The court said: "The question here presented is not one of difficulty, and may be disposed of upon a brief consideration. Code, § 2203, is in the following language: 'When property is owned by either the husband or wife, the other has no interest therein which can be the subject of contract between them, or such interest as will make the same liable for the contracts or liabilities of either the husband or wife who is not the owner of the property, except as provided in this chapter.' This provision relates to the interest which a husband or wife holds in the lands owned by his or her spouse which arises under the mar-band, competent to dispose of her esriage relations. It does not refer to a property interest that may be based upon contract, or may be derived from sources other than the marriage relation. The section evidently contemplates and includes in its language the dower estate. Upon the marriage relation this estate is based. The exception at the close of the section refers to § 2214, which provides that expenses of the family, and of the education of the children, are chargeable upon the property of the husband and wife; contracts made by one spouse, under which such expenses are incurred, may be enforced against the other. Sections 2207 and 2208 provide for the enforcement of such contracts in cases of abandonment of the association required by the marriage relation. The exception cannot be construed as applicable to contracts relating to dower. Section 2202 provides that a married woman may own, convey, and devise property acquired by descent, gift, or purchase, to the same extent and in the same manner as such acts may be done by the husband; and § 2206 declares that a conveyance, transfer, or lien, executed by either husband or wife, to or in favor of the other, shall be valid to the same extent as between other persons.' These provisions relate to property owned absolutely by the husband and wife in their own right, and not to the interest one may have in lands of the other. This construction of the several sections cited will give effect to all. It is, too, in accord with the obvious meaning of the language tate by will. Code, § 3270. Under band and wife each own a quarter section of land, and they enter into an agreement by which they unite and convey both tracts to a third person in exchange for a half section conveyed to the wife alone, it cannot be doubted that this also is a perfectly valid transaction, although the result of it is a radical change in their inchoate rights. Each has relinquished such right in a quarter section, and the husband has acquired such right in a 320-acre tract-all of which was necessarily involved in the original agreement between them. This is not in violation of the statute, because the subject of the contract is tangible substantive property owned by the parties, while the effect upon their inchoate rights follows only as incident to changes in ownership of the fee, and is effected by operation of law. Coming a step nearer to the case in hand, we see no good reason why husband and wife may not agree to unite their separate estates in the creation of a trust for the benefit of a third person, who shall come into the legal title and right of possession upon the death of the survivor. If to that end they execute a joint instrument, clearly expressing their purpose, then, whether it be called a contract, compact, will, or conveyance, we think it should be treated as a relinquishment of dower right, or, at worst, when one maker has died without attempting to revoke it, the other should be held estopped to set up any right which tends, in whole or in part, to the defeat of the common purpose. A contract is none the less a contract because it contains provisions which are testamentary in character, nor is a will any less a will, if properly executed, because it embodies contractual features." In Newberry v. Newberry (1901) 114 Iowa, 704, 87 N. W. 658, the court said: "Appellant's counsel cite cases to the effect that the wife's interest in her husband's real estate during his life is but a contingent interest, a mere inchoate right of dower incapable of being transferred or released except to one who has, or by the same instrument acquires, an in dependent interest in the estate. While these cases hold that the inchoate right of dower is not an estate, they recognize that it is a contingent interest; and we think, under our statute, that interest cannot be the subject of contract between husband and wife." In Kolb v. Mall (1919) 187 Iowa, 193, 174 N. W. 226, the court said: "While indebted to plaintiff's decedent, defendant Sam Mall sold a farm to one Benda. The defendant Addie B. Mall, his wife, refused to join in the conveyance to Benda unless her husband would pay her the sum of $6,000 out of the purchase price. The husband agreed to make such payment, and it was made. This sum was invested in a mortgage, which, as we gather from the record, is still owned by her. One prayer of the plaintiff is a decree that, as to so much of the said $6,000 as may be necessary to pay plaintiff's claim in full, Addie B. Mall holds in trust for plaintiff. The appellant contends, appellees concede, and we hold, that this arrangement between husband and wife was unenforceable, because violative of § 3154 of the Code, which prohibits any contract touching the inchoate right of one spouse in the property of the other. See Shane v. McNeill (1889) 76 Iowa, 459, 41 N. W. 166, and Sharff v. Hayes (1906) 132 Iowa, 609, 110 N. W. 24. Such a contract is invalid, and cannot be enforced so long as it remains executory." In Maine, although the rights of a married woman have been extended by enabling statutes, she has not acquired the absolute right to release her dower by express contract with her husband. Pinkham v. Pinkham (1901) 95 Me. 71, 85 Am. St. Rep. 392, 49 Atl. 48. See also Rowe v. Hamilton (1824) 3 Me. 63 (rule at common law); French v. Peters (1851) 33 Me. 396. In Pinkham v. Pinkham (Me.) supra, the following agreement was asserted as a bar to the widow's right to dower: "By mutual consent and agreement this day entered into by and between Elisha F. Pinkham and Frances O. Pinkham, both of Augusta, Maine, man and wife, and for a valuable consideration paid by the one unto the other, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, each does hereby release and discharge, convey and transfer unto the other, all of his right, title, and interest in dower of his or her real estate of which he or she is now seised or possessed, and of which he or she may die seised or possessed. And likewise do further hereby acknowledge full and complete satisfaction for and of each in the other's personal estate at time of his or her decease, hereby waiving and canceling and discharging each unto the other all claim and right of claim which each may have at the time of the other's decease in each other's estate, whether by allowance or widow's or widower's thirds, under general laws of the state, excepting this writing shall not cut nor interfere with any provision made in the will of the party who shall first decease, if any such provision shall be made in favor of the other." The court said: "But is the agreement valid? We think not. At common law a wife could not bar her dower by a release to her husband during coverture. If such power now exists, it must be by reason of some enabling statute. If the power be sought in the general statutes extending the powers wives to contract with their husbands, we think the search will be unavailing. Certainly no such power is expressly given, and we think it is not given by any fair intendment. Such statutes, as was said in that case, 'must be construed strictly as in derogation of the common law, and as modifying a long approved policy.' Now, because the statutes empower a wife to convey her real estate to her husband, a matter of bargain and sale, or gift, it does not follow that she may devest herself of her dower right, or, as we now say, her right and interest by descent, by simply contracting mutual releases with her husband. The two matters are different. The right and interest by descent arise by reason of the marital relation, and continue, unless barred, as long as that relation exists. It is not barred of by a sale to the husband; for if the wife convey her real estate to her husband, her inchoate right by descent springs at once into existence. It is not defeated nor barred. The law jealously regards the rights of a wife in the estate of her husband. She may not be barred by his deed or his will, unless she joins in the one, or is willing to accept the provisions of the other. She is even protected against her own too easily persuaded confidence in her husband, her own improvident contracts with him. For if, during coverture, jointure or pecuniary provision is made for her, even with her consent, and her dower or right and interest by descent would be thereby barred, she may waive the provision, and save her interest. . . . Had it been the intention of the legislature to grant to wives a power of so serious a character and of such doubtful utility to them as the irrevocable power claimed in this case would be, we think that intention would have been more clearly expressed." In Davis v. Davis (1873) 61 Me. 395, it was held that a wife cannot release her inchoate right of dower to her husband by a parol agreement. Likewise, in other jurisdictions, the common-law rule still obtains to the effect that a married woman does not have the right to release her dower to her husband by express contract with him, and any such attempted release made during coverture is therefore void and unenforceable as against the wife. Martin v. Martin (1853) 22 Ala. 86; Stilson v. Stilson pending divorce proceedings); See(1878) 46 Conn. 15 (contract executed ley's Appeal (1888) 56 Conn. 202, 14 Atl. 291 (contract executed pending divorce proceedings); McCaulley v. McCaulley (1884) 7 Houst. (Del.) 102, 30 Atl. 735. Thus, in Martin v. Martin (Ala.) supra, the demandant, alleging that she was the widow of the deceased, filed a petition for the allotment of her dower. In opposition to her petition it was alleged inter alia that, for a valuable consideration, the demandant had entered into an agreement with the deceased whereby she had expressly released and relinquished all her claim to dower. The court said: "The only remaining question is, Has the demandant released, forfeited, or in any manner barred her right to dower? Premising that what we say upon this subject must be considered as applicable to the case in the common-law forum, and without any intimation as to whether a remedy exists elsewhere, we are quite sure that the agreement said to have been entered into between Shadrach Martin and the demandant cannot be looked to as creating any bar or impediment to a recovery of dower. If the husband by jointure after marriage make a competent livelihood of freehold for the wife, of lands and tenements, to take effect presently, in possession or profit, after the decease of the husband, and to continue for the wife's life, even this shall not bar her dower, unless she elects to accept it in lieu of dower after her husband's decease; for she is not capable of consenting to such provision during coverture. Much less would the inadequate provision made by the parties in this case to continue two years, and entered into during their marriage, have the effect of barring the wife's right. It is well-settled law that a release of dower from the wife to the husband either before or during the coverture is void." In England it has been held that a contract of separation executed by a husband and his wife and a trustee for the latter, containing certain clauses alleged to be in release of the wife's dower interest, would not bar her right to dower under the Statutes of Distribution. Slatter v. Slatter (1834) 1 Younge & C. Exch. 28, 160 Eng. Reprint, 12. Modification of rule. However, in a number of jurisdictions, by the application of the doctrine of estoppel or election, rather than by a distinct recognition of the existence of a contractual power on the part of the wife, an agreement to release dower to the husband, which in its nature is fair and just, has been held to be a bar to the wife's right of dower in the estate of her husband, she having retained the benefits accruing under the agreement. Georgia.-Lively v. Paschal (1866) 35 Ga. 218, 89 Am. Dec. 282; Butts v. Trice (1882) 69 Ga. 74. Iowa.-Compare Shane v. McNeill (1889) 76 Iowa, 459, 41 N. W. 166; Sawyer v. Biggart (1901) 114 Iowa, 489, 87 N. W. 426; Re Kennedy (1912) 154 Iowa, 460, 135 N. W. 53. Maine.-Woods v. Woods (1885) 77 Me. 434, 1 Atl. 193 (contract executed pending divorce proceedings). also Bubier v. Roberts (1862) 49 Me. 460. Compare Pinkham v. Pinkham (1901) 95 Me. 71, 85 Am. St. Rep. 392, 49 Atl. 48. Jones v. Fleming New York. (1887) 104 N. Y. 418, 10 N. E. 693; Barnes v. Klug (1908) 129 App. Div. 192, 113 N. Y. Supp. 325; Hogg v. Lindridge (1912) 151 App. Div. 513, 135 N. Y. Supp. 928, denying motion for leave to appeal in (1912) 151 App. Div. 885, 136 N. Y. Supp. 1137, affirmed in (1912) 206 N. Y. 743, 100 N. E. 1128. See also Crain v. Cavana (1862) 36 Barb. 410; Doremus v. Doremus (1892) 66 Hun, 111, 21 N. Y. Supp. 13; Dworsky V. Arndtstein (1898) 29 App. Div. 274, 51 N. Y. Supp. 597. Compare Guidet v. Brown (1877) 3 Abb. N. C. 295, 54 How. Pr. 409 (under earlier rule). Tennessee. Chaney v. Bryan (1885) 15 Lea, 589. See also Watkins v. Watkins (1834) 7 Yerg. 283; Parham v. Parham (1845) 6 Humph. 287. In Maine, where it is provided by statute that a married woman may be barred of dower in her husband's lands by pecuniary provision made for her in lieu of dower, with her consent, contracts containing such provisions executed by husband and wife have been deemed to be valid, unless within the statutory period the wife elected to waive their provisions. Woods v. Woods (1885) 77 Me. 434, 1 Atl. 193 (contract executed pending divorce proceedings). See also Bubier v. Roberts (1862) 49 Me. 460. Thus, in Woods v. Woods (Me.) supra, the court said: "A married woman may be barred of dower in her husband's lands by a pecuniary provision made for her, instead of dower with case, while her husband was alive, the plaintiff received from him $1,000 in money, and some other property, in consideration of which she agreed in writing, under her hand and seal, that the property so received should be in full discharge of all claim, right, or interest upon him and upon his property, for her support and maintenance, by way of dower or otherwise. Her husband is now dead, and the question is whether this agreement bars her right to dower. We think it does. That her husband intended that the provision so made for her should be in lieu of dower, and that she deliberately and advisedly accepted it as such, there can be no doubt. The express wording of the agreement will admit of no other interpretation. We think she must abide by the agreement she then made." But in Pinkham v. Pinkham (1901) 95 Me. 71, 85 Am. St. Rep. 392, 49 Atl. 48, it was held that a mutual release by husband and wife of the interest that each may have in the property of the other is not such a "pecuniary provision" as will satisfy the statute. In New York by statute it is provided that if, after coverture, a pecuniary provision shall be made to a wife in lieu of her dower, she shall make her election whether she will take that provision or whether she will be endowed of the lands of her husband, but she shall not have both. Under that statute it has been held that if a wife enters into an agreement with her husband, releasing dower in lieu of a valuable consideration, she cannot accept and retain the consideration and thereafter claim her dower interest in his land, as the executed agreement is binding on her as an election. Jones v. Fleming (N. Y.) supra; Barnes v. Klug (1908) 129 App. Div. 192, 113 N. Y. Supp. 325; Hogg v. Lindridge (1912) 151 App. Div. 513, 135 N. Y. Supp. 928, denying motion for leave to appeal in (1912) 151 App. Div. 885, 136 N. Y. Supp. 1137, affirmed in (1912) 206 N. Y. 743, 100 N. E. 1128. See also Crain v. Cavana (1862) 36 Barb. (N. Y.) 410; Dormeus v. Doremus (1892) 66 Hun, 111, 21 N. Y. Supp. 13; Dworsky v. Arndtstein (1898) 29 App. Div. 274, 51 N. Y. Supp. 597. Compare Guidet v. Brown (1877) 3 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 295, 54 How. Pr. 409 (under earlier rule). Thus, in Hogg v. Lindridge (1912) 151 App. Div. 513, 135 N. Y. Supp. 928, denying motion for leave to appeal in (1912) 151 App. Div. 885, 136 N. Y. Supp. 1137, affirmed in (1912) 206 N. Y. 743, 100 N. E. 1128, supra, the court said: "The complaint alleges that on or about January 28, 1905, the plaintiff entered into an agreement of separation with her husband, Charles B. Hogg (now deceased), in and by which he agreed to pay her the sum of $5,200 per annum during her life or until her remarriage, and that he would effectively provide by his last will and testament for the payment of said amount to her yearly after his death if she survived him. . . That thereafter her said husband prepared and executed his will, in and by which he secured to her the payment of said yearly sum of $5,200 during her life or until her remarriage, but provided that such bequest should be in lieu of dower in any real property of which he might die seised. . . . I think the terms of this agreement establish conclusively the understanding and intent of the parties that the payment of the sum therein provided should extinguish the plaintiff's right of dower. The plaintiff covenanted that at the request of her husband she would unite with him at any time in the execution of deeds of any real property he then owned or might thereafter acquire, 'without compensation or payment other than herein before provided,' and such covenant, with all the other provisions and agreements in the instrument, is to apply to, bind and be obligatory upon the heirs, executors, administrators, personal representatives, successors, and assigns of the parties, or either of them, |