Congress than does the prohibition of any duty, impost, or excise that is not uniform throughout the United States; (5) that the meaning of the Constitution can not depend upon accidental circumstances or upon particular interests in our own or foreign lands; (6) that the decision in De Lima . Bidwell, that Porto Rico was a domestic territory of the United States, was inconsistent with the view that it was not embraced by the words "throughout the United States;" (7) that Neeley v. Henkle, 180 U. S. 119, had no bearing upon the pending question, since it merely decided, in conformity with the declarations of Congress and the treaty of peace with Spain, that Cuba was a foreign country within the meaning, not of the tariff act, but of the act of June 6, 1900, 31 Stat. 656, providing for the surrender of fugitives from justice; (8) that if Porto Rico did not, by virtue of the treaty of cession and the appropriation of money to carry it into effect, become a part of the United States, it was "incorporated" by the act in question, which provided a civil government complete in its legislative, executive, and judicial departments. Downes e. Bidwell (May 27, 1901), 182 U. S. 244. States. III. An action was brought to recover back duties paid under protest at San Juan, Porto Rico, on several consignments of Dooley v. United merchandise imported into Porto Rico from New York between July 26, 1898, and May 1, 1900: (1) From July 26, 1898, to August 19, 1898, under an order of General Miles continuing the former Spanish duties; (2) from August 19, 1898, to February 1, 1899, under a tariff for Porto Rico proclaimed by the President of the United States; and (3) from February 1, 1899, to May 1, 1900, under an amended tariff promulgated January 20, 1899, by the President. The duties were therefore collected partly before and partly after the ratification of the treaty of peace, but in every instance prior to the taking effect of the Foraker Act, May 1, 1900. Mr. Justice Brown, delivering the opinion of the court, held (1) that the duties exacted prior to the ratification of the treaty of peace were lawfully collected," the right to exact them arising from the fact that New York, up to that time, remained a foreign country with respect to Porto Rico; (2) that as, by the ratification of the treaty, Porto Rico ceased to be a foreign country, and the right to collect duties at New York under the general tariff laws on imports from the island ceased, so the correlative right to exact duties in Porto Rico on a Haver. Yaker, 9 Wall. 32; Halleck, International Law, II. 444; New Orleans v. Steamship Co., 20 Wall. 387, 393; Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar, 9 Cranch, 191; Flemingr. Page, 9 How. 603; American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511; Cross 7. Harrison, 16 How. 182. Fleming . Page, 9 How. 603. imports from New York also ceased, the spirit as well as the letter of the laws admitting of duties being levied only on importations from foreign countries; (3) that this change in the situation bound the military commander, who, although he necessarily retained, after the ratification of the treaty and till further action by Congress, the right to administer the government of the territory, yet was not, in his legislative capacity, "wholly above the laws of his own country;" a (4) consequently, that when, by the ratification of the treaty, the United States ceased to be a foreign country with respect to Porto Rico, the authority of the commander in chief to impose duties on goods imported from the United States ceased, and such goods were entitled to free entry "until Congress otherwise constitutionally directed." Mr. Justice White, in a dissenting opinion concurred in by Justices Gray, Shiras, and McKenna, besides recapitulating the propositions contained in the dissenting opinion in the De Lima case, maintained (1) that when Congress lays duties on merchandise coming from "foreign countries," this means from countries which are not a part of the United States within the meaning of the tariff laws; (2) that, as long as Congress retains the power to lay duties on merchandise from a certain country, it must be a foreign country in that sense; (3) that as it had been decided, in Downes . Bidwell, that Porto Rico, after the ratification of the treaty of cession, remained in a position where Congress could impose a duty on goods coming from that island to the United States, it followed that it remained, after such ratification, a foreign country within the meaning of the tariff laws, unless indeed it could be maintained that Congress, although forbidden to levy imposts on goods coming from one part of the United States to another,' nevertheless might, after a country had by the constitutional force of a treaty of cession ceased to be foreign within the meaning of those laws, cause it to become foreign in that sense by laying, in violation of the Constitution, an impost upon its products coming into the United States; (4) that even admitting, for the sake of the argument, that the treaty incorporated Porto Rico into the United States, the doctrine that it immediately became subject to the tariff laws was in conflict with the provisions of the Constitution conferring powers upon Congress in relation to the revenue, since it would deprive Congress of any opportunity to adjust the laws to the conditions involved in or created by the annexation either in the United States or in the territory annexed. Dooley v. United States (May 27, 1901), 182 U. S. 222; Armstrong v. United @Jecker c. Montgomery, 13 How. 498; The Grapeshot, 9 Wall. 129, 133; Mitchell r. Harmony, 18 How. 115; Mostyn e. Fabrigas, Cowper, 180; Raymond v. Thomas, 91 U. S. 712. Woodruff r. Parham, 8 Wall. 123. IV. Huus v. S. S. Co. A libel was filed to recover spoken pilotage at New York, June 25, 1900, on the American-built steamship Ponce, belonging to a New York corporation, and duly enrolled and licensed for the coasting trade, and then on a voyage from San Juan, Porto Rico, to New York. The following questions were certified to the Supreme Court: 1. Were Porto Rican ports, at the date in question, foreign ports in the sense of the New York pilotage statutes? 2. Were vessels then engaged in trade between Porto Rican and United States ports engaged in the coasting trade in the sense of those statutes? 3. Were steam vessels engaged in such trade coastwise steam vessels in the sense of sec. 4444 of the Revised Statutes of the United States? The court, Mr. Justice Brown delivering the opinion, answered the second and third questions in the affirmative. An answer to the first question thus became unnecessary. Huus v. New York & Porto Rico S. S. Co. (May 27, 1901), 182 U. S. 392. V. Goetze v. United Petitions were presented for a review of two decisions of the Board of General Appraisers, holding subject to duty certain merchandise, imported, in the one case from Porto Rico, and in the other from Honolulu, in the Hawaiian Islands. Mr. Justice Brown, delivering the opinion of the court, said: "As the sole question presented by the record in these cases was whether Porto Rico and the Hawaiian Islands were foreign countries within the meaning of the tariff laws, we must hold, for the reasons stated in De Lima e. Bidwell, just decided, that the Board of General Appraisers had no jurisdiction of the cases." Goetze . United States (May 27, 1901), 182 U. S. 221; Crossman r. United The diamond rings. VI. Emil J. Pepke, returning to the United States as a soldier from the Philippines, in September, 1899, brought with him fourteen diamond rings, which were afterwards seized by the customs authorities for nonpayment of duty. The rings were acquired by Pepke in the Philippines after the exchange of ratifications of the treaty of peace by which the islands were ceded to the United States. Were they subject to duty as having been imported from a foreign country? Fuller, C. J., delivering the opinion of the court, held that this question must be answered in the negative on the strength of the decision in De Lima. Bidwell, the applicability of which was not affected either by the Senate resolution of February 14, 1899, or by the existence of armed native resistance to the authority of the United States. Mr. Justice Brown delivered a concurring opinion. Justices Gray, Shiras, White, and McKenna dissented for the reasons stated by them in their opinions in De Lima. Bidwell, Dooley v. United States, and Downes . Bidwell. Fourteen Diamond Rings, Emil J. Pepke, claimant, v. United States (Dec. 2, In a report to the Secretary of War, November 18, 1901, Mr. Magoon, law By the act of March 8, 1902, "temporarily to provide revenue for the Philip- VII. Second Dooley case. Dooley, Smith & Co. brought suit to recover duties paid under protest at San Juan, Porto Rico, on goods imported from New York after May 1, 1900, when the Foraker Act took effect. The validity of the act was assailed on the ground that it violated the constitutional provision (Art. I., sec. 9) that no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State." Mr. Justice Brown, delivering the opinion of the court, held that the word "export" in this clause referred only to goods exported to a foreign country; that Porto Rico was no longer a foreign country; that, while the place at which a duty was actually laid was not necessarily decisive as to its being an export tax, yet, in determining the nature of the duty, it was important to consider for whose benefit it was levied; and that the duty in question was under the Foraker Act in reality laid for the benefit of Porto Rico and was properly collected.' « Woodruff r. Parham, 8 Wall, 123; Brown r. Houston, 114 U. S. 622; Fairbank r. United States, 181 U. S. 253; Muller r. Baldwin, L. R. 9 Q. B. 457. "De Lima ". Bidwell; Dooley r. United States. 1 Mr. Justice White delivered a concurring opinion. Chief Justice Fuller, with whom concurred Justices Harlan, Brewer, and Peckham, dissented. Dooley v. United States (Dec. 2, 1901), 183 U. S. 151. Discussions of the questions involved in the insular cases may be found in the following publications: The Status of our New Territories, by Prof. C. C. Langdell, Harvard Law Rev. (Jan., 1899), XII. 365; The Constitutional Questions incident to the Acquisition and Government by the United States of Island Territory, by the Hon. Simeon E. Baldwin, id. 393; The Constitution and New Territory, by Prof. J. W. Burgess, Political Science Quarterly (Sept., 1900), XV. 381; The Law and Policy of Annexation, by Carman F. Randolph (Longmans, Green & Co., New York and London, 1901);. The Insular Cases, by the Hon. Chas. E. Littlefield, before the Am. Bar Assoc., Aug. 22, 1901; The Supreme Court and the Insular Cases, by Prof. L. S. Rowe, Annals of the Am. Academy of Polit. and Social Science, Sept., 1901; The Supreme Court and the Insular Cases, by the Hon. Simeon E. Baldwin, Yale Review, Aug., 1901; The Insular Cases, by Carman F. Randolph, Columbia Law Review (Nov., 1901), I. 436; The Porto Rico Tariffs of 1899-1900, by Edward B. Whitney, Yale Law Journal, May, 1900; The Insular Decisions of December, 1901, by Edward B. Whitney; Columbia Law Review, Feb., 1902, p. 79; Two Treaties of Paris and the Supreme Court, by Sidney Webster (New York, Harpers, 1901, pp. 133); Practical Legal Difficulties incident to the Transfer of Sovereignty, by Frederic R. Coudert, jr., being an address delivered before the Academy of Political Science at Columbia University, May 27, 1902. Division of territory. By the treaty between the United States and the Sultan of Muscat, then sovereign of Zanzibar, which was concluded Sept. 21, 1833, and which was accepted, ratified, and confirmed by the Sultan of Zanzibar Oct. 20, 1879, it was provided that vessels of the United States entering any port within the Sultan's dominions should pay no more than five per cent duties on the cargo landed. Under this stipulation it was the custom to import into the island of Zanzibar all goods intended for the Sultan's East African dominions, and after paying the duty there to transship them to the various coast ports, the island being used merely as a base of distribution. Dec. 22, 1890, the German consul at Zanzibar notified the consul of the United States that from Jan. 1, 1891, the duty of five per cent would be collected by his Government on the coast now known as the German East African coast, which the Sultan had then recently sold to Germany. At that time the American house of Ropes, Emmerton & Co. held in the city of Zanzibar goods valued at $44,746, imported for the coast in question, and on which they had paid to the Zanzibar customs the stipulated duty. No arrangement was made between the German Government and the Sultan of Zanzibar as to goods so situated. The Government of the United States took the ground that, under the circumstances, the American merchants were entitled either to have the merchandise, on which the duty had been paid, admitted free of duty into the coast, for which it was actually imported, or else to receive a drawback from the Sultan |