PANAMA CANAL TREATIES

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 1977

UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:40 a.m., in room 318, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. John Sparkman (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Sparkman, Church, Pell, McGovern, Clark, Biden, Glenn, Stone, Sarbanes, Case, Javits, Percy, and Griffin.

OPENING STATEMENT

The CHAIRMAN. Let the committee come to order, please.

The purpose of this meeting is to continue the committee's hearings on the Panama Canal agreements. Our witnesses this morning are from the Department of Defense. We are pleased and honored to have with us Secretary of Defense Harold Brown; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. George S. Brown; Vice President of Naval Operations, Adm. Robert L. J. Long; and the Commander in Chief for the U.S. Southern Command, Lt. Gen. D. P. McAuliffe.

As soon as all of the witnesses have presented their prepared statements, we will proceed with questions under the 10-minute rule. At the end of today's hearing, members who wish to do so may submit written questions to the witnesses. Both questions and answers will then be printed in the transcript of the hearing.

It appears we are to have frequent rollcall votes. In fact, I understand that we will have a rollcall vote every 15 minutes. I hope, however, that we can keep the committee going by alternating our departure times for the votes.

Senator CHURCH. We will play musical chairs.

The CHAIRMAN. Right. Gentlemen, I understand that you do have prepared statements. Is that correct?

General BROWN. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. Please present them to us as you see fit. Our first witness will be Hon. Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense.

STATEMENT OF HON. HAROLD BROWN, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Secretary BROWN. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, my colleagues and I are very pleased to appear before the committee today to testify and to indicate support for the Panama Canal treaties. Just over 63 years ago-actually, it was 63 years ago last month

the first U.S. vessel crossed through the Panama Canal from one to the other of the two great oceans which border our country.

Let us strip the matter to its essentials. Your deliberations in this committee room today are vital. As much as any other factor, they will determine whether we can be confident that our ships of war and vessels of commerce will continue to use that important but fragile waterway during and beyond the last quarter of the 20th century as they did in the first.

We Americans have always been a practical people, proud of our history but not sentimental; remembering where we have been but oriented toward the future. You are all practical men or you would not hold the offices that you do. In my judgment, the issues before you are practical ones, and I shall address them in practical terms.

mititing

ADMINISTRATION SUPPORT FOR TREATIES

On September 7 of this year, the President signed two treaties affecting the operation and control of the Panama Canal. I am pleased to appear before you this morning with Gen. George Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and also with Admiral Long and General McAuliffe, to state to you that the Department of Defense wholeheartedly and fully supports these treaties and to explain why I believe that these treaties deserve our and your full support.

TREATIES PROMOTE U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST, NATIONAL SECURITY

Quite properly, the focus of your deliberations must be on whether these treaties promote the national interest and specifically the national security interest of the United States. To help in answering that question, there are three points that I consider critical.

Use of the canal is more important than ownership.

Efficient operation of the canal in the years ahead is more important than nostalgia for a simpler past.

Ability to defend and control access to the canal is essential, but the issue is how that ability can best be assured-by a cooperative effort with a friendly Panama or by a garrison amid hostile surroundings.

I have examined these issues personally, and in detail. So have the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Department of Defense has been fully involved in all stages of the drafting and negotiation of these treaties. Mr. Chairman, I believe personally and in the light of my responsibilities as Secretary of Defense that these treaties fully serve and greatly promote our national security interests.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, as you will hear from General Brown, share that assessment. These treaties deal with today's realities. They provide the security which we need for the future.

I see three elements which together make up our national security concerns relating to the canal. These are, first, unimpeded use; second. effective operation; and finally, physical security of the canal. These are our paramount objectives.

UNIMPEDED USE BY NAVY, MERCHANT SHIPS

The first requirement includes free and unimpeded use of the canal both by our Navy and by our merchant ships. Free use of the canal is

essential to assure optimum ability to shift our forces and materiel rapidly between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. That capability enhances our defense posture in both the European and Pacific regions. The neutrality treaty, more formally, the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal, provides that the canal shall be open permanently to all vessels of all nations. Moreover, it contains an important additional provision. The United States is given a preferred position with respect to use of the canal, a position which no other country except Panama will enjoy: U.S. vessels of war, and the U.S. auxiliary fleet-important examples of which are oilers and supply ships are guaranteed rapid transit through the canal. This is so irrespective of the cargo they carry. These provisions assure us that the United States will remain able to use the canal in timely fashion whenever military necessity dictates, just as we can today.

EFFECTIVE OPERATION OF CANAL

Our second national security requirement is that the canal operate effectively. The Panama Canal Treaty provides that during its term the United States will operate the canal, with increasing participation of Panamanian managers and workers operating under the treaty terms according to U.S. laws and regulations. Thus, the United States can continue the present efficient operation of the canal for many years to come, and the Panamanians will be in a position to operate it successfully when the treaty expires.

DEFENSE OF CANAL FROM HOSTILE ACTS

Our third national security requirement is that we must be able to defend the canal from hostile acts. Our armed forces now control and they will continue to control with overwhelming forces, the sea approaches to the canal, on both the Pacific and Caribbean ends. This is not affected by the treaty.

The treaty goes even further, however. It states unequivocally that during the life of the treaty, the U.S. armed forces shall enjoy the right and the primary responsibility to defend the canal itself. It further provides that during that period the United States may station, train, and support units of our armed forces in Panama, and that the United States will decide unilaterally whether and how to modify the force levels we maintain there. All key military bases and training areas which we now operate in the Canal Zone will remain under U.S.

control.

When the Panama Canal Treaty expires, as the year 2000 dawns, the neutrality treaty provides that the United States and Panama are to maintain jointly the permanent neutrality of the canal, and that no troops other than Panamanian may be stationed in Panama. The United States is also made a guarantor of the neutrality of the canal. In that capacity, we have the right to take appropriate measures to enforce this guarantee. In my judgment, these provisions insure that the U.S. ability and unilateral right to defend the canal against any external threat remain unimpaired.

There is another aspect of the third national security requirementability to defend the canal from hostile acts-which cannot be ignored.

Such hostile acts might not be external. If Panama and other Latin American countries, or major elements of the Panamanian population, became hostile to the United States, then protecting the canal against internal threats, terrorism, and guerrilla actions would become much more difficult.

Such occurrences are far less likely under the new treaty than they would be if the long unsettled status quo were to continue. The treaty is a gage of our good faith, toward Panama and all of Latin America. It also provides Panama with a tangible stake in the continued effective operation of the canal. Further, the treaty contemplates a combined defense agreement between the United States and Panama as a result. of which Panama's armed forces will be able to protect the canal against threats from within Panama more effectively than they can at present. Nothing in life, and still less in international life, is certain. But all these elements should add to the real security of the canal, and make its availability for U.S. use much more sure than any alternative course of action.

TREATIES PROVIDE REAL SECURITY

As I see it, and I do not think anyone with national security responsibilities disagrees, the Panama Canal will, for the foreseeable future, be an important defense artery for the United States. The treaties which you are examining provide real security, not paper claims. They offer the firmest and most practical guarantees obtainable that the canal will remain operational, secure, and available to the United State.

The canal was built for shipping, not slogans. We seek to guarantee transit of vessels, not theoretical claims of title. These goals we have sought, as I said at the beginning, are practical. The issues before you are practical ones. Our negotiations have obtained instruments which, more certainly than thousands of forces and their armaments on the spot, will assure those practical objectives for generations to come.

I am convinced that approval of these treaties will best provide for our national security.

After General Brown and my other colleagues have made their prepared statements, we would all be happy to answer any questions that you may have.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Our next witness is Gen. George S. Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We will be very glad to hear from you, sir.

STATEMENT OF GEN. GEORGE S. BROWN, USAF, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

General BROWN. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: I am here to discuss the security aspects of the proposed Panama Canal Treaty.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize the Panama Canal as a major defense asset, the use of which enhance U.S. capability for timely reinforcement of U.S. forces. The strategic military value of the canal is reflected in our ability to accelerate the shift of military forces