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did with the Suez Canal. What do you see in your mind's eye-what do you see that the United States could do under these treaties, and probably would do, in view of your experience? This is directed to either of you.

Ambassador LINOWITZ. First, Senator, it is a mistake to look upon the Suez experience as having any relevance to the Panama Canal situation.

In the case of Suez, the Suez Co. was a private Egyptian company, stock-owned by the French and the British, and the Egyptian Government undertook to nationalize an Egyptian company, and it did so. There is no such private company in operation here. There are treaty rights.

Senator BAKER. Would you stop for just a moment?
Ambassador LINOWITZ. Sure.

Senator BAKER. Was there not a convention, an international undertaking, that protected the access of that canal, notwithstanding its private ownership?

Ambassador LINOWITZ. But not the nationalization aspect, not so far as it affected the ownership. You asked about nationalization.

Senator BAKER. Didn't the United States take the position that the actions of the Egyptian Government in nationalizing it were illegal? Ambassador LINOWITZ. In nationalizing it?

Senator BAKER. Yes.

Ambassador LINOWITZ. Or, in interfering with access to it?
Senator BAKER. Both.

Ambassador LINOWITZ. It was the interference with the accessthat was my understanding-the closing of the canal, in effect, was the illegal action.

U.S. REACTION TO PANAMA'S RESTRICTING ACCESS TO CANAL

Senator BAKER. All right. Then modify the example to that extent. Strike "nationalize" and let's say that the worst case occurred and the Panamanians tried to restrict the access to the canal at some future point. What could we do under these treaties, and what do you think we would do, in light of your experience?

Ambassador LINOWITZ. I will answer that first, and then perhaps Ambassador Bunker would then wish to undertake it.

No. 1, what we would undertake to do is up to us. We would decide what remedy is best designed to open up the canal and make sure that we have free access to it. That could cover a wide range-everything from a stiff note, to a showing of flag, to moving even more drastically. It is up to us to decide what has to be done.

But doing it, and doing it under these treaties, Senator-a point that I tried to make before-we move under a treaty which has been endorsed by a large number of countries of the world who look to us to keep that canal open. Therefore, we are in a far stronger position politically than if we tried to do the same thing today under the 1903 treaty.

Senator BAKER. What did we do in Suez?

Ambassador LINOWITZ. How did we actually respond?
Senator BAKER. Yes; how did we respond?

Ambassador LINOWITZ. I don't know.

Senator BAKER. As I recall, what happened was that the United States indicated that while it was a violation of the international covenants to restrict access of the canal, particularly to Israeli vessels, even so, under the U.N. Charter, and by virtue of general principles of international law, we would not agree with the use of force by the British or the French to guarantee the rights of free passage, which were memorialized in an international convention.

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Senator BAKER. Is that not identical to the situation here, and do you think, then, that it is unlikely in view of that precedent that we would do anything to implement the neutrality of the Panama Canal! Ambassador LINOWITZ. No, sir. I don't think the situation is identical. I don't think it is the same kind of arrangement which we have worked out here and which would include, as I have said, the approval of the other countries of the world to this, to the maintenance of neutrality by the United States and Panama; and, if we had that backing, I think politically we would be in a far stronger position in the eyes of the world than to try to do it under the present arrangement.

As you know, former Secretary Rusk and former Secretary Kissinger both agree with this, that this is an important addition which comes with a new treaty arrangement; that our freedom to move is enhanced, rather than diminished.

Senator BAKER. Mr. Chairman, I think my time has expired on this round. I thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator.

I will place in the record statements made on behalf of the committee announcing these hearings.

[The information referred to follows:]

MEDIA NOTICE-FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE ANNOUNCES HEARINGS ON PANAMA CANAL PACTS

(Statement by Senator John Sparkman, Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Floor of the Senate Scheduled for Monday, Sept. 12, 1977)

Mr. President, on behalf of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I wish to announce that starting the week of September 26, the Committee will begin hearings on the proposed Panama Canal treaties.

During that week, the Committee has set aside four days to hear from top Administration officials, leading off on the first day with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, treaty negotiators Ellsworth Bunker and Sol Linowitz, and U.S. Ambassador to Panama William Jorden.

On the second day, the Committee will take testimony from Secretary of Defense Harold Brown: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General George S. Brown: Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Southern Command Lt. Gen. D. P. McAuliffe and Chief of Naval Operations Adm. James L. Holloway.

On the third day, the Committee will hear from Attorney General Griffin Bell and State Department Legal Adviser Herbert Hansell, followed by Secretary of the Army Clifford Alexander and U.S. Governor of the Canal Zone Maj. Gen. H. R. Parfitt.

On the fourth and final day of this round of hearings, the Committee will receive testimony on economic considerations from State Department Under Secretary Richard N. Cooper: Treasury Under Secretary Anthony Solomon: a spokesman for the Department of Transportation: and a spokesman for the Maritime Administration.

The precise dates and times during the week of September 26 for the appearance of these witnesses has yet to be determined.

The following week, on October 4 and 5, the Committee will take testimony from Members of the House and Senate who wish to express their views on the proposed Panama Canal treaties.

Following these hearings and at a time yet to be determined, the Committee will hear public witnesses on the proposed Panama Canal arrangements. Throughout the hearing process, the Committee will make a genuine effort to listen to all interested parties and endeavor to compile as complete and full a record as we can in order to guarantee to the Senate, the Congress and the American people that every effort has been made to obtain all points of view on this very important, but highly controversial, issue.

Mr. President, in considering the Panama Canal arrangements, the Committee will pursue one clear course of action: to review fully the issues involved in the new Panama Canal pacts; to inform ourselves and the citizenry of the United States about those issues; and, in the final analysis, to give the Senate its best judgment on the proposed agreements.

FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE ANNOUNCES FURTHER HEARINGS ON PANAMA CANAL PACTS

(Statement by Senator John Sparkman, Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on the Floor of the Senate-Sept. 22, 1977)

Mr. President, as I announced on behalf of the Foreign Relations Committee, hearings on the proposed Panama Canal agreements will begin the week of September 26. During that week, the Committee will hear from an array of Executive Branch witnesses. The following week, on October 4 and 5, we will hear from Members of Congress.

Now turning to the week of October 10, I wish to announce that the Committee has rearranged its schedule so that all five days during the morning can be devoted to testimony on the proposed Canal agreements. During that time, the Committee will hear from a variety of public witnesses and outside experts. Among others:

We will ask President Ford and Governor Reagan to appear.

We will ask former Secretaries of State Dean Rusk, William Rogers and Henry Kissinger to appear.

We will ask military and defense specialists to appear.

We will ask a panel of Canal Zone residents to appear.

We will ask scholars on U.S.-Latin American relations to appear.

We will ask business, labor and church leaders to appear.

In short, during the week of October 10, we will hear from as many organizations and individuals as we can.

But this will not complete the Committee's hearings on the Panama Canal treaties. Once again, I want to state that the Committee will endeavor to compile a full and complete hearing record. We will honor as many requests as we possibly can-and then some.

There will arrive, however, a cut-off point somewhere down the road, and for that reason I want to encourage individuals who wish to express themselves on this issue to do so in writing. They can send their views to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and as Chairman I want to assure them that their written statements will be retained in the Committee's files for use by the Members of the Committee and the Senate as a whole. I hope that many individuals interested in the Canal issue will avail themselves of this opportunity.

September 26: Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Ellsworth Bunker, and Sol Linowitz.

September 27: Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. George S. Brown, Vice Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Robert L. J. Long, and Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Southern Command Lt. Gen. D. P. McAuliffe.

September 29: Attorney General Griffin Bell, State Department Legal Adviser Herbert Hansell, Secretary of the Army Clifford Hansell, Secretary of the Army 96-949-77

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Clifford Alexander, U.S. Governor of the Canal Zone Maj. Gen. H. R. Parfitt, and U.S. Ambassador to Panama William Jorden.

September 30: Secretary of Transportation Brock Adams, State Department Under Secretary Richard N. Cooper, Treasury Department Under Secretary Anthony Solomon, and Spokesman from the Maritime Administration.

October 4: Senator Strom Thurmond, Senator Ernest F. Hollings, Congressman Samuel S. Stratton, and Congressman Baltasar Corrada.

October 5: Senator Mike Gravel, Senator Paul Laxalt, and Congressman John M. Murphy.

Congressman Gene Snyder and Senator Robert Dole, precise date not yet determined.

QUESTION FOR THE RECORD

The CHAIRMAN. We may also have additional questions for the record.

Gentlemen, I will call your attention to the fact that the committee. meets again at 3 o'clock this afternoon. We will also meet tomorrow at 9:30 to resume these hearings.

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have several questions answered for the record by our witnesses, please.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentleman, Senator Case has some questions which will be submitted for your response for our record.

[The information referred to follows:]

STATE DEPARTMENT ANSWERS TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS OF SENATOR CASE Question 1. What would be the effect of the Senate adding reservations—would the treaties have to be renegotiated

What if there were "Understandings" attached?

Or a Protocol? Or Minutes?

Answer. Effect of reservations, understandings, etc.

A reservation modifies the substantive effect of one or more of the treaty provisions, and it must be agreed to by the other party to a bilateral treaty for the treaty to enter into force and to have a legal controlling effect in the treaty relationship. Whether or not renegotiation will be required depends upon the nature of the reservation and its acceptability to the bilateral treaty partner. An understanding, protocol, or minute does not change the treaty obligations, but rather clarifies or interprets one or more provisions, or incorporates a statement of policy or procedure. Technically, a true "understanding" need not be accepted by the other party for the treaty to enter into force. If it is accepted by the other party, it will be controlling in the treaty relationship, it may be rejected with or without affecting the entry into force of the treaty. As with a reservation, whether or not renegotation will be required depends upon the nature of the understanding and its acceptability to the treaty partner.

Question 2. Does the Committee have in its possession all of the official documentation on the Panama Canal agreements? Are there any understandings, exchanges of notes or anything else that bears on the interpretation of the treaties that has not been furnished to the Committee?

Answer. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee does have in its possession all of the official treaty texts, associated documents and understandings Canal agreements. There are no other agreements between the two Parties which have not already been made public.

Question 3. With respect to the negotiating sessions, was a transcript kept Does the Executive Branch have notes on those sessions?

Will the Committee be given access to these notes or transcripts?

Answer. Some transcripts and notes were kept by the US negotiators in accordance with a specific understandnig with Panama's negotiators that they would be kept confidential and would not be circulated outside the U.S. negotiating team. As records of some of the negotiating sessions these transcripts and notes do not purport to be a complete record of the negotiations. The subject of access to documentation relating to the Panama treaties is under discussion by the Executive branch and the Committee.

Question 4. In a September 11 New York Times article, retired Navy Captain Paul Ryan noted that the chief Panamanian negotiator, Dr. Escobar, asserted "the treaty does not establish that the U.S. has the right to intervene in Panama." Answer. The rights of the U.S. to maintain the regime of neutrality agreed to in the Neutrality Treaty have been clarified in the State of Understanding of October 14, which was subsequent to Dr. Escobar's statement.

Question 5. Is there a danger that the U.S. has one understanding of what the Treaty means and the Panamanians another, leading to the possibility of a future dispute if trouble arises?

Answer. Great care was exercised in the drafting of the two treaties to avoid the possibility of different interpretations or misunderstandings regarding treaty provisions. The Statement of Understanding of October 14 incorporated the understandings which the Chief Executives and the negotiators of both Partieshad reached during the Treaty negotiations. We believe the two treaties and the Statement of Understanding are well drafted and will obviate misunderstandings.

Question 6. Do you have any negotiating documents to back up your interpretation? Can you provide them to the Committee?

Answer. As stated in the answer to question 3 above, the subject of access to treaty documentation is under discussion by the executive branch and the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. This committee is hereby adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:58 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]

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