may be applied is as great as are the needs of a community. For examples, see Ex parte Shrader, 33 Cal. 286; Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36; In re Wong Yung Quy, 6 Saw. 442; Ex parte Frazer, 54 Cal. 94, recognizing the state's right to provide for a board of medical examiners; Green v. Swift, 47 Id. 536, involving the power of the state to straighten the channel of a river. But it is much easier to perceive and realize the existence and sources of this power than to mark its boundaries, or prescribe limits to its exercise: Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 84.

Immigration.-One of the most important uses to which the general supervisory power of a state may be applied is the protection of its people from the influx of dangerous foreigners. The importance of the power in this particular is measured by the difficulty of the questions arising in connection with its exercise. The right of the state legislature to direct what immigrants should be permitted to land upon its shores was brought for decision before the supreme court of the United States in the celebrated Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, and in New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 103. The question was involved in each of those cases in a general way, the precise point in controversy being how far certain state statutes, with respect to the duties of masters on the landing of passengers from other countries, conflicted with the constitutional right of congress to regulate commerce. While those decisions and others, Holmes v. Jamieson, 14 Pet. 540; Grove v. Slaughter, 15 Id. 449; Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Id. 539, seemed to establish the constitutionality of police regulations by the state to protect itself from foreign paupers, the question is not yet finally determined; recent adjudications have settled what the state cannot do in this particular, but have not defined the extent of state power.

It has been repeatedly said by the United States supreme court, and now may be fairly deemed a closed question, that a law or a rule emanating from any lawful authority which prescribes terms or conditions on which alone a vessel can discharge its passengers is a regulation of commerce, and in case of vessels and passengers coming from foreign ports is a regulation of commerce with foreign nations: Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 189; Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283; Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U. S. 259. It is because the dealing with the right of passengers to land may come in conflict with the congressional right to regulate commerce, that gives rise to the difficulty. In the Henderson case, above cited, the New York statute under consideration required the master of a vessel to give a bond for every passenger landed, conditioned to indemnify the commissioner of immigration, and every county, city, and town in the state, against any expense for the relief or support of the person named in the bond, for four years thereafter. The statute provided, however, that the owner or consignee might commute such bond by paying one dollar and fifty cents for each passenger, within twenty-four hours after his or her landing. A similar statute from Louisiana was also before the court at the same time. The justices took occasion to refer to earlier decisions of that court, stating the extent to which the Passenger Cases, supra, and New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 103, were authority. The latter, they said, decided no

more than that the requirement from the master of a vessel of a catalogue of his passengers landed in the city, rendered to the mayor on oath, with a correct description of their names, ages, occupations, places of birth, and of last legal settlement, was a police regulation within the power of the state to enact, and not inconsistent with the constitution of the United States. The result of the Passenger Cases, supra, they declared, was to hold that a tax demanded of the owner of the vessel for every such passenger was a regulation of commerce by the state, in conflict with the constitution and laws of the United States, and therefore void.

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The New York and Louisiana statutes were pronounced unconstitutional. They were deemed to be clearly attempted regulations of commerce, as imposing upon masters of vessels onerous and perhaps impossible conditions upon their right to land passengers. It did not help the statutes to call them police regulations, as the court insisted, for they invaded the domain of legislation which belonged exclu sively to the congress of the United States. A similar statute came before the supreme court of California, in State v. S. S. Constitution, 42 Cal. 578. The bond to indemnify the state, counties, and cities thereof against all cost for support of the passengers landed was quired from the master from each and every passenger. By reason of its extending to all persons, and not being confined to such as would be likely to be a burden upon the community, the act was pronounced void. Said Judge Crockett, for the court: "Whilst the legislature may exercise a wide discretion as to the proper subjects for police and sanitary regulations, it cannot, under color of this power, enact laws which in no proximate degree are germane to the subject. I am therefore of opinion that a statute which obstructs the entrance into this state of persons who are neither paupers, vagabonds, nor criminals, or in any wise unsound or infirm in body or mind, is not an exercise of the police power of the state in any just sense of that term."

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Both in this case and in Henderson v. Mayor of N. Y., 92 U. S. 259, was suggested the vital proposition, Cannot the state legislatures pass such acts as were then under scrutiny, where congress has not moved in the matter? In other words, is the regulation of commerce an exclusive power in congress? The California supreme court came to the conclusion, based on decisions of the United States supreme court, that when a regulation of foreign commerce is national in its character, when it is of such a nature that the power to enact can be most advantageously and appropriately exercised by congress under a general system, applicable alike to the whole nation and all its parts, then congress has the exclusive power to legislate upon it, and the states severally have no power to deal with it. But if the regulation be local in its nature, and demanding varying rules so as to adapt it to particular localities, it is within the province of the state legislatures to adopt such local rules and regulations, in the absence of legislation by congress on that particular subject. Similar views seem to be entertained by Cooley, Const. Lim., sec. 586. Pomeroy, Const. Law, sec. 330, as a conclusion from an examination of the principles involved and of the adjudications bearing upon them, states that where congress has not legislated, the states are

free to act, their action being constantly subject to be displaced by the laws of congress, and that where congress has "legislated upon any subject connected with foreign commerce, the several states are entirely deprived of any authority over the same subjectmatter." See also the same view adopted in Cardwell v. Bridge Co., 113 U. S. 205.

The language employed in Henderson v. Mayor of N. Y., 92 U. S. 259, clearly shows that the relations of the states and the United States in regard to regulating commerce is not finally determined. It will be seen that the court notices the distinction pointed out in State v. S. S. Constitution, 42 Cal. 578, between regulations of a local character and regulations capable of being made part of one national system, and decides that as to the latter the power in congress is exclusive, whereas as to the former, they may perhaps be controlled by the state legislature in the absence of congressional action. The court in the Henderson case say: "It is said, however, that under the decisions of this court, there is a kind of neutral ground, especially in that covered by the regulation of commerce, which may be occupied by the state, and its legislation is valid so long as it interferes with no act of congress or treaty of the United States. Such a proposition is supported by the opinions of several of the judges in the Passenger Cases, supra; by the decisions of this court in Cooly v. The Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299; and by the cases of Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, and Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Id. 713. But this doctrine has always been controverted in this court, and has seldom, if ever, been stated without dissent. These decisions, however, all agree that under the commerce clause of the constitution, or within its compass, there are powers which, from their nature, are exclusive in congress; and in the case of Cooly v. The Board of Wardens, supra, it was said, that 'whatever subjects of this power are in their nature national, or admit of one uniform system or plan of regulation, may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by congress.' A regulation which imposes onerous, perhaps impossible, conditions on those engaged in active commerce with foreign nations must of necessity be national in its character." Speaking of the statutes then before the court, it was declared: "It is equally clear that the matter of these statutes may be, and ought to be, the subject of a uniform system or plan. It is apparent, therefore, that if there be a class of laws which may be valid when passed by the states until the same ground is occupied by a treaty or an act of congress, this statute is not of that class." And in conclusion, it was said: "We are of opinion that this whole subject has been confided to congress by the constitution; that congress can more appropriately and with more acceptance exercise it than any other body known to our law, state or national; that by providing a system of laws in these matters applicable to all ports and to all vessels, a serious question, which has long been matter of contest and complaint, may be effectually and satisfactorily settled. Whether in the absence of such action the states can, or how far they can, by appropriate legislation protect themselves against actual paupers, vagrants, criminals, and diseased persons arriving in their territory from foreign countries, we do not decide."

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It is interesting, in view of the uncertainty upon the power of the state to regulate commerce, even to the extent of guarding against the influx of undesirable strangers, to read in connection with Mr. Justice Miller's words above quoted the dictum of Mr. Justice Strong in Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465, 471, delivered two years later: " 'It may also be admitted that the police powers of a state justify the adoption of precautionary measures against social evils. Under it a state may legislate to prevent the spread of crime or pauperism or disturbance of the peace. It may exclude from its limits convicts, paupers, idiots, and lunatics, and persons likely to become a public charge, as well as persons afflicted by contagious or infectious diseases; a right founded, as intimated in the Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, by Mr. Justice Greer, in the sacred law of self-defense." The court, however, reiterates the doctrine: "But whatever may be the nature and reach of the police power of a state, it cannot be exercised over a subject confided exclusively to congress by the federal constitution"-a doctrine sufficiently well settled, but, as has been seen, not clearly defined upon the subject we are considering.

In Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U. S. 275, a statute of California was before the court, in effect giving to the commissioner of immigration power to determine what passengers arriving from a foreign port were lunatic, idiotic, deaf, dumb, blind, criminal, or what woman was lewd or debauched, and to demand from the master or owner or consignee a bond to indemnify the people against loss for the support of such person, which bond could be commuted for such sum as the commissioner might see fit to exact, twenty per cent of which sum went into his own pocket. The statute was pronounced unconstitutional beyond a doubt. Said Mr. Justice Miller, for the court: "It is hardly possible to conceive a statute more skillfully framned to place in the hands of a single man the power to prevent entirely vessels engaged in a foreign trade, say with China, from carrying passengers, or to compel them to submit to systematic extortion of the grossest kind. We are not called upon by this statute to decide for or against the right of a state, in the absence of legislation by congress, to protect herself by necessary and proper laws against paupers and convicted criminals from abroad; nor to lay down the definite limit of such, if it exist. Such a right can only arise from a vital necessity for its exercise, and cannot be carried beyond the scope of that necessity. When a state statute limited to provisions necessary and appropriate to that object alone shall, in a proper controversy, come before us, it will be time enough to decide that question. The statute of California goes so far beyond what is necessary, or even appropriate for this purpose, as to be wholly without any sound definition of the right under which it is supposed to be justified.”

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The same statute was brought before the circuit court of the United States for the district of California in In re Ah Fong, 3 Saw. 144, and was declared unconstitutional, in an able opinion, instructive in this connection, delivered by Judge Field. By the supreme court of that state the statute has been upheld: Ex parte Ah Fook, 49 Cal. 402. The supreme court of California, in Lin Sing v. Washburn, 20 Id. 534, have probably gone to the full extent in