be provided facilities for exchanging it for manufactured goods.

Of course the soldiers found out that this was not true except sometimes in the case of the man who belonged to the few purely Communist regiments, but the failure to carry out this brilliant plan was declared to be due not to the inadequacy of Bolshevism but to the continuance of the "landlords' war," which required one more supreme effort on the part of the Red army. Even if the men remained unconvinced by this explanation there was nothing

they could do about it except that those who had no families deserted at the first opportunity. But the men who had families could do nothing whatever because desertion on their part would mean simply that even the little that remained to their families would be taken away. These were the men who allowed themselves to be made prisoners so very readily -who would call out to the opposing troops that they would not shoot, if only they were saved from their own cavalry. For the Red cavalry is the big stick which drives the infantry into the fight.

AN

A BLOOD PACT

N ILLUSTRATION of the Red method of ensuring the loyalty of their officers came up when a Red aviator, formerly in Denikin's army, descended near Radionovka while I was there. This aviator had been very well and favorably known there in the Denikin forces, but had been captured by the Bolshe viki some months previously when he had made a forced descent behind their lines on account of an accident to his motor. Accordingly, upon his now descending behind the Wrangel lines, his former comrades thought that he had come over voluntarily from the Reds, and he was accordingly greeted enthusiastically. But he quickly dispelled the illusion by saying that his engine had stopped, otherwise he never would have landed. He then explained that in his squadron were twenty aviators divided into groups of five each. Whenever a machine went out over the enemy lines the four other aviators of that particular group were placed under surveillance until that machine returned. If it descended behind the enemy lines, no matter what the reason, the four were summarily shot. As a result of this system these aviators had bound themselves to one another by a most solemn oath never to come down behind enemy lines no matter what their sympathies, or what the risk. pathies, or what the risk. Consequently, the consternation of the aviator just captured; his non-return at sundown would mean the summary shooting of his four comrades.

I do not describe in detail the organization and methods of the Red army because the whole scheme and its results can be so briefly and accurately summed up. The military organization has, indeed, progressed, and to-day it is undoubtedly much superior to the unorganized and disorderly mobs of the early days, but the great point is that such gains in effi