(198 Cal. 698, 247 Pac. 202.)

"The rule is well settled that an employee, in going to work, comes under the protection of the act when he enters the employer's premises or upon the means provided for access thereto, though the premises and such means of access are not wholly under the employer's control or management (Starr Piano Co. v. Industrial Acci. Commission, 181 Cal. 433, 184 Pac. 860; Judson Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Acci. Commission, 181 Cal. 300, 184 Pac. 1); and the same rule applies when the employee is leaving such working premises provided he does not unnecessarily loiter thereon (Wabash R. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 294 Ill. 119, 128 N. E. 290; Lienau v. Northwestern Teleph. Exch. Co. 151 Minn. 258, 186 N. W. 945).

At the time the accident occurred respondent Craig was traveling in a southerly direction upon Grove street, after serving those customers of his employer whose places of business cr residences abutted upon the easterly half of said street. The easterly property line of said Grove street marked the westerly boundary of his district in so far as the physical act of delivering newspapers was concerned. Upon making delivery to the last and furthermost subscriber on Grove street, respondent crossed from the east to the west side of said street, and was traveling homeward over the same course he had gone in his outward journey, which course led southerly past said employer's residence and also past the initial and other points where packages of newspapers were left by the employer for distribution on the outgoing trip. The carrier had traveled about five blocks on the return trip, whereupon an automobile collided with his bicycle. As a result of the impact, the youth suffered a fracture of the right femur about four inches above the knee. The course taken upon his return trip was the one habitually traveled by him, and it was the most practicable route for him to take. He was receiving a flat salary of $15 per month, and his employment was con

fined to a fixed, definite area or district; the hours of his employment being from 4:45 a. m. to about 7 o'clock a. m. of each day. The papers designed for distribution within the district were divided into three separate packages or bundles, and placed along the route by the employer at fixed stations, and so apportioned as to weight and number as to be convenient for distribution by said employee. As successive stations were reached, the bundles left for distribution by the employer were taken in charge by the employee. The initial station of deposit was located within the district a short distance from the southerly boundary line at a point on San Pablo avenue between Sixteenth and Seventeenth streets. This point marked the beginning and practically the end of the route required to be taken by respondent Craig in the discharge of his duties. The route and method of distribution were laid out by, and were under the control and direction of, the employer. Undoubtedly the employee was required to deliver newspapers in accordance with the instructions given him by his employer. No claim is made that respondent was guilty of loitering. within the area of his employment, or that he was guilty of willful misconduct in any degree. The injury occurred after the carrier had thrown his last paper, but before he had arrived at the initial point at which he received the first parcel or lot of newspapers, and while he was yet within the exterior limits of the district to which he had been assigned. While it is a fact that there was no established office or headquarters at which the employee was required to report, it is a reasonable inference arising out of the nature of the employment and the circumstances disclosed by the record that the instructions essential for the proper performance of the service for which Craig was employed were left by the employer and received by Craig at the stations where the parcels of papers were left for distribution, or at

some point along the route of his travel.

It is the contention of petitioner that the facts of this case bring it within the rule generally known as the "going and coming rule." This rule has been considered and applied by this court in numerous cases where the person injured was employed to perform service at or in a particular plant or upon particular premises, and the injury claimed to be compensable was inflicted while he was going to, or returning from, his place of employment, or where the employee had left the place of employment on an errand personal to himself. The general rule, subject to many exceptions, however, is that injuries inflicted under the foregoing circumstances are not compensable. California Casualty Indemnity Exch. v. Industrial Acci. Commission, 190 Cal. 433, 213 Pac. 257; London Guarantee & Acci. Co. v. Industrial Acci. Commission, 190 Cal. 587, 213 Pac. 977. Awards have been affirmed by this court, however, where the facts of the case showed that the injured employee was not at the time he was injured upon his master's premises. Judson Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Acci. Commission, 181 Cal. 300, 184 Pac. 1. Each case must be adjudged by the facts which are peculiarly its own. Industrial accidents are produced by so many varying circumstances that it is rather unusual to find any two or more cases that may be ruled by the same legal precedent. While the facts of this case present a situation that has not heretofore come to the attention of this court, we are of the opinion that the principles of law applicable to the decision of an ordinary case of injuries received by an employee while upon the master's premises, and who is thus injured within the course of his within territory. employment, must rule the instant

Workmen's compensationnewsboy re

turning home

case. It is true that no physical wall or barrier circumscribed the area or district which was adopted

by the master as the place of the respondent's employment and to which he had been assigned; nevertheless, the limits of his working district were as definitely fixed by the employer as if it had been inclosed by a physical structure. The area thus definitely marked by reference to designated streets as fixing its boundary was adopted by the employer with full knowledge of all its attendant traffic hazards, and assigned to the youth as his place of employment. The streets were used not only as a means of conducting the business, but were also occupied as supply stations at three separate points along the route of distribution. This, it will be observed, is not a case where an outside worker, such as a solicitor or agent, selects his own territory or working district ad libitum, but it is a case where the employer has definitely fixed the boundaries of a district within which the employee is required to labor without any right upon his part to change them in any respect whatsoever. Under the facts of this case. the district thus established and controlled by the employer will be held to be the employee's place of employment. No unreasonable expansion of the Industrial Accident Act (Stat. 1913, p. 279, as amended) is required to bring the instant case within its compensatory provisions.

It is a further contention of petitioner that the injury was inflicted without the working district of the respondent, and, therefore, is not compensable. This contention is predicated upon the theory that respondent Craig's district was limited by the center line of Grove street, and not by the street considered with reference to its entire width. There was no other way by which respondent could have returned to the initial point at which he entered without crossing to the westerly half of Grove street. Had he attempted to return on the easterly side of said street he would have violated the traffic laws of the state, and would thereby have subjected himself to arrest and imprisonment.

(198 Cal. 698, 247 Pac. 202.)

It would be a harsh and narrow construction of the act, indeed, that would deprive a person of his civil rights who, while acting in obedience to the law's mandate, is injured under the circumstances disclosed by the record in the instant case. As to this issue we think there is no substantial merit in petitioner's contention.

The award is affirmed.

We concur: Waste, Ch. J.; Curtis, J.; Shenk, J.; Lawlor, J.; Richards, J.

NOTE.

The question as to whether an injury sustained by an employee while

entering or leaving his place of employment is one arising out of and in the course of the employment is treated in the annotation following UTAH APEX MIN. Co. v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, post 424 [Workmen's Compensation, § 45.]

The question of whether an injury sustained by a delivery man while making deliveries arises out of and in the course of the employment within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act is the subject of annotations in 8 A.L.R. 935, and 23 A.L.R. 403 [Workmen's Compensation, § 41].

As to injury to local solicitor, collector, or outside salesman, as arising out of and in the course of the employment, see annotations in 29 A.L.R. 120, and 36 A.L.R. 474 [Workmen's Compensation, § 41].

Workmen's compensation, § 45 - injury in course of employment ing premises.

1. An employee's death occurs in the course of his employment within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act, when it is caused by coming in contact with a cable which, without his knowledge, has accidentally become charged with electricity, although he is traveling a little-used path from his working place to the highway after quitting work for the day, the use of which by him had never been sanctioned by his employer, although others were permitted to use it, if its use by him had not been forbidden, and it was more convenient for him than the one regularly provided.

[See annotation on this question beginning on page 424.]

Workmen's compensation, § 93-ap-
peal - refusal to weigh evidence.
2. The supreme court will not re-
view the evidence taken before a com-
mission in a proceeding under the
Workmen's Compensation Act and

pass upon its weight, where there appears to be a substantial conflict.

[See 28 R. C. L. 828, 829; 3 R. C. L. Supp. 1600; 4 R. C. L. Supp. 1872; 5 R. C. L. Supp. 1580.]

PETITION for a writ to review an award by the Industrial Commission to claimant in a proceeding by her under the Workmen's Compensation Act to recover compensation for the death of her husband. Award affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.