11. General rules.

It may be stated as a general rule that one whose property does not abut on the closed section has no right ordinarily to compensation for the closing or vacation of a street if he still has reasonable access to the general system of streets.

United States.-Lockwood v. Portland (1923; C. C. A. 9th) 288 Fed. 480 (Oregon case).

Alabama.-Jackson v. Birmingham Foundry & Mach. Co. (1908) 154 Ala. 464, 45 So. 660; Albes v. Southern R. Co. (1909) 164 Ala. 356, 51 So. 327, later appeal in (1911) 173 Ala. 279, 55 So. 816. See also Hall v. Atlanta, B. & A. R. Co. (1908) 158 Ala. 271, 48 So. 365 (obstruction of street).

California. Symons v. San Francisco (1897) 115 Cal. 555, 42 Pac. 913, 47 Pac. 453.

Connecticut.-Newton v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. (1899) 72 Conn. 420, 44 Atl. 813; Park City Yacht Club V. Bridgeport (1912) 85 Conn. 366, 39 L.R.A. (N.S.) 478, 82 Atl. 1035 (recognizing rule); Warner v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. (1913) 86 Conn. 561, 86 Atl. 23.

Idaho.-Canady v. Coeur D'Alene Lumber Co. (1911) 21 Idaho, 77, 120 Pac. 830.

Illinois. Chicago v. Union Bldg. Asso. (1882) 102 Ill. 379, 40 Am. Rep. 598 (vacated portion several blocks distant); East St. Louis v. O'Flynn (1887) 119 Ill. 200, 59 Am. Rep. 795, 10 N. E. 395; Parker v. Catholic Bishop (1893) 146 Ill. 158, 34 N. E. 473; Guttery v. Glenn (1903) 201 Ill. 275, 66 N. E. 305 (no special injury and therefore no right to injunction); C. Hacker Co. v. Joliet (1915) 196 Ill. App. 415. See also Littler v. Lincoln (1883) 106 Ill. 353; Chicago Anderson Pressed Brick Co. v. Chicago (1891) 138 Ill. 628, 28 N. E. 756.

Indiana. Dantzer v. Indianapolis Union R. Co. (1894) 141 Ind. 604, 34 L.R.A. 769, 50 Am. St. Rep. 343, 39 N. E. 223. See also Hall v. Lebanon (1903) 31 Ind. App. 265, 67 N. E. 703 (no special damage entitling to injunction).

Iowa.-Long v. Wilson (1903) 119

Iowa, 267, 60 L.R.A. 720, 97 Am. St. Rep. 315, 93 N. W. 282 (dictum).

Kansas. Heller v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. (1882) 28 Kan. 625. See also Arnold v. Weiker (1895) 55 Kan. 510, 40 Pac. 901. Maryland. German Evangelical Lutheran St. Lucas Congregation v. Baltimore (1914) 123 Md. 142, 52 L.R.A. (N.S.) 889, 90 Atl. 983, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 231.

(1851) 7 Cush. 254; Castle v. Berkshire County (1858) 11 Gray, 26; Davis v. Hampshire County (1891) 153 Mass. 218, 11 L.R.A. 750, 26 N. E. 848; Stanwood v. Malden (1892) 157 Mass. 17, 16 L.R.A. 591, 31 N. E. 702; Nichols v. Richmond (1894) 162 Mass. 170, 38 N. E. 501; Hyde v. Fall River (1905) 189 Mass. 439, 2 L.R.A. (N.S.) 269, 75 N. E. 953.

Michigan.

Buhl v. Fort Street Union Depot Co. (1894) 98 Mich. 596, 23 L.R.A. 392, 57 N. W. 829; Baudistel v. Michigan C. R. Co. (1897) 113 Mich. 687, 71 N. W. 1114; Beutel v. West Bay City Sugar Co. (1903) 132 Mich. 587, 94 N. W. 202; Sioux City Seed & Nursery Co. v. Detroit & M. R. Co. (1915) 184 Mich. 181, 150 N. W. 841; Tomaszewski V. Palmer Bee Co. (1923) 223 Mich. 565, 194 N. W. 571; Phelps v. Stott Realty Co. (1926) 233 Mich. 486, 207 N. W. 2. See also People ex rel. Bristol v. Ingham County (1870) 20 Mich. 95; Board of Education v. Gilleland (1916) 191 Mich. 276, L.R.A.1916E, 468, 157 N. W. 609.

V.

Mississippi. Jackson v. Welch (1924) 136 Miss. 223, 101 So. 361; Wesson v. Swinney (1926) — Miss. 110 So. 669. See also Poythress v. Mobile & O. R. Co. (1908) 92 Miss. 638, 46 So. 139.

Missouri. Glasgow v. St. Louis (1891) 107 Mo. 198, 17 S. W. 743. See also Rude v. St. Louis (1887) 93 Mo. 408, 6 S. W. 257 (obstruction of street at railroad crossing); Knapp, S. & Co.

Co. v. St. Louis (1900) 153 Mo. 560, 55 S. W. 104 (no right to injunction); Knapp, S. & Co. Co. v. St. Louis (1900) 156 Mo. 343, 56 S. W. 1102 (same); John K. Cummings Realty & Invest. Co. v. Deere & Co. (1907) 208 Mo. 66, 14 L.R.A. (N.S.) 822, 106 S. W. 496 (same); Applegate v. Director Gen. (1920) 205. Mo. App. 611, 226 S. W. 628 (obstruction).

Nebraska.

Enders V. Friday

(1907) 78 Neb. 510, 111 N. W. 140, 15 Ann. Cas. 685; Lee v. McCook (1908) 82 Neb. 26, 116 N. W. 955; Van Valkenberg v. Rutherford (1913) 92 Neb. 803, 139 N. W. 652; Burkley v. Omaha (1918) 102 Neb. 308, 167 N. W. 72.

New Hampshire.-Cram v. Laconia (1901) 71 N. H. 41, 57 L.R.A. 282, 51 Atl. 635.

New Jersey.State, Kean, Prosecutrix, v. Elizabeth (1892) 54 N. J. L. 462, 24 Atl. 495, affirmed in (1893) 55 N. J. L. 337, 26 Atl. 939; Newark & B. R. Co. v. Montclair (1913) 84 N. J. L. 46, 85 Atl. 1028.

New York. Coster v. Albany (1871) 43 N. Y. 399; Brooklyn Park v. Armstrong (1871) 45 N. Y. 234, 6 Am. Rep. 70 (recognizing rule); Fearing v. Irwin (1874) 55 N. Y. 486 (owners of adjoining land accessible by another public way not entitled to compensation); Kings County F. Ins. Co. v. Stevens (1886) 101 N. Y. 411, 5 N. E. 353; Re Grade Crossing Comrs. (1901) 166 N. Y. 69, 59 N. E. 706; Reis v. New York (1907) 188 N. Y. 58, 80 N. E. 573; Re West 151st Street (1908) 123 N. Y. Supp. 343; People ex rel. Bushnell v. Newell (1909) 131 App. Div. 555, 115 N. Y. Supp. 399; Re Pinehurst Ave. (1910) 67 Misc. 510, 123 N. Y. Supp. 344; Re Goldman (1911) 132 N. Y. Supp. 607; Re West 151st Street (1912) 149 App. Div. 55, 133 N. Y. Supp. 894 (recognizing rule); Corning v. O'Neill (1917) 180 App. Div. 454, 167 N. Y. Supp. 743; Re Grade Crossing Comrs. (1924) 210 App. Div. 328, 206 N. Y. Supp. 103, affirmed in (1925) 240 N. Y. 612, 148 N. E. 727 (recognizing rule).

Ohio.-Kinnear Mfg. Co. v. Beatty (1901) 65 Ohio St. 264, 87 Am. St. Rep. 600, 62 N. E. 341; Doppas v. Chi

cago, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. (1900) 19 Ohio C. C. 582, 10 Ohio C. D. 286.

Pennsylvania.-Hedrick v. Harrisburg (1923) 278 Pa. 274, 122 Atl. 281 (dictum supporting rule); Re Ruscomb Street (1907) 33 Pa. Super. Ct. 148; Re Edgemont Street (1917) 66 Pa. Super. Ct. 142; Holmes v. Public Serv. Commission (1922) 79 Pa. Super. Ct. 381 (rule recognized). See also Spang & Co. v. Com. (1924) 281 Pa. 414, 126 Atl. 781.

Rhode Island. See Gerhard v. Seekonk River Bridge Comrs. (1886) 15 R. I. 334, 5 Atl. 199 (obstruction).

South Carolina.-See Cherry v. Rock Hill (1897) 48 S. C. 553, 26 S. E. 798 (alteration of route of street near plaintiff's lot, increasing distance to business portion of city).

South Dakota.-Hyde v. Minnesota, D. & P. R. Co. (1912) 29 S. D. 220, 40 L.R.A. (N.S.) 48, 136 N. W. 92.

Tennessee.-State ex rel. Beckham v. Taylor (1901) 107 Tenn. 455, 64 S. W. 766.

Virginia. See Lynchburg v. Peters (1926) Va. -, 133 S. E. 674 (suit for injunction; rule recognized). Washington.-Ponischil v. Hoquiam Sash & Door Co. (1906) 41 Wash. 303, 83 Pac. 316; Mottman v. Olympia (1907) 45 Wash. 361, 88 Pac. 579; Freeman v. Centralia (1912) 67 Wash. 142, 120 Pac. 886, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 786.

Wisconsin. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Railroad Commission (1918) 167 Wis. 185, P.U.R.1918D, 650, 167 N. W. 266.

whether the property abuts on the street or part of the street vacated, but whether the owner, by such vacation or closing, should be regarded as having suffered special injury. Supporting the general proposition, that the right to recover damages for the vacation or closing of a street is not necessarily dependent on the question whether the property of the one claiming damages abuts on the closed section, are the following

cases:

United States. Chicago v. Baker (1898) 30 C. C. A. 364, 58 U. S. App. 569, 86 Fed. 753, later appeal in (1900) 39 C. C. A. 318, 98 Fed. 830 (Illinois case). See also Mason City & Ft. D. R. Co. v. Wolf (1906) 78 C. C. A. 589, 148 Fed. 961 (Nebraska case). Alabama. Jackson v. Birmingham Foundry & Mach. Co. (1908) 154 Ala. 464, 45 So. 660 (recognizing rule). See also Birmingham R. Light & P. Co. v. Moran (1907) 151 Ala. 187, 125 Am. St. Rep. 21, 44 So. 152 (obstruction of alley); Meighan v. Birmingham Terminal Co. (1910) 165 Ala. 591, 51 So. 775 (obstruction of street).

Colorado.

Denver Union Terminal R. Co. v. Glodt (1920) 67 Colo. 115, 186 Pac. 904.

Connecticut.-Park City Yacht Club v. Bridgeport (1912) 85 Conn. 366, 39 L.R.A. (N.S.) 478, 82 Atl. 1035.

Illinois. Chicago v. Burcky (1895) 158 Ill. 103, 29 L.R.A. 568, 49 Am. St. Rep. 142, 42 N. E. 178; Hill v. Kimball (1915) 269 Ill. 398, 110 N. E. 18; C. Hacker Co. v. Joliet (1915) 196 Ill. App. 415 (recognizing rule). Indiana. Dantzer v. Indianapolis Union R. Co. (1894) 141 Ind. 604, 34 L.R.A. 769, 50 Am. St. Rep. 343, 39 N. E. 223 (recognizing rule); Oler v. Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. (1915) 184 Ind. 431, 111 N. E. 619; Falender V. Atkins (1917) 186 Ind. 455, 114 N. E. 965. See also Pennsylvania Co. v. Stanley (1894) 10 Ind. App. 421, 37 N. E. 288, 38 N. E. 421 (closing of end of alley).

Iowa. See Park v. Chicago & S. W. R. Co. (1876) 43 Iowa, 636 (obstruction of street by railroad embankment); Dairy v. Iowa C. R. Co. (1900) 113 Iowa, 716, 84 N. W. 688 (same).

Kansas.

Highbarger v. Milford

(1905) 71 Kan. 331, 80 Pac. 633.

Kentucky. Gargan v. Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. (1899) 89 Ky. 212, 6 L.R.A. 340, 12 S. W. 259; Bannon v. Rohmeiser (1890) 90 Ky. 48, 29 Am. St. Rep. 355, 13 S. W. 444 (closing of alley); Henderson V. Lexington (1908) 132 Ky. 390, 22 L.R.A. (N.S.) 20, 111 S. W. 318 (same).

Minnesota. RE HULL (reported herewith) ante, 320 (recognizing rule); Vanderburgh v. Minneapolis (1906) 98 Minn. 329, 6 L.R.A. (N.S.) 741, 108 N. W. 480; Maletta v. Oliver Iron Min. Co. (1916) 135 Minn. 175, 160 N. W. 771.

New Hampshire. Concord's Petition (1871) 50 N. H. 530; Candia v Chandler (1877) 58 N. H. 127; Cram v. Laconia (1901) 71 N. H. 41, 57 L.R.A. 282, 51 Atl. 635 (recognizing rule).

New Jersey. Newark v. Hatt (1910) 79 N. J. L. 548, 30 L.R.A. (N.S.) 637, 77 Atl. 47.

New York. Re Walton Ave (1909) 131 App. Div. 696, 116 N. Y. Supp. 471, affirmed in (1909) 197 N. Y. 518, 90 N. E. 59; Re West 151st Street (1912) 149 App. Div. 55, 133 N. Y. Supp. 894; Re Hoyt (1914) 162 App. Div. 469, 147 N. Y. Supp. 599, affirmed without opinion in (1914) 213 N. Y. 651, 107 N. E. 1079; Re William Street (1918) 103 Misc. 313, 171 N. Y. Supp. 116. Ohio. Madden v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (1900) 21 Ohio C. C. 73, 11 Ohio C. D. 571. See also Kinnear Mfg. Co. v. Beatty (1901) 65 Ohio St. 264, 87 Am. St. Rep. 600, 62 N. E. 341 (recognizing rule).

Pennsylvania. Re Melon Street (1897) 182 Pa. 397, 38 L.R.A. 275, 38 Atl. 482; Donnelly v. Public Serv. Commission (1920) 268 Pa. 345, 112 Atl. 160; Hedrick V. Harrisburg (1923) 278 Pa. 274, 122 Atl. 281; Re Ruscomb Street (1907) 33 Pa. Super. Ct. 148. See also Chambersburg Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Cumberland Valley R. Co. (1913) 240 Pa. 519, 87 Atl. 968 (suit to enjoin railroad company from obstructing street); Holmes v. Public Serv. Commission (1922) 79 Pa. Super. Ct. 381 (recognizing rule).

Tennessee. Illinois C. R. Co. v.

Canada.

McQuade v. Rex (1902) 7 Can. Exch. 318; MacArthur v. Rex (1903) 8 Can. Exch. 245, reversed in (1904) 34 Can. S. C. 570; Taylor v. Belle River (1910) 15 Ont. Week. Rep. 733, 1 Ont. Week. N. 609.

In Hill v. Kimball (1915) 269 Ill. 398, 110 N. E. 18, the court said that under all the decisions in that state property may be so specially and peculiarly injured, even though not immediately abutting on the vacated street or alley, that damages may be recovered from the municipality for such vacation.

And in Dantzer v. Indianapolis Union R. Co. (1894) 141 Ind. 604, 34 L.R.A. 769, 50 Am. St. Rep. 343, 39 N. E. 223, the court said that it might safely assert that the obstruction of the easement of access need not always be upon the immediate front of the lot whose owner is affected; but that if the obstruction, although remote, renders access to such lot impossible, or impairs it in a substantial manner, at the point where it abuts upon the street, the property right of the lot owner is invaded and he may recover. It was held, however, that there was no right to compensation under the particular circumstances.

It has been pointed out, also, that while the discontinuance of a part of a street away from the complainant's premises, which has the effect to destroy or impair the portion of the street upon which he abuts as a means of access, by cutting it off from communication with the system of streets, is actionable, this is not because of the discontinuance of the street way from the premises, but because of the practical discontinuance of the part upon which the complainant's property abuts, as an effect of the actual discontinuance of the part distant therefrom. Cram v. Laconia (1901) 71 N. H. 41, 57 L.R.A. 282, 51 Atl. 635.

But it is well settled that if the owner of property not abutting on the closed section has reasonable access to the general system of streets, the fact that he may suffer inconvenience or loss of trade because of the closing or vacation will not entitle him to compensation, such injury being damnum absque injuria. This proposition is supported by the statements and holdings in the cases set out below, as well as in other subdivisions of the annotation. See particularly III. b, infra.

It was said in Jackson v. Birmingham Foundry & Mach. Co. (1908) 154 Ala. 464, 45 So. 660, that the limit, territorially speaking, of the easement of access, is found when the property owner is afforded a convenient and reasonable outlet to neighboring thoroughfares which he may unobstructedly use. In this case, where a lot owner sought abatement of alleged nuisances resulting from obstruction of streets, in discussing the question of the validity of a statute which authorized the closing of a street on which, to either side of the vacated part, the plaintiff was an abutting owner, the court further said: "It has been long settled that, save as limited by constitutional restrictions, the state has plenary power over streets and highways within its borders. Such power is an attribute of sovereignty, and the fundamental law can, and alone does, set bounds to its exercise. In consequence of these considerations, the inquiry raised by the constitutional objection urged by complainant is whether a property owner whose real estate does not abut on the street sought to be vacated suffers a 'taking' of a private right of property by the partial or entire vacation of a public street. The answer to this question must depend upon the character and extent of the right such an owner has in such a street. The question arises: To what extent, in the abutted street, does the private right of easement or access extend? In our opinion, and the conclusion is decisive of the constitutionality of the act as here assailed, the easement of access comprehends the unobstructed right of convenient and reasonable in

gress and egress to the property abutting on the street. Necessarily the determination of what, in a given case, is a 'taking' short of an infringement upon a 'convenient and reasonable' way of ingress and egress to the property involved, must depend upon the circumstances and conditions developed by the investigation. No hard and fast rule can be declared, nor should an esthetic taste or unreasonable desire for convenience of way be allowed to expand the right of easement of access to an extent beyond that necessarily essential to a fairly convenient way to the property of the complaining owner. This rule appeals to us as right and just to both the state and property owner. If the right should be limited to only those whose property abuts on the vacated section of a formerly public highway, that would result, palpably, in a denial of the very essence of the private right of property existing in the easement of access, because the vacation of the street on either side of that upon which the lot of the property owner abuts would just as effectually destroy his means of access as if that part of the street adjoining the lot was undertaken to be surrendered. The whole right is implied in the term ‘access;' and, to afford it, neither distance, within reasonable limits, nor ease of travel, left open, should be permitted to lead to wider requirement than we have undertaken to state, generally, as necessitated to avoid an infringement upon the private right of access to the owner of property abutting public streets."

And it was said in Hall v. Atlanta, B. & A. R. Co. (1909) 158 Ala. 271, 48 So. 365, that, beyond the abutting owner, the only limit to the bar of the legislature to abolish a street is that the property owners along the street shall not be deprived of a convenient and reasonable outlet to neighboring thoroughfares.

It is said, also, in Symons v. San Francisco (1897) 115 Cal. 555, 42 Pac. 913, 47 Pac. 453, that owners of abutting property have a special easement, which is property, upon the street in front of their premises; but that it is

49 A.L.R.-22.

well settled that owners of other realty have no such property in a street as entitles them to damages for its vacation; that whatever detriment or inconvenience they may suffer by the closing of the street, they bear in common with the community at large for the public convenience and welfare, as decreed by the proper legislative authorities in ordering the vacation. This statement, however, seems too broad according to the weight of authority, or at least may be so construed.

And in Newton v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. (1899) 72 Conn. 420, 44 Atl. 813, the court took the view that a property owner's easement of access to a street is confined to the street in front of his lot; and that a remote obstruction, if it does not affect the easement of access at that place, is not a legal injury or tort, even though the access be rendered more inconvenient, or a more circuitous route be necessitated.

And it was said in Park City Yacht Club v. Bridgeport (1912) 85 Conn. 366, 39 L.R.A. (N.S.) 478, 82 Atl. 1035, that the vacation of a part of a street does not ordinarily permit a recovery to an owner fronting on another part of the street; and that this is true even though it results in some inconvenience of access to him, or compels a more circuitous route of access or a diversion of travel in front of the premises and a consequent diminution of value. However, in this case it was held that the circumstances were such that the owner of premises left on a cul-de-sac could recover compensation. See III. c, infra.

It is stated, also, in the syllabus by the court in Canady v. Coeur D'Alene Lumber Co. (1911) 21 Idaho, 77, 120 Pac. 830, that one owning land not abutting on the part of the street vacated cannot recover damages, although such vacation may tend to lessen the value of his land. And in the opinion the court reiterates this rule, naming, however, two exceptions to it: (1) Where one owns property situated on a street opening only at one end, and the authorities of the municipality decide upon a vacation of