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STATE OF MONTANA EX REL. L. A. FOOT, Attorney General,

V.

DISTRICT COURT OF FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR LEWIS AND CLARK COUNTY et al.

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1. The declaration by the legislature that any child under the age of eighteen years found in specified situations should be deemed a delinquent child, or juvenile delinquent person, indicates a purpose to include within the purview of the statute all delinquent persons under the age of eighteen years, whether married or not.

[See annotation on this question beginning on page 402.]

Infants, § 6 effect of marriage.

2. The marriage of a child does not change its status from that of minor to that of adult, within the meaning of statutes defining those terms, unless some statute expressly so provides. [See 20 R. C. L. 612.]

Statutes, § 220 construction

ing meaning to every word.

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ment of such persons to a state vocational school.

[See 3 R. C. L. Supp. 205; 4 R. C. L. Supp. 893.] Juvenile offenders, § 1 statutes providing for juvenile delinquents.

5. Statutes providing for juvenile delinquents are enacted under the police power of the state, and so long as they appear to be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of their objects they need have no connection with, or reference to, the statutes defining minority.

Juvenile offenders, § 1- effect of fixing age for majority.

6. Fixing the age for majority of girls at eighteen years does not prevent the legislature, in the exercise of its police power, from fixing a higher age in the classification of juvenile delinquents.

APPLICATION by the state for a writ of supervisory control to annul an order of the respondent court releasing one granted a writ of habeas corpus, from a vocational school for girls. Writ issued.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Messrs. L. A. Foot, Attorney General, and I. W. Choate, Assistant Attorney General, for relator:

Marriage, or attaining his or her majority, emancipates the child only from parental control; it does not emancipate the minor from anything else.

Com. v. Graham, 16 L.R.A. 578 and note, 157 Mass. 73, 34 Am. St. Rep. 255, 31 N. E. 706; Bool v. Mix, 17 Wend. 119, 31 Am. Dec. 285; 31 C. J. p. 1009.

The state, in the exercise of its po

lice power to prevent a person from becoming a criminal, has the right to exercise restraint over such person, both before and after majority.

31 C. J. p. 1103; Re Hooks, 95 Vt. 497, 19 A.L.R. 610, 115 Atl. 730; State ex rel. Evans v. District Ct. 118 Minn. 170, 136 N. W. 746; Re Willis, 30 Cal. App. 188, 157 Pac. 819; Re Lundy, 82 Wash. 148, 143 Pac. 885, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 1007; Stoker v. Gowans, 45 Utah, 556, 147 Pac. 911, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 1025; State ex rel. Matacia v. Buckner, 300 Mo. 359, 254 S. W. 179;

(- Mont. - 250 Pac. 973.)

Hills v. Pierce, 113 Or. 386, 231 Pac. 652; Ex parte Blackey, N. D. 208 N. W. 238.

Messrs. E. D. Phelan and David R. Smith for respondents.

Matthews, J., delivered the opinion of the court:

Original application by the state of Montana on the relation of L. A. Foot, attorney general, for writ of supervisory control to annul an order of the district court of Lewis and Clark county releasing Florence Fleming Crimmon from the vocational school for girls, on writ of habeas corpus. Writ issued.

Florence Fleming Crimmon was born April 16, 1908. Some time prior to January, 1925, she married, but in that month left her husband. On October 27, 1925, she was committed to the vocational school for girls until she should attain the age of twenty-one years, unless sooner legally discharged or paroled. In April, 1926, she attained the age of eighteen years, and in September following filed her petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which writ was granted and her discharge ordered; this proceeding resulted.

But two questions are presented: (1) Does the juvenile delinquency law apply to one who, though under age of eighteen years of age, is married, and, if so, (2) can a girl who has been legally committed to the institution in question be held therein after she attains the age of eighteen years?

The statutes governing such commitment are found in chapter 51 of part 2, and chapters 5 and 6 of part 3, of our Penal Code of 1921. Therein, § 12,275 declares that "for the

purposes of this act" the words "delinquent child" and "juvenile delinquent person" shall include any child under the age of 18 years, who comes within the provisions of the act; while § 12,276 again declares that "any child under eighteen years

female delinquents to the state vocational school for girls, and § 12,539 declares that "each girl committed

shall remain there until she arrives at the age of twenty-one years, unless paroled or legally discharged: Provided, that it shall be lawful for the executive board to discharge therefrom any girl, an inmate thereof, who has arrived at the age of eighteen years," under certain conditions.

1. Counsel for the delinquent contend that her marriage placed her in the same situation as though she had reached her majority, and that therefore the court was without jurisdiction to commit her, citing § 5841, Revised Codes of 1921, which provides that the authority of a parent over a child ceases (1) upon the appointment of a guardian for the child, (2) upon the child's marriage, and (3) upon the child attaining its majority.

Although marriage may, and under our statute does, emancipate a child from parental authority, it has otherwise little effect (Bool v. Mix, 17 Wend. 119, 31 Am. Dec. 285); the disabilities of infancy remain in the absence of express statutory provision (31 C. J. 1009); in other words, while marriage releases a child from parental authority, it does not change the status of the child from that of a minor to that of an adult, Infants-effect within the meaning

of marriage.

of statutes defining those terms, unless some statute expressly so provides (see Trammell v. Trammell, 20 Tex. 406; Taunton v. Plymouth, 15 Mass. 203; Austin v. Austin, 167 Mich. 164, 132 N. W. 495, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 545). We have no such statutory provision; in fact, the statute

quoted is the only one on the subject, and it refers to majority and marriage as different situations.

While the Washington statute on majority provides that the marriage

of age," found in the situation there- of a female under eighteen years of

in described "shall be deemed a delinquent child or a juvenile delinquent person." Section 12,536 provides for the commitment of such

age to one of full age has the effect of making such female of full and lawful age, the supreme court of that state, nevertheless, held that “a

girl under eighteen years of age is within the purview of the juvenile law and within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, notwithstanding her prior marriage to a person of full age," saying: "The statute referred to, in removing the disabilities of minority does not use the words 'for all purposes' which we are asked to read into it. That statute merely removes the commonlaw disabilities of minority. It was never intended to prohibit a classification of minors for the purpose of legislation, nor to limit the meaning of the word 'minor' in acts relating to minors as a class without that exception." Re Lundy, 82 Wash. 148, 143 Pac. 885, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 1007.

In a note to this case, found in Ann. Cas. 1916E, 1007, it is said that "it is generally held that the jurisdiction of a juvenile court of a charge of delinquency against a minor is not affected by the fact that the minor is a married person" (citing Stoker v. Gowans, 45 Utah, 556, 147 Pac. 911, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 1025; Re Willis, 30 Cal. App. 188, 157 Pac. 819).

While the reported case is directly in point here, the cases cited in the note present a different situation, as, in those cases, it is held that the operation of the juvenile law is not suspended by the marriage of the delinquent after the juvenile court. had acquired jurisdiction. To this effect see also Re Hook, 95 Vt. 497, 19 A.L.R. 610, 115 Atl. 730.

In the case before us, there is more cogent reason for holding as did the Washington court, for, as pointed out above, our statute removes no disability of the minor, on marriage, other than that of parental authority, and the very statute on which counsel rely recognizes a distinction between marriage and majority; while either will release the person from parental authority, they are otherwise disconnected; the latter releases such person because of majority, the former in spite of

minority.

The wording of our juvenile delin

quent statutes reveals the legislative intention to include, rather than exclude, married minors. In § 12,276 above, the phrases "delinquent child" and "juvenile delinquent person" are used in the disjunctive; clearly, this dual designation was used for a purpose. The latter includes and is broader than the former; but, if we were to adopt the construction contended for in this connection, the former designation is sufficient and we must discard the latter as having no force or effect. This we cannot do, for in construing a statute we are required to give ef- struction-giv fect, if possible, to ing meaning to every word, clause, phrase, and sentence employed in it, and none thereof shall be held meaningless, if effect can be given to each thereof. Mid-Northern Oil Co. v. Walker, 65 Mont. 414, 211 Pac. 353. The only status of a juvenile "person" which we can call to mind in which such person may not, with propriety, be called a "child" is that wherein such person, while still under the age of majority, is married; and it is therefore apparent that the legislature used the

Statutes-con

every word.

ers-delinquent

tory construc

two phrases in the Juvenile offendalternative advised- persons-statuly, for the purpose tion. of including within the purview of the section all delinquent persons under the age of eighteen years, and with good and sufficient reason. The purpose of the statute is benevolent; it is protective and not penal; it seeks to protect and reform erring ones who have not reached an age of discretion and mature judgment; but, while this is the primary object of the act, the statute performs a secondary and wholesome purpose, in that it protects youthful society from the pernicious influence of the wayward ones, and it is conceivable that a delinquent minor, who married, may evince by the very act her need of protection and reformation, at least after she had separated from her husband, and that such an one will be a greater menace to

(Mont., 250 Pac. 973.)

youthful society than would an unmarried girl of the same age, though both come within the definition of delinquents.

Under these circumstances, we conclude that Florence Fleming Crimmon was, at the time of her commitment, "a juvenile delinquent person," within the meaning of the statute, and therefore the order of commitment was valid.

-married girl as juvenile delinquent.

2. It is next contended that the juvenile delinquent law "has its sanction in the fundamental fact that such enactments relate to and deal with minors as distinguished from adult persons;" that "the status of the person to be dealt with is fixed and circumscribed by the minority of such person;" and, from these statements, it is argued that no person can be held under a commitment and within the vocational school after such person reaches the age of majority.

Section 5673, Revised Codes 1921, declares that minors are males un

der twenty-one years of age, and females under eighteen years of age, while other persons are adults. If this statute, as claimed by counsel, fixes and circumscribes the age limit in the juvenile act, then that act should be held to include within its purview males under the age of twenty-one years. But, as was said in the Lundy Case above, the controlling element in juvenile laws is age, not minority.

"Viewed as a remedial rather than a punitive statute, we would not be justified in holding that the definition of a delinquent or dependent person, found in the language of the first section of the juvenile] act and controlled by the single word . is dominated

inating judgment, and stability of character in children under the age of 18 years; hence it does not apply to all minor children, but only to 'all minor children under the age of eighteen years.'" Re Lundy, above.

-statutes providing for

quents.

Such statutes are enacted under the police power of the state (Re' Hook, above), and, so long juvenile delinas the statute appears to be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of its known objects, it need have no connection with or reference to the minority statutes. It is so held in Moore v. Williams, 19 Cal. App. 600, 127 Pac. 509, wherein such a statute as ours was attacked as unconstitutional, the court saying: "No sound reason can be suggested why the state may not do this to save a female under the age of twenty-one, if it may do so to rescue and save a male of that age. There is no sound reason why a female of equal age with the male may not be declared to be a 'delinquent' for violating a state law defining crime."

The

In McPherson v. Day, 162 Iowa, 251, 144 N. W. 4, the facts are identical with those before us; a delinquent was ordered released in she had reached the age of majority habeas corpus proceedings because and was a married woman. court said: "The order of commitment followed the provisions of this statute. It is manifest . that the plaintiff was not illegally restrained and that her period of detwenty-one years of age." tention did not expire until she was

Whatever reasoning impelled the jority of females at eighteen years, Legislature to fix the age of ma

while that of males was fixed at twenty-one, this was but the exer

'minor,' taken in its technical legal cise of legislative discretion for the

significance as found in other connections, and as applied in relation to other things. it, the legislature indulged the usual In passing presumptions, arising from human experience, that there is ordinarily a lack of mature discretion, discrim

49 A.L.R.-26.

-effect of fixing

ity.

purpose of the act, and did not pre-
vent different clas-
sification for other age for major-
purposes, and could
not bind the legislature, in the valid
exercise of the police power of the
state with regard to delinquents;

that body was at liberty to entirely disregard its former arbitrary declaration, for another purpose, that a female reaches majority at the age of 18 years, and declare that a juvenile delinquent person, for the purpose of protection and reformation of the individual and for the purpose of protecting society, should be committed until such person reached the age of 21 years, regardless of the sex of such person; it did so. The statute is valid, and it follows that Florence Fleming Crimmon was not illegally restrained.

If the purposes of the statute have been accomplished; if the inmate can show that "while there" she has deported and conducted herself "in such manner as to make it

reasonably probable that she has reformed and is a proper person to be discharged" (§ 12,539, above), she may successfully seek a discharge at the hands of the executive board of the institution, but the courts are without authority to take such action.

The order of the District Court of Lewis and Clark County is annulled, and said court is hereby directed to dismiss the proceeding and to remand the said Florence Fleming Crimmon to the custody of the state vocational school for girls.

Order annulled.

Callaway, Ch., J., and Stark, J.,

concur.

Holloway and Galen, JJ., not sitting.

ANNOTATION.

Marriage as affecting jurisdiction of juvenile court over delinquent or de

pendent.

[Juvenile Offenders, § 1.]

The annotation in 19 A.L.R. 616 reviews the earlier cases discussing the effect of marriage on the jurisdiction of a juvenile court over a delinquent or dependent child.

No recent decision other than that in the reported case (STATE EX REL. FOOT V. DISTRICT CT. ante, 398) has been found pertaining to this question. In this case the court takes the view adhered to by the weight of au

thority, holding that the fact that an infant is married has no effect on the juvenile court's jurisdiction over her. This is especially true in Montana, says the court, because the statute of that state, by judicial construction, shows the legislative intent to include married children, since it uses both the phrases, "delinquent child," and "juvenile delinquent person."

E. W. P.

T. PAPPADAKIS, Sole Trader Doing Business under the Name of Athenian Confectionery & Bakery, Respt.,

V.

NETHERLANDS FIRE & LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY et al., Appts.

Washington Supreme Court (Dept. 2)

January 21, 1926.

(137 Wash. 430, 242 Pac. 641.)

Insurance, § 638 what is hostile fire.

1. A fire escaping through a crack in the oven in which it is being used, and heating a head in the automatic fire extinguisher system so that it lets go and injures property of the insured, is a hostile fire within the meaning of a policy insuring against all direct loss or damage by fire.

[See annotation on this question beginning on page 406.]

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