have coincided with the ministerial views if they had been in office. The cession was simply used as a party cry to damage the ministry and impair their credit; the intention of parting with the rock ultimately in exchange for some more valuable acquisition was never given up; it slumbered, but still existed, and so lingered on till the time of the elder Pitt, one of whose schemes was the surrender of Gibraltar to Spain, on condition that she restored Minorca, which the unfortunate Admiral Byng had lost, and joined us in the (Seven Years') war then being prosecuted against France.

19. The British minister conveyed his proposal in a secret despatch (23rd August, 1757) to Sir Benjamin Keene, our Envoy at Madrid. Pitt, we are told, was so careful about the terms and style of this despatch that he occupied three days in its composition. But opportunity was no longer favourable to such a proposal; the Court of Madrid entertained the hope that by a combination of all the Bourbon powers against England they might be able to recover Gibraltar by force of arms; and, with this expectation, Spain presently allied herself with France. The step was disastrous to all her anticipations.

Instead of acquiring Gibraltar, she was compelled to cede Florida, without even the option of giving it or anything else in exchange for the fortress she had coveted for so many years. Then, in 1782, she made, in conjunction with a French army and fleet, that memorable siege, the signal failure of which, with the splendid defence made by the garrison under General Elliott, endeared Gibraltar in the hearts of the English nation, and at once created it a British interest of the highest value, so that no Minister after that would have dared even to dream of surrendering it, on any terms whatever.

IS SCIENTIFIC MATERIALISM COMPATIBLE WITH

DOGMATIC THEOLOGY?

THE qualifying adjective is necessary, for the object of this Essay is to enquire whether Materialism, in its strict sense, necessarily bears the meanings which have been inferentially put upon it. Scientific Materialism means the reduction of not only the inorganic universe, but also the phenomena of life and mind, to conditions of matter and force. The question is, Does it also necessarily mean the denial of a personal God and Creator, or of the existence of spiritual beings, or of other minds than that of man, or of a future life of man? These last constitute, together with the former, the popular meaning attached to the word, and no doubt it is so far justified by the fact that many scientific Materialists do hold these last opinions. Many, also, of those who, on metaphysical or other grounds, have abandoned the beliefs of Dogmatic Religion, and even Theism, use the arguments of Scientific Materialism in their favour, just as has been done in the case of Astronomy, Geology, and other departments of science in their turn.*

* There are other popular meanings of the word Materialism to which Atheists, Deists, and Pantheists reasonably object; the ethical and aesthetic one, for instance, which may be defined as a low tone of mind, which is set upon money and material possessions, the gratification of personal wants ministering to bodily comfort, to luxury, vanity, and other objects of vulgar ambition, in preference to the more spiritual states, desiring intellectual, artistic, and the higher moral objects involving self-sacrifice. The objection is just, and we have no right to charge on any philosophical opinion the inferences which we, and not the author, put upon it as respects natural morality. Spinoza and David Hume were among the most amiable and upright of men. Again, Materialism has been characterised by Comte as the endeavour to explain phenomena of a higher in the terms of a lower order; to explain chemistry by physics, biology by chemistry, and social science as a simple

A

It must be kept in mind that Physics and Biology are not the only sciences on which ethico-religious Materialism has been based, for, on their own foundation, many metaphysical writers have reared a like superstructure. I shall, however, confine myself here to the bearing of scientific Materialism upon the Theory of Evolution, and the connection of Life and Mind with organised matter. Even here it will be impossible to go into detail, except on a very few points, and the arguments will be summarised, or the positions merely stated in their proper place, without attempting proof in detail; the subjects themselves being so large that volumes rather than pages would be necessary for their full discussion.

We have first to deal with the conflict of the Evolution theory with Natural Theology, the counterpart and handmaid of Dogmatic Religion. Natural Theology is set forth in its earliest and probably its best and purest forms-as not derived, even unconsciously, from any other source than that of nature and thought-in the Dialogues of Socrates.*

corollary of biology. Again, G. H. Lewes, in his recent Essay (Fortnightly, May, 1876), limits the word "to the explanation of vital phenomena by physical and chemical laws, without regard to the speciality of organic conditions, and to the explanation of mental phenomena without due regard to the complexity of psychical conditions, vital and social." Likewise, he objects to looking on mind as a property of the brain isolated from the rest of the organism, instead of recognising the inter-dependence of all parts; and also to the coarse chemical views of some Materialists, who would reduce mental power to the standard of the phosphorus contained as the nerve tissue. On the strength of these he asserts for himself a middle position equally opposed to pure Materialism and to pure Spiritualism. At the same time, however, he rejects all "extra organic agency in the causation of vital and mental phenomena." This position does not really differ from that of the physiologists who hold the protoplasmic theory of life; and, therefore, unless the distinct profession of belief in non-material spirits or agencies is added (as by Fletcher for supernatural, and Beale for certain natural phenomena), it, as well as Comte's, must share the position of the popular notion of Materialism; as must also the speculations of those philosophical idealists who maintain that the personal life of the individual perishes with the ideal matter composing his body.

In proof of this may be given some passages from the fourth chapter of Xenophon's Memorabilia. Socrates is conversing with Aristodemus, a man who professed contempt for religion and the gods:-"Whether do those who form images

In these we see anticipated all the strong points of Natural Theology, in the arguments from design, as well as in those founded on metaphysical reasoning. Yet, although Socrates speaks of a Supreme Deity, or Wisdom, it was to the gods, who made and ruled all things providentially, that he prayed for only that which was good, and whose will was expressed in oracles, and omens, and was to be enquired into by the practice of divination. His Natural Theology thus

without sense and motion, or those who form animals endowed with sense and vital energy, appear to you the more worthy of admiration?" "Those who form animals, by Jupiter, for they are not produced by chance, but by understanding." "And regarding things of which it is uncertain for what purpose they exist, and those evidently existing for some useful purpose, which of the two would you say were the productions of chance, and which of intelligence?" "Doubtless those which exist for some useful purpose must be the productions of intelligence." "Does not he, then, who made men at first, appear to you to have given them, for some useful purpose, those parts by which they perceive different objects, the eyes to see what is to be seen, the ears to hear what is to be heard? What would be the use of smells if no nostrils had been assigned us? What perception would there have been of sweet and sour, and of all that is pleasant to the mouth, if a tongue had not been formed in it to have a sense of them? In addition to these things, does it not seem to you like the work of forethought, to guard the eye, since it is tender, with eyelids, like doors, which, when it is necessary to use the sight, are set open, but in sleep are closed? To make the eyelashes grow as a screen, that winds may not injure it? To make a coping on the parts above the eyes with the eyebrows, that the perspiration from the head may not annoy them? To provide that the ears may receive all kinds of sounds, yet never be obstructed? and that the front teeth in all animals may be adapted to cut, and the back teeth to receive food from them and grind it? To place the mouth, through which animals take in what they desire, near the eyes and the nose? An 1 since what passes off from the stomach is offensive, to tura the channels of it away, and remove them as far as possible from the senses? Can you doubt whether such a disposition of things, made thus apparently with attention, is the result of chance or of intelligence?" And so on in the same strain. Again, if we are conscious of reason and intelligence, can we suppose there is not an intelligence elsewhere, which has produced this stupendous universe, and not chance? And if we do not see the gods, neither do we see our own souls, which govern and direct our bodies. Again, from the manifold gifts to man above the animals, he infers the providential government of the gods. Again, would the gods have brought into the mind of man a persuasion of their power to make him happy or miserable if they had no such power? Again, "Consider, my Aristodemus, that the soul which resides in thy body can govern it at thy pleasure, why then may not the soul of the universe, which pervades and animates every part of it, govern it in like manner?" Again, he infers the love and sympathy the gods must bear to us from the love and sympathy we bear towards each other. Finally, that the Supreme Deity, who raised and upholds the universe, is Himself invisible, and it is only in His works that we are capable of admiring Him.