and, following the assignment, he continued in the case, representing the assignee, though most of plaintiff's relations, correspondence, etc., seem to have been with Osterling rather than with the trust company. The case was set for trial on January 8, 1923, before Judge Maxey, of the court of common pleas of Lackawanna county, without a jury. In December, 1922, it was decided between plaintiff and Osterling that another lawyer, D. J. Reedy, of the Lackawanna county bar, should be associated with plaintiff in the trial of the case. On December 30, 1922, plaintiff wrote to Osterling that Mr. Reedy was engaged in the trial of another cause which would occupy him for some time to come, and suggested that, if the suit against the county could be continued, Reedy could then take part in that case and it could be tried at the next term of court. In this letter, plaintiff suggests to Osterling that if he, Osterling, should be so ill as to be confined to his home and would arrange for a certificate from a physician-stating the nature of the illness and that he would not be able to appear at court-and would have the trust company send a telegram to this effect, "to be followed by" the doctor's certificate, "the case might be continued on account of (such) illness." This was followed. by a telegram from plaintiff to Osterling stating: "If case continued, R. will come in, illness of material witness only cause for continuance, see special delivery letter, telephone me.' On cross-examination, plaintiff admitted that, at the time he wrote the above letter and sent the telegram, he had received no intimation. from any one that Mr. Osterling was ill, and, so far as he knew, Osterling was then "in perfect health." He also admitted that he "knew of no physician in attendance on Mr. Osterling." At the trial of plaintiff's case de fendant trust company requested binding instructions, which were refused, and after verdict against it, defendant moved for judgment n. o. v., and for a new trial, urging, inter alia, that the above letter, telegram, and testimony showed plaintiff guilty of such unprofessional conduct in attempting a fraud on the court as would deprive him of the right to collect a fee from the client whom he, at the time, represented. The court below left to the jury the question of whether or not plaintiff had acted in bad faith, and, in overruling defendant's motions subsequent to trial, it said: "Assuming for the purpose of this case that the court was wrong in submitting the interpretation of that letter to the jury, and assuming further that the proper interpretation of that letter did exhibit an intention on the part of the plaintiff to deceive the court, yet there remains the question, Under such conditions, was the letter material to the issue involved? There was certainly no purpose on the part of the plaintiff of committing a fraud on his client, or doing the client any harm. Such being our opinion of the effect of that letter, it was in no way material to the question of whether the defendant owed to his attorney a proper fee." The court erred in submitting to the jury the question of plaintiff's good or bad faith. The evidence which went to that point consisted only of the letter and telegram, already referred to, and plaintiff's admission that he had no reason to suppose that Osterling was sick or under the care of a physician. Moreover, plaintiff offered no exculpatory explanation, merely stating, "the letter speaks for itself." From the above uncontested facts only one conclusion is possible: Plaintiff suggested to Osterling that he simulate illness for the purpose of deceiving the court and obtaining a continuance of the case brought against the county of Luzerne by the trust company, Attorneyssuggestion of simulation of illness to witness-bad faith. (287 Pa. 348, 135 Atl. 204.) plaintiff's client. Such conduct was not only bad faith toward the court, but also professional bad faith toward the client. The case in question was set for trial before a judge without a jury, and it is quite certain that, had this incident come to the attention of that judge, or any other judge in such a position, or of a jury, had the case been fixed for jury trial, it might very properly have injured the client by making the trier or triers of the cause believe that a client who would permit such conduct must have a weak or dishonest cause, and this the attorney must have known; so he cannot say he was acting in professional good faith toward his client. There is nothing to show that the incident came to the attention of the client till after the case had been settled, but let us suppose the trust company had ascertained that its lawyer was indulging in such conduct. Under those circumstances, -duty to discharge attorney. the client would not only have been justified in discharging the attorney, but it would also have been its duty to discharge him. Had this occurred, and had the attorney, after his dismissal, sued the trust company for fees, there could have been no recovery; that the knowledge of the attorney's misconduct did not come to the client at the time and that he did not, in fact, discharge the attorney can make no difference in this regard. Here, plaintiff testified that his connection with the case started on September 18, 1922, and terminated on January 16, 1923, and that he was claiming a fee of $10,000 to cover professional services of every kind and description rendered to the trust company during that period. This was a bulk charge and, of course, included the professional service in writing the letter to Osterling which suggested that he join with plaintiff in committing a fraud on the court; if plaintiff may not recover for that part of the services, which certain cover fees. ly he cannot, then, right to rethis letter and all connected with it being part of the bulk services for which he is asking compensation, it follows that he cannot recover for any part of such services. In Ingersoll v. Coal Creek Coal Co. 117 Tenn. 263, 9 L.R.A. (N.S.) 282, 119 Am. St. Rep. 1003, 98 S. W. 178, 10 Ann. Cas. 829, the supreme court of Tennessee very properly ruled that, where an attorney is guilty of unprofessional conduct, he may, in addition to or in place of other and more severe penalties, be deprived of the right to recover fees for services connected with the case in which his misbehavior occurred; this principle is applicable to the present case, and the court below should have so ruled. The fact that the material witness approached by plaintiff did not join in the act of deception and bad faith toward the court suggested to him cannot serve to relieve the culprit; for his letter and telegram to this witness were overt acts of misconduct, in themselves, which carried plaintiff's professional misbehavior beyond the point of mere unexecuted intentions. Nor can the fact that plaintiff's breach of professional duty occurred in one court of the commonwealth and he sued to recover fees in another be taken advantage of by him, for, so far as concerns the application of principles which serve of judicial deto maintain the integrity of the administration of law, all courts of the commonwealth are parts of the judicial department of the government and may be viewed as one. -courts all part partment. The judgment is reversed and is now entered for defendant, notwithstanding the verdict for plaintiff. Petition for rehearing denied. ANNOTATION. Misconduct of attorney not directly prejudicial to client as affecting his right to compensation. [Attorneys, § 59.] The annotation presupposes that the contract for the attorney's services was legal and proper in its inception, but that subsequently the attorney was guilty of some unethical conduct in the prosecution of his client's interests, or at least conduct not directly prejudicial to him. Therefore, cases of lobbying contracts, champerty and maintenance, contracts to procure pardons, which turn upon the validity of the contract or the remedy in respect of services rendered thereunder, are beyond its scope. As to the effect on the rights inter se of attorney and client where there was an agreement or understanding between such parties to use money for unlawful purposes, see the annotation in 20 A.L.R. 1476, supplemented in 26 A.L.R. 98 [Attorneys, §§ 33, 59]. The decision in the reported case (DUFFY V. COLONIAL TRUST Co. ante, 406) denying an attorney right to recover compensation for his services by reason of his unprofessional conduct in the case, of which the client was ignorant, although it appear severe, is but one of many illustrations which show the extent to which the "jealous mistress" will go in the commendable effort to punish or penalize practitioners who are guilty of fraudulent or unfair practices in connection with their dealings with their clients. In 2 R. C. L. 939, referring to attorneys at law, it is said: "He is also an officer of the court, and as such he owes the duty of good faith and honorable dealing to the courts before whom he practises his profession. His high vocation is to inform the court as to the law and facts of the case, and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusions. He violates his oath of office when he resorts to deception, or allows his client to do so." So far as appears, the misconduct in the reported case (DUFFY v. COLO NIAL TRUST Co.) was not intentionally prejudicial to the client's interest, and the court's suggestion that it involved a breach of professional faith toward the client as well as toward the court is prompted by the consideration-applicable in all cases of misconduct by an attorney, however much apparently in the interest of the client-of the possibility of the incident coming to the attention of the judge or jury, and prejudicing them against the client because of the belief that a client who would permit such conduct must have a weak or dishonest cause. A limitation of the effect of the decision is suggested by the emphasis which the opinion places on the fact that the charge for professional services was a "bulk" charge, covering professional services of every kind and description rendered to the client during the particular period, so including his activities in respect of the matter of which he was guilty of professional misconduct. The decision in Ingersoll v. Coal Creek Coal Co. (1906) 117 Tenn. 263, 9 L.R.A. (N.S.) 282, 119 Am. St. Rep. 1003, 98 S. W. 178, 10 Ann. Cas. 829, cited in the opinion in the DUFFY CASE, is to the effect that courts will not enforce contracts secured by an attorney by visiting the scene of a disaster in which many persons were killed and wounded, and soliciting employment for the bringing of actions against the person responsible, from strangers to himself, for a percentage of the recovery, so far as to hold the defendant liable for the fee in case he effects a settlement of such actions without the consent of the attorney. The case is not, therefore, on its facts, within the scope of the annotation, which, as already stated, is concerned with incidental misconduct in the performance of services under a lawful and proper employment. R. P. D. Workmen's compensation, § 46 - newsboy returning home within territory. A paper delivery boy who, after making his last delivery in his territory, which is bounded by one side of a street, has crossed the street in accordance with traffic rules and begun his homeward journey, is, while still within the exterior limits of the territory assigned to him, in the course of his employment, within the protection of the Workmen's Compensation Act. [See annotation on this question beginning on page 424.] ON PETITION by the Industrial Accident Commission for determination by the Supreme Court, after the annulling of an award of compensation by the District Court of Appeal, of a proceeding brought under the Workmen's Compensation Act to recover compensation for injuries sustained in the course of the employment of claimant's minor son. Award affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. Mr. Warren H. Pillsbury, for respondent Commission: Where a person is employed to work, not at a particular plant, but throughout the streets of a city, he enters the course of his employment when he leaves his home instead of when he commences his first task, and leaves the course of his employment upon his return to his home rather than upon the completion of his last task, provided, of course, he has not abandoned his duties in the meantime. United States Casualty Co. v. Superior Hardware Co. 175 Wis. 162, 184 N. W. 694; J. E. Porter Co. v. Industrial Commission, 301 Ill. 76, 133 N. E. 652; Harby v. Marwell Bros. 203 App. Div. 525, 196 N. Y. Supp. 729, affirmed in 235 N. Y. 504, 139 N. E. 711; Moran's Case, 234 Mass. 566, 125 N. E. 591; State ex rel. London & L. Indemnity Co. v. District Ct. 141 Minn. 348, 170 N. W. 219; Haddock v. Edgewater Steel Co. 263 Pa. 120, 106 Atl. 196; Reese v. National Surety Co. 162 Minn. 493, 203 N. W. 442; Dùffield v. Peers, 37 Ont. L. Rep. 652, 32 D. L. R. 339; Stansberry v. Monitor Stove Co. 20 A.L.R. 324, note; State ex rel. McCarthy Bros. Co. v. District Ct. 141 Minn. 61, 169 N. W. 274. liveries and while returning by direct route through his working territory. The going trip and return trip are correlative and of the same legal nature. Wabash R. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 294 Ill. 119, 128 N. E. 290; Stacey's Case, 225 Mass. 174, 114 N. E. 206; J. E. Porter Co. v. Industrial Commission, 301 Ill. 76, 133 N. E. 662; Re Raynes, 66 Ind. App. 321, 118 N. E. 387; Martin v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. 197 App. Div. 382, 189 N. Y. Supp. 467; State ex rel. London & L. Indemnity Co. v. District Ct. 141 Minn. 348, 170 N. W. 219. Mr. W. S. Angwin, for petitioner employer: The commission exceeded its jurisdiction in making an award to the employee in that the injury did not occur in the course or arise out of the employment. California Highway Commission v. Industrial Acci. Commission, 61 Cal. App. 284, 214 Pac. 658; California Casualty Indemnity Exch. v. Industrial Acci. Commission, 190 Cal. 433, 213 Pac. 257; Ocean Acci. & G. Co. v. Industrial Acci. Commission, 173 Cal. 313, L.R.A.1917B, 336, 159 Pac. 1041; At least, Craig entered the course - Echman v. Globe Indemnity Co. 20 of his employment at the moment he received his first bundle of papers, and continued therein during his de Ind. Acci. Comm. 244; N. K. Fairbanks Co. v. Industrial Commission, 285 Ill. 11, 120 N. E. 457. Seawell, J., delivered the opinion of the court: The petition of respondent Industrial Accident Commission praying for a hearing by this court after decision by the District Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, having been granted, the proceeding is properly before us for final determination. The respondent commission made an award in favor of respondent George A. Craig, a youth 15 years of age, who was injured by a traffic collision that occurred upon Grove street, city of Oakland, this state. The commission found that said George A. Craig was employed by petitioner, J. N. Makins, as a deliverer or distributor of newspapers, and that the injury sustained by said George A. Craig occurred in the course of, and arose out of, his employment. The circumstances of the injury and the contentions of the respective parties to the proceeding are well stated by Mr. Justice Cashin, author of the opinion adopted by said District Court of Appeal, and we hereby adopt it in part as follows: "The compensation claimant was, on December 6, 1924, in the employ of petitioner as a carrier of newspapers in the city of Oakland, his route of delivery being within a definite territory, which began at Fourteenth street, and included the section between San Pablo and Telegraph avenues, extending north to the intersection of Grove street with San Pablo avenue, and thence covered the section between Grove street and Telegraph avenue to Thirty-Sixth street in that city. "Claimant in the course of his employment received each morning at the corner of Sixteenth street and San Pablo avenue a portion of the newspapers to be delivered, being supplied with additional papers at points along his route, and from Fourteenth street proceeded with such delivery in a northerly direc tion to the southeasterly corner of Grove and Thirty-Sixth streets, at which point the last delivery by him in the course of such employment was made; no deliveries being made by him at any place west of the east side of Grove street. Claimant was paid a stated sum each month for the service rendered, furnished his own means of conveyance, which in this case was a bicycle owned by him, and his duties in every respect ceased each day upon the last delivery being made at the point above mentioned. On December 6, 1924, claimant, after the last delivery on his route, and with the purpose of proceeding to his home, which was situated several blocks to the south and west, crossed to the west side of Grove street at or near its intersection with Thirty-Sixth street, and proceeded thence in a southerly direction along said street, remaining, in accordance with the traffic regulations, on the west side thereof, to its intersection with ThirtyFirst street, at which point he received injuries from an automobile intersection. being driven westerly across such "Respondent, as its conclusion from the above facts, found that the injuries occurred in the course, and awarded compensation therefor. arose out, of the employment, and "Petitioner in this proceeding bases his application for relief upon the contention that the facts shown, and which are not disputed, do not support such conclusion, and that, therefore, respondent acted in excess of its powers in making the award. "Respondent contends that, the injuries having occurred on Grove street, though the westerly side thereof had not been traversed by claimant in the course of his em ployment in making deliveries, and at a point approximately five blocks south of the point where the last act in the rendition of services to petitioner was performed, claimant tory, and that until he passed the was still within his working terristreets, where the first papers for corner of of Sixteenth and Grove delivery were received, he remained within the protection of the compensation act. |