ernment toward its own people and to other states, with courts for the administration of justice, with a local habitation, possessing such organization of force, such material, such occupation of territory, as to take the contest out of the category of a mere rebellious insurrection, or occasional skirmishes, and place it on the terrible footing of war, to which a recognition of belligerency would aim to elevate it. The contest, moreover, is solely on land; the insurrection has not possessed itself of a single sea-port whence it may send forth its flag, nor has it any means of communication with foreign powers except through the military lines of its adversaries. No apprehension of any of those sudden and difficult complications which a war upon the ocean is apt to precipitate upon the vessels, both commercial and national, and upon the consular officers of other powers, calls for the definition of their relations to the parties to the contest. Considered as a question of expediency, I regard the accordance of belligerent rights still to be as unwise and premature, as I regard it to be, at present, indefensible as a measure of right. Such recognition entails upon the country according the rights which flow from it difficult and complicated duties, and requires the exaction from the contending parties of the strict observance of their rights and obligations. It confers the right of search upon the high seas by vessels of both parties; it would subject the carrying of arms and munitions of war, which now may be transported freely and without interruption in the vessels of the United States, to detention and to possible seizure; it would give rise to countless vexatious questions, would release the parent Government from responsibility for acts done by the insurgents, and would invest Spain with the right to exercise the supervision recognized by our treaty of 1795 over our commerce on the high seas, a very large part of which, in its traffic, between the Atlantic and the Gulf States, and between all of them and the States on the Pacific, passes through the waters which wash the shores of Cuba. The exercise of this supervision could scarce fail to lead, if not to abuses, certainly to collisions perilous to the peaceful relations of the two states. There can be little doubt to what result such supervision would before long draw this nation. It would be unworthy of the United States to inaugurate the possibility of such result, by measures of questionable right or expediency, or by any indirection. Apart from any question of theoretical right, I am satisfied that, while the accordance of belligerent rights to the insurgents in Cuba might give them a hope, and an inducement to protract the struggle, it would be but a delusive hope, and would not remove the evils which the Government and its people are experiencing, but would draw the United States into complications which it has waited long and already suffered much to avoid." President Grant, Seventh Annual Message, December 7, 1875 "Cuba is again gravely disturbed. An insurrection, in some respects more active than the last preceding revolt, which continued from 1868 to 1878, now exists in a large part 1895. of the eastern interior of the island, menacing even some populations on the coast." Insurrection of 1896. President Cleveland, Annual Message, Dec. 2, 1895. See, also, opinion of "As the contest has gone on, the pretense that civil government exists on the island, except so far as Spain is able to President Cleve- maintain it, has been practically abandoned. Spain land's message, does keep on foot such a government, more or less imperfectly, in the large towns and their immediate suburbs. But that exception being made, the entire country is either given over to anarchy or is subject to the military occupation of one or the other party. It is reported, indeed, on reliable authority that, at the demand of the commander in chief of the insurgent army, the putative Cuban government has now given up all attempt to exercise its functions, leaving that government confessedly (what there is the best reason for supposing it always to have been in fact) a government merely on paper. It was at first proposed that belligerent rights should be accorded to the insurgents--a proposition no longer urged because untimely and in practical operation clearly perilous and injurious to our own interests." 66 1897. * * * President Cleveland, Annual Message, Dec. 7, 1896. Recognition of the belligerency of the Cuban insurgents has often been canvassed as a possible if not inevitable step both President McKin- in regard to the previous ten years' struggle and durley's Message, ing the present war. I am not unmindful that the two Houses of Congress in the spring of 1896 expressed the opinion by concurrent resolution that a condition of public war existed requiring or justifying the recognition of a state of belligerency in Cuba, and during the extra session the Senate voted a joint resolution of like import, which, however, was not brought to a vote in the House of Representatives. In the presence of these significant expressions of the sentiment of the legislative branch it behooves the Executive to soberly consider the conditions under which so important a measure must needs rest for justification. It is to be seriously considered whether the Cuban insurrection possesses beyond dispute the attributes of statehood, which alone can demand the recognition of belligerency in its favor. Possession, in short, of the essential qualifications of sovereignty by the insurgents and the conduct of the war by them according to the received code of war are no less important factors toward the determination of the problem of belligerency than are the influences and consequences of the struggle upon the internal polity of the recognizing state. "The wise utterances of President Grant in his memorable message of December 7, 1875, are signally relevant to the present situation in Cuba, and it may be wholesome now to recall them. At that time a ruinous conflict had for seven years wasted the neighboring island. During all those years an utter disregard of the laws of civilized warfare and of the just demands of humanity, which called forth expressions of condemnation from the nations of Christendom, continued unabated. Desolation and ruin pervaded that productive region, enormously affecting the commerce of all commercial nations, but that of the United States more than any other by reason of proximity and larger trade and intercourse. At that juncture General Grant uttered these words, which now, as then, sum up the elements of the problem: * * * a "Turning to the practical aspects of a recognition of belligerency and reviewing its inconveniences and positive dangers, still further pertinent considerations appear. In the code of nations there is no such thing as a naked recognition of belligerency unaccompanied by the assumption of international neutrality. Such recognition without more will not confer upon either party to a domestic conflict a status not theretofore actually possessed or affect the relation of either party to other states. The act of recognition usually takes the form of a solemn proclamation of neutrality which recites the de facto condition of belligerency as its motive. It announces a domestic law of neutrality in the declaring state. It assumes the international obligations of a neutral in the presence of a public state of war. It warns all citizens and others within the jurisdiction of the proclaimant that they violate those rigorous obligations at their own peril and can not expect to be shielded from the consequences. The right of visit and search on the seas and seizure of vessels and cargoes and contraband of war and good prize under admiralty law must under international law be admitted as a legitimate consequence of a proclamation of belligerency. While according the equal belligerent rights defined by public law to each party in our ports disfavors would be imposed on both, which while nominally equal would weigh heavily in behalf of Spain herself. Possessing a navy and controlling the ports of Cuba her maritime rights could be asserted not only for the military investment of the Island but up to the margin of our own territorial waters, and a condition of things would exist for which the Cubans within their own domain could not hope to create a parallel; while its creation through aid or sympathy from within our domain would be even more impossible than now, with the additional obligations of international neutrality we would perforce assume. a Here follows the passage given above, pp. 196-197. "The enforcement of this enlarged and onerous code of neutrality would only be influential within our own jurisdiction by land and sea and applicable by our own instrumentalities. It could impart to the United States no jurisdiction between Spain and the insurgents. It would give the United States no right of intervention to enforce the conduct of the strife within the paramount authority of Spain according to the international code of war. "For these reasons I regard the recognition of the belligerency of the Cuban insurgents as now unwise and therefore inadmissible. Should that step hereafter be deemed wise as a measure of right and duty the Executive will take it." President McKinley, Annual Message, Dec. 6, 1897. Referring to the foregoing passage, President McKinley, in his special message to Congress, April 11, 1898, on the relations of the United States to Spain by reason of the warfare in Cuba, said: "Nothing has since occurred to change my views in this regard; and I recognize as fully now as then that the issuance of a proclamation of neutrality, by which process the so-called recognition of belligerents is published, could, of itself and unattended by other action, accomplish nothing toward the one end for which we labor-the instant pacification of Cuba and the cessation of the misery that afflicts the island." (H. Doc. 405, 55 Cong. 2 sess. 8.) 10. COLOMBIA. § 68. "A state of war' has not in a formal sense, either before or after the 20th of April last, been recognized by the GovernInsurrection, 1885. ment of the United States as existing in the United States of Colombia, nor have the insurgents now in arms against the latter Government been recognized by the Government of the United States as belligerents, nor, so far as the Government of the United States is advised, have the insurgents in question been recognized by the United States of Colombia as belligerents." Mr. Bayard, Sec. of State, to Mr. Garland, Attorney-General, July 1, 1885, 156 MS. Dom. Let. 151. This letter relates to the insurrection in Colombia, which formed a subject of discussion in the case of the Ambrose Light, 25 Fed. Rep. 443. In that case the court held that the Secretary of State of the United States had given an "implied recognition" of the belligerency of the insurgents in a note addressed to the Colombian minister at Washington, April 24, 1885. A criticism of the decision of the court may be found in 33 Albany Law Journal, Feb. 13, 1886, p. 125. With reference to the insurrection prevailing in Colombia in 1900, Mr. Hay, Secretary of State, advised the Colombian minister at Washington, August 1, 1900, that the United States had not at any time considered the status of the insurgents such as to require an examination of any possible claim on their part to belligerent rights. (For. Rel. 1900, 405.) 11. HAYTI. 1889. $ 69. "On the 18th day of February, 1889, neither of the parties claiming ascendency in Hayti was recognized as a belligerent. Factional contest, Belligerent recognition is usually effected by the President's proclamation of neutrality as between two hostile parties, and no such proclamation has been made in respect of the existing troubles in Hayti. "No formal recognition of either of the Haytian factions as a Government by the Government of the United States had been made subsequent to the downfall of President Salomon and prior to the 18th of February 1889. De facto relations with the authorities in possession of power at Port au Prince have been kept up through the United States minister at Port au Prince and through the representative of General Legitime's Government in the United States for the necessary transaction of business." Mr. Blaine, Sec. of State, to the Attorney-General, Mar. 18, 1889, 172 MS. This was in response to an inquiry of the Attorney-General, made in connec- tary of State, March 16, 1889, MSS. Dept. of State.) "Various documents issued from the Department of State have been put in evidence, containing certain expressions which Requisite evidences the court is invited to examine in order to find therein of recognition. an implied recognition of the faction of Legitime as representing the Government of Hayti. I do not think that in a case like this the court is required to deal with uncertain implications contained in such documents as have been here presented. The fact of public recognition of any prince, state, colony, district, or people as a belligerent is one to be made known to all men by public proclamation from the Executive or some public act by necessary implication equivalent to such a proclamation." Benedict, J., The Conserva, 38 Fed. Rep. 431, 437 13. BRAZIL. $ 70. At the beginning of September, 1893, a Brazilian squadron, consisting of the warships Aquidaban, Jupiter, and Republica, and a number of merchant vessels which had been seized, revolted under the command of Admiral José Custodio de Mello, Naval revolt, 1893. |