the street into which this stub of the street enters; and (2) where one owns a tract of land connected by a private way or easement to a public highway, and the authorities vacate the highway, in which case he would lose the benefit of his estate or be compelled to open a way at his own expense. These exceptions, however, do not apparently cover the ground, according to the weight of authority. And it is said in C. Hacker Co. v. Joliet (1915) 196 Ill. App. 415, that as a rule the owner of property abutting on a public street has no legal ground for complaint if travel is diverted from his premises because of the vacation of a street at some distance therefrom, or because of the suspension or removal of some business, public or private, that drew travel in that direction. It has been said that courts do not look favorably on claims based on the mere inconvenience arising from the closing of streets, when another approach remains. Long V. Wilson (1903) 119 Iowa, 267, 60 L.R.A. 720, 97 Am. St. Rep. 315, 93 N. W. 282. As already indicated, the test to be applied in determining whether an owner of property which does not abut on the part of the street closed is entitled to compensation is whether he is able to prove special and peculiar damage. Denver Union Terminal R. Co. v. Glodt (1920) 67 Colo. 115, 186 Pac. 904. So, in Parker v. Catholic Bishop (1893) 146 Ill. 158, 34 N. E. 473, the court applies the doctrine that, to entitle a property owner to damages for the closing of a street or alley not adjacent to his property, his damages must be different in kind, and not merely in degree, from those sustained by the general public. The statute provided for payment of compensation when property was "damaged" by the vacation of any street or alley. And the principle applied or recognized in many other cases is that no private action will lie for damages of the same kind as those sustained by the general public, although in a much greater degree. See East St. Louis v. O'Flynn (1887) 119 Ill. 200, 59 Am. Rep. 795, 10 N. E. 395, which cites Chicago v. Union Bldg. Asso. (1882) 102 Ill. 379, 40 Am. Rep. 598, holding that a property owner could not enjoin a municipality from vacating a street over three blocks distant from his property, the closing of which would not interfere with access thereto. In the latter case the court said that the damages suffered were of the same kind as those sustained by the general public, differing, if at all, only in degree. And in the O'Flynn Case the court pointed out that the inconvenience that would be occasioned to the plaintiff (whose property was in another block from the street vacated) in going from the street in front of his house to a particular part of the city, on account of the closing up of certain streets and alleys, was the same kind of damage that would be sustained by all other persons in the city who might have occasion to go that way, and that, although the inconvenience he might suffer might be greater in degree than that to any other person, this fact would not give him a right of action. So, in Ponischil v. Hoquiam Sash & Door Co. (1906) 41 Wash. 303, 83 Pac. 316, the court said that there was some conflict of authority as to whether owners of lots not abutting upon that portion of a street actually vacated can recover damages; but that the current of authority seems to be against any such right of recovery unless special damage is shown as distinguished from that sustained by the public in general. No compensation can be exacted by property owners for the vacation of streets, where their property does not abut or touch upon the vacated portion, and access to their property is preserved over other streets or ways; in other words, an added inconvenience to such property owner is not a "damage" or "taking" within the meaning of those terms as they are used in constitutional provisions. Freeman v. Centralia (1912) 67 Wash. 142, 120 Pac. 886, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 786. The statement in this case that, unless the property of the claimant actually abuts upon the vacated portion of the street or he suffers a special injury, he has no private right, seems confusing, since in any event the basis of the right to compensation is the special injury to the property owner as distinguished from the damages sustained by the public in general. The line must be drawn somewhere, on practical grounds, between those who may, and those who may not, recover for damages caused by the discontinuance of a street in whole or in part, and it has been drawn so as to limit the right of recovery to damages which are special and peculiar, and different in kind from those suffered by the public at large; so that, although, owing to proximity of premises to the discontinued portion of the way and to the use which the property owner makes of the premises, the inconvenience and damage to him may be greater than to others having occasion to use the street or way, this is a difference merely of degree, and not of kind, for which damages may be recovered. Nichols v. Richmond (1894) 162 Mass. 170, 38 N. E. 501. The inconvenience caused to an abutting owner on a street by discontinuing another portion of the street, making travel to and from his premises less direct, is damnum absque injuria, being the same in kind that all the public suffers, and cannot be regarded as damages within the provision of a statute providing for the payment of all damages consequent on the closing of streets. Buhl v. Fort Street Union Depot Co. (1894) 98 Mich. 596, 23 L.R.A. 392, 57 N. W. 829 (where, however, the discontinued portion was not, it seems, in the same block as the plaintiff's property). It was said that a distinction may well be held to exist between the injury which results to an abutting owner, or another so situated that the means of ingress to and egress from his premises are cut off by discontinuance of a street, and that which results to one owning land upon another street or on the same street at a distance from the part of the highway discon tinued. A lot owner's right to object to the vacation of a part of a street has been said to depend upon whether his lot abuts upon or comes in actual contact with the vacated portion, or whether access to his lot is entirely or materially cut off by reason of the vacation; and the fact that he may be inconvenienced, or that he may have to go a more roundabout way to reach certain points, does not bring to him any injury different in kind from the general public, but only in degree. Tomazewski v. Palmer Bee Co. (1923) 223 Mich. 565, 194 N. W. 571. And although not involving directly the question of damages, but of interest, because the decision is placed on the want of special injury, attention is called to Board of Education v. Gilleland (1916) 191 Mich. 276, L.R.A. 1916E, 468, 157 N. W. 609, holding that the mere fact that owners of land abutting on a highway will be compelled to go a block to the right or left to pass the obstruction in case a section of the highway not adjoining their property is discontinued does not give them a standing to contest eminent domain proceedings seeking to acquire the fee of that section for the purpose of closing it and devoting the land to other purposes. And in a suit for injunction it was said in Knapp, S. & Co. Co. v. St. Louis (1900) 153 Mo. 560, 55 S. W. 104, that, to entitle the plaintiff to relief as an adjoining proprietor, it devolved upon it to allege and prove that it owned property fronting or abutting on the part of the street which the ordinance in question vacated; in other words, it must aver facts showing that it would suffer special or peculiar injury, and not merely such inconvenience as was cast upon all other persons in that neighborhood. To the same effect is Knapp, S. & Co. Co. v. St. Louis (1900) 156 Mo. 343, 56 S. W. 1102, a case involving the same state of facts. It was held, also, in John K. Cummings Realty & Invest. Co. v. Deere & Co. (1907) 208 Mo. 66, 14 L.R.A. (N.S.) 822, 106 S. W. 496, that since a private individual must have suffered some injury peculiar to himself different from that of other property owners in the neighborhood similarly situated, be fore he can enjoin the vacation of a street, the owner of property abutting on the street, but not on the portion thereof which the municipality was attempting to vacate, could not maintain a suit to enjoin such act, merely because it would depreciate the value of his property more than other property in the city. In Enders v. Friday. (1907) 78 Neb. 510, 111 N. W. 140, 15 Ann. Cas. 685, it is said that where part of a street is vacated, the general rule is that only those owners whose property abuts upon the vacated part of the street, and who are thus cut off from access to their property, are entitled to damages on account of such vacation. To the same effect are Lee v. McCook (1908) 82 Neb. 26, 116 N. W. 955; Van Valkenberg v. Rutherford (1913) 92 Neb. 803, 139 N. W. 652; and Burkley v. Omaha (1918) 102 Neb. 308, 167 N. W. 72. These decisions do not, however, seem to preclude the recovery of damages if the property, although not abutting on a part of the street closed, is left fronting on a cul-de-sac. See III. c, infra. In discussing the question of right to damages for vacation of streets and for public improvements generally, the court in Burkley v. Omaha (Neb.) supra, said that it is a better rule to hold that people purchasing property must contemplate public improvements of this character and make their purchases upon such basis; that the making of improvements should not be imperiled by the danger that whole neighborhoods would bring suits for damages. The mere fact that one who has property abutting on a street is assessed for a benefit resulting from the opening of the street peculiar to himself does not give him a vested right in the continued existence of the entire street, of which he may not be deprived without compensation through the closing of another part of the street than that on which his property abuts. State, Kean, Prosecutrix, v. Elizabeth (1892) 54 N. J. L. 462, 24 Atl. 495, affirmed in (1893) 55 N. J. L. 337, 26 Atl. 939. See also Kings County F. Ins. Co. v. Stevens (1886) 101 N. Y. 411, 5 N. E. 355, where the property owner was assessed for the cost of a street when it was purchased by the municipality, under authority of the state, from a turnpike company. Whether the injury to a property owner from the obstruction or closing of a street or other public way is special or peculiar, entitling him to damages, or such only as is common to the general public, so as to preclude recovery, is a question which is often difficult to determine, and one which does not frequently admit of solution by application of general rules. Rather, the courts have been influenced by practical considerations in determining whether individual cases came on one or the oth- See also the reported case (RE And in Heller v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. (1882) 28 Kan. 625, the court (Brewer, J.) points out that it is not always easy to draw the dividing line. between those cases in which the injury is direct and special and those in which it is indirect and general; that no one would suppose that a citizen of another town could challenge the action in vacating the streets, whether right or wrong; that it was equally plain that one in a remote part of the municipality in question had no such interest as justified his interference; but that as a closer approach is made to the vacated streets the question becomes more doubtful; that where a party owns a lot which abuts on that portion of the street vacated, so that access to the lot is shut off, it is clear that the lot owner is directly injured and may properly challenge the action, as he, by the loss of access to his lot, suffers an injury which is not common to the public. As access to the lots in question was not interfered with, the court reached the conclusion that the injury in question was only such an indirect result as might be occasioned by the improvement of other streets, resulting in the diversion of travel, and not such an injury as gave the lot owner any cause of action. See this case under III. d, infra. The Canadian decisions appear to be more liberal than the American cases in allowing recovery of damages for the closing or vacation of a street which results in injury to property not abutting on the closed portion, partly, at least it would seem, because of the broad provisions of the statutes involved. See III. a, infra. III. Particular applications. a. Damages recoverable, in general. Where the parts of the street closed were several hundred feet distant from the plaintiff's property, so that her means of access thereto were merely impaired, and not destroyed, it was held in Mason City & Ft. D. R. Co. V. Kennedy (1911) 113 C. C. A. 412, 192 Fed. 538, that the plaintiff might recover for special damages, in excess of that of the community at large, under the rule in Nebraska, applying the constitutional provision of that state that the property of no person should be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation. An important case on the present subject, in which it was unsuccessfully contended that a property owner cannot recover for the vacation of a public street unless the portion of the street vacated is in front of his property, is Denver Union Terminal R. Co. v. Glodt (1920) 67 Colo. 115, 186 Pac. 904, where the plaintiff's property, which was near the easterly end of a block, fronted on a street extending on its western terminus to a cross street which was closed in the direction of the business portion of the city, so that access to the plaintiff's property from that direction was materially impaired. The approach over the cross street on the east was inconvenient because of an overhead viaduct, and dangerous because of numerous railroad tracks. Under these conditions, even though the plaintiff's property was not entirely cut off from access to the general system of streets, it was held that he had a right to compensation for the closing of the street, since his means of access which remained were not reasonably adequate. The Constitution provided that private property should not be "taken or damaged" for public or private use without just compensation. The right of the property owner ordinarily to access over the streets which bound the block on which his property is located, and the right to claim special damages for the closing of one of these streets, even though his property does not abut on the closed section, is sustained in Highbarger v. Milford (1905) 71 Kan. 331, 80 Pac. 633, where an owner of property in the same block as the property of the plaintiff claimed the right to the land in a street by reason of an act of the legislature undertaking to vacate the streets in that tract, and the plaintiff, who owned property in the same block and adjacent to that of the defendant, sought an injunction to restrain the obstruction of the streets. The court said that, when one purchases a parcel of ground bounded by a laid-out and dedicated street in a given platted parcel of land, he does not thereby necessarily become vested for all time with the right to travel over and along all streets and alieys of such platted parcel of ground, or even all of the streets that it would be convenient for him to use; but that he does obtain the right to the use of such streets as are reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of the land so purchased by him; and that these streets are ordinarily such as bound the block in which his land is situated, or such as furnish access to his property from either direction. And it was held that, where an attempt is made to vacate and obstruct a portion of the street upon which a parcel of land is situated, but not abutting, so as to prevent access all around the block or portion of block in which such parcel lies, the court will, as a matter of law and without proof of the fact, assume that the owner of such parcel sustains damage by such vacation and obstruction, of a different kind than that sustained by the general public; and that he may maintain a suit for injunction to prevent such vacation and obstruction. This case seems to go farther than the cases generally hold regarding the 'owner's right to claim special injuries from the vacating of a part of the street where his property abuts on that street, but not on the vacated part. It was held, also, in Concord's Petition (1871) 50 N. H. 530, that under a statute providing that on petitions for discontinuance of highways referred to the county commissioners, if they reported for the discontinuance, they should assess the damages "occasioned to any person thereby," the recovery of damages for discontinuance of a highway is not necessarily precluded by the mere fact that the land of the person claiming damages does not abut on the highway. In this case the commissioners denied the claim of a landowner to damages, on the ground that his land "did not come to the road," supposing that they had no lawful authority to award damages in such case. This was held erroneous. But the court says that it could not have been the intention of the legis lature to give damages on a discontinuance to any individual for inconveniences experienced by him in common with all the rest of the community; and if the inconveniences suffered by the landowner in question differed only in degree, and not in kind, from those sustained by the public generally, no damages could be recovered. And the error in law was held to require recommitment to consider whether any peculiar and special damages had been sustained by the nonabutting owner. The The doctrine is stated in Madden v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (1900) 21 Ohio C. C. 73, 11 Ohio C. D. 571, that where the closing of a street, either by vacation or by obstruction by railroads or in any other way, is near enough to property materially to affect its value, then the property owner has a right to compensation before the street is so obstructed or closed, and he can prevent such closing or obstruction by injunction. The suit was one for injunction by claimants whose property did not abut upon the particular part of the street closed. doctrine which is stated obviously must be applied with qualifications according to the weight of authority; although the court in this instance, properly, it appears, overruled the contention that the property owner had rights only in that part of the street which would be included between the lot lines extended across the street, since the closing might not be directly in front of his lot and yet his right of ingress and egress be entirely cut off so that his right in the immediate street in front of the premises would be of no value. See III. g, infra. Attention is called also to O'Brien v. Central Iron & Steel Co. (1902) 158 Ind. 218, 57 L.R.A. 508, 92 Am. St. Rep. 305, 63 N. E. 302, in which it was held that the permanent obstruction of a street within 200 feet of the property of an abutting owner, cutting him off from his usual and only direct access to the business portion of the town, thereby depreciating the value of his property, inflicts special injury on him for which he may recover damages. It has been held in Pennsylvania |