the newspapers, it comprises such things as "Yap," "the Open Door in China," the seizure of Shantung," "a white Australia," and "a Japanese mandate in the Pacific, north of the equator." But we must get a broader picture if we are to "find the sources of friction and remove them." Let us try to sketch this broad picture very briefly. The great outstanding fact of Asia is the helplessness of China. Here is a vast and far from fully populated territory, a Golconda of undeveloped riches, a treasure-house of coal and iron and petroleum, a fertile land for agriculture, peopled by a mixed race of industrious, intelligent, and thrifty citizens who, once brought under the modern industrial system, would probably be the richest group of human beings in the world, and the best customers of all the other nations. These people, however, have not come into the modern industrial civilization and hence cannot yet develop the priceless material gifts with which Nature has endowed them. And, what is worse, these people have not developed or acquired the art of national government. They are thus, on the one hand, helpless to use their treasures; and they are thus, on the other hand, helpless to defend them. Now, into the same part of the world with this helpless giant, there appeared, a few years ago, six other nations. These were Russia, Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and the United States. The first five undertook to seize China's riches by annexing Chinese territory. Common threats of war and common fears made this partition of China a matter of attrition rather than of outright dismemberment. The method was to start with the seizure of a small slice of territory, to claim beyond this a "sphere of influence," and then to transform the sphere of influence into a larger seizure of land, and so on. This procedure was in full operation when the World War broke out and destroyed, for the moment, the power of two of these nations (Germany and Russia) to continue their aggressions, while strengthening the power of a third nation (Japan) to acquire Chinese territory. The sixth nation concerned with China's problem was the United States of America. We adopted a different policy. We declared that we had no wish to annex Chinese territory, and that we did not believe that any one else should do so. We took the position that China should be taught to govern herself and develop her own natural resources. Our contention was, that once she did so, she would become a market big enough for everybody, and all other nations would share in her prosperity. This was our policy of "the Open Door." The positions of the other five powers were not identical, but they were every one radically different from ours. The positions of Great Britain, Russia, France, and Germany were substantially identical among themselves; namely, that China, left to herself, would never develop herself industrially or politically, and that, as they needed her raw materials and markets at once, they would take charge of such parts of China as they could seize, and develop them themselves. The actual position of Japan was practically the same as that of her European rivals, but Japan professed other motives in addition. Japan pointed to two unique peculiarities of her relationship with China. These were (1) her geographical position and (2) her immediate need to find room for her excess population. Japan claimed the same right as other advanced nations claimed, to exploit a backward nation. But she made these other two claims in addition. One of these was political-the right to defend a "Monroe Doctrine of Asia." The other was economic-the right to "racial self-preservation.” It is beside the point to argue the merits of these various points of view. The point to observe is, that they are various. They are different, and they breed differences. They are most emphatically "sources of friction." Our philosophy of China's position has brought us into conflict with Japan, acting under her philosophy of China's position, in the question of the future status of Shantung. Australia's philosophy of Japan's position has brought the British Government into conflict with Japan over the whole question of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. And these concrete examples could be multiplied endlessly. But it is needless to do so; for, if we will remember the broad statement of the three main philosophies of helpless China's position, all details of the "Pacific and Far Eastern problems" will fall into proper perspective. Remembering, in addition, that Yap, for example, is an incidental strategic military corollary of the main issue, while Shantung obviously goes to the economic heart of the problem, just as the AngloJapanese Alliance goes to the political heart of the problem. The reasons are now clear for the inclusion of the Pacific in President Harding's programme for the Conference. The "Peace of Europe was written at Paris. He proposes that the, "Peace of Asia" be written at Washington. The one was written to end a world war. The other is to be written to prevent another world war. The stupendous significance of the Washington Conference can scarcely be overstated. The most significant point about it is that America called it and that it will sit in America. The meaning of this point is clear. It means that America has at last accepted the fact that this country is the moral, political, and economic leader of the world. This is not said boastingly, or in a spirit of exultation. Pride has no place at such a moment, when the most awful responsibility that ever rested upon human conscience is placed upon us. The whole world looks to us for leadership out of terrors too frightful for the human spirit to contemplate, and for relief from burdens too grievous to be borne. The peace of the world, the means of human sustenance, the continuance of civilization, perhaps the very survival of the human race as we know it-these things rest largely upon our wisdom, our character, and our goodwill. For we now have the largest civilized population, with the most effective economic mechanism, and the least impaired political institutions, of all the peoples of the earth. These things are the measure of our responsibilities, not of our opportunities. In truth, we have had this position for ten years past. The significance of the Washington Conference is that we have at last awakened to our responsibilities, and that we have at last resolved manfully to discharge them. Hardly less significant are the new spirit and method of the Conference. To resume, for a moment, the analogy used earlier in this article. Our Constitution was written under the inspiration of the French Revolution, and was an effort to imitate the rigid, logical processes of the Latin mind. As has been pointed out, this alien-origined Constitution has been perpetuated only by the practice of a curious process of continuous "interpretation," which was in reality an exhibition of our Anglo-Saxon tradition at work upon this anomalous political document, making it politically practical. No sane American would dream of abandoning our system of a written Constitution. But when President Wilson proposed to write a similar World Constitution, the American stomach rebelled. It rebelled consciously at the danger to American sovereignty implied in a federation of the world. But it rebelled unconsciously at the proposed violation of the AngloSaxon political tradition, inherent in our race. Our intellect has tempted us into imitating "the fathers" by writing state constitutions in imitation of the Federal Constitution, just as their intellect tempted them into imitating the logical French by writing a Constitution at all. We have learned to make such constitutions "work," and see no reason for abandoning them. "The fathers" themselves were conscious of the need for amendments, and promptly began to make them. But our instinct is to let practical measures, meeting present emergencies, evolve into unwritten laws of general application. This is the spirit of the Washington Conference. It is a return to the natural Anglo-Saxon method. This method produced the great British Empire. It has been the real method (obscured under French forms) that has underlain our own success in developing the United States, with its marvelous growth from a handful of colonies into a nation whose territory spreads from the longitude of Greenland to the longitude of Peking, and whose people are (practically speaking) the best governed as well as the most prosperous in the world. The Washington Conference, then, is primarily an evidence of America's awakening to the fact and the responsibility of her world leadership. It is, besides, a return to our inherited, instinctive, practical, evolutional method of political action, as against our acquired Franco-logical method of making constitutions to order, and then trusting to luck and good management to make them fit the work they are expected to do. CONTROL OF THE PURSE Helping Our Government to a Solution by a Glance at Other Countries. Lord Bryce's "Modern Democracies" and Other Recent Books on Government P BY LINDSAY ROGERS OPULAR government, as Lord Morley has said, is not a delicately synchronized chronometer. It is, on the contrary, a rough piece of machinery which will work somehow, even though all of its parts are not perfectly adjusted. The American Government can furnish many illustrations of the truth of this statement. Our political system, for example, provides far more than the usual opportunities for acute and continued antagonism between the executive and the legislative departments of the Government, and we alone, among the great states of the world, have been able until now to worry along without a budget system. As Lord Bryce told us a quarter of a century ago, our financial machinery made us waste "millions annually," but fortunately we had "the glorious privilege of youth, the privilege of committing errors without suffering from their consequences." The recent insertion of the budget cog in our political machinery will unquestionably make it run with greater economy and less friction, but we must not delude ourselves into thinking that the adjustment will be immediately satisfactory. There are a number of unsolved problems, relating to financial control, confronting those countries which have long had budget systems and on whose experience we drew to frame our own recent statute. Nowhere is the financial part of the political machinery a perfectly functioning unit and its frequently unsatisfactory operation serves to direct attention to other closely connected parts. I select only three, all relating to the Legislature: its efficiency, organization for its work, and separation into two chambers. Difficult questions as to these three matters are raised by the control of the purse. It is a remarkable fact that the question of the method of controlling the Government's money, one of the oldest problems of government, is still almost as acute as it ever was. Supply, historically, is the raison d'être for the House of Commons. In antiquity the Cortes of Aragon, the Cortes of Castille, and the StatesGeneral of France were the rivals of the English Parliament, but the latter alone survived, primarily because it secured control of the purse, while the other legislative bodies did not. Yet at present this control is limited. By a selfdenying ordinance which has been continuously in force for more than two hundred years, the House of Commons will "receive no petition for any sum relating to the public service, or proceed upon any motion for a grant or charge upon the public revenue . . unless recommended by the Crown" (which means the Cabinet). That puts the responsibility where it should be squarely on the Executive; and it is still within the power of the Commons to reject or reduce the items which are recommended. But, in fact, so strictly does the party system operate, that the entire financial programme of the Ministry is always adopted without any substantial change, and, indeed, without discussion of many of its features, except in cases where one party loses power on the question of passing the budget. The result is, that so far as appropriations are concerned, the House of Commons in many ways is little more than a rubber stamp for the Cabinet, which is really an executive committee of the House. An Ex-chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Austen Chamberlain, has declared that "there is no more wasteful body than the House of Commons." For one economy that the House assists, it forces on the Ministry a hundred unnecessary extravagances. "We hate imposing taxes, but love to spend money." And in this the House of Commons is exactly like other legislative bodies. Like other legislatures, also, it has been very much concerned by its impotence during the war; by the executive dictatorship which the exigencies of the conflict forced it to sanction, and by the apparent impossibility of regaining its normal authority. Uneasy about the situation in general, and particularly anxious to effect economies, the House set up a Select Committee on National Expenditure to report how money could be saved and how the Legislature could exercise a real control. One of the reports of this Committee declared that "there has not been a single instance in the last twenty-five years where the House of Commons, by its own direct action, has reduced on financial grounds any estimate submitted to it." The debates on appropriations have been valuable for the discussion of policy and the efficiency of the administration, but the appropriations would not have been noticeably different if the estimates had not been submitted to Parliament. In times past, the House of Commons humbled kings in order to control expenditure. Its task now is to control its agents, the Ministry. For this the present financial procedure is largely futile, and to effect any improvement it is generally agreed that three reforms will be necessary. This is not the opinion of academic theorists but of the members of the House of Commons themselves, for there have been several very earnest debates on the manner in which there can be more adequate parliamentary control. The proposals should be of interest in the United States, now about to control supply by a system which is modeled very largely on that of England. First of all, it is recognized that there must be a submission of the estimates in such a form that the Commons will be really able to have an intelligent opinion as to whether the executive programme is economical. That is a condition which should be realized under the American Budget Act and it will be interesting to see whether it is. In the second place, it is essential if their power is to be intelligently directed; unless sectional claims are absolutely barred; and unless the House insists that its committee be economical and then accepts its recommendations. Thirdly, it must come to be realized in England that insistence on economy is not a vote of "no confidence" in the Government, with a consequent general election. At the present time, if a motion is made to reduce an estimate, the party in power need only marshall its supporters and the motion will be defeated, irrespective of its merits; such is the control which the Cabinet has over the Commons and so averse is the latter to a possible dissolution. That is not the case in France where the Cabinet is relatively weak, among other reasons because, although responsible to the Chamber, it cannot dissolve it and force an appeal to the electorate. In the United States, with its separation of powers theory, Congress can insist on having its way. But, in a sense, the trouble is more deepseated than the suggestion of these three minor adjustments would seem to indicate, and the experience of parliaments elsewhere shows very clearly that the introduction of a budget system will not solve all our troubles with regard to Congressional control of the purse. Economy and efficiency will have to be striven for, and there will be difficulty with regard to harmonizing taxation and expenditures, the amendment of budget proposals, the audit, and deficiencies. These are important but minor matters. The more fundamental trouble is this: THE GROWING POWER OF THE EXECUTIVE EGISLATIVE regulation of finance, par evident that a body of seven hundred members, Eticularly in these days when supplied only with figures, the answers of Ministers, and chance facts, is not adapted to form any very intelligent opinion on the merits of the estimates. There must be some committee empowered to investigate establishments, hold hearings, examine witnesses, and make recommendations to the Commons. In France there is real supervision through the powerful budget commissions of the Chambers. A similar expedient is already provided for in the United States by the changes in the rules of the House of Representatives which send the appropriations to a single committee; but this control will be ineffective unless the committee is fortunately made up of men interested in finance, and willing to devote themselves to that drudgery of detail which is more than one government is facing bankruptcy, is probably the most important of all political functions, but it is now one of a hundred different functions. Adam Smith's treatise on political science, published a century and a quarter ago, was entitled "Lectures on Justice, Police Revenue, and Arms." Those subjects, for his day, adequately indicated the scope of state authority, the chief problems with which legislatures had to deal; but at the present time, even apart from the abnormal control of the war, modern governments have become vast public service corporations. All states now exercise powers which cannot fairly be termed essential, their assumption being dictated by considerations of expediency rather than of necessity. The collectivist state is no longer the idle dream of theorists; it is almost upon us. Most critics inveigh against it on grounds of personal liberty. The point I wish to make here is that it imposes an almost unbearable burden on political institutions which were formed to deal with a few, comparatively simple problems. The ordinary legislator simply has not the time necessary to secure the information which will enable him to have intelligent opinions on the many questions which clamor for some legislative action. In England, also, a Parliament, devised for the government of two islands-in itself a sufficient burden-has become responsible for one fourth of the inhabitants of the globe. In the United States local self-government is a vanished dream rather than a reality, and the commonwealths are becoming mere geographical expressions. Congress, with its powers enormously increased over those intended by the "founding Fathers," spends, nevertheless, an astonishing proportion of its time on unimportant matters. Of the legislative grist which comes from the Congressional mill, more than half is of purely private or local concern. The number and complexity of governmental problems result, therefore, in inevitable legislative inefficiency. This change in the character of government is very largely responsible for one tendency which is constantly pointed out-the vast increase of executive power. There is a direct connection between legislative inefficiency and executive autocracy. In the United States we are accustomed to inveigh against the latter and to talk about making the Executive more responsible. That is an entirely laudable purpose, and it is not to be doubted that the powers of the irresponsible American Presidency are so great as to be alarming. But we should not lose sight of the fact that the complexity of modern life, with its many demands for governmental regulation, requires very extensive delegations to the Executive, and that even in countries where there is, in theory, an absolutely responsible government, critics point to the decline of parliamentary authority and the dictatorship of cabinets. Mr. Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George did not get their power simply because they wanted to have it and seized it. Parliamentary and Congressional inefficiency or perhaps I had better say inability to deal with their problems-magnified many times the offices of President and Prime Minister. If the cry now is simply to let the pendulum swing backward, it will stop at a point in its arc far removed from that indicated by the literary theory of constitutional division of power, and will result in poor functioning of the governmental machine. It is doubtful, indeed, if the pendulum can swing backward, so helpless is a large legislative body without leaders, and so impossible is it to check the delegation of power to administrative agencies. The choice, however, is not between autocracy and inefficiency; both can be prevented. If legislatures are to control expenditure or to exert a real influence on other governmental policies, they must organize for that purpose. Only the most efficient organization will make possible effective supervision. AN EFFECTIVE SYSTEM IN FRANCE T IS an interesting fact that in France the pendulum seems to swing the other way, the criticism there being that the Executive does not play a large enough part in the government of the country. For this situation there are a number of causes, but not the least of them is a very efficient organization of the French Chamber into commissions, nineteen in number. In their composition they represent faithfully the political groups in the Chamber, prepare legislation so that proceedings in the Chamber are frequently perfunctory and its business less congested, and, most important of all, organized to articulate with the Executive Departments, they are able to exert a control over administration which is unknown to the House of Commons or the American Congress. Their attention to details can be better informed and more effective than the roving criticism of the Chamber. Ministers appear before them and find in them able allies or severe critics. There is no separation of powers theory, as in the United States, to allow the departments to hold the legislature at arms length, and no cabinet dictatorship to protect department from legislative disapproval, as in England. The Commission on Foreign Affairs exercises a supervision over diplomacy which is far more informed and real than that possessed by the American Senate. In one important respect, however, the American Government stands alone. Nowhere, except in the United States, has the Upper Chamber more power than the Lower House. As a rule the makers of constitutions have intended that the popular branch of the legislature should pre-dominate; and this was |