of the County of Glamorgan the place in question is situated, having always been treated as part of the parish of Cardiff and as part of the county of Glamorgan, is a strong illustration of the principle on which we proceed, namely, that the whole of this inland sea between the counties of Somerset and Glamorgan is to be considered as within the counties by the shores of which its several parts are respectively bounded. We are therefore of opinion that the place in question is within the body of the county of Glamorgan." Reg. v. Cunningham (1859), Bell's C. C. 72, 86. See a discussion of this case in Direct United States Cable Co. v. Anglo-American Telegraph Co. (1877), L. R. 2 App. Cas. 394. Conception Bay lies on the eastern side of Newfoundland, between two promontories, the southern ending at Cape St. Conception Bay. Francis and the northern at Split Point. The bay is well marked, the distance from its head to Cape St. Francis being about 40 miles, and from its head to Split Point about 50 miles. The average width is about 15 miles, but the distance from Cape St. Francis to Split Point is rather more than 20 miles. A telegraph company having laid a cable to a buoy more than 30 miles within the bay, but at no point within 3 miles of the shore, a question was raised as to the territorial dominion over a body, of water of such configuration and dimensions as that in question. The court, after examining the subject in the light of the common law and of the law of nations, said: "It does not appear to their lordships that jurists and text writers are agreed what are the rules as to dimensions and configuration, which, apart from other considerations, would lead to the conclusion that a bay is or is not a part of the territory of the state possessing the adjoining coasts; and it has never, that they can find, been made the ground of any judicial determination. If it were necessary in this case to lay down a rule the difficulty of the task would not deter their lordships from attempting to fulfill it. But in their opinion it is not necessary so to do. It seems to them that, in point of fact, the British Government has for a long period exercised dominion over this bay, and that their claim has been acquiesced in by other nations, so as to show that the bay has been for a long time occupied exclusively by Great Britain, a circumstance which in the tribunals of any country would be very important. And moreover (which in a British tribunal is conclusive) the British legislature has by acts of Parliament declared it to be part of the British territory, and part of the country made subject to the legislature of Newfoundland." Direct United States Cable Co. v. Anglo-American Telegraph Co. (1877), By section 5 of the act of June 5, 1882, reestablishing the Court of Commissioners of Alabama Claims, it was provided Chesapeake Bay. that the tribunal should receive and examine certain classes of claims, among which were "claims directly resulting from damage done on the high seas by Confederate cruisers during the late rebellion, including vessels and cargoes attacked on the high seas, although the loss or damage occurred within four miles of the shore." In the case of Stetson . The United States, No. 3993, class 1, a claim was made under this clause for the destruction, in October, 1862, of the ship Alleganean in the Chesapeake Bay, by a Confederate naval force, while she lay at anchor in rough water south of the mouth of the Rappahannock River and opposite Guinn's Island. It was established by the evidence that the ship was at the time of her capture and destruction more than four miles from any shore. The court, in deciding the case, observed that the term "high seas," as used by legislative bodies, had been construed to express widely different meanings. As defining the jurisdiction of admiralty courts, it was held to mean the waters of the sea "exterior to low-water mark." In international law it had been held to mean "only so much of the ocean as is exterior to a line running parallel to the shore and some distance therefrom, commonly such distance as can be defended by artillery upon the shore, and therefore a cannon shot or a marine league (3 nautical or 4 statute miles)." It was in this sense, so the court held, that the term was used in the act of June 5, 1882; and therefore such parts of the waters of the Chesapeake Bay as were within 4 statute miles of either shore formed no part of the high seas in the sense of the act. But, how as to other waters of the bay? "The distance," said the court, "between Cape Henry and Cape Charles, at the entrance of the bay, is said to be 12 miles, and it is stated that lines starting from points between the capes, 4 miles from each, and running up the bay that distance from either shore, would not intercept each other within 125 miles from the starting points. The evidence shows that the Alleganean was anchored between such lines at the time of destruction. Was she upon the high seas as the court defines the statutory term?" The court, after citing Phillimore, Int. Law, I. § 200; Grotius, B. II. c. 3, $$ 7, 8: Vattel, I. B. I. c. 23, § 291: Wheaton, Int. Law, Dana's ed. 255; Kent, Com. I. 29, 30; Woolsey, Int. Law, § 60; Wharton, Int. Law, § 192; Regina 2. Cunningham, Bell's C. C. 72; Direct Cable Co. . Anglo-American Tel. Co., 2 App. Cas. 349, discussed the physical situation of the Chesapeake Bay, its rise and inclusion within the territory of the United States, and the legislation of the United States and of the States of Maryland and of Virginia concerning it, and reached the following conclusion: "Considering, therefore, the importance of the question, the con figuration of Chesapeake Bay, the fact that its headlands are well marked, and but twelve miles apart, that it and its tributaries are wholly within our own territory, that the boundary lines of adjacent States encompass it; that from the earliest history of the country it has been claimed to be territorial waters, and that the claim has never been questioned; that it cannot become the pathway from one nation to another; and remembering the doctrines of the recognized authorities upon international law, as well as the holdings of the English courts as to the Bristol Channel and Conception Bay, and bearing in mind the matter of the brig Grange and the position taken by the Government as to Delaware Bay, we are forced to the conclusion that Chesapeake Bay must be held to be wholly within the territorial jurisdiction and authority of the Government of the United States and no part of the high seas' within the meaning of the term as used in section 5 of the act of June 5, 1872." Second Court of Commissioners of Alabama Claims, Stetson v. United States, No. 3993, class 1; Moore, Int. Arbitrations, IV. 4332–4341. The court, in referring to the decision in the case of the Grange, said: "It will hardly be said that Delaware Bay is any the less an inland sea than Chesapeake Bay. Its configuration is not such as to make it so, and the distance from Cape May to Cape Henlopen is apparently as great as that between Cape Henry and Cape Charles.” Buzzards Bay. Complaint was made against defendant for taking fish with a purse seine in the waters of Buzzards Bay, within the jurisdiction of the State of Massachusetts. He was found guilty. The distance between the headlands at the mouth. of Buzzards Bay is more than one and less than two marine leagues. The place where the act was committed was within the bay, about a mile and a quarter from the shore, but at a point where the bay is more than two marine leagues wide. By the public statutes of Massachusetts (chap. 1, sec. 12) the territorial limits of the Commonwealth extend one marine league from the seashore at lowwater mark. When an inlet or arm of the sea does not exceed two marine leagues in width between its headlands a straight line from one headland to the other is equivalent to the shore line, and the Sovereignty and jurisdiction of the Commonwealth are declared to extend to all places within the boundaries thereof, subject to the rights of concurrent jurisdiction granted over places ceded to the United States. "We regard it as established," said the court," that, as between nations, the minimum limit of the territorial jurisdiction of a nation over tide waters is a marine league from the coast, and that bays wholly within its territory not exceeding two marine leagues in width at the mouth are within this limit, and that included in this territorial jurisdiction is the right of control over fisheries, whether the fish be migratory, free-swimming fish, or free-moving fish like lobsters, or fish attached to or imbedded in the soil. The open sea within this limit is, of course, subject to the common right of navigation, and all governments, for the purpose of self-protection in time of war, or for the prevention of frauds on the revenue, exercise an authority beyond this limit. We have no doubt that the British Crown will claim the ownership of the soil in the bays and in the open sea adjacent to the coast of Great Britain to at least this extent whenever there is any occasion to determine the ownership. The authorities are collected in Gould on Waters, Part I. cc. 1, 2, and notes. See also Neille. Duke of Devonshire, 8 App. Cas. 135; Gammell. Commissioners of Woods and Forests, 3 Macq. 419; Mowat v. McFee, 5 Sup. Ct. of Canada, 66; The Queen . Cubitt, 22 Q. B. D. 622; St. 46 & 47 Vict. c. 22." Commonwealth v. Manchester (1890), 152 Mass. 230. Affirmed in Manchester . Massachusetts, 139 U. S. 240. 9. DETERMINATION OF BOUNDARIES. (1) POLITICAL QUESTIONS. $ 154. In a controversy between the United States and a foreign nation as to boundary, the courts will follow the decision of those Departments of the Government to which the assertion of its interests against foreign powers is confided, i. e., the legislative and executive. Foster r. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253; Garcia r. Lee, 12 Pet. 511; Williams r. Suffolk Ins. Co., 13 Pet. 415; United States v. Reynes, 9 Howard, 127. To an application for a writ of prohibition to restrain the United States district court in Alaska from enforcing a sentence of forfeiture of a British vessel for taking seals unlawfully in the waters of Bering Sea (In re Cooper, 138 U. S. 404), it was objected that, as the allegation of want of jurisdiction in the district court was based on the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the United States at the place of seizure, which was fifty-seven miles from any land, and as this question of the jurisdiction of the United States was then a subject of controversy with Great Britain, the judiciary must follow the action of any political department of the Government or, at any rate, abstain from a decision upon the question pending its political determination. For the petitioner it was urged that, even assuming that the Executive might alone bind the courts in respect of the sovereignty of foreign territory, the changes in foreign governments, the existence of civil war in a foreign country, and the character of a foreign minister, the Executive, without the clear authority of an act of Congress, could never, by determining a so-called political question or by construing an act of Congress or a treaty, conclude the right of persons or property under the Constitution and laws of the United States or conclude the courts of the United States in a determination of these rights (Little v. Barreme, 2 Cranch, 170, 177; United States v. Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407, 418); and it was argued that Congress, in passing the act of March 2, 1889, in relation to the seals in Bering Sea, deliberately declined to determine the question of the extent of the dominion of the United States in that sea. In response to these arguments the court said that it did not appear by the act in question that Congress had "invited" the judicial branch of the Government to determine that question; but that there was, on the contrary, much force in the position that the passage of the act, with full knowledge of the previous executive action and of the diplomatic situation, justified the President in the conclusion that it was his duty "to adhere to the construction already insisted upon as to the extent of the dominion of the United States, and to continue to act accordingly. If this be so," continued the court, "the application calls upon the court, while negotiations are pending, to decide whether the Government is right or wrong, and to review the action of the political departments upon the question contrary to the settled law in that regard. Foster . Neilson, 2 Pet. 253; Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 3 Sumner, 270; S. C. on certificate of division, 13 Pet. 415; Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1; Georgia . Stanton, 6 Wall. 50; Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202; Nabob of Carnatic. East India Company, 1 Ves. Jr. 371; S. C., 2 Ves. Jr. 56; Barclay v. Russell, 3 Ves. Jr. 424; Penn. v. Baltimore, 1 Ves. Sr. 444 . . . "We are not to be understood, however, as underrating the weight of the argument that in a case involving private rights, the court may be obliged, if those rights are dependent upon the construction of acts of Congress or of a treaty, and the case turns upon a question, public in its nature, which has not been determined by the political departments in the form of a law specifically settling it, or authorizing the Executive to do so, to render judgment, since we have no more right to decline the jurisdiction which is given than to usurp that which is not given.' 66 But we need not go further in this direction, as our decision rests upon narrower grounds." In re Cooper (1892), 143 U. S. 472, 502–505. The court then decided that as, upon the face of the libel, the facts found, and the final decree, none of which disclosed the exact place of the seizure, the district court clearly had jurisdiction, the writ of prohibition should not issue. The observations of the court, therefore, on the political question, though suggestive, were not material to the decision actually made. "Who is the sovereign, de jure or de facto, of a territory is not a judicial but a political question, the determination of which by the |