The provisions of a conveyance in trust for a certain person to permit him "to use, occupy, possess, enjoy, improve, rent, and build upon the said tracts or lots of land in any manner he may deem best for the support, maintenance, and benefit of himself and his children during his natural life," do not create a trust for the children, such words amounting to a mere expression of motive for the conveyance. Bryan v. Howland (1881) 98 Ill. 625. An intention to create a trust, of which his wife was the trustee, for the benefit of herself, her children, and the father of the testator, is manifested by a will in which testator gave his wife all his estate, "to be used by her for her own support and for the maintenance and education of my children," adding: "It is my will that my wife, who is hereby constituted my executrix, shall in her discretion bestow such sums of money on my father from time to time, Thomas J. Summers, in case of his becoming so infirm by age or disease that he shall be unable to support himself. It is my will that, in case of the death of my wife before any of my children above named attain their majority, that whatever of my estate may be left when the youngest child, William Summers, shall have arrived at the age of twenty-one years and over and above the education and maintenance of my said children, shall be divided equally among them, share and share alike." Summers v. Higley (1901) 191 Ill. 193, 60 N. E. 969. A trust in the income for the benefit of the family of testator's son is created by a will by which testator constituted a trust fund, with directions to pay the income yearly to his son "for the support of himself and his family and the education of his children." Chase v. Chase (1861) 2 Allen (Mass.) 101. A trust is created by a will in which testator devised all his real estate and the residue of his personal estate to his wife "and to her heirs in fee simple, for the maintenance and support of my said wife and my infant child." Pratt v. Miller (1888) 23 Neb. 496, 37 Under a will by which testator gave his estate to his wife during her lifetime "for the support of herself and children," and provided that in event of her death all his estate should be divided equally between his son and daughter, and further that, in event of the wife's remarriage, she should take one third of the estate, the remaining two thirds to be divided equally between the son and daughter, the widow took in trust for herself and children. Billar v. Loundes (1884) 2 Dem. (N. Y.) 590. A beneficial interest is given to testator's son George by a will in which testator gave all his estate to his son Logan, "to the support of him and his brother George; that is, that George gets no more than what will support him equal to Logan should he not be extravagant." Carson V. Carson (1841) 36 N. C. (1 Ired. Eq.) 329. No trust for testator's children is created by a gift to testator's wife of the rents and profits of all his property during her life, "for her support and the support and education of my children under the direction of my executors." Paisley's Appeal (1871) 70 Pa. 153. No trust is created by a will in which testator devised to his daughter Elizabeth, "for the support of herself and her children," certain property. Cressler's Estate (1894) 161 Pa. 427, 29 Atl. 90, 95. g. Gift to one "for the support of" another. A trust is created by a bequest to a daughter of the testator, "for the support of my daughter Caroline," who was insane. Buffington v. Maxam (1886) 140 Mass. 557, 5 N. E. 519. h. Gift to one "to enable him to" provide for children of himself or another. No trust in favor of testator's children is created by a will in which he directed the payment to his wife during her natural life, absolutely, of the income from his property, "to enable her to support, educate, and maintain our children. . . My said wife is not to be liable to account in any man ner or in any court for the use or application of the moneys which she may receive under this subdivision of this 'third' clause, and the same are given to her absolutely to use and apply as she may deem best and proper." Slater v. Slater (1905) 46 Misc. 332, 94 N. Y. Supp. 900, affirmed in (1906) 114 App. Div. 160, 99 N. Y. Supp. 564, which is affirmed in (1907) 188 N. Y. 633, 81 N. E. 1176. No trust is created by a will in which testator gave one a stated sum "the better to enable him to provide for his younger children." Brown v. Casamajor (1799) 4 Ves. Jr. 498, 31 Eng. Reprint, 255. No trust is created by a will in which testator gave property "to my brother Arthur Benson, to enable him to assist such of the children of my deceased brother, Francis Benson, as he, the said Arthur Benson, shall find deserving of encouragement," but the words quoted are to be taken in their natural import as indicating the motive for the gift. Benson v. Whittam (1831) 5 Sim. 22, 58 Eng. Reprint, 246. In Leach v. Leach (1843) 13 Sim. 304, 60 Eng. Reprint, 118, where a testator gave certain property in trust to pay an annuity to his daughter for her separate use for life, remainder to her husband to enable him to maintain his children by her until the youngest attained twenty-one, it was held that the husband was bound to apply the annuity for the maintenance of the children, but that, if he maintained them properly, they would not be entitled to an account against him. i. Gift to one "for the purpose of" doing some specified thing. A gift made by the following provision: "I give to the trustees of the Brooklyn Masonic Veterans the sum of $1,000 for the purpose of founding a home midway on Long Island for destitute Masons, their widows, or children," is absolute, the definition by the testator of the purpose to which he desired the gift to be applied being merely precatory. Re Baldwin (1911) 74 Misc. 325, 134 N. Y. Supp. 405. The absolute legal estate created by bequest to testator's wife, of all his negroes, is not qualified by the words, "for the purpose of raising and educating my two sons," to whom he gave the negroes at his wife's death, but the words merely give a reason for the gift and in that way suggest and recommend the duty which was incumbent on his wife. Mason v. Sadler (1860) 59 N. C. (6 Jones, Eq.) 148. No trust is created by the recital in a deed conveying land to the vestry and wardens of a church, that it was made "for the purpose of aiding in the establishment of a home for indigent widows or orphans or in the promotion of any other charitable or religious objects to which the property may be appropriated" by the grantee. St. James v. Bagley (1905) 138 N. C. 384, 70 L.R.A. 160, 50 S. E. 841. No trust in favor of the children is created by a will by which testator gave his wife all his estate "for the purpose of raising her children, to have and to hold to her and her heirs forever," the words quoted being construed as assigning the motive for the gift. Seamonds v. Hodge (1892) 36 W. Va. 304, 32 Am. St. Rep. 854, 15 S. E. 156. j. Gift to one "in order that" he may do a certain thing. The widow was held to take absolutely, and not as trustee, under a will by which testator left to his wife all his property, "in trust nevertheless for the several uses, intents, and purposes hereinafter mentioned," going on to direct the payment of debts and funeral expenses, giving nominal legacies to those of his children for whom he had provided in his lifetime, and sums of money to each of his unmarried daughters, charging his estate with their payment, and further providing: "It is also my will that my youngest son, Peter Morrin, shall live and reside with his mother, my said beloved wife, and be attentive to her and directed by her, in order that she may, by deed or by her last will and testament, provide for him in such manner as to her may seem most expedient and proper; and I appoint and nominate my said beloved wife, Anne Morrin, my residuary legatee and trus tee to this my last will and testament in order that she may direct and govern my said children and assist to arrange all matters between them, and, previous to her death-provided always that she does not again marrythat she may dispose of the residue of my property to and amongst my said children and provide for my son Peter as she may think most expedient," since the words "in order that," as used in the clause with regard to testator's son Peter, do not approach to a precatory trust, and it is to be presumed that they have the same meaning in the subsequent provision making his wife his residuary legatee "in order that," etc. Morrin v. Morrin (1886) Ir. L. R. 19 Eq. 37. k. Miscellaneous. No trust in favor of testatrix's daughter is created by a will by which she gave her entire estate to her grandson, to have and to hold to him and to his heirs and assigns, to his and their own proper use, benefit, and behoof forever, with the statement that it was her intention to make no provision for her daughter or granddaughter, as in her judgment they would be more amply provided for by her grandson than they could be by her in her will. Floyd v. Smith (1910) 59 Fla. 485, 37 L.R.A. (N.S.) 651, 138 Am. St. Rep. 133, 51 So. 537, 21 Ann. Cas. 318. No trust estate in the property devised for the remainderman is created by a will by which the testator gave the whole of his estate to his wife "during her widowhood, to be as absolutely under her control and management as it now is under my own, being perfectly willing to trust my children to her care and her bounty." Belt v. Gay (1914) 142 Ga. 366, 82 S. E. 1071. No trust is created by a will in which testator gave to a person named the contents of his bank box, "such as scarf pins and other personal effects, to be by him distributed among my friends as he sees fit," the legatee not being charged with the duty of holding and delivering such effects to any par ticular person or persons at any particular time. Maginnis's Succession (1925) 158 La. 815, 104 So. 726. No trust is created in favor of the daughters by a will giving property to testator's wife "for her own use, and to be disposed of at her decease according to the terms of any will that she may leave," and further stating: "She is, of course, to charge herself with the education and support of our daughters so long as they shall remain unmarried." Spooner V. Lovejoy (1871) 108 Mass. 529. . In Knibbs v. Knibbs (1920) 236 Mass. 182, 127 N. E. 885, where testator bequeathed to his wife all his property, "to have and to hold, spend whatever pleases her, after her death whatever may be left leave to my only sister's child $500. The rest to be equally divided between our dear children or their heirs . . if in the judgment of my dear wife she deems it best furnish money to put our grandson" through college. It was held that the gift to his sister's child and to his own children with the suggestion for the education of his grandson, in view of the earlier provisions for his wife, did not affect the absolute interest given to her, but were to be interpreted as expressions of a desire and request that his wife would carry out his wishes. An absolute devise is made by a will in which the testatrix gave her estate "in trust" to a religious society "upon the following terms and conditions and for the following purposes:" To care for her grave and that of her father, "the balance of said income and profit to be used and expended by my said devisee and legatee as it may deem best providing it be used for some worthy Christian and charitable purposes, but I prefer, if possible, that such surplus of profits and income be used to pay upon or help defray the salary or compensation of the minister who may be located and preach in the locality where said graves are located;" it being clear that the terms and conditions annexed to the gift were. but an attempted embodiment in the will of the by-laws and practice of the religious corporation to which the be quest was made. Re Little (1919) 143 property is expressed by a will in Minn. 298, 173 N. W. 659. The wife takes subject to a trust in favor of the children under a will by which testator gave to her all his property "to hold and dispose of as she may think best for the welfare of herself and our children," the direction as to the use of the property being part and parcel of the gift. Kidder v. Kidder (1903) N. J. -, 56 Atl. 154. No implied trust arises from a will by which testator gave his residuary estate to his wife, "to have and to hold to her my said wife and to my son Harry Steinhart such portion as my wife, Lena Steinhart, may see fit to give him." Steinhart v. Wolf (1923) 95 N. J. Eq. 132, 122 Atl. 886. The absolute interest of testator's widow is not affected by the precatory expressions in the following clauses: "I give and bequeath unto my wife all my real estate, to have and to hold the same to her, and to her heirs and assigns, forever, subject, however, to a distribution of the same among all my children in her discretion and when she may deem proper so to do. I give and bequeath also to my wife all my personal property which, together with my said real estate herein before devised to her, shall be by her used and appropriated by her to the use of all my children, in such portions and at such time or times as she shall adjudge most practicable; but she to make no appropriation of my said property to deprive my children thereof, and also to divide the same among them in her discretion when she may deem proper." Parsons v. Best (1873) 1 Thomp. & C. (N. Y.) 211. In Farmers' Loan & T. Co. v. Shaw (1907) 56 Misc. 201, 107 N. Y. Supp. 337, affirmed on opinion below in (1908) 127 App. Div. 656, 111 N. Y. Supp. 1118, it was held that a bequest of a sum of money to an educational institution is not rendered anything other than an absolute gift by a clause suggesting that a fund be used as a memorial to a certain person and as a scholarship fund. Nothing more than a wish or desire as to the ultimate disposition of the which the testatrix gave to her sister, who was her only heir at law and next of kin, "the sole disposition of all my possessions, to use as she may see fit during her life. And at the end, the said Edwin McGraw be entitled to anything my sister may feel disposed to give to him. . . In case of the decease of the said Edwin McGraw, his portion goes to his sisters." Re Enright (1919) 109 Misc. 337, 179 N. Y. Supp. 757. A widow is held to take an absolute estate under a will in which testator gave her all his property "for her support during her natural lifetime," adding: "Any remainder at her decease to be disposed of by her as she may think just and right among my children," the clause last quoted being held to have only precatory force. Boyle v. Boyle (1893) 152 Pa. 108, 34 Am. St. Rep. 629, 25 Atl. 494. Nothing less than an absolute estate is given to testator's daughter by a bequest of slaves "to be hers forever, to be disposed of as she may think proper amongst her children or grandchildren by will or otherwise." Thompson V. McKisick (1842) 3 Humph. (Tenn.) 631. Only precatory force is to be given. to a provision in a will by which testator gave the whole of his property to his wife and her heirs, "to have and to hold in her own use and benefit until my heirs become of age, and for her to divide equally the amount due to each that she, in her judgment, shall be entitled to." Weller v. Weller (1899) 22 Tex. Civ. App. 247, 54 S. W. 652. No trust is created by a will in which testatrix bequeathed to her husband a certain sum "for his sole use, and all that is remaining in the stock that he has not necessary use for to be equally divided between" a brother and sister. Sprange v. Barnard (1789) 2 Bro. Ch. 585, 29 Eng. Reprint, 320. No trust is created by a will in which testator devised his estate to the wife of his brother, "for her to manage and appropriate in the best manner for the welfare of her family," and went on to state that, on account of the embarrassed condition of his brother's affairs, which might leave nothing to his family, he desired that the property devised be held in trust for the brother's wife for her sole and separate use. Crawfurd v. Crawfurd (1825) 3 L. J. Ch. (Eng.) 105. Words merely expressing an expectation, as in the case of a will in which testatrix, after speaking of the provision made for her two elder daughters, said: "If they die single of course they will leave what they have amongst their brothers and sisters,"will not create a trust. Lechmere v. Lavie (1832) 2 Myl. & K. 197, 39 Eng. Reprint, 919. No trust is created by a will in which testator gave his wife the residue of his estate, with power to her to dispose thereof unto and amongst all his children for such estate or estates or in such other shares, proportions, or interests as she should in her discretion deem most fitting and proper. Howarth v. Dewell (1861) 6 Jur. N. S. (Eng.) 1360. No trust is created by a will in which testator gave the residue of his estate to his wife, adding: “And for my dear wife, Ann Bond, to do justice to those relations on my side such as she think worthy of remuneration, but under no restriction to any stated property, but quite at liberty to give and distribute what and to who my dear wife may please." Re Bond (1876) L. R. 4 Ch. Div. (Eng.) 238. VI. Recommending the employment of an agent or attorney as creating a trust. (1838) 5 Clark & F. 129, 7 Eng. Reprint, 353-H. L.; Finden v. Stephens (1846) 2 Phill. Ch. 142, 41 Eng. Reprint, 896; Foster v. Elsley (1881) L. R. 19 Ch. Div. (Eng.) 518. Thus, in Re Ogier (Cal.) supra, it was held that no obligation to employ the person named is imposed by a provision in the will: "I hereby select as the attorney of my estate John W. Mitchell and direct my executrix to consult and employ him in all matters pertaining to the distribution of my estate and the requirements of this, my last will.” In Colonial Trust Co. v. Brown (1926) 105 Conn. 261, 135 Atl. 555, where testator gave his residuary estate in trust to raise money for the payment of annuities, charges, and legacies, and directed that the trustee should maintain an office for the benefit of persons having business with his estate, and further stated: "It is my wish that Blanche M. Pierce, having had twenty years and more experience and knowledge of my business, shall be retained during her lifetime as the principal and head of said office," and further requested that anjanitor, it was held that the language other person named be retained as employed with regard to the continuance in employment of the persons named, particularly when contrasted. with the imperative nature of the testator's other instructions, could only be regarded as precatory. No trust is created by a provision in the will of one who, with his brothers, had conducted a jewelry business, that "I desire that my friend Robert M. Jewell be retained in the employ It is uniformly held that a recom- of the firm on such liberal terms as mendation in a will that certain perhis long and faithful service entitles son be employed, or continued in em- him to," so as to render it incumbent ployment, creates no obligation. See upon the testator's widow, who ultiRe Ogier (1894) 101 Cal. 381, 40 Am. mately acquired the interest of the St. Rep. 61, 35 Pac. 900; Colonial brothers in the business, to retain him Trust Co. v. Brown (1926) 105 Conn. in her employment at the salary which 261, 135 Atl. 555; Jewell v. Barnes he received at the time of the testa(Jewell v. Louisville Trust Co.) tor's decease. Jewell V. Barnes (1901) 110 Ky. 329, 53 L.R.A. 377, (Jewell V. Louisville Trust Co.) 61 S. W. 360; Re Thistlewaite (1907) (1901) 110 Ky. 329, 53 L.R.A. 377, 61 104 N. Y. Supp. 264; Re Pittock (1921) 102 Or. 159, 17 A.L.R. 218, 199 Pac. 633, 202 Pac. 216; Shaw v. Lawless S. W. 360. The force of a direction or command is not to be given to a provision of a |