The Military Academy. Military Establishment, to prepare for, and perpetuate to, the United States, at a very moderate expense, a body of scientific officers and engineers, adequate to any future exigency, qualified to discipline for the field, in the shortest time, the most extended armies, and to give the most decisive and useful effects to their operations. It is not conceived that the United States will ever think it expedient to employ militia upon their frontiers, or to garrison their fortified places in time of peace, nor that they will be disposed to place their reliance, for defence, against a foreign invading enemy, upon militia alone, but that they will, at all times, maintain a body of regular troops commensurate with their ability to maintain them, and the necessity or policy that may demand such an establishment. To qualify and keep our citizens, in general, of suitable bodily ability, prepared to take the field against regular forces, would demand the most radical changes in our militia system, and such an uninterrupted series of training, discipline, and instruction, to be applied as well to the officers as to the men, as comports with regular troops only, while in its results the measure would be found, on account of the loss to the community, occasioned by the abstraction from labor or occupation, and direct cost, greatly to exceed in expense what would be required to support a moderate Military Establishment. This position, which is thought to be a sound une, does not bring into view the effects of the measure upon the morals, industry, and habits of the citizens. Practically considered, may we not as well calculate to be commodiously lodged, and have the science of building improved, by employing every man in the community in the construction of houses, and by exploding from society, as useless, architects, masons, and carpenters, as expect to be defended efficiently from an invading enemy, by causing every citizen to endeavor to make himself master of the several branches of the art of war, and excluding engineers, scientific officers, and regular troops? There is certainly, however, a system, as it respects our militia, which, if resorted to, and persevered in, may secure the utility of their services in times of danger, without much injury to the morals, or materially affecting the general industry of the nation. When the perfect order and exact discipline which are essential to regular troops are contemplated, and with what ease and precision they execute the different manœuvres indispensable to the success of offensive or defensive operations, the conviction cannot be resisted, that such troops will always have a decided advantage over more numerous forces composed of uninstructed militia or undisciplined recruits. It cannot yet be forgotten, that, in our Revolutionary war, it was not until after several years' practice in arms, and the extension of the periods for which our soldiers were at first enlisted, that we found them at all qualified to meet in the field of battle those to whom they were opposed. The Occasional brilliant and justly celebrated acts of some of our militia, during that eventful period, detract nothing from this dear bought truth. With all the enthusiasm which marked those days, it was perceived, and universally felt, that regular and disciplined troops were indispensable, and that it was utterly unsafe for us to trust to militia alone the issue of the war. The position, therefore, is illustrated, that, even in times of the greatest danger, we cannot give to our militia that degree of discipline, or to their officers that degree of military science upon which a nation may safely hazard its fate. The great man who conducted the war of our Revolution was continually compelled to conform his conduct to the circumstances growing out of the experimental lessons just mentioned. What was the secret of his conduct? Must it be told? It may be, and without exciting a blush or uneasy sensation in any of his surviving companions in arms. He had an army of men, but he had few officers or soldiers in that army. Both were to be formed, which could not be effected in a single campaign, or while his regiments were continually returning home, and, like the waves of the sea, each in their turn lost in the abyss, and succeeded by new ones. It was not till after he was furnished with a less fluctuating and more stable kind of force that he could commence with a prospect of advantage, military instructions, or enforce the ordinances of discipline; and, even then, he felt that time and instructers were required to render his labors useful, and enable his army to meet the enemy upon anything like equal terms. Are we to profit by, or is this experience to be lost to our country? The art of war, which gives to a small force the faculty to combat with advantage superior numbers indifferently instructed, is subjected to mechanical, geometrical, moral, and physical rules; it calls for profound study; its theory is immense; the details infinite; and its principles rendered useful only by a happy adaptation of them to all the circumstances of place and ground, variously combined, to which they may be applicable. Is it possible for an officer of militia to obtain a competent knowledge of these things in the short space his usual avocations will permit him to devote to their acquisition? Is it possible for any officer, having acquired a knowledge of these details, this theory, and these principles, to carry them into useful practice with a handful of militia, in the few days in each year allotted by law to trainings and exercises? Is that perfect subordination and obedience of men to their officers, and of each inferior to his superior officer, through all the grades of rank, from the corporal up to the commander-in-chief, which forms a vital principle essential to the energy and force of armies, to be acquired by, or communicated to, a body of militia organized and trained according to our laws? And does it consist with a humane and enlightened policy to march men so imperfectly instructed and disciplined, unless in cases of the last extremity, against veteran troops, (where this principle reigns in full activity,) commanded by skilful and scientific officers? Admitting, how The Military Academy. all the military grades, and arrived from an inferior to a superior rank, but after having deserved each successive promotion by some distinguished action. ever, that militia officers, during the few months the law permits their corps to be retained in actual service, could render their men, by incessant instruction, capable of fulfilling the object of their destination; yet, as that advantage is but momen- A slight attention to circumstances, and the actary, as these borrowed instruments must be quick-tual position of our country, must lead to the conly returned to the depot which furnished them, as new ones must be resorted to, and successively instructed, what can be expected from such a system, but perpetual incoherence between the means and the end, and certain shipwreck to the best connected and combined military projects? This, to be sure, is the old story; it cannot, however, be too often repeated, because it can never be refuted. The secret of discipline, and the importance of military science, were well known to those ancient Governments whose Generals and troops have filled the world with the splendor of their victories. According to Scipio, nothing contributed to the success of enterprises so much as skill in the individual officers. The severity of the Roman discipline is well understood, and the estimation in which it was held by Caesar. Livy has observed, that science does more in war than force. Vegetius, that it is neither numbers nor blind valor which insures victory, but that it generally follows capacity and science in war. Machiavel, who has written upon military affairs, placed so much dependence on an exact discipline and military science, as to efface from his list of great Generals all those who with small armies did not execute great things: but to the committee it is unnecessary to repeat the authorities of Generals and writers of the first reputation, to show the high importance attached to military science and discipline in all ages of the world, or resort to history for evidence of its effects. They must be well acquainted with the facts, and, no doubt, will give them their due weight in considering the subjects now before them. There is, however, an authority, so much in point relative to the essentiality of the institution in question, that I cannot forbear to mention it. The Marshal de Puisegur, who has left an excellent treatise on the art of war, the result of his experience, observes: "I have been, perhaps, at as many sieges as any of those in service, and in all sorts of grades; as subaltern, I have commanded troops and working parties in a siege; as major I have conducted to the trenches and posts to which they were destined troops and laborers; I have been major of brigade, marshal de camp, and lieutenant general: however, as I have not learned fortification, my practice has not enabled me to acquit myself in conducting attacks, so that I should be obliged to suffer myself to be instructed in many things by the lights of engineers, their practice being founded upon principles which are known to them, an advantage I have not in this branch of war." This is the candid acknowledgment of a man who had served sixty years in the army; who had learned the military art under a father; that, in forty years service, had been present at two hundred sieges; and who had himself passed through viction, that a well-connected series of fortifications is an object of the highest importance to the United States, not only as these will be conducive to the general security, but as a means of lessening the necessity, and consequently the expense of a large Military Establishment. By strongly fortifying our harbors and frontiers, we may reasonably expect, either to keep at a distance the calamities of war, or render it less injarious when it shall happen. It is behind these ponderous masses only that a small number of men can maintain themselves, for a length of time, against superior forces. Imposing, therefore, upon an enemy who may have everything to transport across the Atlantic, the necessity of undertaking long and hazardous sieges, increases the chances against his undertaking them at all, or, if he does, in despite of such circumstances, insures to us the time he must consume in his operations, to rally our means to a point, and unite our efforts to resist him. We must not conclude, from these brief observations, that the services of the engineer is limited to constructing, connecting, consolidating, and keeping in repair fortifications. This is but a single branch of their profession. though indeed a most important one. Their utility extends to almost every department of war, and every description of general officers, besides embracing whatever respects public buildings, roads, bridges, canals, and all such works of a civil nature. I consider it, therefore, of vast consequence to the United States, that it should form in its own bosom, and out of its own native materials, men qualified to place the country in a proper posture of defence, to infuse science into our army, and give to our fortifications that degree of force, connexion, and perfection, which can alone counterbalance the superiority of attack over defence. With these advantages in prospect, is it not incumbent upon us to hasten, with all reasonable diligence, the commencement and completion of an institution essential to realize them and are expenditures, which give such valuable results, to be otherwise viewed than as real economy? It is a well known fact, that England had neither native artillerists nor engineers before the time of the Duke of Cumberland, and till after she established military schools. I shall now, having respectfully submitted these observations, present an estimate of the expense of the military schools, which it appears to me ought to be immediately instituted. Agreeably to the plan of the Military Academy, the directors thereof are to be officers taken from the Army, consequently no expense will be incurred by such appointments. The plan also contemplates that officers of the army, cadets, and non-commissioned officers, shall receive instruction in the academy. As the ra The Military Academy. tions and fuel which these are entitled to in the Army, will suffice for them in the academy, no additional expense will be required for these objects of maintenance while there. years, or till after the completion of the Fundamental School. The Secretary takes occasion also to mention, that the laws have already made provision for The expenses of servants, and certain incidental four teachers or professors to the artillerists and charges relative to the police and administration, engineers, at a salary of eighty dollars per month, may be defrayed by those who shall be admitted and two rations per day, which may be considout of their pay and emoluments. ered equivalent to four thousand three hundred According to the plan contemplated, fifty offi-and thirty-six dollars and forty-six cents per ancers, cadets, or non-commissioned officers, may be annually instructed in the Fundamental School, and an equal number in the School of Artillerists and Engineers, the only schools which it is deemed expedient to bring into operation. num; and that the act providing for raising and organizing a corps of artillerists and engineers, passed the 9th May, 1794, makes it "the duty of the Secretary of War to provide, at the public expense, under such regulations as shall be directed by the President of the United States, the necesprofessary books, instruments, and apparatus, for the use and benefit of the said corps." To instruct these may require, when both schools are in full activity, the following sors, viz: In the Fundamental School. According to the plan and estimate of the buildings by Mr. Foncin, the two schools will cost dollars. Two professors of mathematics, at $800 per an- thirty-eight thousand eight hundred and forty-six num, and two rations per day Two professors of geography and natural philosophy One professor of chemistry One designing and drawing master - 1,848 20 1.818 20 724 17 According to the plan and estimate by Mr. Latrobe, the two schools will cost eighty thousand dollars. The modification of the two regiments of artillerists and engineers will liberate twenty thousand nine hundred and fifty-five dollars annually. The establishment of the two schools will liberate the salaries of the four teachers before mentioned, or four thousand three hundred and thirtysix dollars annually. The books, apparatus, and instruments, directed to be provided for the use of the artillerists and engineers, are considered as an adequate offset for the books, apparatus, and instruments, required for the use of the schools; consequently, no charge has been stated in the estimate for these objects. If, therefore, we oppose the sums thus annually liberated to the annual salary of the professors and original cost of the buildings, whichever of the plans is adopted, we shall find the measure proposed, viewed merely in the light of an operation of finance, to result in a considerable saving to the United States. An individual would think it a good bargain to receive twenty-five thousand two hundred and ninety-one dollars, annually, the sum liberated, and to give, in lieu thereof, ten thousand four hundred and sixty-six dollars, annually, the salary of the professors, and a principal sum, equal to the cost of the buildings. In other words, he would receive fourteen thousand seven hundred and twenty-five dollars, annually, which is equivalent, at six per cent., to a capital, or principal, of two hundred and forty-five thousand four hundred and sixteen dollars; a sum greatly exceeding the estimated cost of the buildings upon either estimate. The committee, while they perceive that the seed, which it is now proposed to sow, is to yield a future harvest, will, at the same time, justly appreciate the various beneficial consequences which must result from the immediate adoption, and the striking inconveniences, and danger to be apprehended from a postponement of the measure. Whether our country is to be plunged into a war, or enjoy, for a length of time, the blessings Action between the Constellation and La Vengeance. of peace and interior tranquillity; whether the portentous events which have afflicted Europe, and, in their progress, threatened the United States, are to subside into a settled state of things; whether the blessings of peace, and the customary relations, among the transatlantic Powers, are to take place, or hostilities shall be continued, protracted, and extended, beyond their present limits; in either view, it is equally a suggestion of policy and wisdom to improve our means of defence, and give as much perfection as possible to such establishments as may be conceived essential to the maintenance of our rights, and security from insults. The unavoidable collisions growing out of trade, and the reciprocal restrictions of great commercial States; the apprehensions and jealousies natural to Powers possessing contiguous territory; the inefficacy of religion and morality to control the passions of men, or the interest and ambition of nations; the impossibility, at times, for governments to adjust their differences or preserve their rights, without making sacrifices more to be dreaded than the hazards and calamities of war: all these considerations, illustrated by volumes of examples, teach the soundness of the axiom, si vis pacem para bellum. And what time more proper to prepare the materials for war than a time of peace, or more urgent, than that in which a nation is threatened with war? I have the honor to be, with the greatest respect, sir, your most obedient servant, JAMES MCHENRY, HARRISON G. OTIS, Esq.. ACTION BETWEEN THE CONSTELLATION [Communicated to the House of Reps., March 21, 1800.] NAVY DEPARTMENT, March 20, 1800. received from Captain Baker, of the Delaware sloop of war, from B. H. Phillips, Esq., American Consul at Curaçoa, and from D. M. Clarkson, Esq., Navy Agent at St. Kitts. Captain Baker, in a letter dated Curaçoa, Sth of February, mentions that a French ship, called La Vengeance, of fifty-four_guns, had left Guadaloupe on her return to France, about the 1st of February, had a very severe action with the Constellation the following night, and arrived at Curaçoa on the 6th, in a most shattered condition; that he had understood she had lost one hundred and forty men in the action, and when she escaped from the Constellation had eight feet water in her hold. Mr. Phillips, in a letter dated Curaçoa, 9th of February, to the Secretary of State, announces the arrival there of the French ship La Vengeance, of fifty-six guns, bound from Guadaloupe to France, with a valuable cargo, and a large sum of specie, in a very distressed situation, having lost one hundred and sixty men, killed and wounded, and her masts and rigging nearly all shot away, in an engagement of five hours, within pistol shot, with the Constellation. Mr. Clarkson, at St. Kitts, in a letter dated 16th of February states "we are certain Captain Truxtun's gallant action was fought with La Vengeance, a French man of war of fifty-four guns. and five hundred picked men, from Guadaloupe to France." As to the conduct of any particular officer, or other persons on board the Constellation, the Secretary has no information, except what is to be found in the communications from Captain Truxtun, by which, but still more by the result of this heroic action, it appears that all the officers and men on board the Constellation must have nobly performed their duty. The praise of having pursued, for many hours, a ship known to be of force so greatly superior to his own, to bring her to action, and of conducting that action with so much skill as to compensate for his great inferiority of force, belongs exclusively to their gallant commander. In obedience to the order of the House of Representatives of the United States, of the 18th instant, the Secretary of the Navy has the honor to lay before the House a copy of Captain Truxtun's letter of the 3d of February, together with a copy of the extract from his journal, referred to in the said letter, detailing the particulars of the engagement between the Constellation, under his command, and a heavy French ship, mounting, as he Hon. SPEAKER of the House of Reps. supposed, fifty-four guns. It cannot be necessary for the Secretary to add to the eulogium bestowed by Captain Truxtun, on the brave young midshipman, James Jarvis, who gloriously preferred certain death to an abandonment of his post. All which is respectfully submitted. Secretary of the Navy. The Secretary has received a number of letters too voluminous to trouble the House with, of dates Copy of a letter from Captain Thomas Truxtun to the both prior and subsequent to the action, which leave no doubt on his mind that the French ship, | so gallantly defended against the bravery and superior skill of Captain Truxtun, is the same that arrived at Guadaloupe from France, in the month of December last, called La Vengeance, mounting fifty guns or upwards. In confirmation of this opinion, the Secretary takes the liberty of stating the substance of letters UNITED STATES' SHIP CONSTELLATION, AT SEA, February 3, 1800. SIR: I had the honor to address you the day after my arrival at St. Christopher's, the 21st ult. as per copy annexed; after which I made every exertion in my power to get the squadron, as well as my own ship, to sea, in the shortest time possible; and gave all the commanders of the different Action between the Constellation and La Vengeance. vessels orders to cruise separately, in certain situations, agreeably to the copies enclosed. fifty-four guns. I immediately gave orders for the yards to be slung with chains, topsail sheets, &c., stoppered, and the ship cleared, ready for action, and hauled down the English colors. At noon the wind became light, and I observed the chase, that we had before been gaining on fast, held way with us, but I was determined to continue the pursuit, though the running to leeward, I was convinced, would be attended with many serious disadvantages, especially if the object of my wishes was not gratified. SUNDAY, February 2. On the 30th I left St. Christopher's with the Constellation, in an excellent trim for sailing, and stood to windward in order to occupy the station I had allotted for myself, before the road of the enemy at Guadaloupe, where I was informed a very large and heavy frigate, of upwards of fifty guns, was then lying, and early on the next day I fell in with L'Insurgent, Captain Murray, and the prize brig Conquest, of Italy, that had been fitted out to cruise with him in those seas. After a short interview with Captain Murray I requested him to proceed to St. Christopher's without loss of fresher than the noon preceding, and an appearAt one o'clock, P. M., the wind being somewhat time, and call on our agent there, Mr. Clarkson, for letters that I had lodged for him, which point- the enemy to action began to brighten, as I perance of its continuance, our prospect of bringing ed out his further destination. On our parting heceived we were coming up with the chase fast, and immediately made sail to leeward, and I continued plying to windward. At half past seven, A. every inch of canvass being set that could be of M., of the following day, I discovered a sail to the service, except the bag reefs, which I kept in the southeast, to which I gave chase; and, for the fur-topsails, in case of the enemy, finding escape from ther particulars of that chase, and the action after it, I must beg leave to refer you to the extracts of my journal, which is also enclosed, as being the best mode of exhibiting a just, fair, and candid account of all our transactions in the late business, which has ended in the complete dismantlement of the Constellation, though, I trust, to the high reputation of the American flag. I have just fell in with the Enterprise, Lieutenant Shaw, returning from Curaçoa, who I send off to you with my despatches, and I shall be obliged by your sending him again to meet me at Port Royal, Jamaica, as early as possible, as I shall be impatient to hear from you, especially as we are now in want of everything, being a mere wreck. If I had met Captain Morris, of the Adams, should have taken the command of that ship and kept the station to windward, leaving him in charge of the Constellation to be refitted at Jamaica; but I have not been so fortunate. I I have the honor to be, with great respect and esteem, your very obedient humble servant, THOMAS TRUXTUN. BENJAMIN STODDERT, Esq., Secretary of the Navy, Philadelphia. A circumstantial account of the engagement between the United States frigate Constellation, of thirtyeight guns, and a French national frigate, of fiftyfour guns, on the 1st of February, 1800; taken from Commodore Truxtun's Journal, viz : our thunder impracticable, should haul on a wind, be her commander's intention; I, however, got and give us fair battle; but this did not prove to within hail of him at eight P. M.; hoisted our ensign, and had the candles in the battle lanterns all lighted, and was in the lee gangway, ready to speak him, and to demand a surrender of his ship to the United States of America, when, at that instant, he commenced a fire from his stern and quarter guns, directed at our rigging and spars. No parley being then necessary, I sent my principal aid-de-camp, Mr. Vandyke, to the different officers commanding divisions on the main battery, to repeat strictly my orders before given, not to throw away a single charge of powder and shot, but to take good aim, and to fire directly into the round shot, and, now and then, with a round shot hull of the enemy, and load principally with two and a stand of grape, &c.; to encourage the men at their quarters, and to cause or suffer no noise or confusion whatever, but to load and fire as fast as possible, when it could be done with certain effect. These orders being given, in a few moments I gained a position on his weather quarter, that enabled us to return, effectually, his salute, and thus as close and as sharp an action as ever was fought between two frigates, commenced, and continued until within a few minutes of one, A. M., when the enemy's fire was completely silenced, and he was again sheering off. It was at this moment that I considered him as my prize, and was trimming, in the best manner I could, my much shatSATURDAY, February 1, 1800. tered sails, when I found the mainmost was totalAt half-past seven, A. M., the road of Bassaterre, ly unsupported with rigging, every shroud being Guadaloupe, bearing east, five leagues distance, shot away, and some of them, in many places, so saw a sail in the southeast standing to the west- as to render stoppers useless, which in fact could ward, which, from her situation, I at first took for not be applied with effect. I then gave orders for a large ship from Martinico, and hoisted English all the men to be sent up from the gun deck, to encolors, on giving chase, by way of inducement deavor to secure the mast, in order that we might for her to come down and speak me, which would get alongside of the enemy again as soon as possihave saved a long chase to leeward of my intend- ble; but every effort was in vain, for it went over ed cruising ground; but finding she did not attempt the side in a few moments after, and carried with to alter her course, I examined her more atten- it the topmen, among whom was an amiable tively as we approached her, and discovered her young gentleman, who commanded the main top, to be a heavy French frigate, mounting at least | Mr. James Jarvis, son of James Jarvis, Esq., of |