investigations on the Isthmus and report on the subject. The President gave an account of this mission in his message of January 9, 1837. He submitted to Congress that there was no probability of taking up the construction of the canal at an early date, and therefore he considered it inexpedient to enter into negotiations with foreign governments upon the subject.'

In the following year the question was again discussed in Congress. The Mayor of New York, and some members of that city and of Philadelphia, addressed a petition to that body pointing out the national importance of the construction of a maritime canal, and praying the aid of the State for such enterprise. This memorial was submitted to the Committee of Roads and Canals of the House of Representatives. Mr. C. F. Mercer, in his report of March 2, 1839, said: "It is obvious that if the contemplated communication from sea to sea be practicable, the nation which has the right to appropriate its exclusive use to itself might lawfully control the richest commerce of the world, or prescribe to all other nations the terms upon which they be admitted to share its enjoyment. The policy is not less apparent which should prompt the United States to co-operate in this enterprise liberally and efficiently." The House of Representatives then passed a resolution similar to the one which the Senate had issued three years before.

In spite of the suggestive tenor of the report of Mr. Mercer, the new President, van Buren, contented himself with sending another agent to Central America, who did not deem it expedient to undertake the work at the

1 Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol iii. p. 272. 2. Sullivan, op. cit.p.20

moment, on account of the unsettled and revolutionary state of the country. We need not be surprised at the apathy evidenced by the United States at this time. Van Buren, who was of the same political creed as Jackson, followed also his canal policy, which was no other than that of Clay. The United States did not desire anything more than the use of the canal, if it was ever constructed, under the same conditions as it would be granted to all other nations. The government itself seems to have been somewhat slow in advocating the opening of a route. In fact, the policy of the Department of State was, with the cautious limitation just pointed out, of the laissez-faire type, both because there does not appear to have been a pressing demand for such an enterprise as a State concern (even though this may be limited to instigating private undertaking), and also because the relative strength of the United States did not urge politicians to a broader foreign policy which, potentially at least, might encumber the administration.

But the acquisition of vast territories on the Pacific side as a result of the war with Mexico, the discovery of rich gold mines in California, and finally the absence of direct means of communication, gave a new impetus to canal projects. President Polk instructed the American agent in Mexico, Mr. Trist, to offer double the indemnity in case Mexico should agree to grant to the United States the exclusive right of transit across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec. Mexico refused to concede this privilege.

About the same time (1846), the American Chargéd'affaires at Bogota was concluding a treaty of peace, amity, navigation, and commerce with New Granada. In this convention there appears a clause

whereby this republic "guarantees to the government of the United States, that the right of way or transit across the Isthmus of Panama, upon any modes of communication that now exist, or that may be hereafter constructed, shall be open and free to the government and citizens of the United States;... and the United States guarantee, positively and efficaciously to New Granada, by the present stipulation, the perfect neutrality of the before-mentioned Isthmus, with the view that the free transit from the one to the other sea may not be interrupted or embarrassed in any future time while this treaty exists; and in consequence, the United States also guarantee, in the same manner, the rights of sovereignty and property which New Granada has and possesses over the said terrritory."

This was the first treaty concluded by the United States that contains direct reference to trans-isthmian transit. Apart from this fact, the treaty itself contains a provision that marks an epoch in the diplomatic history of that country. The protection tendered by the United States to another country actually ran counter to that traditional policy that "the fathers" had bequeathed to future statesmen, and which had always been regarded as the foundation-stone of American foreign relations. The guarantees of neutrality over the Isthmus of Panama and of the sovereignty of New Granada over that piece of territory would, potentially at least, lead the United States into embroilments abroad. Polk well knew this, but he also perceived the importance of taking a bold move, with the attendant dangers, if he was to facilitate to the nation the means of communication with the newly acquired regions on the Pacific. The fact is that he never gave instructions to his Chargé d'affaires at Bogota for

the insertion of the clause of guarantees. In his message to the Senate submitting the treaty he says that "the Chargé d'affaires acted in this particular upon his own responsibility and without instructions." But Polk nevertheless assumed the responsibility, and transmitted the treaty to the Senate, where it was finally ratified without a dissenting vote.

It has now become known that Mr. Bidlack, the United States Chargé d'affaires at Bogota, consented to the insertion of the clause of guarantees after perceiving the enormous benefits that his government would obtain thereby. The moral and material advantages that would accrue to the United States were pointed out to him by Señor Mallarino, the New Granada Minister of Foreign Affairs, in a confidential memorandum. It was common at that time, and to a certain extent it was excusable, to fear British designs in Spanish America. To counteract any aggressive tendencies that Great Britain might have had on the Isthmus, Mallarino urged on the American Chargé d'affaires the adoption of his plan. His good faith, and, perhaps, his lack of foresight, prevented the Minister from perceiving the difficulties that such a guarantee would create, and further the preponderant influence that it was bound to exert in the destinies of his country.?

It is of paramount importance for our purpose that we should consider the extent of the neutrality that the United States guaranteed according to this treaty, as interpreted by President Polk. "In entering into the mutual guarantees proposed by the thirty-fifth article of this

I Messages of the Presidents, vol. iv.p. 511

2 The memorandum is given at length in Garc®a-Merou, Historia de la diplomacia americana. tomo segundo, pp. 7 et seq.

treaty," thus runs his message, "neither the government of New Granada nor that of the United States has any narrow or exclusive views. The ultimate object, as presented by the Senate of the United States in their resolution to which I have already referred,' is to secure to all nations the free and equal right of passage over the Isthmus. If the United States, as the chief of the American nations, should first become a party to this guarantee, it cannot be doubted—indeed it is confidently expected by the government of New Granada-that similar guarantees would be given by Great Britain and France... That either of these governments would embrace the offer cannot be doubted, because there does not appear to be any other effectual means of securing to all nations the advantages of this important passage but the guarantee of great commercial powers that the Isthmus shall be neutral territory. The interests of the world at stake are so important that the security of this passage between the two oceans cannot be made to depend upon the wars and revolutions which may arise among different nations."?

We may pause here for a while to consider the march of events in connection with this subject from the time in which the United States first came to show any interest in trans-isthmian communication up to the moment when the treaty with New Granada was ratified. It is easy to see that Polk completed Clay's policy, for the latter, although fully conscious of the importance of a canal communication and of the benefits that would thereby

I The resolution of the Senate alluded to is the one that we have quoted on p. 13, supra. The fact is, as Polk himself tells us, that he is following no other than the original policy of his country in connection with the subject of a trans-isthmian canal.

2 Messages of the Presidents, vol.iv. p. 512.